One of the reasons for the failure of the CIA in Laos and the US troops in Vietnam was that they did not coordinate well with each other. The military had their own war in one country. The CIA has another war in another country. And there, in another country, the forces on which the Americans relied also fought their wars. This, of course, was not the main or only reason. But that was one of them, and quite an important one.
The fighting in central Laos was a clear testament to this. Wang Pao and the Hmong fought for their sacred land and the opportunity to found their own kingdom separate from Lao. This, among other things, limited how much youth tribal leaders could give him to recruit - a departure from national goals could curtail the influx of recruits. Royalists and neutralists also fought each for something different. The CIA wanted to stop the "spread of communism" first of all, and the suppression of Vietnamese communications was number two. The military needed to cut the "Path", but how the situation in central Laos as a whole worried them to a much lesser extent. But one day the pieces of the puzzle came together in the correct order.
Take back the lost honor. Operation Kou Kiet
The defeat of the Hmong and royalists in the Valley of the Jugs was perceived by Wang Pao very painfully. And the risk of further advancement of the Vietnamese grew significantly. American intelligence reported that the Vietnamese were concentrating tanks and men for a further offensive, which was to begin in the near future. Wang Pao himself, however, wanted to attack at any cost. His task was initially to consider cutting Route 7, the east-west road that supplied the Vietnamese contingent in the Valley. This would at least prevent the Vietnamese offensive. The CIA succumbed to his persuasion and gave the preparation a "green light". And this time, the Americans really, as they say, "invested" in the blow.
It was 1969 and it was a pretty wild land, far from civilization. The standard in the armament of a third world infantryman in those years was either a semi-automatic carbine, for example, the SKS, or the same rifle, for example, the Garand M1. Shop rifles weren't uncommon either. Alternatively - a submachine gun from the Second World War. So, the Lao neutralists ran with the PCA received from the USSR even when the civil war was on the decline and everything was going towards a single socialist Laos sometime very soon.
The Hmongs and all other participants in the offensive received M-16 rifles.
With all the disadvantages of this weapon in terms of reliability, accuracy and accuracy of fire, it still has almost no equal among infantry weapons. In addition, its light weight allowed shorter Asians to handle it much easier than a long-barreled rifle. In addition, all the detachments participating in the future offensive, both Hmong and other royalists, received all the necessary supplies.
The problem, however, was the people. Wang Pao was already recruiting everyone in his detachments, but there were not enough people - the past military failures crippled the mobilization resource of the Hmong. The CIA, however, by that time "bit the bit", and took an unprecedented action for the war in Laos - CIA operatives managed to obtain consent from other tribal and mercenary guerrilla groups to fight for the Hmong under the command of their leader. In addition, the available royalist troops were also subordinated to Wang Pao, and all the local Hmong militias - self-defense units theoretically unsuitable for such tasks - went under his command. It was not easy, but they did it, and by the time the future offensive began, Wang Pao more or less "plugged the holes" with the number of personnel. Although she was, as they say, at a minimum.
The main trump card was that the new US ambassador to Laos, George Goodley, found the right approaches to the military. US air strikes have previously been of key importance for the actions of the Royalists and Hmongs, but the ambassador managed to achieve the involvement of aviation on a completely different level - both he and the CIA received firm guarantees that, firstly, there would be no recall of aircraft and a reduction in the number of sorties. … Second, the US Air Force has ensured that defoliants will be deployed en masse if necessary. For this, an outfit of forces and a supply of "chemistry" were allocated.
But the strongest card that the new ambassador threw on the table, and the trump card that turned out to be decisive, was the Air Force's guarantees to send strategic B-52 bombers to the battlefield, and every time tactical air strikes were not enough. For this, some of the aircraft were removed from missions for raids on North Vietnam. The Americans proceeded from the fact that if the attack on the Vietnamese positions did not help the advancing troops to throw them back, then the bombers who arrived would simply incinerate all the resisting troops, which guarantees the Hmong the opportunity to move on.
Another trump card was that the operation was planned primarily as an airborne assault. If earlier the Hmong attacks on the Valley of Kuvshinov were carried out from west to east (although the Americans practiced limited-scale airlift), now the attack had to be carried out from all sides - including from the rear, from the Vietnamese border. Although the VNA units were superior in numbers and weapons to the attacking side, the combination of surprise attack, the power of air strikes and a coordinated attack from different directions, according to Wang Pao's plan, was to ensure victory for his troops. The CIA doubted, however, that the Royalist units would be able to carry out such a difficult maneuver, but Wang Pao insisted on his own. Moreover, through negotiations with the authorities of the neighboring "military regions" of Laos, he was able to "occupy" two more irregular battalions.
