At the end of the previous article "The formation of the Dnieper and Zaporizhzhya troops and their service to the Polish-Lithuanian state" it was shown how the repressive policy of the Commonwealth against the Orthodox population of the Dnieper Cossacks and all of Ukraine began to grow from the end of the 16th century. The Polish order provoked opposition among the Orthodox, reaching up to popular uprisings and the main forces in this struggle were the Dnieper Cossacks. The continuous violence of Poland against the Cossack population also strengthened its stratification, some went to the left bank and to the Zaporizhzhya Niz, others continued to serve Poland in the registries. But due to the violence of the Poles, tension continued to grow in the registered army, and from this seemingly loyal to Poland environment, more and more rebels emerged against the power of the Poles. The most prominent of the rebels of that period was Zinovy-Bohdan Khmelnitsky. An educated and successful careerist, a loyal campaigner of the king because of the arbitrariness and rudeness of the Chigirinsky podstarosta, the Polish nobleman Chaplinsky, he turned into a stubborn and merciless enemy of Poland. Supporters of independence began to group around Khmelnytsky, and ferment against the Poles began to spread. Having entered into an alliance with the Perekop Murza Tugai-Bey, Khmelnitsky appeared in the Sich, was elected hetman and with 9 thousand Cossacks of the Grassroots army, in 1647 he began a struggle with Poland.
Rice. 1 Rebel Cossacks
On May 2, 1648, the advanced Polish troops met with the troops of Khmelnitsky at the Yellow Waters. After a three-day battle, the Poles suffered a terrible defeat, and the hetmans Pototsky and Kalinovsky were captured. After this victory, Khmelnitsky sent out generalists calling for an uprising against the gentry, Jews and Catholicism, after which the entire Russian population and the Cossacks rose up. Several "Haidamak corrals" were formed, which went for a walk in all directions. During this turmoil, King Vladislav died. Since the Crimean Tatars fought against Poland on the side of Khmelnitsky, Moscow was forced, under an agreement of mutual assistance, to provide Poland with military assistance against the Tatars in 40 thousand troops. From that moment on, the civil war in Polish Ukraine began to turn more and more into a tangled tangle of political hypocrisy, hypocrisy, intrigue and contradictions. The Tatars were forced to retreat to the Crimea, and Khmelnitsky, having lost an ally, ceased hostilities and sent ambassadors to Warsaw with demands to mitigate the fate of the Russian population and increase the Cossack register to 12,000 people. Prince Vishnevetsky opposed the Cossack demands and after a break the war resumed. The Polish troops at first managed to stop the Cossack offensive in Western Ukraine, but the Tatars again came to the aid of Khmelnitsky. Panic spread among the Poles that the Tatars had bypassed them from the rear. The Polish commanders, succumbing to panic, abandoned their troops and fled, followed by the troops. The huge Polish convoy and rear areas became the prey of the Cossacks, and after this victory they moved to Zamoć. By this time, Jan Kazimierz was elected king of Poland, who ordered Khmelnytsky, as a vassal of the king, to retreat from Zamoć. Khmelnitsky, personally acquainted with Kazimir, retreated from Zamoć and solemnly entered Kiev. The Polish ambassadors also arrived there for negotiations, but they ended in nothing. The war continued again and Polish troops entered Podolia. Khmelnitsky was at the zenith of his glory. Khan Girey himself and the Don Cossacks came to his aid. With these troops, the Allies laid siege to the Poles in Zbrazh. The king with troops came to the aid of the besieged Poles and removed Khmelnytsky from the hetmanate. But Khmelnytsky, with a bold maneuver, without lifting the siege, surrounded the king and forced him to negotiations. 