On May 22, 1803, England declared war on France, and its ships began to seize the merchant ships of this country (as well as Holland). Napoleon responded by ordering the arrest of all British subjects who were on French territory, occupied Hanover, which belonged to the English kings, and began preparations for an invasion of the British Isles. A huge military camp was created in Boulogne-sur-Mer, in which troops were assembled, by August 1805 their total number reached 130 thousand people, about 2300 landing ships were collected.
Napoleon was now about to put an end to the centuries-old confrontation between France and Britain, destroying British influence on the continental countries:
"I only need three days of foggy weather - and I will be the Lord of London, Parliament, the Bank of England."
The British pretended that everything was going according to plan and drew funny cartoons:
However, in fact, London was well aware that if at least half of Napoleon's army reached the English shores, King George III, along with his cabinet, would have to urgently emigrate to Canada.
In this situation, British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger acted according to the traditional English scheme, instead of soldiers putting up an invincible army of sacks of gold. For the British, the subjects of the Austrian Empire and Russia had to shed their blood.
But why did Russia need this war, which did not even have a common border with Napoleon's state? Considering that Napoleon would gladly share the world with Russia - at the expense of Britain, which he hates, of course.
One of the motivations of Alexander I was his personal hatred of Napoleon, who in one of his letters dared to tell him the truth, very transparently hinting at his participation in a conspiracy against his own father, Paul I:
“If Emperor Alexander found out that the murderers of his late father were on foreign territory, and nevertheless arrested them, Napoleon would not have protested against such a violation of international law” (reply to the note about the execution of the Duke of Enghien).
Alexander I, contrary to the liberal legend, was a very capricious and headstrong, but at the same time - a weak ruler. This is how M. M. Speransky:
"Alexander was too strong to be ruled, and too weak to be ruled by himself."
But he really wanted to control everything and everyone. To G. Derzhavin, who at one time looked at Alexander I through "rose-colored glasses", the emperor replied:
"You want to teach everything, but I am an autocratic tsar and I want it to be this way and not otherwise."
British historian M. Jenkins would later write about him:
“Alexander was just as intolerant of criticism as Paul was, and he was just as jealous of his authority. He was almost obsessively obsessed with the idea of order and neatness: nothing aroused his enthusiasm as much as commanding a parade."
In the depths of his soul, Alexander I understood his inferiority - the flaw that Napoleon, who was very well versed in people, caught:
“There is something missing in his character. But I cannot understand what exactly”(Metternich - about Alexander I).
Therefore, Alexander I adored flattery and did not tolerate even the slightest hint of criticism. And Napoleon struck the most sore spot - he dared to remind him of the sin of parricide, which still burdened his conscience. And therefore, Alexander retained his hatred of the French emperor for the rest of his life.
The second factor was the notorious "bags of gold": British gentlemen paid well for Russian blood - higher than the "market price" of serfs in Russia. According to the agreement of March 30, 1805, the British gave 12.5 million rubles for 100 thousand soldiers (125 rubles per head), and even a fourth of this amount for mobilization. That is, the cost of one soldier reached 156 rubles 25 kopecks. And "revision souls" in Russia at that time cost from 70 to 120 rubles.
Finally, the third factor pushing Alexander to an alliance with England was the desire of the Russian aristocrats to lead a European way of life. And they could get currency for foreign trips, equipping their city mansions and country estates, paying for the services of foreign specialists (from cooks and governesses to estate managers and architects) only from trade with Britain.
"At the same time, the young tsar knew to what extent the nobility, selling agricultural raw materials and bread to England, was interested in friendship with England", - wrote in his classic work "Napoleon" Eugene Tarle.
The autocracy in Russia at that time was very much "limited by the noose", and Alexander did not want to end his life in some "secluded and very pleasant place" like Ropsha.
"More than anyone, he knew about the organization of the" apoplectic stroke "that befell his father, especially since he himself played an essential role in the preparation of this incident."
(E. Tarle.)
Alexander's desire to fight with the "offender", and at the same time to make money on the trade of his subjects, was so great that Russian diplomacy made great efforts to persuade the Austrians to join the coalition, who were terribly afraid of the armies of the "little Corsican".
