Based on the experience of fighting the armed opposition units and studying the captured documents in 1984. Excerpts from documents developed in 1985 by the headquarters of the 40th Army. In this memo for the officers of the OK SV, the style and spelling of the original source are fully preserved.
The leaders of the counter-revolution and international reaction have been waging an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for a long time. The irreversible processes taking place in the DRA are causing the fierce anger of international imperialism and the Afghan counter-revolution, which are making more and more attempts to change the existing situation in the country and restore the old order.
In the course of the struggle against the people's power, the leadership of the counter-revolution, under pressure and with the help of some reactionary regimes, primarily the United States, is trying to unite all its forces under a single military-political leadership, to develop a single line of struggle, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the legitimate government of the DRA and creating in Afghanistan Islamic state by the type of regimes in Pakistan and Iran.
The rebels seek by any means and means to intensify the struggle against the DRA. For a long time they have been waging an armed struggle on the territory of the country, combining it with widespread sabotage and terrorist actions and active agitation and propaganda activities. At the same time, armed struggle is invariably placed in the first place.
Despite the significant losses incurred by the rebels in the course of hostilities, they did not abandon an active armed struggle, still believing that only in this way can decisive success be achieved. In this regard, much attention is paid to improving the tactics of armed struggle. Other factors are considered important but not as effective.
In their struggle against the people's power in the DRA, the leadership of the counter-revolution takes full account of the national and religious characteristics of the Afghan people, which is one of the factors in the vitality of the insurrectionary movement. Islam and nationalism are at the forefront of organizing the struggle against democratic reforms in the country.
The counter-revolution receives great moral and material support from the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, as well as a number of countries in Western Europe and the Middle East. From them, the rebels will receive large consignments of modern weapons, ammunition and materiel. Without this help and the support of world reaction, the actions of the counter-revolution would not have had such a scale.
At the heart of the actions of the rebels are still Basmak or, as they call them, partisan methods and methods of struggle, which are constantly being improved. Advantageous for conducting this kind of hostilities is that most of the kishlak zone is controlled by the rebels. The disunity of the population due to physical and geographical conditions and limited communication routes also plays into the hands of the counter-revolution.
Based on the evolving situation in various regions of the country, the rebels use certain methods and methods of struggle that can bring at least temporary successes. The choice of methods and methods of struggle depends on the physical and geographical conditions of the area and the composition of the population. In all circumstances, high morale and good training of rebel groups are considered important.
Below, the issues of armed struggle, the tactics of the actions of the rebels in various conditions, the organization of sabotage-terrorist and agitation-propaganda activities by them are considered in detail.
Rebels' military tactics. The rebel leadership views the war in Afghanistan and the tactics of action in this war from the point of view of Islam, declaring it a holy war against the infidels. Proceeding from this, the ideologists of the Islamic counter-revolutionary movement have developed tactics of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, which they are persistently introducing into the practice of the actions of detachments and rebel groups.
These tactics include methods and methods of armed struggle against regular troops and forces of maintaining order, as well as methods of conducting sabotage and terrorist actions and agitation and propaganda activities.
The main thing in the tactics of the actions of the rebels is the refusal to open large-scale operations against regular troops. Without engaging in battle with superior forces, they act in small groups using the factor of surprise.
These views of the leadership of the rebels were most clearly confirmed at the beginning of the Panshir operation in April 1984, when the leadership of the IOA grouping in the Pandsher region, without engaging in defensive battles, withdrew most of their formations from under the attack and sheltered them in the mountainous areas of the upper reaches of the rockadny gorges and on passes, leaving small groups in Pandshir for reconnaissance and sabotage.
The rebel leadership requires that all those involved in hostilities have the necessary understanding of the tactics of action and be able to practically apply their knowledge. This requires focusing on nighttime activities, as well as activities in small groups.
High morale, discipline and initiative are considered important. Gang personnel are brought up in the spirit of Islam and personal responsibility so that each member of the group perceives the war as a private matter. Discipline and responsibility are imposed by the most brutal methods, including the death penalty.
Combat planning is being introduced into the practical activities of rebel groups and detachments. Currently, large groups and detachments are conducting combat operations according to pre-developed and approved plans. The rebels abandoned the conduct of trench warfare and completely switched to mobile combat operations, constantly changing their basing areas, taking into account the degree of support from the population and the physical and geographical conditions of the terrain. Much attention is paid to reconnaissance, disinformation and moral decay of the enemy.
The success of the armed struggle is directly dependent on the united joint actions of groups and detachments of different party affiliation. However, such unity has not yet been achieved.
The insurgent tactics envisage the conduct of guerrilla, defensive and offensive combat operations.
Guerrilla actions. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, guerrilla actions are actions throughout the country with the involvement of not only existing detachments and groups, but also the majority of the population in the armed struggle.
Such actions include ambushes, attacks on posts, garrisons of the deployment of troops, various economic and military facilities, shelling, sabotage and terrorist actions, actions on highways with the aim of disrupting traffic and robbery.
In order to avoid defeat from air strikes and artillery, groups and detachments are dispersed, often among the local population, periodically changing their location. Armed with light weapons and knowing the terrain well, the gangs constantly maneuver, appear suddenly in certain areas, stay in one place for no more than a day. In order to minimize losses from air and artillery strikes, shelters are equipped, and natural shelters are retrofitted in engineering terms.
To direct the partisan actions of the rebels, Islamic committees have been created and are functioning as unified party and political bodies of the counter-revolution on the ground.
In general, according to the leaders of the Afghan counter-revolution and international reaction, the guerrilla actions of the rebels significantly weaken the government troops and the people's power. The state is allegedly unable to resist this kind of struggle for a long time.
Defensive actions. They provide for stubborn resistance, as well as further hostilities with the aim of delivering retaliatory strikes. Defense is a forced type of hostilities and is used in the event of a surprise attack, when the escape routes are cut off and it is impossible to avoid open combat.
When troops attack large centers of counter-revolution on the territory of the DRA, in some cases defense is envisaged with the involvement of a maximum of forces and means.
Offensive actions. The decision to conduct joint offensive actions is taken depending on the development of the military-political situation, the economic situation, the state of the terrain, the balance of forces and means, as well as the morale of the parties.
Offensive actions are envisaged to conduct the so-called. fronts in one province or another, as well as in a number of provinces in order to capture large administrative centers and a certain territory. Also, actions, as a rule, are planned and carried out in the border provinces, where it is possible to transfer reinforcements in a short time, and in case of defeat, go abroad.
When carrying out an offensive, it is envisaged to choose a direction for delivering the main attack by the main forces. Such actions were carried out by the rebels in the provinces of Paktia and Paktika, in the regions of Khost and Urgun to seize large administrative centers and a certain territory in order to create the so-called. free zones and the formation of the "Provisional Government" on the territory of the DRA.
In all cases of combat activity, surprise, initiative, maneuver of forces and means, as well as the factor of independence in the implementation of planned plans with well-organized reconnaissance and notification are highly valued.
Rebel warfare tends to be fleeting, especially if unsuccessful for the rebels. In this case, they quickly withdraw from the battle and, under cover, retreat along pre-selected routes. After the end of military operations, the rebels return to the abandoned areas.
Successful armed actions, according to the views of the leadership of the counter-revolution, are unthinkable without the creation of centers (base regions), bases and regions, which are intended for the leadership and all-round support of the operating groups and detachments of the rebels.
The centers (base areas) are isolated areas of significant territory, from where activities are carried out to expand the influence of the rebels. These are strongholds, relying on which they conduct military operations against the people's power.
The centers are located mainly in mountainous and wooded areas, usually far from communication routes and garrisons where troops are deployed, well protected from enemy attacks, and have fairly strong air defense, especially against air targets operating at low altitudes.
Usually, such centers are organized in hard-to-reach gorges, where a multi-tiered defense is created with the widespread use of mining roads, trails, as well as places accessible to traffic and personnel.
Centers can be permanent and mobile.
The permanent centers are intended, along with the leadership and supply of the active bandit groups, to carry out measures to expand the "popular resistance". They have significant reserves of weapons, ammunition, food. There are also training centers for the military training of the rebels. Permanent rebel centers are subdivided into main, subsidiary, and secret centers.
Moving centers are created temporarily at the initial stage of the organization of permanent centers. They are designed to organize the defense of the selected area of deployment of the permanent center and to draw the attention of the population to the struggle waged by the rebels.