2 contracts were concluded, separately with the Cossacks and Tatars. The Cossacks were given the same rights, the register increased to 40,000 people. All the insurgent Cossacks were promised amnesty, and Chigirin, the ancient capital of Cherkas and black hoods, was handed over to Khmelnitsky. Polish troops were withdrawn from all Cossack places, and the women were forbidden to live there. A peace treaty was concluded with the khan, according to which the king pledged to pay 200,000 zlotys. The Tatars, having received money and robbed the Kiev region, went to their place. In 1650, the Sejm approved the Zboriv Treaty and the lords began to return to their Ukrainian estates and began to take revenge on their slaves who robbed their estates. This caused discontent among the slaves. The number of Cossacks who wanted to serve in the register exceeded 40 thousand people and there were also dissatisfied Cossacks among the Cossacks. But the main discontent was caused by Khmelnytsky himself, they saw him as a supporter and guide of the Polish order. Under the pressure of these sentiments, Khmelnitsky again entered into relations with the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan, promising to surrender himself under the auspices of Turkey for support. He demanded that the nobles stop repressions and fulfill the terms of the Zborov Treaty. This demand aroused the indignation of the clandestine priests, and they unanimously opposed it. Khmelnitsky turned to Moscow for help, which also demanded that Poland improve the situation of the Orthodox population. But Moscow was also aware of Khmelnitsky's double-dealing and his relations with the Crimea and Turkey, and secret surveillance was established for him. In April 1651, hostilities began. The legate of Pope Innocent brought to Poland his blessing and absolution for all fighters against unfaithful schismatics. On the other hand, Metropolitan Josaph of Corinth girded Khmelnytsky with a sword consecrated on the Holy Sepulcher, and blessed the troops for the war with Poland. In alliance with Khmelnitsky, the Crimean Khan Islam-Girey spoke out, but he was unreliable, because Don Cossacks threatened him with a raid on the Crimea. The troops met at Berestechko. In the course of a fierce battle, the Tatars suddenly abandoned their front and went to the Crimea. Khmelnitsky rushed after and began to reproach the khan with treason, but was taken hostage at the khan's headquarters and released only at the border. On returning, Khmelnitsky learned that due to the treachery of the Tatars in the battle with the Poles, up to 30,000 Cossacks had been destroyed. The Poles moved 50 thousand troops into the Cossack lands and began to devastate the country. Khmelnitsky saw that he could not cope with the Poles, the Tatars betrayed him and he found it necessary to surrender under the protection of the Moscow Tsar. But cautious Moscow, knowing from the past about the infinite treachery of the Dnieper and their hetmans, was in no hurry to help Khmelnitsky and he was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty with Poland in Bila Tserkva. However, in Moscow they saw that the peace of the Cossacks with Poland was not lasting, the enmity between them had gone too far and that sooner or later it would be necessary to make a choice, namely:
- either accept the Cossacks into citizenship and, as a result, start a war with Poland because of this
- either to see them as subjects of the Turkish Sultan, with all the ensuing geopolitical consequences.
The domination of the Poles that came after the Treaty of Belotserkov and the terror unleashed by them forced the Cossacks and the people to move en masse to the left bank. Khmelnitsky again equipped ambassadors to Moscow with a request for help. But at the same time, the ambassadors of the Crimea and Turkey were constantly with him and he did not have faith. Moscow thought it best for the Cossacks to be a subject of the Polish king and to work diplomatically about the rights of the Western Russian Orthodox population. The Poles replied that Khmelnytsky sold himself to the Turkish sultan and accepted the Busurmanian faith. A tangled tangle of insurmountable contradictions and mutual hatred no longer allowed peace in Polish Ukraine. In the summer of 1653, the Turkish embassy arrived at Khmelnitsky to take the oath of office from the Cossacks. But the military clerk Vyhovsky wrote: "… we no longer believe in the Tatars, because they are only looking to fill their womb." Moscow had to make a difficult decision, because it meant a war with Poland, and the lessons of the failures of the Livonian War were still fresh in the memory. To resolve the issue, on October 1, the Zemsky Sobor gathered in Moscow "from all ranks of the people." The council, after a long debate, sentenced: “for the honor of Tsars Michael and Alexei to stand and wage war against the Polish king. And so that Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporozhye Army with cities and lands, the sovereign deigned to take under his hand. " Ambassadors and troops were sent to Chigirin, and the population was to be sworn in. In Pereyaslavl, the Rada was assembled and Khmelnitsky announced his acceptance of the citizenship of the Moscow Tsar.