You, of course, know that this war did not bring any glory to Russia, on the contrary, it ended in the unprecedented humiliation of Austerlitz and in vain victims of the subsequent campaign of 1806-1807. Before the Battle of Austerlitz, for almost 100 years (after the Prut catastrophe of Peter I - 1711), the Russian army did not lose a single general battle. And therefore, the catastrophe in this battle made a terrible impression on Russian society. The Sardinian envoy to Russia, Joseph de Maistre, reported on the mood in St. Petersburg:
“Here the effect of the Battle of Austerlitz on public opinion is like magic. All the generals are asking for resignation, and it seems as if defeat in one battle paralyzed the whole empire."
But now we will not consider in detail the course of the 1805 campaign, confining ourselves to two of its episodes, in which the hero of our article showed both extraordinary resourcefulness and innocence. And who, with extraordinary precision and relief, draw before us the image of this extraordinary person.
Joachim Murat: the brave "king of the boulevard"
Armand de Caulaincourt called Murat "the bravest of kings and the king of the brave" - and there was no person in the world who would undertake to challenge this statement.
Napoleon said about him:
"I have never seen a man braver, more decisive and more brilliant than him during cavalry attacks."
AND:
"I did not know anyone braver than Murat and Ney."
But he was well aware of Murat's shortcomings:
“He was a knight, a real Don Quixote on the battlefield. But put him in a chair in the office, and he became a notorious coward, devoid of any common sense, unable to make any decision."
Tulard wrote:
“When it is necessary to drive a retreating enemy without rest, this tireless and incomparable horseman no longer remembers himself. Fatigue does not take him."
History includes the words of Murat from the report to Napoleon:
"The fighting ended due to the absence of the enemy."
Countess Pototskaya, recalling in her memoirs about the entry of Joachim Murat into Warsaw (November 28, 1806), writes:
"With his majestic appearance, he resembled an actor playing the role of kings."
Caulaincourt also recalls his "ill-fated passion for lush costumes," which led to Murat "looking like a king from the boulevard stage."
For this passion for theatrical effects and lush costumes, contemporaries called him "a cross between a peacock and a clown."
Marshal Lann did not hesitate to call Murat "a rooster", "a buffoon", and said that he "looks like a dog that dances."
But the desperate bravery of the charismatic Gascon was recognized by everyone - both friends and enemies.
Segur spoke of him:
"Murat, this theatrical king for the sophistication of his attire and a true monarch for his extraordinary courage and vigorous activity."
Let's go back to the military campaign of 1805.
"If I am not in London in 15 days, then I should be in Vienna in mid-November,"
- said Napoleon, and his army set out from the Bois de Boulogne.
"Caesar campaign" of the Russian army
On August 13, the Podolsk army of M. Kutuzov (about 58 thousand people) entered the so-called "Caesar campaign", which was joined by the Volyn army of Buxgewden (48 thousand soldiers) and the guards units of the Lithuanian army of Essen I. Russian troops in six "echelons" moving on a day's march from one another, they went to join the Austrian army, which was nominally commanded by Archduke Ferdinand, but the actual power was with Quartermaster General Karl Mack.
Napoleon, who later became better acquainted with Poppy in Paris, left the following review about him:
“Mac is the most mediocre person I've met. Filled with conceit and pride, he considers himself capable of anything. Now he is meaningless; but it would be desirable to be sent against one of our good generals; then I would have to see enough interesting things."
It was Mack who made the fatal decision: without waiting for Kutuzov's army, move to Bavaria, to the Iller River. Napoleon, whose army made an exemplary transition from the Bois camp (from the English Channel to the Danube the French reached in 20 days), took full advantage of Mac's mistake. The first to approach Ulm were the corps of Ney, Lanna and Murat's cavalry. On October 15, Ney and Lannes took the heights surrounding Ulm, which made the situation of the surrounded Austrians almost hopeless. Napoleon demanded surrender, threatening not to spare anyone in the event of an assault.
On October 20, 1805, almost the entire Mac army (32 thousand people) and the Ulm fortress with all military supplies, artillery (200 cannons), banners (90) were surrendered to the French. In addition, Murat's cavalry took 8 thousand soldiers prisoner outside the fortress. Mac was released as unnecessary, and his soldiers were sent to France as free labor: it was necessary for someone to replace the men who served in the French army.
Only two detachments of this army, totaling 15 thousand people, managed to break out of the encirclement. The first, led by Ferdinand (about 5 thousand), went to Bohemia, the other, under the command of Kinmeier (about 10 thousand), later joined the army of Kutuzov on the Inn River. Napoleon also went there, and Kutuzov moved to Vienna, hoping to meet on his way reinforcements from Russia and Austrian units coming from Italy and Tyrol.