The bases are intended to house governing bodies such as Islamic committees, recreation and training of rebels. The bases have warehouses with weapons, ammunition, materiel, food and medicine supplies.
All the activities of the armed detachments are directly directed from the bases, the current supply of the rebels is carried out, as well as the management of all aspects of the life and activities of the population, if the area is under the control of the rebels.
The location for the bases is selected in hard-to-reach areas and is usually kept secret. The locations of warehouses with weapons and ammunition are especially secret. A limited circle of people knows about their whereabouts.
Areas are ranked by rebels in terms of their use. They are subdivided into the following categories:
areas controlled by the rebels, from where bandit groups conduct sorties to carry out attacks, shelling, ambushes, etc.;
areas where the rebels, dissolving among the population, operate covertly or infiltrate the area secretly to carry out assigned tasks and from there they can raid neighboring areas;
quiet areas. This is a territory under the control of government forces, where the rebels operate in secret and are there mainly during the operation.
The leadership of the counter-revolution, attaching special importance to the isolated areas, introduced a strict access regime and the necessary security there. In some areas, a small part of the rebels remain at the bases for protection, the rest are scattered among civilians, as a rule, in their villages. This tactic is characteristic and designed for the conduct of periodic hostilities for a long time. To control the movement of residents, ensure safety and provide timely warning, observation posts are created (10–12 people each).
The commanders of the groups that operate in certain areas are ordered to establish Islamic order there, establish their own power and strict access control.
When conducting operations by troops, the commanders of groups and detachments are obliged to help each other, especially if they belong to the same party grouping.
In the opinion of the rebel leadership, heavy weapons should not be used in large quantities, as they are of little use for mobile groups and detachments. It is recommended to use heavy weapons mainly in mountainous areas, for on the plains they can become easy prey for the enemy.
When planning and conducting operations, much attention is paid to keeping the upcoming actions of groups and detachments secret, increasing vigilance, and neutralizing enemy agents.
The tactical training of gangs is carried out in the centers and points of training of rebels in Pakistan and Iran, as well as in some other countries of the West and the Middle East. The training focuses on preparation and action in small groups (15 to 50 people).
According to the seasons, the actions of the rebels until the winter of 1983 were characterized as follows: in the summer - the conduct of active hostilities in all directions on the territory of Afghanistan, in the winter - rest, combat training, replenishment of weapons, ammunition and personnel. Moreover, for rest and replenishment, most of the gangs went to Pakistan and Iran.
In the winter of 1983, the gangs did not leave the territory of Afghanistan abroad, but continued to act actively in the same way as in the summer. This is one of the features of the rebels' tactics.
The leadership of the counter-revolution and international reaction, in order to increase the activity of the rebel movement, determined the amount of material remuneration for counter-revolutionary activities, depending on the length of stay in the ranks of the rebels: for 6 years - 250, 4 years - 200, 2 years - 150, 1 year - $ 100 per month … For gang leaders, there is a monthly remuneration ranging from $ 350 to $ 500.
The leadership of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan intends to take decisive actions to seize power in the country. Proceeding from this, combat action plans were developed and practical instructions for their implementation were given.
Firstly, it was ordered to activate hostilities throughout the country, to conduct operations in close contact, regardless of party affiliation.
Secondly, the main efforts should be concentrated in the provinces bordering with Pakistan in order to seize large administrative centers.
Third, to intensify hostilities on highways, especially on the roads connecting vital regions of the country, as well as on pipelines, power lines, etc. in order to disrupt the planned transportation of national economic goods and material and technical support.
Any operations after comprehensive reconnaissance are planned by Islamic committees (IC) and carried out at their direction. After the end of the operation, the IC evaluates the actions of each group, summarizes the combat experience.
The united IRs, leading the gangs' combat activities, communicate their decisions and instructions to the gangs through the grassroots IRs. Armed operations are carried out mainly by small and lightly armed groups (20-50 people), which operate throughout the country. If necessary, when solving complex problems, several groups are combined into detachments of 150-200 people.
The composition and organizational structure of groups and detachments in different provinces of the country is not the same. As an option, the following organization of a group (gang) of rebels can be cited: the commander (leader) of the group (gang), has two or three bodyguards, a deputy commander (leader) of the group, three or four scouts (observers), two or three combat groups (each 6-8 people each), one or two DShK crews, one or two mortar crews, two or three RPG crews, a mining group (4-5 people). The personnel in such a group is up to 50 people.
Following their tactics, the rebels attack military units when they move to the upcoming combat area, in the areas of operations, and most often when the troops return from the operation. Usually, an attack is organized on small military and rear columns, as well as on columns with military equipment, when it has weak security and follows without air cover.
Rebel bands often fire at security posts and military garrisons. Shelling is usually carried out at night using mortars, DShK, rockets. According to the leadership of the rebels, such "harassing" shelling keep the enemy personnel in constant moral and physical stress, exhausting forces.
Sometimes united gangs carry out operations to destroy organizational nuclei in counties and volosts, especially where there are no troops, and the self-defense units of the people's government are weak and morally unstable.
In the areas bordering with Pakistan, the unification of gangs of various party affiliations was noted in order to seize military garrisons and large administrative centers. In the southeast zone, for example, in 1983, there were united rebel bandit formations with a total strength of up to 1,500-2,000 people and more, which, in the opinion of the rebel leadership, makes it possible to more effectively strike at troops, columns and other objects, complicates the supply of troops in controlled rebel areas, conducting more decisive hostilities, organizing active defense, demonstrating their strength in front of the population.
In case of failure, the rebels must go abroad, replenish the losses in personnel and weapons, and return to the territory of the DRA to resume the struggle.
In the course of hostilities, using the absence of a solid front, the rebels infiltrate at night from the encirclement through the battle formations of the troops or to the targets of attack between the guard posts, occupy an advantageous position, and suddenly open fire at dawn. The main focus is on effective sniper fire. Currently, some gangs organize special sniper teams.
The economic blockade of certain regions of the republic is also a tactical device of the rebels. In this direction, sabotage at enterprises is widely carried out, disruption of the transportation of national economic goods is carried out, the disruption of power transmission lines, communications, agricultural structures, pipelines, irrigation facilities, etc.
The rebels skillfully use the protective properties of the terrain, have learned how to carry out engineering equipment of the terrain. Positions are set up on the ridges or slopes of heights, when entering or exiting gorges, using caves, burrows, specially equipped structures. In the gorges, firing positions of a multi-tiered defense are usually equipped 1–2 km from the entrance to the gorge, as well as in the spur gorges. At the commanding heights, the positions of the DShK are equipped, covering the approaches to the gorge, which allow them to fire at both air and ground targets.
Warehouses for weapons, ammunition and materiel are set up in hard-to-reach areas, in caves, specially constructed adits, the entrances to which are well camouflaged, and the approaches are mined.
One of the tactical methods of the rebels is to negotiate and conclude agreements to end the armed struggle. Some gangs enter negotiations, having lost faith in the outcome of a hopeless struggle, others - in order to gain time, preserve strength, and receive appropriate assistance from the state. Also, gangs, entering negotiations, continue combat training, conduct secret subversive activities among the population.
Leaders of gangsters, when negotiating, usually try to hide the number of weapons in the gang, especially heavy weapons (mortars, BO, RPGs, anti-aircraft weapons), underestimate its number in the event of a forced surrender, and hide the rest in hiding places.
In order to prevent the gangs from entering negotiations and going over to the side of the people's power, the leaders of the counter-revolution carry out the physical destruction of the leaders of these gangs. When an attempt is made to end the struggle, such leaders are removed from the leadership and sent to Pakistan for investigation. Devoted and trusted individuals are appointed instead.
In 1984, the arrival of the leading functionaries of the counter-revolutionary movement to the territory of the DRA was noted in order to study the causes and prevent the cessation of armed struggle by the gangs, there were cases when the leading leaders of the rebels themselves led the hostilities of groups and detachments against government forces. For example, the leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan personally led in the summer of 1984 the fighting of the gangs in the JAJI region.
It should be noted that the leaders of the counter-revolution came to the conclusion about the low effectiveness of the hostilities of small rebel groups. Therefore, in order to coordinate and improve the leadership of hostilities, it was decided to create larger formations - the so-called. shock regiments for commanding combat operations in border areas (KUNAR, NANGARKHAR, PAKTIA, PAKTIKA, KANDAGAR).
In addition, in the districts of the KHOST and JAJI (ALIHEIL) districts, several so-called. shock battalions for direct participation in hostilities. In particular, two such battalions are intended for operations in the JAJI region.