Rice. 2 Pereyaslavskaya Rada
Khmelnitsky with the Cossacks took the oath, they were promised their liberties and a register of 60,000 people. However, a strong party arose against the reunification with Great Russia and was headed by the outstanding koshevoy ataman of the Zaporizhzhya Host Ivan Sirko. With his comrades, he went to Zaporozhye and did not take the oath. After the acceptance of the Cossacks and the population into the Tsar's citizenship, Moscow inevitably got involved in a war with Poland.
Rice. 3 Ataman Sirko
By this time, significant changes had taken place in the armed forces of the Moscow kingdom. Along with the formation of an army of archers, children of boyars, nobles and Cossacks, the government began to form the troops of the "new system". Foreigners were invited to form and train them.
So already in 1631 there were 4 colonels, 3 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 13 captains, 24 captains, 28 warrant officers, 87 sergeants, corporals and other ranks. A total of 190 foreigners. The regiments of the new system consisted of soldiers, reitars and dragoons. To increase the number of these troops, the government issued a decree on the compulsory recruitment of one soldier out of 3 male population of a suitable age. By 1634, 10 regiments of the new system were formed with a total number of 17,000 people, 6 soldiers and 4 reitars and dragoons. In the new regiments, the number of Russian "foremen" grew rapidly, and already in 1639, out of 744 foremen of the command personnel, 316 were foreigners and 428 were Russians, mainly from boyar children.
Fig. 4 Cossack, archer and soldier
In March 1654, a review of the troops took place on the Devichye Pole in Moscow, and they went west along the Smolensk road, and Trubetskoy was ordered from Bryansk to unite with the troops of Khmelnitsky and strike at the Polish possessions. Khmelnitsky dispatched 20 thousand Cossacks under the command of Hetman Zolotarenko. Guarding the southern borders from the Crimean Khan was entrusted to the Don Cossacks. The war began successfully, Smolensk and other cities were taken. But with the beginning of the war, the real character of the leaders of the newly annexed region was determined. Under the pretext of a threat from the Crimea, Khmelnitsky remained in Chigirin and did not go to the front. Zolotarenko at the front behaved arrogantly and independently, did not obey the Moscow governors, but did not fail to seize the supplies prepared for the Moscow troops, finally abandoned the front and went to Novy Bykhov. The Tsar wrote to Khmelnitsky that he was dissatisfied with his sluggishness, after which he spoke, but when he reached Bila Tserkva he returned to Chigirin. On the part of Khmelnitsky and his foremen, there was a complete unwillingness to reckon with the authority of the Moscow authorities. He was supported by the clergy, dissatisfied with the acceptance of citizenship of the Moscow Patriarchate. Despite this, in 1655 the Russian troops had decisive successes. The international situation for Russia is clearly favorable. Sweden opposed Poland. The Swedish king Karl X Gustav was an outstanding military leader and statesman and had an excellent military force. He utterly defeated the Polish army, occupied the whole of Poland, including Warsaw and Krakow. King Jan Casimir fled to Silesia. But Moscow quite rightly feared the excessive strengthening of Sweden and the excessive weakening of Poland, and in 1656 in Vilna concluded an armistice with Poland, according to which it returned to Poland a significant part of the occupied lands. Khmelnitsky and the Cossack foremen were extremely dissatisfied with this decision, and most of all with the fact that they were not allowed to negotiate and did not take their opinion into account. And their behavior was not surprising. The transition of the Dnieper Cossacks under the authority of the Moscow Tsar took place, both on the one hand and on the other, under the influence of a coincidence of circumstances and external reasons. The Cossacks, fleeing from their final defeat by Poland, sought protection under the rule of the Moscow Tsar or the Turkish Sultan. And Moscow accepted them to keep from coming under Turkish rule. On the part of the Moscow Tsar, the Cossacks were declared their liberties, but the requirements were presented as to a service army. And the Cossack foreman did not at all want to give up her privileges in managing the army. This duality of the gentry consciousness of the Ukrainian elite was characteristic from the very beginning of the annexation of Little Russia to