The planned operation was named "Kou Kiet" in the Hmong dialect "Restoration of Honor". This was very symbolic for the Hmong, for whom the vicinity of the Valley of the Jugs and she herself had a sacred meaning.
The operation plan called for the involvement of more than eight battalions. The number of daytime airstrikes was planned at least 150 during daylight hours, of which from 50 to 80 were to be applied on the guidance of "air controllers" mainly on the positions of the Vietnamese troops. At least 50 more airstrikes were to be launched every night. There were not enough helicopters for the landing of the attacking troops, and they were to be dropped on one of the sites from PC-6 Pilatus Turbo Porter and DHC-4 Caribou aircraft, piloted by Air America mercenaries.
Part of the royalist forces were to attack by land, from the southwest of the Valley of the Jugs. By early August, Wang Pao and his troops were ready. The Americans were also ready.
The Vietnamese, apparently, missed the preparation of the enemy. Intelligence did not report any changes in the behavior of the VNA units and, apparently, the planned offensive should have come as a surprise to them.
Attack
The offensive was postponed for several days due to rains, but finally on August 6, 1969 it began.
One battalion, "occupied" by Wang Pao, from the "neighbors" was dropped from helicopters at the point "Bauemlong" north of route number 7, west of Phonsavan, there it joined up with waiting groups of Hmong militias and moved south, to the point, in which route number 7 should have been cut.
South of Route 7, at San Tiau, many more troops were dropped by aircraft. Firstly, a detachment of Hmong battalions, which bore the name of the Special Guerillia Unit (like all Hmong units organized into a regular military force, not a militia) 2, and secondly, another non-Hmong battalion - the 27th Royalist Volunteer Battalion … All of them were flown in and landed. There they were also joined by local irregular groups of Hmong militias.
Both landed detachments began an offensive at the point "Nong Pet" - that was the name of that conditional place on route number 7, which had to be taken under fire control. However, a terrible downpour that began to halt the advance of the southern group, on the way of which was very difficult terrain, and it could not move forward at all. In a few days the northern group was able to reach the road and take it "under the gun". The forces of the Vietnamese were many times superior to the forces of the attackers.
But then the bombers came into play. If the weather was a critical obstacle for light aircraft, it simply did not exist for the “strato-fortresses”. Visibility over the war zone was poor, but on the ground the CIA had scouts from local tribes with radios, and the bombers were not limited by the flow of bombs.
A flurry of attacks from the sky paralyzed any activity on the part of the Vietnamese troops. A wave of air attacks crushed one of their strongholds after another, covered convoys and groups of vehicles trying to move along the roads, and the downpours were so strong that they excluded any off-road maneuver. They had to literally lie on the ground and die - with a salvo dropping of bombs from a bomber, it was impossible to survive even in the trenches.
Within a week, the Americans drove the Vietnamese unable to move into the ground, by August 19 the weather improved, and the southern group of the advancing troops was immediately planted on helicopters and transferred closer to the required point. On August 20, the ticks closed and route number 7 was cut. By that time, the monstrous air strikes had completely disorganized the Vietnamese troops, to the point of complete inability to resist.
In fact, the royalists managed to achieve access to strategic communication without resistance. Inspired by his success, Wang Pao launched the next phase of his attack.
Three Royalist battalions, the 21st and 24th Volunteers and the 101st Parachute, were covertly concentrated at Ban Na and from there launched an offensive northward.
To the south of the Valley, two detachments of about a regiment of infantry each, Mobile Group 22 and Mobile Group 23, began to move to the southern edge of the Valley.
Neither on this day, nor in the next week, the advancing units did not meet organized resistance. Interrogations of prisoners showed a complete loss of control of their troops by the Vietnamese and a decline in morale and discipline under the influence of the bombing. The resistance they put up everywhere was poorly organized and was stifled by aviation.
Air strikes, meanwhile, were getting stronger and stronger. On September 31, when the already advancing Wang Pao units wedged into the Vietnamese defenses everywhere, the US Air Force began to flood the rice fields in the Valley with defoliant in order to deprive the local rebels and the population of any food sources. The number of sorties from the Royal Lao Air Force also increased and reached 90 sorties per day. The valley was bombed continuously; in fact, during this period, the interval between air strikes against Vietnamese troops was measured in minutes. In early September 1969, part of the Vietnamese troops tried to break through to the rear along route 7, but were met with fire from the adjacent peaks and returned.