Usually gangs are located at bases, in separate adobe fortresses with high duals, in caves, tents, and dugouts. A group of 30–60 people can either be accommodated in one place (fortress) or disperse in the houses of the villagers for 1–2 people. Small gangs (15–20 people) are usually housed together. When co-located, security and notification are organized.
It should be noted that many villagers do not conduct a constant and active struggle against the people's power, they are peasants and are engaged in farming for most of the year. They do not want to fight away from their villages, but they guard and sometimes stubbornly defend their villages. In the kishlak zone, the majority of the population, on pain of severe punishment, supports the rebels and supplies them with everything they need.
There are many gangs that are constantly among the residents, or the residents themselves are bandits. Such a gang gathers in a designated place to complete a task at a specific time. After completing the task, the bandits disperse again until the next gathering. In this case, the weapon is folded in certain caches, the location of which is known to a limited number of people. The female half of the house is often used to store weapons.
The most active gangs are usually located near communications, as well as in areas of green zones and administrative centers. Various meetings and gathering of gangs are usually held in mosques (they are not attacked by aircraft), in gardens, from where you can quickly leave or disguise yourself. The gathering place of the gang is kept in the strictest confidence.
The rebels widely use disinformation, deceit, cunning, spread false rumors about the whereabouts of gangs or leaders, and use traitors and provocateurs. The rebels use disinformation especially widely regarding the number, location and routes of movement of gangs on the territory of the DRA, with the aim of misleading the command of government forces, creating a false idea of the number of rebels, and concealing the true basing areas, the nature of their actions and their intentions.
Cases of insurgents in the form of Afghan servicemen with the aim of discrediting and disorganizing troops in the course of hostilities have become more frequent. Replenishment of losses is carried out through the recruitment and forced conscription of young people in the field, as well as through the transfer of trained contingents from Pakistan and Iran.
The leadership of the rebels analyzes the experience of conducting combat operations against regular troops, implements it in the practice of armed struggle, and develops new tactics on its basis.
The rebels have learned quite well the tactics of the actions of government troops. The fighting skill of the rebels has increased in recent years, they began to act more cautiously, to avoid risks, gained experience, and are constantly improving the methods and methods of armed struggle. Particular attention is paid to the tactics of the rebels in ambushes and raids.
Ambush. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, ambushes should be carried out and are practically carried out both by small groups - 10-15 people, and by larger gangs - up to 100-150 people, based on the assigned tasks. The ambush is planned in advance in place and time. The correct choice of the ambush site is considered especially important. As a rule, they set up on the roads with the aim of destroying or seizing state columns with national economic goods, as well as against military columns. The main purpose of the actions of the insurgents on the roads is to disrupt traffic, which, in their opinion, will cause discontent among the population, divert a significant part of the troops to guard highways and convoys. At the same time, they seize weapons, ammunition and other material and technical means to replenish their reserves, that is, they are engaged in robbery.
When choosing an ambush site, they skillfully use the terrain. The most suitable places are gorges, narrows, passes, cornices over the road, galleries. In such places, the rebels secretly prepare their positions for an ambush in advance. Positions are set up on the slopes of mountains or on the ridges of heights, at the entrance or exit from the gorges, on the pass section of the road. In addition, ambushes are set up in green areas, likely resting places. Before setting up an ambush, a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain is carried out.
The ambush team usually includes:
observers (3-4 persons) for observation and warning. Observers can be unarmed, impersonate civilians (shepherds, peasants, etc.). The involvement of children in the supervision takes place;
the fire group carries out a mission to defeat manpower and equipment (the group includes the main forces);
warning group (4–5 people). Its task is to prevent the enemy from retreating or maneuvering from the ambush zone;
the reserve group takes up a position convenient for opening fire. It can be used to reinforce a fire group or a warning group, as well as cover when retreating.
The zone of destruction during an ambush is chosen in such a way that the main forces of the enemy enter it. Escape routes are planned in advance and masked. The place of gathering of the group after departure is appointed. It must be safe and secretive. The ambush site is well camouflaged.
The fire group is located near the enemy's engagement zone. The warning group takes up a position in the direction of a possible withdrawal or maneuver of the enemy. During an ambush, it is recommended to avoid the location of a fire group and a reserve on both sides of the road in order to avoid the defeat of personnel from the fire of their own groups.
When attacking convoys from an ambush, the main forces of the gang are in a fire group, which may include 1-2 DShKs, a mortar, 2-3 grenade launchers, several snipers and other personnel armed with rifles or machine guns.
The personnel of the fire group is deployed along the road at a distance of 150 to 300 m from the roadbed and at a distance of 25–40 m from each other.
On one of the flanks there is a strike group, which includes grenade launchers, machine guns, snipers. At commanding heights, DShKs are installed, adapted to fire at ground and air targets. At the same time, positions are set up out of the reach of heavy weapons.
When the convoy enters the affected area, sniper riflemen are the first to open fire on the drivers and senior vehicles, others begin shelling vehicles with personnel. At the same time, the rebels are firing at armored targets from RPGs, BOs and heavy machine guns.
First of all, the fire is concentrated on the head and radio vehicles in order to create a traffic jam, disrupt control, create panic, and, consequently, the prerequisites for the destruction or capture of the column.
It should be noted that the techniques of the ambush device do not have a template. For example, in the province of KANDAGAR, as well as in some other areas of the DRA, ambushes are arranged in the following way: several groups of rebels gather in a certain place, after which they move along different routes to the chosen ambush site, usually at night. In the ambush area, as a rule, they are located in three lines.
On the first line (position) - small groups of 3-4 people at a distance of 3-5 m from each other and 25-40 m from the group with a common front of 250-300 m. They are located on one side of the road. The main forces (fire group) are located here.
On the second line (20-25 m from the first) there are rebels, designed to ensure communication of the leaders of the gangs with the first line, as well as bring ammunition for the fire group. The rebels on the second line usually have no weapons.
On the third line, at a distance of up to 30 m from the second, there are the commanders of the bandit groups. This is, according to its purpose, KP. In addition to the ringleaders, there are observers and messengers here. The NP is located at heights, from where the road is clearly visible on both sides of the ambush site.
In the summer of 1984, ambushes at Pandshera were typically carried out in the afternoon before dark, allowing the rebels to strike and escape under cover of darkness when the air force was no longer active.
Sometimes, during ambushes, rebels seek to tear apart the convoy. In this case, they freely pass the outposts or most of the convoy and attack the closure. Lagging vehicles or small convoys moving without adequate protection and air cover are especially often attacked. Ambush convoys are most often carried out in the early morning or evening, when an attack is least expected.
Sometimes roadside insurgents act in the form of Afghan soldiers or Tsarandoi to rob passengers and discredit the government forces and Tsarandoi.
Ambushes in green zones are set up along the paths of the likely movement of troops with the aim of sudden shelling both from the front and from the flanks. Moreover, ambushes from the front can be organized sequentially on several lines as the troops advance, both in columns and in a deployed battle formation.
It is also recommended to set up ambushes when troops return from operations, when fatigue is affecting and vigilance is dulled. These ambushes are considered to be the most effective.
When subunits withdraw from the blocking area, small groups pursue them, firing at them from all types of weapons. Often, the chosen ambush site on the road is mined, landslides and explosions of bridges on rivers are being prepared in suitable places.
The rebels are trying to study the order of movement of state and military columns, to determine the places of rest stops in order to set up ambushes there. When identifying such places, the rebels can shoot them with mortars or mines in advance, fire at a stopped convoy from advantageous positions and quickly escape.
Stealth, surprise, deception and cunning are characteristic of ambushes. According to the views of the leadership of the rebels, ambushes are one of the main methods of warfare. In general, by ambushing, especially on the roads, the rebels inflict serious damage to the state and at times significant losses to government troops. Providing organized resistance to the rebels, they quickly remove their ambushes and hide without much resistance. With well-organized reconnaissance and protection of convoys by escort forces, as well as with reliable air cover, rebels usually do not risk ambushing and attacking such convoys.
Plaque. In the tactics of the actions of the rebels, such a method of combat operations as a raid is widely used. It is believed that a well-developed plan, covert approach to the target of the raid, security during the raid and a rapid retreat with the use of maneuver are required for a successful raid. At the same time, much attention is paid to the factor of surprise.
Before a raid, training is usually carried out in conditions that are as close as possible to the real conditions of the situation and terrain.