On October 28, the Russian army crossed the Danube at Mautern, destroying the bridge behind them, and unleashing an attack on Mortier's corps, which was on the left bank of this river. According to Napoleon's plan, this corps was supposed to be the first to approach the bridge, blocking the way for the Russians, but it was late.
In the battle of Krems, which is also called the Dürrenstein battle (October 30), the Russian army did not succeed in completely defeating the French; the Mortier corps, although it suffered heavy losses, managed to cross to the right bank. Now, Kutuzov, whose army was separated from the French by the full-flowing Danube, had as many as three options: he could give his troops a rest, staying at Krems, he could go east - towards Buxgewden's army that was hurrying to help, he could move in the direction of Vienna. He chose the first option, which turned out to be the worst. However, the Russian commander-in-chief, of course, could not predict the incredible events that will now be discussed. And now the time has come for the main character of our article, Joachim Murat, to appear on the stage.
Murat, who commanded the cavalry of Napoleon's army, received an order, together with the corps of Lannes, Soult and Oudinot's grenadier division, to go to Vienna, capturing two strategically important bridges over the Danube: Taborsky, about 100 meters long, and Spitsky, whose length was 430 meters. The capture of these bridges allowed the French to reach the rear of Kutuzov's army.
The defense of the bridges seemed a very simple task, since they were timely mined, covered with artillery batteries and defended by a 13,000-strong Austrian corps. Austrian units were given the strictest order to destroy the bridges at the first appearance of enemy soldiers. But the French were commanded by a very ardent rootless Gascon Joachim Murat, the Austrians - by an arrogant aristocrat, Prince Karl Auersperg von Mautern, who was previously the commander of the "toy soldiers" of the court guard.
And therefore, everything went completely different from what the Austrian Emperor Franz I and M. I. Kutuzov.
The first "Gasconade" of Murat
In the novel by L. N. Tolstoy's "War and Peace" Kutuzov's adjutant Bilibin describes these events as follows:
“The French are entering Vienna, as I told you. Everything is very good. The next day, that is, yesterday, the gentlemen marshals: Murat, Lannes and Belyard, get on horseback and set off for the bridge. (Note that all three are Gascons.)
“Gentlemen,” says one, “you know that the Taborsky bridge has been mined and countermined, and that in front of it is a formidable tête de pont and fifteen thousand troops, who were ordered to blow up the bridge and keep us out. But our sovereign Emperor Napoleon will be pleased if we take this bridge. Let's go three of us and take this bridge.
- Let's go, others say;
and they go, and take the bridge, cross it and now with the whole army on this side of the Danube are heading for us."
How did all this actually happen?
On October 31, French envoys came to the Tabor bridge, announcing that Marshal Murat would soon arrive here for talks with Auersperg. Generals Henri-Gracien Bertrand, Napoleon's adjutant (and Gascon, concurrently) and Moissel (who was not a Gascon, but was the commander of the artillery of Murat's corps) soon appeared.
The brave generals "covered themselves" the four cavalry regiments (two hussars and two dragoons) moving behind them, a grenadier division, and at the same time three cannons. The "parlamenters" were in a friendly conversation with the Austrian lieutenant, while their subordinates at this time insolently broke the locks on the lowered bridge lattice. Ordinary Austrian soldiers opened fire, and everything should have ended quite well - if Colonel Goeringer had not been nearby. Bertrand "with a blue eye" told him that an agreement on the cessation of hostilities had been signed between France and Austria, but the main condition for further peace negotiations was the safety of the Taborsky and Spitsky bridges. Dumbfounded Goeringer let Bertrand and Moissel "to his side" to negotiate with Auersperg. The deputy prince, General Kienmeier (the one who managed to withdraw 10 thousand of his soldiers from Ulm), begged him, without entering into negotiations, to give the order to destroy the bridge, but Auersperg turned out to be above reasonable arguments. He appeared on the bridge (where he was kindly greeted by another Gascon - General Augustin-Daniel de Belyard, chief of staff of the cavalry reserve of Murat's corps) and quite favorably listened to Bertrand's complaints about the indiscipline "of his subordinates, who by unauthorized actions almost disrupted peace negotiations. The last person who could save Vienna and the honor of Austria was an unnamed corporal: he shouted to the commander that the French were deceiving him, and, annoyed by such disrespect, Auersperg ordered his arrest. A few minutes later, the first French platoon had already broken into the other side of the bridge and started to mine it. The next French detachments took up the Austrian cannons.