By September 9, the defense of the Vietnamese was already in some places focal in nature. By September 12, it collapsed everywhere, with "Mobile Groups" 22 and 23 occupied the city of Phonsavan - once again during this war. To this day, only the Muang Sui Ganizon, a village to the west of Phonsavan, where there was an airstrip strategically important for the royalists, really held out. The garrison was blockaded by approximately seven infantry companies of Hmong militias and could not raise its head from air strikes.
The way they were bombed is characterized by such a detail - in more than a week of fighting, not a single Vietnamese soldier was able to reach their own weapons depots located in a defended settlement. By an amazing accident, not a single bomb hit them either, they were well camouflaged and kept away from the defensive positions, but the Vietnamese could not take advantage of them.
By the end of the day on September 24, the royalists reached the northern edge of the Valley of the Pitchers. The Vietnamese in small groups fled to the east through the mountains in an unorganized manner. Their allies from among the former neutralists followed them, also avoiding engaging in battle. The two Pathet Lao battalions fled across the countryside, hiding in villages and disguising themselves as civilians. Only the detachment in Muang Sui, cut off from their own, kept.
On the night of September thirtieth their resistance was also broken. Unable to withstand the hurricane bombing, the Vietnamese infiltrated the battle formations of the surrounding Hmong and went into the mountains, abandoning their heavy weapons and all supplies.
The valley of the Kuvshinov fell.
By that time, the Vietnamese had begun to transfer troops to the region. But the units of the 312th division that arrived from Vietnam were late and were only able to stop the advance of several Hmong detachments with a series of counterattacks near Mount Phou Nok in the north of the Valley.
The results of the operation, however, were controversial.
On the one hand, it was without exaggeration the defeat of units of the Vietnamese People's Army. It is not known exactly what losses they suffered in people, but they were definitely considerable - the fact that the Vietnamese were forced to flee from the battlefield says a lot about the force with which the enemy hit them. The serious demoralization of the Vietnamese units suggests the same thing. Material losses were also enormous.
So, 25 PT-76 tanks, 113 vehicles of various types, about 6400 units of small arms, about six million units of ammunition of various calibers and types, about 800,000 liters of gasoline, a ration for several battalions of soldiers for five days, a large the number of livestock intended for the food supply of the troops. US aviation destroyed 308 pieces of equipment, many warehouses and positions of Vietnamese troops and almost all heavy weapons used in battles. The important powerful radio station Pathet Lao, located in a fortified cave, was captured. The rice fields were destroyed by chemical attacks, leaving the people of the Valley without food.
Moreover, immediately after the capture of the Valley, Wang Pao undertook an operation to displace approximately 20,000 people - these people were ripped from their places of residence and driven west - it was assumed that this would deprive the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao of the labor force that was used to carry the goods. for the VNA and the population, which was the source of supplies and recruits for the Pathet Lao. However, the defoliant in any case deprived these people of the opportunity to live in their native places.
However, the too swift offensive of the royalists, who went far beyond the limits of the area allotted to them for the capture, played a cruel joke. According to the plans of the Americans, after the air strikes broke the resistance of the Vietnamese and put them to flight, it was necessary to literally bombard the entire area around the Valley with antipersonnel mines from the air, thus excluding the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops - in conditions of heavy and very rugged terrain. still not dry after the rains, they would have to retreat through continuous minefields tens of kilometers deep. But the royalists "rushed out" themselves into the areas designated for mining and thwarted this part of the plan. Not wanting to kill a large number of Royalist troops, the US Air Command canceled this part of the operation, and this made it possible for many Vietnamese to get to their own and continue their participation in the war.
The second problem was the lack of reserves - in the event of a counterstrike by the Vietnamese, there would be no one to reinforce the number of Wang Pao's troops. Intelligence, meanwhile, warned that the Vietnamese were concentrating their units for a counterattack.
And yet, Operation Kou Kiet proved to be a spectacular victory for the Royalists and their allies, as well as the CIA.
For the CIA, this was especially important because, almost simultaneously with this offensive, the royalists struck a successful attack on the VNA in another region of Laos. Now it is no longer on the outskirts of the "Path", but on it itself.