As with all other methods of hostilities, the raid is preceded by a thorough reconnaissance of the object (security system, fencing, the possibility of a reinforcement approach, etc.).
The approach to the target is planned in such a way as to exclude the possibility of contact with the enemy. For this purpose, routes of movement to the starting area are selected.
The objects of the raid are guard posts, small garrisons of troops, various warehouses and bases, institutions of state power.
Covert approach to the object is carried out in small groups, which, observing a certain distance, bypass open areas of the terrain, moving after them, without crowding and observing camouflage measures. Control and monitoring during movement are carried out by voice, specially developed signals or by radio.
On the distant approaches to the target of the raid, the advance of the gang can be carried out covertly even in the daytime, especially under unfavorable conditions for aviation operations.
When moving, the provision of security measures is entrusted to the sentinels following in front of the groups, and side observers, who are located in advance at the dominant heights.
The forward patrol (2-3 people) follows separately in front of the group on horseback or on foot, disguising itself as shepherds, peasants, etc.
First, one sentinel walks or drives, followed by a second in 1-2 km. The main group, having received information from the sentinels and observers that the path is clear, moves to the starting area, most often with the onset of dark.
In order to ensure secrecy and surprise, direct advance to the raid target is carried out at night.
The optimal composition of the raid group is determined at 30–35 people. It usually includes:
suppression group;
engineering group;
cover group;
the main plaque group.
The suppression group is entrusted with the task of neutralizing the sentries and thereby ensuring the actions of other groups.
The engineering team provides access to the barriers.
The cover group blocks the enemy's escape routes and maneuvers, prevents the reserve approach, and covers the retreat of their groups after completing the mission.
The main group of the raid is designed to suppress the resistance of the guards and destroy the object or post.
Upon arrival at the facility, the cover group is the first to take position.
The main group, after removing the sentries and providing passage through the obstacles, moves to the object behind the cover group and carries out a raid. When an object is captured, it is destroyed by detonation or arson by the main group. After the destruction of the object, the main group quickly departs. Its retreat is provided by a cover group.
When retreating, great importance is attached to misleading the enemy. To do this, the personnel of the gang are divided into small groups, which arrive by different routes to the designated gathering place.
Fighting in settlements. As you know, the rebels generally shy away from direct confrontation with regular troops. However, if necessary, they are sometimes forced to carry out defensive actions, including in populated areas.
When conducting hostilities in settlements, a fire system is being developed. Open areas of the terrain, tactically important heights are shot through. In addition, firing positions of DShK, PGI, mountain guns can be equipped at heights. In this case, approaches to the settlement are mined. Observers are stationed on the rooftops. The defense is engaged behind the duals, in which loopholes are made, or in residential buildings. For machine guns, BO, RPG, several firing positions are selected, which change at short intervals. Sandbags can be placed on roofs and windows. Ammunition and explosives are stored in the depths of the premises, away from windows and doors.
When firing from buildings in order to disguise and avoid damage, it is recommended to stay away from windows.
When the troops approach a populated area, concentrated fire opens, after which the rebels retreat into the depths of the village, leaving it halfway and occupying a new line of defense, usually in the houses of residents.
When the enemy's equipment and personnel enter the village, and the distance between the sides is small, the rebels open fire from all types of weapons. In their opinion, at the moment the attackers cannot use the full power of their equipment, their maneuver will be limited, the use of artillery against aviation is impossible, because their personnel and equipment will inevitably be amazed.
If the enemy has a significant superiority, then the rebels, after a short shelling of the attackers, retreat along pre-planned routes, kyariz, gardens to a new gathering place.
During air raids and artillery shelling, they take refuge in kyariz, specially constructed shelters, and after the end of the raid (shelling) they again take up their positions.
After the withdrawal of troops from the settlement, the rebels return to their old place and continue their anti-state activities.
According to the latest instructions from the leadership of the counter-revolution, it is forbidden to carry out major operations in cities or towns with a large population in order to avoid the defeat of civilians. It is recommended to send special groups there to commit sabotage and terrorist acts. However, in most cases these instructions from the leadership of the gang leaders are not followed.
Fighting aviation. Considering that aviation does not strike peaceful villages, as well as mosques, madrassas, cemeteries and other places sacred to Afghans, the rebels seek to settle close to such places or directly in them.
Air strikes are the most dangerous for the rebels. Therefore, increased attention is paid to the fight against aircraft and helicopters.
Currently, the rebels have anti-aircraft weapons only for hitting air targets at low altitudes.
DShK, ZGU, welded machine guns, as well as small arms and even RPGs, which are available in most gangs, are used as anti-aircraft weapons. In some gangs, new air defense systems began to appear for them, such as MANPADS of the Strela-2M and Red-I type.
The tactics of dealing with air targets consists in firing at airplanes and helicopters during takeoff or landing, during raids on objects, when, attacking the target, they descend to 300-600 meters. At the same time, fire is conducted intensively from all types of weapons, usually at the slave in a pair, which reduces the possibility of detection and retaliatory strike.
In order to destroy aircraft at airfield parking lots, the rebels often fire at them from mortars, 76-mm mountain cannons, DShKs, and rocket launchers.
Air defense means, as a rule, cover centers (base areas), various bases and depots of weapons and ammunition, as well as other important objects.
For DShK and 3GU, trenches are usually built in the form of vertical shafts at dominant heights with a certain sector of fire, which are carefully camouflaged. For the DShK, open-type positions are also equipped, adapted for firing at both air and ground targets. Often such positions are even concreted. The positions for the DShK have special slots for sheltering personnel. The slots are arranged in a star order from the main position. The order of using one or another slot for shelter depends on the purpose for which the planes (helicopters) are attacking.
Recently, much attention has been paid to training air defense specialists in training centers, where the rebels study air defense systems, theory and practice of firing, and aviation tactics.
Despite the fact that the rebel gang has a significant number of anti-aircraft air defense weapons, the effectiveness of these means remains low. The main disadvantage of the rebels' air defense is the lack of means of destroying air targets at medium and high altitudes.
Mining. The rebels on the territory of the DRA launched a real mine war, especially on highways, with the aim of interrupting or seriously obstructing the movement of state transport with national economic goods, as well as military convoys.
The main attention is paid to mining sites on the main roads: KABUL, HAYRATON; KABUL, KANDAGAR, GEPAT; KABUL, JELALABAD; KABUL, GARDEZ, HOST.
On the roads, mines are installed both on the roadway in potholes in asphalt (concrete) and on the sides of the roads, in places where columns stop and bypasses of large potholes.
To destroy military equipment and vehicles, anti-tank, anti-vehicle mines, as a rule, of pressure action are installed on the roadway. On the roadsides, in the places where the convoys stop, various land mines and anti-personnel mines are installed in order to undermine the equipment when overtaking the convoys, as well as when they stop outside the carriageway.
Along with the main roads with a hard surface, the rebels also mine field roads in case of movement of military columns along them, as well as roads near the deployment of troops.
Mainly used are pressure mines produced in various Western countries, as well as land mines with electric fuses. Guided mines and surprise mines are also used, especially in cities, as well as in areas of hostilities.
The setting of mines can be carried out both in advance and immediately before the passage of the columns. For laying mines in large gangs there are specialists and specially trained mining groups (4-5 people). Often local residents and even children are used for these purposes after a little training. The setting of mines for anti-handling is applied.
In some cases, the rebels, in order to detain the columns with the help of mines and landmines, arrange blockages on the roads in places where detour is difficult or impossible (gorge, passes, narrowness, etc.).
After blowing up several vehicles on mines or device blockage, the convoy is fired upon from all types of weapons.
With the aim of destroying a large number of vehicles at the same time, the rebels begin to use "chain" mining (30-40 minutes at a section of 200-300 m).
Cases have become more frequent (Alikheil, Paktia province, Larkoh mountains, Farah province, Pandsher) of laying in places where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines or high-powered land mines are jointly mined.
A new element is noted in the use of mines, bombs filled with fuel (gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel). When they explode, the burning substance is sprayed, which is achieved by the ignition of not only the exploded object, but also others nearby.
In accordance with the instructions of the rebel leadership, group commanders should set up posts in the places of laying mines that warn drivers of private cars and pedestrians. There is usually a charge for the warning.
With the help of mining, the rebels intend to inflict significant losses on state transport, as well as on military columns.