In Austria, this tragicomic incident was called "the miracle of the Vienna Bridge."
Later, a military tribunal sentenced Aursperg to death, but the emperor pardoned him. When those responsible for failure and disaster avoid punishment just because they are aristocrats and representatives of ancient, well-deserved families, empires and kingdoms are doomed, you can turn on the "countdown timer". But the "old monarchies" lack the instinct of self-preservation, nothing can be done about it.
On November 1 (13), 1805, French troops entered Vienna, where they captured just an indecent amount of weapons (about 2000 guns alone), ammunition, equipment and food.
Thus ended the first "Gasconade" by Joachim Murat.
The second "Gasconade" by Joachim Murat
After the loss of the Danube bridges, Kutuzov's troops found themselves in a very difficult situation. Now it was already necessary not even to go, but to run towards Buksgeden's army. On the night of November 2 (14), Kutuzov's army began to move. There was a road every hour and therefore all the sick and wounded were left in Krems. To cover the right flank, Kutuzov allocated a rearguard, which was commanded by Major General P. I. Bagration.
The following regiments were at his disposal: Kiev and Little Russian grenadiers, Podolsk and Azov musketeers, 6th Jaegers, Chernigov dragoons, Pavlograd hussars, two Cossacks. Also, an artillery company from the 4th artillery regiment and an Austrian hussar regiment under the command of Count Nostitz were attached to his detachment.
On November 3 (15), 1805, these units occupied positions north of the city of Hollabrunn - near the villages of Schöngraben and Grund. Murat soon came up here too. The resounding success at the Danube bridges turned his head, and he decided to repeat the same "Gascon trick" with another enemy. The first part of the "trick" he succeeded: finding Nostitz's regiment in front of him, Murat informed the count that peace had been concluded between Austria and France. And as evidence, he told about the free passage of the French army through the Danube bridges to Vienna. It was really difficult to believe that the French could capture them without a fight. P. Bagration tried in vain to dissuade the Austrian count - Nostitz left, leaving the Russian allies.
Let us digress for a while to notice how easily Nostitz believed in the very possibility of concluding a separate peace with France. And let us inform that Emperor Franz I, before fleeing from Vienna, really proposed such a treaty to Napoleon, but he, realizing that after Ulm, the campaign had already been actually won, decided to end the war with a spectacular blow, which was supposed to break the morale of the opponents and destroy their will to resist. Therefore, he then refused to negotiate. With regard to the Austrians, his calculation turned out to be correct.
Now let's return to Murat, who made the mistake of accepting rearguard units for the entire Russian army. Not in the least embarrassed, he decided to deceive the Russians too: "to play for time" until Marshal Soult's corps arrived - under the pretext of peace negotiations, of course. Kutuzov and Bagration gladly played along with him: Adjutant General F. Vintzengerode (a Thuringian German in the Russian service) was sent to Murat as envoy, who, as it turned out, was able to "talk" just as well as the Gascons.
A certain armistice document was even signed, copies of which were sent to Kutuzov and to Napoleon. And the Russian army during the negotiations managed to break away from the French at a distance of two crossings.
Napoleon was simply amazed and enraged at the stoppage of Murat's movement. He sent him a severe reprimand with the order to immediately attack Bagration. On November 4, a 20,000th French corps attacked a 7,000th Russian detachment. This was the famous Schöngraben battle, from which Bagration emerged, having lost a third of his personnel and 8 guns, stuck in the mud.
Stills from the Soviet film "War and Peace" (directed by S. Bondarchuk):
On November 6, Bagration's detachment joined Kutuzov's army in Pogorlitsa. The commander greeted him with the famous words:
“I am not asking about the loss; you're alive - that's enough!"
In November this year, Bagration was promoted to lieutenant general.
And the troops of Kutuzov on November 7, 1805 in Vishau successfully united with the army of Buxgewden (27 thousand people). Ahead was the battle of Austerlitz, the story of which is beyond the scope of this article. You can read a short story about him in the article Damn general. Nikolai Kamensky and his Suvorov nickname - the head of the "Military campaigns of 1805-1807."
