What did the captured Soviet military leader tell the Germans?
This document was preserved in an envelope glued to the album "The Volkhov battle", which was published in a limited edition in December 1942 by the 621st propaganda company of the 18th German army. He ended up at the disposal of a German collector who turned to me with a request to help in finding a Russian museum or a colleague interested in getting the find to Russia.
Fragments of the protocol published below were already published in No. 4 of the "Military-Historical Journal" for 1991 (translation from a copy kept in the archive of the Lubyanka), but I got acquainted with its full text for the first time. Here it is.
“Secret.
Report on the interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian shock army, Lieutenant General Vlasov.
Part I
Brief information about the biography and military career.
Vlasov was born on 1.9.1901 in the Gorky region (as in the text. - BS). Father: a peasant, owner of 35-40 morgen of land (morgen - 0.25 hectares, therefore, the allotment area is about 9-10 hectares, that is, Vlasov's father was a middle peasant, not a fist, as the Soviet propaganda claimed.), an old peasant family. Received secondary education. In 1919 he studied for 1 year at the University of Nizhny Novgorod. In 1920 he joined the Red Army.
“Vlasov did not hide anything from the Germans and told the enemy everything he knew or heard. However, nothing indicated the possibility of his transfer to the service of the enemy"
V. was not initially accepted into the Communist Party as a former seminarian.
1920 - attends the school for junior commanders. Then he commanded a platoon on the Wrangel front. Continues military service until the end of the war in 1920. Then, until 1925, he was a platoon leader and acting company commander. 1925 - attends the school of secondary commanders. 1928 - the school of senior commanders (in his autobiography dated April 16, 1940, brigade commander A. A. Vlasov reported: “In the period 1928–1929 he graduated from the tactical and rifle advanced training courses for the command personnel of the Red Army“Shot”in Moscow.” - B. WITH.). 1928 - battalion commander, 1930 - joins the Communist Party with the aim of promotion in the Red Army. 1930 - teaches tactics at the officers' school in Leningrad. Since 1933 - assistant to the head of department 1a (operational department) at the headquarters of the Leningrad military district (in the autobiography of A. A. where he held the following positions: assistant chief of the 1st sector of the 2nd department - 2 years; assistant chief of the combat training department - 1 year, after which for 1, 5 years he was the head of the training department of military translator courses of the reconnaissance department of the LVO. department at that time was really called the operational department. - BS). 1930 - regiment commander. 1938 - for a short time, Chief of Staff of the Kiev Military District, after participating in the Soviet-Russian military delegation in China. During this period, he was promoted to the rank of colonel. At the end of his business trip to China in 1939, he was commander of the 99th division in Przemysl. The commander of this division is 13 months old. 1941 - Commander of the motorized corps in Lemberg (Lvov. - BS). In the battles between Lemberg and Kiev, the mechanized corps was destroyed. After that, he was appointed commander of the Kiev fortified area. At the same time, he was transferred to the newly formed 37th Army. He came out of the encirclement in the Kiev region with a small group of people. After that, he was temporarily assigned to the disposal of General (actually Marshal - BS) Timoshenko in order to restore the material support units of the Southwestern Front. A month later, he was already transferred to Moscow to take over the command of the newly formed 20th Army. Then - participation in defensive battles around Moscow. Until March 7 - Commander of the 20th Army. March 10 - transfer to the headquarters of the Volkhov front. Here he began his career as a tactical adviser to the 2nd Shock Army. After the dismissal of the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, General Klykov, he took command of this army on April 15th.
Data on the Volkhov Front and the 2nd Shock Army.
The composition of the Volkhov Front in mid-March: 52nd, 59th, 2nd shock and 4th armies.
Commander of the Volkhov Front: General of the Army Meretskov.
Commander of the 52nd Army: Lieutenant General Yakovlev.
Commander of the 59th Army: Major General Korovnikov.
Commander of the 4th Army: Unknown.
Characteristics of General of the Army Meretskov.
Egoist. The calm, objective conversation between the commander of the army and the commander of the front took place with great difficulty. Personal antagonism between Meretskov and Vlasov. Meretskov tried to push Vlasov in. Very unsatisfactory orientation and unsatisfactory orders from the front headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army.
Brief description of Yakovlev.
Has achieved good success in the military field, but is not satisfied with its use. Personnel officers often bypassed him with promotion. Known as a drunkard …
The structure of the 2nd shock army.
Famous brigades and divisions. It is noteworthy that those units of the 52nd and 59th armies that were stationed in the Volkhov cauldron were not subordinate to the 2nd shock army.
By mid-March, the units of the 2nd Shock Army looked very exhausted. They suffered heavy losses during the heavy winter fighting. Armament was available in sufficient quantity, but not enough ammunition. In mid-March, supplies were already bad and the situation was getting worse day by day.
The information about the enemy in mid-March was of low quality.
Reasons: lack of intelligence sources, only a few prisoners were captured.
The headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army believed in mid-March that the armies were opposed by about 6-8 German divisions. It was known that in mid-March these divisions received significant reinforcements.
In mid-March, the 2nd Shock Army had the following tasks: the capture of Lyuban and the connection with the 54th Army.