Great Russia, it was not eliminated in the future, it has not been eliminated to this day. It is the basis of the Russian-Ukrainian mistrust and misunderstanding that has been characteristic for many centuries and has become the basis for numerous betrayals and desertions of the Ukrainian gentry, rebellions and manifestations of separatism and collaboration. These bad habits spread over time from the Ukrainian gentry to the wider masses. The subsequent history of a three-century cohabitation of two peoples that did not become fraternal, as well as the history of the twentieth century, gave a number of examples of this situation. In 1918 and 1941, Ukraine almost resignedly accepted the German occupation. Only after some time, the "charms" of the German occupation prompted some of the Ukrainians to start fighting the invaders, but the number of collaborators was also always great. So out of 2 million Soviet people who collaborated with the Nazis during the war, more than half were citizens of Ukraine. Ideas of independence, independence, hostility to the Muscovites (read to the Russian people) constantly agitated the popular consciousness of many Ukrainians under any government. As soon as Gorbachev shook the USSR, Ukrainian separatists and collaborators immediately and ardently took up his destructive ideas and backed them up with massive popular sympathy and support. It is no coincidence that President Kravchuk, having arrived in Belovezhie in 1991, said at the Minsk airport that Ukraine would not sign a new union treaty. And he had a strong legitimate basis for this, the decision of the all-Ukrainian referendum on the independence of Ukraine.
But back to that old story. Already with the beginning of the Polish war, Khmelnitsky and his chieftains acted completely independently of the Moscow governors and did not want to obey them. Khmelnitsky himself assured the tsar of loyalty, and he himself was looking for new allies. He set himself the broad goal of forming a federal union of the Dnieper Cossacks, the Ukrainian suburban population, Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania under the protectorate of the Polish king, and at the same time concluded an agreement with the Swedish king on the partition of Poland. During these separate negotiations, Khmelnitsky died without completing this matter. Death saved him from treason, therefore in Russian history he, the only Ukrainian hetman, is justly revered as a national hero-unifier of two Slavic peoples. After the death of Khmelnitsky in 1657, his son Yuri became hetman, completely unsuitable for this role. Among the Cossack foremen, feuds began, they lagged behind Poland, but did not stick to Moscow. They were divided into the left-bank, where Samko, Bryukhovetsky and Samoilovich dominated, holding on to the Moscow side and the right-bank ones, where the leaders were Vygovsky, Yuri Khmelnitsky, Teterya and Doroshenko, who gravitated towards Poland. Soon Vyhovsky dismissed Yuri Khmelnitsky, gathered the Rada in Chigirin and was elected hetman, but the Cossacks and some colonels did not recognize him. Thus began a thirty-year, cruel, bloody and merciless civil war in Ukraine, which in Ukrainian history received the name Ruin (devastation). Vyhovsky began to play a double game. On the one hand, he conducted secret negotiations with Poland and the Crimea and incited the Cossacks against the presence of Moscow troops. On the other hand, he swore allegiance to Moscow and asked for permission to deal with the recalcitrant Cossacks of Poltava and Zaporozhye, and he succeeded. Moscow believed him, and not the Poltava Colonel Pushkar, who reported that Vygovsky was getting along with Poland, Crimea and Turkey and embarrassed the Cossacks against the Tsar, assuring that the Tsar wanted to take away the Cossacks' liberties and write Cossacks as soldiers. Vyhovsky, however, declared Poltava and Zaporozhian rebels and defeated them, and burned Poltava. But the betrayal was revealed when in 1658 Vygovsky tried to drive the Russian troops out of Kiev, but was repulsed by them. Given this situation, Poland broke off the truce and again went to war against Russia, but the Polish troops under the command of Gonsevsky were defeated, and he himself was taken prisoner. However, in June 1659, Vygovsky, in alliance with the Tatars and Poles, arranged for the Russian troops under the command of Prince Pozharsky a vent near Konotop and brutally beat them. But the Cossacks and their allies still lacked unity. Yuri Khmelnitsky with the Cossacks attacked the Crimea and the Tatars hastily left Vyhovsky.