Attack on provincial and county centers. Attacks on provincial and county centers are preceded by thorough preparation, including reconnaissance of forces and means of people's power posts in a particular settlement, their deployment, study and preparation of the area of upcoming combat operations in engineering terms, and propaganda among the personnel of the DRA Armed Forces. In recent years, attacks have been increasingly carried out by several groups of different party affiliations.
At a preliminary meeting, the leaders of the bandit groups draw up a plan of action, outline the directions and zones of action for each group of rebels. Conducting reconnaissance of the targeted objects as a whole is not difficult, since bandit groups, as a rule, have a wide network of informants in the city, agents among the KhAD workers, Tsarandoi employees and personnel of units and subdivisions of the government armed forces, as well as under the guise of local residents they themselves have the opportunity move around the city.
First of all, the situation in the area of people's power posts, the number and mood of the personnel, the number and type of weapons, the location of firing points, the time for changing sentries, etc. are studied. The area of combat operations is prepared in advance in engineering terms. In the gardens and courtyards of houses of local residents, positions can be equipped for mortars and machine guns, recoilless guns, escape routes are prepared, for which ditches, ditches, planting vineyards are used, undermines are made for duval or disguised passages in them.
Immediately before an attack, rebels may be stationed in local homes, gardens, abandoned buildings, or occupy positions on the approaches to the city. At the appointed time or on a prearranged signal, designated rebel groups open fire on posts from heavy weapons, while others, armed with RPGs and small arms, approach the posts and also open fire from several directions. After the end of the bombardment from heavy weapons, the groups begin an attack and, under favorable conditions, capture the object.
Attacks on provincial centers, which are now all under the control of the people's authorities, are carried out relatively rarely and are aimed at maintaining tension in the city through a demonstration of force, exerting a propaganda influence on the local population, and undermining their faith in the ability of the people's government to effectively combat counter-revolution, which should facilitate the departure of residents to refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan, joining the ranks of the rebels. After the attack, the bandit groups do not stay long in the provincial center, and after the reprisals against party members and officials, robbery, collection of taxes from the population and carrying out mobilization activities go to the mountains.
County centers can be captured and held for a long time. At present, the leadership of the counter-revolution plans to seize several counties in one of the provinces bordering on Pakistan, in particular in Nangarhar, create a "free zone" there and declare a provisional government of Afghanistan in it.
The rebels avoid attacking those settlements in which there are garrisons of government troops.
Shelling of settlements, troop dispositions, posts of people's power, industrial and other facilities. In the tactics of the actions of the rebels during the shelling of various objects, one can distinguish such main stages as reconnaissance of the object, the departure of the group from the permanent base and gathering at the designated place, the occupation of pre-prepared firing positions, direct shelling, withdrawal and reconnaissance of the results.
In general terms, the rebels are constantly conducting reconnaissance of objects of interest to them in the area of activity. But before performing a specific task, including firing at a given target, a detailed study of its location, daily routine and lifestyle of personnel (population, employees, etc.) is carried out. The reconnaissance is carried out with the help of local residents and the rebels themselves, who pass or drive by the object. Sometimes selected members of bandit groups under the guise of shepherds and brushwood gatherers measure the distance from the target to the prepared firing position for launching rockets, installing recoilless guns, mortars, DShK. If the shelling is planned only from small arms, then the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the object is additionally studied, the routes of approach and withdrawal are outlined, the time and place of assembly after the task is assigned.
Basically, a group of 15 to 30 rebels is created to carry out the shelling. For conspiracy purposes, a specific task is set before going out on a mission. When shelling the most important targets, such as the location of troops, the rebels can act as a combined force from different parties. In such cases, the detachment can be 100 or more people. At the time of the operation, a single leader from one of the parties is appointed. Exit to the area of operations is carried out in small groups along different routes.
Shelling is most often carried out during daylight hours, less often in the morning and sometimes at night. In the dark, it is more difficult to determine the forces of the rebels, their positions, organize a combing of the area and use aircraft. To avoid large losses in a retaliatory artillery strike, wide dispersal tactics are used. At one firing position there are no more than two or three people, who are indicated in advance by the firing sector.
In order to increase the accuracy of the shelling, in addition to measuring the distance to the target in steps, the rebels sometimes make one or two sighting shots during the day. Shelling can be conducted from all types of weapons in service with bandit groups: rockets, recoilless guns, mortars, DShK, RPG, small arms. A group that does not have a heavy weapon can rent one from another group. The signal to start shelling is the first shot from the gun, the launch of the RS. After the end of the shelling, the heavy weapons are camouflaged near the firing position, and the rebels take cover from the return artillery fire. Then, knowing that the area is not being swept, they take their weapons and return to base. In some cases, the rebels start diverting small arms fire from the secondary direction, and then from the main from the heavy one. As far as possible, positions are selected in alignment with the settlement, which creates the danger of the destruction of civilians by return artillery fire.
With the advent of Chinese-made rockets for the rebels, their ability to fire at various targets has increased. The rebels arrive at the launch site of rockets in a car with a launcher in the back. After the shelling, which takes very little time, the car leaves this point even before the return fire opens. So far, the effectiveness of firing rockets is low. This is due to the poor training of the rebels, inaccurate determination of the distance to the target, and the low quality of the product itself.
A heavy weapon ceasefire, the order of the leader of the group in a voice, including through a megaphone, or an earlier appointed time can serve as a command to the rebels to withdraw. When withdrawing from firing positions, the rebels strive not to leave any traces of their stay, carry away the dead, wounded, collect cartridges. This is done with the aim of making it difficult to detect their location in order to use positions during repeated shelling. After leaving, the rebels go to the group rally point, where the operation is being analyzed. Then part of the rebels returns to the base, and the rest disperse to their villages before receiving an order to appear for another sabotage.
When conducting reconnaissance of the results of the shelling, the rebels use the same methods as during the operation. The data obtained is taken into account in subsequent shelling.
Sabotage and terrorist acts. Sabotage is carried out, as a rule, by groups of insurgents of up to five people. The most typical of them are the undermining of military equipment, the disabling of pipelines, the destruction of buildings of public authorities, air terminals, hotels, etc. places of deployment of units. Mines and land mines are installed both directly at parking lots (in trenches) and on the way to them. For detonation, not only conventional, but also electric fuses are used.
Disabling the pipeline is carried out by mining it in one or several sections, mechanical damage to pipes, shooting from small arms, etc. After damage to the pipeline, the resulting fuel is set on fire. Often, in places of pipeline damage, ambushes are set up to intercept emergency teams following for recovery work.
For the destruction of various buildings, mines and land mines are also used, the installation of which is widely involved in service personnel. There have been cases when the rebels used kariz systems to approach the building as close as possible, and then undermined directly under the building.
Terror is the most widespread action of the rebels in the fight against representatives of the people's government, leaders of the party and government, the leadership of the armed forces, with citizens cooperating with the people's government, unwanted civilians in cities and villages, ringleaders and rebels of neighboring groups and other party groups.
The conduct of a terrorist act largely depends on specific conditions. In places where there is no organizer of the people's power, rebel groups simply shoot the residents they dislike. Representatives of the party and the people's power can be destroyed both on a special assignment and in case of accidental seizures, for example, during an ambush on the roads, during attacks on provincial and county centers, and shelling of posts.
After receiving the assignment to destroy a person, a group of up to five people is studying his lifestyle, work schedule, routes and means of transportation, places of rest, regime and security forces at work and at home, etc. The circle of people around is studied most thoroughly. Depending on the results of the study of the situation, a method of physical destruction is outlined. This can be shelling a car, laying mines at work or at home, using poison, installing controlled and magnetic devices on vehicles and other methods.
According to incoming reports, the rebels currently have a large amount of poisonous substances of an unknown type, which have neither color nor smell. Poisonous substances in tablets, ampoules and in powder form are intended for mass poisoning of people in garrisons of military units, catering places, hotels, hotels, for poisoning wells, open reservoirs, etc.
On the issue of the use of artificial underground structures by the rebels to shelter detachments and groups and their hidden withdrawal in the event of a danger. When carrying out operations to cleanse villages, attention is drawn to the fact that often troops pass through settlements without encountering resistance and not finding the rebels, despite the fact that there was reliable, verified data on the location of bandit groups there. In addition, the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery attacks is sometimes very low, although it has been established that the accuracy of bombing and shooting was quite high. Such phenomena are explained by the fact that the rebels, in order to preserve their forces, use artificial structures - kyariz.