The Cossacks were in conflict with each other and with the Poles. The Polish commander Potocki reported to the king: “… do not please your royal grace to expect anything good for yourself from this land. All residents of the western side of the Dnieper will soon be from Moscow, for the eastern side will overtake them. And it is true that soon the Cossack colonels left Vygovsky one after another and swore allegiance to the Moscow Tsar. On October 17, 1659, a new Rada was convened in Pereyaslavl. Yuri Khmelnitsky was again elected as hetman by both sides of the Dnieper, he and the foremen took the oath to Moscow. Some of the Cossacks expressed dissatisfaction with the decisions of the Rada, and Colonels Odinets and Doroshenko went to Moscow with a petition, namely:
- That the Moscow troops were withdrawn from everywhere except Pereyaslavl and Kiev
- So that the court is ruled only by local Cossack authorities
- That the Kiev metropolitan obey not the Moscow, but the Byzantine patriarch
Some of these requirements have been met. However, the new annexation of the Cossacks to Moscow prompted the Crimea and Poland to join the union, after the conclusion of which they began military operations. A small number of Russian troops stationed in Ukraine under the command of Sheremetyev were besieged in Chudovo. The Cossacks, immediately upon the offensive of the Poles and Crimeans, entered into negotiations with them and swore allegiance to the Polish king. Seeing the total treason, Sheremetyev was forced to surrender and went prisoner to the Crimea. The Chudovskoe defeat was even more severe than the Konotop defeat. Young and capable commanders were killed, and most of the army was destroyed. The Dnieper Cossacks again went over to the service of the Polish king, but he no longer had faith in them, and he immediately took them into his "iron mitts", making it clear that the freemen was over. Right-bank Ukraine suffered a terrible devastation by the Poles and Tatars, and the population was turned into a lackey of Polish landowners. After the defeat in Chudovo, Russia did not have enough troops to continue the struggle in Ukraine and she was ready to let it go. Poland did not have the money to continue the war. The left bank and Zaporozhye were left to their own devices, fought off the Tatars with varying success, but because of strife they could not elect a hetman for themselves. There was no reconciliation in Ukraine, the Cossack foreman furiously intrigued among themselves and rushed between Moscow, Poland, Crimea and Turkey. But there was no faith in them anywhere. Under these conditions, in 1667, the Andrusov Peace was concluded between Moscow and Poland, according to which Ukraine was divided by the Dnieper, its eastern part entered into the possession of Moscow, the western part - to Poland.