A wide-ramified network of qariz exists in the Karabagh region controlled by the leader Karim (IPA), which gives him the opportunity to take his people out from under the blows, secretly appear in places of overnight stay, and also store weapons and ammunition underground. For example, according to sources that confirm materials from the interrogation of one of the former leaders of the group from Karim's detachments, the bulk of the weapons and ammunition was stored in the Kalayi-Faiz area (map 100000, 3854-12516). However, the exact location of the warehouses has not yet been established, since it is carefully hidden even from the leaders of the groups.
In the Karim zone, kanats are mainly used, in some places cleared, re-equipped and improved at the direction of Karim. First of all, these are the qanats in the Kalayi-Fayz region, which connect this base with the villages of Langar (3854-12516), Kalayi-Kazi (3854-12516) and Bagi-Zagan (3856-12518).
There is a well-developed network of qanats between the villages of Karabagkarez (3858-12516) and Kalayi-bibi (3856-12516), which Karim most often uses for overnight stays. These settlements are connected both with each other and with the small villages of Kalain-Karim, Kalayi-Khojinsmail, Kalain-Gulamreda (all 3856-12516).
Almost every fortress and even every house in the Karim zone is equipped with qarises to ensure the safety of residents during the bombing, some of them have access to the "main" qarises.
Kyariz, as a rule, are built along the channels of groundwater, but this factor is not obligatory. Pulling kanats and communication trenches is a laborious process due to the difficult ground in the area. The rate of penetration is 2–3 m in 7–8 hours, and sometimes does not even reach 2 meters. The diameter of the wells is 0.5–1.0 m. Steps are cut along the walls of the wells used to enter the kariz. The distance between the wells is 8–15 m. The average depth of the kariz is 3, 5–5 m, and sometimes it reaches 12–15 m. The height of the horizontal adits is up to 1 m. Movement along them is carried out mainly in a “goose step”.
The entrances to the kyariz are carefully masked, secret entrances with secrets are equipped in various utility rooms inside the fortress, and sometimes directly in the duvals. Technical means are often used to mask the entrances. When a danger arises, the rebels leave through the qanats, closing the entrances behind them, so the planning of operations to clean up the villages in this zone should be carried out taking into account the presence of such a network of qanats and the possibility of the rebels leaving through them.
Transportation of gangs and weapons by caravans. Counterrevolutionary groups use 34 main caravan routes (24 from Pakistan and 10 from Iran) to transport trained rebel contingents, weapons, ammunition and materiel from Pakistan and Iran to the DRA. Most of the gangs and caravans with weapons on the territory of Afghanistan are transferred from Pakistan, since almost all the headquarters of counter-revolutionary organizations are located there, and the main flow of weapons supplied to the rebels is sent here.
On the territory of Pakistan and Iran, weapons and ammunition intended to be sent to the DRA are transported by road to the state border or directly to transshipment bases in the border zone of Afghanistan, where caravans are being formed.
When forming caravans and choosing a route through the territory of the DRA, the rebels avoid the template and often change them. In areas where troops are active in the fight against caravans, their formation is carried out on the territory of neighboring states. In order to increase survivability, taking into account experience, caravans follow, as a rule, in dismembered groups (2–5 pack animals, 1–2 vehicles, 20–30 guards) directly to active gangs, bypassing intermediate bases and warehouses.
The movement is carried out mainly at night, as well as during the day in difficult weather conditions for aviation. In the daytime, the caravan stops and disguises itself on pre-selected and prepared days (in villages, gorges, caves, groves, etc.).
Each group can be assigned its own route and final destination. Traffic safety is ensured by a well-organized system of marching and immediate security, reconnaissance and warning along the routes. The rebels often use civilians to carry out reconnaissance and warning missions.
The marching order of caravans usually includes a head patrol - 2-3 people. (or motorcycle), GPP - 10-15 people. (one car), the main transport group with direct security. Rear guard may be included in the marching order of the caravan. Due to the terrain, side patrols are rarely sent out. Organizational nuclei and trained gangs from Pakistan and Iran are deployed in the same manner on the territory of the DRA.
Subversive and terrorist activities. In the general plan of the struggle against the DRA, sabotage and terrorist activities are viewed by the leadership of the counter-revolution as an important factor in the serious weakening of the people's power. Proceeding from the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of the struggle and reducing their losses, the rebels have recently intensified their sabotage and terrorist activities. This activity is closely linked to the armed struggle and the propaganda work of the rebels. In this regard, the number of sabotage and terrorist acts carried out by the rebels is constantly increasing.
The training of terrorist groups is carried out in special centers in Pakistan, as well as in some countries of Western Europe and the Middle East. The insurgent sabotage activities include sabotage at state and military facilities, communications, in public places. The leadership of the counterrevolutionary demands from its executors to intensify sabotage at airfields, at the locations of government troops, petrol storages, at bakeries, water pumping stations, power plants, power lines, in parking areas for state and public transport.
Introducing disorder into the usual rhythm of life, according to the views of the leadership of the rebels, can introduce nervousness and cause discontent among the population with the organs of the people's power. This can be facilitated, for example, by disruptions in the work of city transport, interruptions in the supply of food and basic necessities to the population, the spread of false rumors, sabotage in public places, etc.
Much attention is paid to the conduct of terrorist acts. Terror is considered one of the most important elements of rebel guerrilla warfare. In the tactics of the rebels, developed by one of the ideologues of the Islamic movement Abu Tarok Musafer, it is directly indicated that terror is a particularly important moment in the struggle. The author calls for terror to be carried out against the infidels, wherever they are, to capture them alive or dead, to destroy them physically.
The physical destruction of party and government officials, activists, officers of the armed forces and Tsarandoi is one of the main tasks of the terrorist activities of the rebels. It is also recommended to kidnap prominent personalities, arrange explosions in cinemas, restaurants, mosques, and attribute these actions to government agencies.
Terrorist activities are carried out by specialists and trained groups. The groups also operate both in the capital of the DRA and in many provinces and other administrative centers. Sometimes individuals and even children are involved in such activities for a fee and under duress. Terrorist groups operate in cities, as a rule, they are well undercover and operate mainly at night. So, for example, in Kabul and its environs there are small maneuvering groups trained abroad, as well as separated from gangs based in the vicinity of the city. These groups have the necessary experience in terrorist activities.
Along with carrying out terrorist acts, such groups are tasked with improving attacks on important objects, shelling security posts, various party and state institutions. For this purpose, it is recommended to use cars and trucks with mortars, DShK, RPG installed on them, from which a short-term shelling of targeted objects is carried out at night, after which the gangs quickly hide. The composition of terrorist groups is usually small (8-10 people), they have the necessary weapons and cover documents.
Thus, the leadership of the counter-revolution strongly recommends that the most serious attention be paid to sabotage and terrorist activities, since, in their opinion, this is one of the most important ways that reduce the time to achieve the set goals, causes great material and moral damage to the people's power and excludes large losses of the rebels.
Agitation and propaganda activities of the rebels in Afghanistan. Propaganda and agitation, according to the rebel leadership, are the most important factor for achieving success in the undeclared war against the DRA. It is aimed primarily at creating an environment of political instability in the country, attracting the population to the side of the rebels, decomposing the party and state bodies, as well as units and subdivisions of the armed forces of the DRA, especially units and subunits formed from former bandit groups and tribal detachments. At the same time, much attention is paid to persuading the leaders and elders of the tribes to the side of the counter-revolution.
Agitation and propaganda work is carried out taking into account national characteristics, religious fanaticism, the relationship of various tribes to the people's power. This work is active and purposeful. At the same time, great attention is paid to individual work. Basically, propaganda work among the population is carried out by Islamic committees, they are actively conducting anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda among the population, skillfully using the blunders and mistakes made by party and state bodies.
In some provinces, trained groups of 12-15 people are created for propaganda work, which are sent to individual villages, where they work with the population. The groups are equipped with loudspeakers, tape recordings and propaganda literature. The propaganda is carried out taking into account the interests of the local population and the conditions of the area. For propaganda, priests (mullahs) are widely used, as well as agitators of relatively large gangs who have undergone special training in Pakistan.
For propaganda purposes, disinformation, spreading false rumors, etc. are widely used. To disrupt the government's measures to persuade certain gangs and tribes to the side of the people's power, the rebels seek to get in touch with these gangs, disintegrate them and force them to fight again on the side of the counter-revolution. Many techniques are used to provoke discontent with the people's power. One of them is forcing traders to continuously raise prices for food and essential goods and prohibiting peasants from exporting and selling food in cities. In this way, the rebels provoke discontent among the population, blame the government for all the difficulties, instill that it is incapable of managing and establishing a normal life.
The methods of conducting propaganda work of the rebels are very diverse: individual work, meetings, conversations, distributing leaflets, listening to tape recordings, radio broadcasts of subversive radio stations of the Afghan counter-revolution, as well as radio stations of Pakistan, Iran, the United States, etc. The leadership of the counter-revolution constantly demands from Islamic committees and leaders gangs to intensify propaganda work in accordance with the instructions of the rebel subversive centers. In general, the propaganda work of the counter-revolution in the DRA at the present stage is being carried out actively, purposefully and not without results, therefore it poses a serious danger to the people's power of Afghanistan.
Arming the rebels. The main weapons of the rebels on the territory of the DRA are small arms (Bur-303 rifles, carbines, machine guns, machine guns), RPG, DShK, ZGU, 82-mm and 60-mm mortars, 76-mm mountain guns, 37-mm and 40 -mm anti-aircraft installations. Some gangs are armed with outdated small arms ("Bur" rifles, carbines, shotguns). Organized gangs that have links with counter-revolutionary organizations and operate under their leadership are armed with modern weapons. These gangs have a large number (up to 70%) of automatic weapons. The rebels have a large number of hand grenades, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, as well as homemade land mines.
Much attention is paid to providing the gangs with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. The number of these funds in gangs is constantly increasing. The Strela-2M and Red-Ai MANPADS complexes appear in service. However, air defense and anti-armored vehicles are still insufficient and ineffective. In 1985-1986, according to intelligence, new weapons are expected to arrive.
Currently, gangs have on average 1 RPG for 8-10 people, 1 mortar for 50 people, 1 DShK for 50–80 people. In mid-1984, the Pakistani government took over the function of supplying the rebels with weapons. The following provisions were determined: for a group of 10 people. 1 RPG and 9 AK are allocated, for a detachment of 100 people. and more - one ZGU-1 (or MANPADS), up to 4 DShKs, 4 BOs, 4 mortars, 10 RPGs and the corresponding number of small arms. In addition, the organizational nuclei operating in the areas of airfields and other areal facilities are being armed with rocket launchers.
The plans of the Afghan counter-revolutionary forces for the conduct of armed struggle. The defeat of the rebel group in the Pandsher Valley in the spring of 1984 and the disruption of the counter-revolutionary forces' plans to create a so-called free zone in Afghanistan during the summer period significantly undermined the authority of the counter-revolutionary movement. These events caused concern in the leading circles of the United States and reactionary Muslim countries, which in turn increased pressure on the leadership of the Afghan rebels to consolidate their actions in the fight against popular power, and also expanded the scale of political, military and financial assistance to the forces of counterrevolution.
Recently, attempts to create the so-called government of Afghanistan in exile by electing it at the Loya Jirga in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan have intensified significantly. However, they, in turn, led to sharp disagreements in the highest echelons of the leadership of the Afghan counter-revolution and, as a result, changes in the degree of political influence of individual leaders, led to an increase in the confrontation between the "union of seven" and "union of three" groups, each of which continues to seek to provide for himself the dominant influence in the counter-revolutionary movement. As a result, in recent months, the most solid positions have been acquired by the “alliance of seven,” whose armed formations will in the near future be the main fighting force opposing the government forces. We should expect a certain increase in the coordination of hostilities between the bandit formations of various parties and organizations that make up this grouping.
In the context of the incessant personal rivalry between B. Rabbani and G. Hekmatyar, the figure of the chairman of the "alliance of seven" group A. R. Sayef, who has recently gained more and more political weight and whose authority in the ranks of the counter-revolutionary forces is noticeably increasing, is coming to the fore. …
In order not to reduce the activity of hostilities in the more difficult climatic conditions of the winter 1984-1985, the leadership of the Afghan counter-revolution is making vigorous efforts to create stocks of modern weapons and ammunition in food on the territory of the DRA in the supposed areas of the most active bandit formations. At the same time, the main efforts of the counter-revolution are focused on the following issues:
1. Provision of the necessary conditions for the declaration of the so-called free zone on the territory of Afghanistan and the creation of a counter-revolutionary government there. The most likely areas for the implementation of these plans will be the south and southeast of the NANGARKHAR province (ACHIN district, etc.), as well as the border areas of the PAKTIA province (DZHADZHI, CHAMKASH districts, KHOST district).
2. Expansion of hostilities in the border zone of the provinces of NANGARKHAR and PAKTIA in order to ensure the transfer from Pakistani territory of personnel, weapons, ammunition and other materiel for insurgent gangs operating in the eastern, central and southern regions of Afghanistan in order to disrupt measures to block the Afghani Pakistani border held by the DRA leadership.
3. Increasing efforts to fight for influence in the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan in order to force them to actively oppose the people's democratic government on the side of the rebellious movement.
4. Disrupting the normal life of the capital by disrupting the transportation of essential materials to Kabul, undermining the power supply system, systematic shelling of the city's facilities, organizing terrorist acts and sabotage in order to initiate a new wave of anti-Sovietism and discredit in the eyes of the population the party and state bodies of the DRA as incapable of ensuring the necessary order.
5. Creation of conditions for the activation of internal counter-revolution in the party and state apparatus, the KHAD bodies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Armed Forces of the DRA, the organization of sabotage at all levels of the state mechanism, the decomposition of the army and Tsarandoi personnel through the introduction of agents, the use of tribal, religious and national characteristics in their interests Afghans.
At the same time, the tactics of actions of gangs in the winter period will have the following features:
the main efforts will be shifted to actions by small groups (10-15 people) to commit sabotage mainly along transport routes (mainly in the directions KABUL-KANDAGAR and GERAT-KANDAGAR, KHAYRATON-KABUL, KABUL-JELALABAD), (terrorist, groups of sabotage on highways, groups for the use of anti-aircraft weapons, groups for organizing artillery shelling, groups for escorting caravans);
sabotage and terrorist activities in the country's settlements will increase, as well as the frequency of rocket and artillery attacks on the capital and other large cities. The rebels will take measures to improve the accuracy of artillery fire by adjusting fire using radio communications (mainly in the VHF range) through agents in cities, as well as prior binding of targets by coordinates;
the technical equipment of bandit formations with anti-aircraft weapons (including MANPADS, small arms and artillery weapons, modern communications and explosive devices) will increase;
the activity of underground Islamic committees will increase, mainly in the direction of intensifying propaganda activities and recruiting new members of counter-revolutionary parties in order to prepare for the beginning of the mobilization of the country's male population into bandit formations in the spring;
considerable attention will be paid to ensuring the concealment of the activities planned by the bandit formations, as well as increasing the efficiency of the intelligence plans of the armed forces of the DRA, KhAD and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to conduct operations against counterrevolutionary forces.
The leadership of the Afghan counter-revolution, taking into account the current military-political situation, has identified the following main tasks for the winter period.
Central region of the country. The leadership of the counter-revolutionary forces intends to maintain tension in this area by intensifying the actions of the existing gangs and sending trained reinforcements from Pakistan. In particular, at the past in October p. In Peshawar, a meeting of the leaders of the "union of seven" made a decision to strengthen the anti-government activities of bandit groups in the "Center" zone during the winter period. In accordance with this decision, to this zone during November from. up to 1200 rebels were deployed from other provinces of the DRA, as well as from Pakistan, including 50 people trained in MANPADS firing.
The main directions of actions of counter-revolutionary forces in the Center zone will remain the same: terrorist and sabotage actions in the capital, shelling of the most important facilities in Kabul, more intensive use of anti-aircraft weapons, sabotage on highways, undermining power lines, inciting anti-Soviet sentiments.
By regular shelling of areas where international and foreign missions, the international airport of the capital, and civilian aircraft are located, the leadership of the counter-revolution will seek to force the embassies of Western countries to leave Kabul, thereby demonstrating not only the local population, but also the international community, the inability of the DRA people's government to control the situation even in the capital, and at the same time contributing to the attempts of Western political circles to isolate the DRA in the international arena.
The most purposeful and active in the "Center" zone will be the gangs of the "Union of Seven" grouping, especially the IPA and the IOA. From the union of the "alliance of three" active actions should be expected from the armed formations of DIRA. Significant steps to unite and coordinate the actions of Shiite bandit formations in the central regions of Afghanistan and a sharp activation on this basis of their anti-government activities are not expected. The Iranian authorities are not planning large-scale deliveries of weapons and ammunition to these groups.