Rice. 5 Ukrainian Cossacks of the 17th century
In Muscovy at that time it was also restless, there was a Razin revolt. Simultaneously with Razin's revolt, no less important events took place in Ukraine. The division of the Dnieper across the Andrusov world caused strong discontent among all strata of the Dnieper population. Confusion and vacillation reigned in the country. On the right bank in Chigirin, Hetman Doroshenko declared himself a subject of the Turkish Sultan. On the left bank, Bryukhovetsky, having received boyars and estates from the tsar, began to rule uncontrollably, but continued to play a double game in relation to Moscow. In the western side was the third hetman Honenchko, a supporter and protege of Poland. Zaporozhye tossed about and did not know where to stick. Metropolitan Methodius of Kiev also became an enemy of Moscow. All opponents of Moscow finally gathered a secret Rada in Gadyach, but the whole case was hampered by feuds within the Ukrainian gentry. Nevertheless, the Rada decided to unite on all sides, become citizens of the Turkish sultan and, together with the Crimeans and Turks, go to the Moscow lands, and Doroshenko also demanded to go to the Poles. Bryukhovetsky demanded the withdrawal of Moscow troops from the left bank in an ultimatum. From Gadyach to the Don, a letter was sent in which it was written: “Moscow with the Lyakhami decreed that the glorious Zaporozhian Army and the Don should be ruined and completely destroyed. I ask and I warn you, do not be seduced by their treasury, but be in fraternal unity with Mr. Stenka (Razin), as we are with our Zaporozhye brethren. " Another Cossack rebellion arose against Moscow, and all the surrounding demons gathered together with it. The Tatars came to the aid of the Dnieper people and the Moscow troops left not only the left-bank Ukraine (Hetmanate), but also some of their cities. As a result of the betrayal of Bryukhovetsky, 48 cities and towns were lost. But Doroshenko rose up against Bryukhovetsky, who said "Bryukhovetsky is a thin man and he is not a natural Cossack." The Cossacks did not want to protect Bryukhovetsky and he was executed. But Doroshenko, for his allegiance to the Sultan, was called the hetman of his khan's majesty and he had no authority among the Cossacks.
The ferment and turmoil with the participation of many hetmans, various atamans, Tatars, Turks, Poles, Muscovites continued until the 1680s, when the Cossack Colonel Mazepa made Moscow an offer to streamline the defense of the Hetmanate. He advised increasing the number of troops, but reducing the number of governors, who, by their troubles with each other, spoil the general order. The young talent was noticed by Moscow, and after hetman Samoilovich was arrested on charges of treason, Mazepa was elected to replace him in 1685. Soon, eternal peace was concluded with Turkey and Poland. It was in such difficult internal and external conditions of the Ukrainian turmoil that the Cossack troops of the Hetmanate were transferred to Moscow service.
Mazepa, on the other hand, successfully ruled as hetman for almost a quarter of a century, and his hetmanate was very productive for Moscow and the Cossacks. He managed to end the civil war (ruin), preserve a large Cossack autonomy, pacify the Cossack foreman and put her in the service of the Moscow kingdom. He also managed to instill great confidence in the Moscow authorities and his activities were highly appreciated. But Mazepa, like his predecessors, was burdened by dependence on the Moscow Tsar and held in his soul the hope of breaking free and establishing military independence. Mazepa, having the confidence of the Cossacks and the Moscow government, outwardly expressed obedience and waited for an opportunity. The monstrous betrayal of Mazepa and the Zaporozhye Cossacks on the eve of the Poltava battle prompted Tsar Peter to abruptly and mercilessly defeat the Dnieper Cossacks. Later, during the period of "woman's rule", it was partially revived. However, Peter's lesson did not go for the future. In the second half of the 18th century, a fierce and uncompromising struggle of Russia for Lithuania and the Black Sea region unfolded. In this struggle, the Dnieper showed themselves unreliable again, rebelled, many treacherously betrayed and ran over to the enemy's camp. The cup of patience overflowed and in 1775, by the decree of Empress Catherine II, the Zaporozhye Sich was destroyed, according to the words in the decree, "as a godless and unnatural community, not suitable for the extension of the human race," and the riding Dnieper Cossacks turned into hussar regiments of the regular army, namely Ostrozhsky, Izumoksky, Akhtyrsky and Kharkovsky. But this is a completely different and rather tragic story for the Dnieper Cossacks.
A. A. Gordeev History of the Cossacks
Istorija.o.kazakakh.zaporozhskikh.kak.onye.izdrevle.zachalisja.1851.
Letopisnoe.povestvovanie.o. Malojj. Rossii.i.ejo.narode.i.kazakakh.voobshhe. 1847. A. Rigelman