In the eastern and southeastern regions of the country. The defeat of the largest and most efficient rebel group in Pandshera showed the impossibility of forming a so-called government in a free zone deep in Afghanistan. Therefore, the main goal of the counterrevolutionary forces in the eastern and southeastern provinces of the country will be to seize control of individual regions (HOST district, areas at the junction of three provinces - PAKTIA, LOGAR, NANGARKHAR, southern and southeastern regions of the NANGARKHAR province) and announcement based on them a free zone, the creation of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on its territory. These areas are directly adjacent to the Pakistani border, the main supply routes for the rebels pass here, and therefore there will be a constant opportunity to supply weapons and ammunition to bandit formations, as well as to replenish them with trained personnel from bases and camps in Pakistan. The basis of the bandit formations in these areas will be the detachments of A. R. Sayef and G. Hekmatyar, as well as the formation of a "union of three", which plans to direct special efforts to create large bandit formations on a tribal basis, which, according to the leaders of the "union of three", will provide an opportunity active use of the Pashtun tribes on the side of the counter-revolution, as well as to increase the organization and discipline in the gangs.
When planning actions in the province of PAKTIA, the leadership of the "union of seven" identified three main zones for conducting military operations: the Jadzhi counties (center ALIKHEIL) and CHAMKANI (the center of CHAMKANI, the PAKTIA province) and the JAJI-MAIDAN county (the KHOST district). These areas are the most convenient for the actions of the rebels, as they adjoin directly to the border with Pakistan. In winter, the highest air temperature remains here, ensuring the movement of gangs in the mountainous area through the passes and supplying them with everything they need. In addition, the leaders of the Alliance of Seven group believe that the majority of the population of these areas is on the side of the counter-revolution, and the military garrisons located on their territory, without the support of aviation, are not able to resist in the event of a decisive offensive by the rebels. The only obstacle to the implementation of their plans, the leadership of the "union of seven" considers the impact of aviation.
In order to combat aviation during hostilities in the above-mentioned areas, it is planned to allocate and train special air observers, develop a system for alerting bandit groups about an air attack, provide rebel units with air defense systems for MANPADS, PGI, DShK, and prepare calculations for these means.
Despite the outlined consolidation of forces and coordination of actions of various counterrevolutionary groups, there is no doubt that disagreements, contradictions and even military clashes between them will continue in this zone due to spheres of influence, since this area is currently defined by almost all counterrevolutionary groups. as a base.
According to the available data, the counter-revolution, trying to prevent a decrease in military activity in this area, is also pursuing the goal of widespread involvement of Soviet troops in hostilities in the areas of settlement of the Pashtun tribes. This step would make it possible to dramatically increase the effectiveness of anti-Soviet propaganda in these politically and militarily important areas and finally disrupt the outlined negotiations of a number of Pashtun tribes with government bodies.
Southern regions of the country. The zone of the most active combat activities of the rebels will continue to be the city and the "green zone" of KANDAGAR, as well as the KALAT-KANDAGAR-GIRISHK highway. The bandit formations in this zone will pay special attention to ambush actions. In the province of KANDAGAR, both leading counterrevolutionary groups - the "alliance of seven" and "the alliance of three" are planning active hostilities. At the same time, in winter, this province will be a zone of special attention for the Alliance of Three, which plans to solve the acute problem facing it of replenishing its armed formations with personnel from the male population of the Pashtun tribes inhabiting the province. This work should be supervised by the personal representative Zahir Shah Azizullah Waziri, who has specially arrived in Quetta, who is well aware of the methods and peculiarities of working with the tribes of this zone, since during the Daud period he served as Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs of Afghanistan.
Northern and northeastern regions. Due to the fact that, as a result of the operations carried out by government forces in Pandshera, the traditional supply routes of the IOA grouping actively operating in this region of the country were cut off, one should expect energetic efforts on the part of B. Rabbani to restore positions in this zone. To this end, as well as to strengthen its influence among the population of the above-named regions, this group will go to the intensification of sabotage and terrorist actions in the winter, shelling of administrative centers, major economic objects, primarily objects of Afghan-Soviet economic cooperation, and to blocking the main transport routes … The IOA leadership will try to transfer consignments of weapons and ammunition to these areas. Taking into account that similar goals will also be pursued by the bandit formations of the second most influential counter-revolutionary organization in this zone, the IPA, one should again expect an aggravation of disagreements and even clashes between these groups.
Western regions. In these areas of the country, large-scale hostilities are not expected by the counter-revolutionary forces. The main efforts will be aimed at carrying out sabotage and terrorist activities on highways, power lines, in cities, attacks on border and army posts on the Afghan-Iranian border. Subversive and terrorist activities are becoming especially intense in Herat and its environs. In Herat, the counter-revolution will act like an urban underground, relying on counter-revolutionary elements among the population of the city.
Rebel Combat Management. The general leadership of the insurrectionary movement in Afghanistan is carried out by counter-revolutionary organizations, headquarters, which are located in Pakistan and Iran. Groups and detachments on the territory of the DRA are directly controlled by the united Islamic committees of the provinces, as well as the Islamic committees of counties and townships under the control of the rebels.
Islamic committees act as local administrative bodies. They, in addition to armed struggle, sabotage and terrorist activities, organize agitation and propaganda work among the population, are involved in conscripting young people into gangs, collect taxes, carry out judicial functions, etc.
In addition, so-called fronts have been set up in a number of provinces for more qualified leadership of the combat operations of rebel groups and detachments in important regions of the country, which control the combat activities of the rebels. They have rebel squads at their disposal, operating in their designated areas. The front commander has at his disposal a headquarters consisting of several departments. Front commanders are appointed from one of the most influential counter-revolutionary groups in the area.
Lower links (gangs), the number of which does not exceed 25-50 people, are controlled by local Islamic committees through the leaders of these gangs. A large number of groups and detachments of various national and party affiliations operate without centralized control, without communication with the front, on their own initiative, engaging mainly in robbery for the personal enrichment of gang members, primarily the leaders. Organized gangs and detachments have links with their parties both domestically and abroad, and are governed by the leadership of these parties and local Islamic committees. In order to organize a more precise management system, attempts are being made to unite gangs of various party affiliations in counties and volosts into detachments of a hundred or more people. However, these attempts, due to irreconcilable contradictions both between the gangs and in higher spheres, in most cases are not carried out.
The control system of the armed formations, despite a number of shortcomings, is being improved. More widely, radio communications began to be used for control: at the lower level - VHF, and with external management - in the KB-band. The number of radio vehicles in gangs is constantly increasing. From bonfires, smoke, mirrors, etc., at the beginning of the deployment of an armed struggle, the rebels more and more confidently switch to radio communication for control and warning.
For control and notification, along with radio communication, old methods are still widely used (messengers on cars, horses, on foot). Foreign advisers and specialists play an important role in managing the actions of the rebels, who are in most of the large gangs under the guise of doctors, journalists, and correspondents.
The insurgency management system is becoming more resilient, flexible and efficient. It basically provides leadership in the armed struggle of counterrevolutionary detachments and groups against the people's power. However, it is in dire need of improvement at the present stage.
In order to improve the management of bandit formations on the territory of the DRA, the leadership of the counter-revolution, on the recommendation of foreign advisers, made a decision to form a corps administration (I have not yet confirmed its formation).
conclusions
1. In an undeclared war against the DRA, the rebels combine effective forms of armed struggle with the widespread implementation of ideological sabotage, terror, anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda. This tactic is focused on a protracted war with the conduct of periodic active operations, especially in the summer.
2. In the course of combat operations, the forms, methods of organization and methods of conducting combat operations are being improved, and, consequently, the general tactics of armed struggle. The tactics of the insurgents' actions have become more flexible and competent, they more fully meet modern requirements, taking into account various factors of the conditions of Afghanistan.
3. The methods and methods of action of the rebels have become more decisive and varied. They seek to deploy hostilities over as much of the country as possible, focusing on activation in the border provinces, with a great deal of emphasis on surprise, stealth, mobility and responsiveness.
4. Acting mainly in small groups and with limited goals, the rebels are simultaneously trying to seize individual territories and large administrative centers, especially in the border zone with Pakistan, in order to declare them so-called free areas, on this basis to obtain recognition and officially all kinds of assistance from imperialist states.
5. In the future, the intensification of the armed struggle of the rebels is planned on the basis of the unification of disparate counter-revolutionary forces, the use of new types of weapons, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, the development and implementation of new tactical techniques.