Due to the subordination of the 2nd Shock Army to the Volkhov Front, and the 54th Army to the Leningrad Front, it was not possible to agree on orders for a joint attack on Lyuban.
Information about the real situation of the 54th Army reached the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army very rarely and for the most part did not correspond to reality and exaggerated the army's successes. With the help of such methods, Meretskov wanted to induce the 2nd Shock Army to move faster towards Lyuban.
After joining the 2nd shock and 54th armies, the next task was to defeat the German troops concentrated in the Chudovo-Lyuban area. The ultimate task of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the winter of 1942, according to Vlasov, is the liberation of Leningrad by military means.
In mid-March, the plan for joining the 2nd Shock Army with the 54th Army was as follows: concentration of the 2nd Shock Army forces for an attack on Lyuban through Krasnaya Gorka, strengthening the flank in the Dubovik-Eglino area with the help of the 13th Cavalry Corps, conducting auxiliary attacks on Krivino and Novaya Derevnya.
According to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, this plan failed for the following reasons: insufficient striking power, too exhausted personnel, insufficient supplies.
They adhered to the plan to move towards Lyuban until the end of April.
In early May, Lieutenant General Vlasov was summoned to Malaya Vishera to meet with the front headquarters, which was temporarily headed by Lieutenant General Khozin from the Leningrad Front (M. S. the troops of the temporarily abolished Volkhov Front made himself a scapegoat for the death of the 2nd Shock Army. methods of command and control, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was placed in an extremely difficult position.”But, strictly speaking, the enemy cut the communications of the 2nd Shock Army even before Khozin began to command troops of the Volkhov front. - B. S.). At this meeting, Vlasov received an order to evacuate the Volkhov boiler. The 52nd and 54th armies were to cover the retreat of the 2nd shock army. On May 9, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army met with division commanders, brigade commanders and commissars at army headquarters, to whom he first announced his intention to retreat.
Note. The testimony of the defectors about the 87th Cavalry Division was first received on May 10 at the headquarters of the 18th Army, subsequent news arrived between May 10 and 15.
Between 15 and 20 May, the troops were ordered to retreat. The retreat began between 20 and 25 May.
For the evacuation of the Volkhov boiler, there was the following plan.
First, the withdrawal of rear services, heavy equipment and artillery, guarded by infantry with mortars. This is followed by the retreat of the remaining infantry for three successive lines:
1st line: Dubovik - Chervinskaya Luka;
2nd line: Finev Lug - Olkhovka;
3rd sector: the boundary of the Kerest river.
The retreat of the 2nd Shock Army was to be covered from the flanks by the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies. Units of the 52nd and 59th armies, which were inside the Volkhov cauldron, were to leave it in the eastern direction last.
Reasons for the failure of the retreat: extremely poor road conditions (spill), very poor supply, especially ammunition and provisions, lack of a unified leadership of the 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies from the Volkhov front.
The fact that on May 30 the broken circle of encirclement was again closed by the German troops, the 2nd Shock Army became known only two days later. In connection with this closure of the encirclement, Lieutenant-General Vlasov demanded from the Volkhov Front: the 52nd and 59th armies to shoot down the German barriers at any cost. In addition, he moved all the forces of the 2nd Shock Army at his disposal to the area east of Krechno in order to open the German barrier from the west. Lieutenant General Vlasov does not understand why the front headquarters did not follow a general order for all three armies to break through the German barrier. Each army fought more or less independently.
On June 23, the 2nd Shock Army made the last effort to break through to the east. At the same time, the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies, used to cover the flanks from the north and south, ceased to control the situation (literally: kamen … ins Rutschen - slipped, slipped. more sparing for the command of the 52nd and 59th armies, but not corresponding to the text of the German original translation: "At the same time, to cover the flanks, units of the 52nd and 59th armies began to move from the north and south." - BS) … On May 24 (probably a slip of the tongue, it should be: June 24 - BS) unified leadership of the 2nd Shock Army became impossible and the 2nd Shock Army split into separate groups.
Lieutenant General Vlasov especially emphasizes the destructive effect of German aviation and the very high losses caused by the barrage of artillery fire.
According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, about 3,500 wounded from the 2nd Shock Army emerged from the encirclement in the east, along with insignificant remnants of individual units.
Lieutenant General Vlasov estimates that about 60,000 people from the 2nd Shock Army were either captured or destroyed. (in all likelihood, Vlasov means losses for March - June. For comparison: during this period, the 18th German Army lost 10,872 people killed and 1,487 people missing, as well as 46,473 people wounded, and only 58,832 people, which is less than the irrecoverable losses of Vlasov's army alone. The German irrecoverable losses are five times less than the irrecoverable losses of the 2nd Shock Army alone. But Lindemann's army at that time also fought against the 52nd and 59th armies, a significant part of whose formations also ended up in the cauldron and suffered no less damage than Vlasov's army. In addition, the 4th and 54th armies acted against the 18th German army. It can be assumed that the irrecoverable losses of these three armies were at least three times more than the irrecoverable losses of the 2nd Shock. - B. S.). He could not provide any information about the number of units of the 52nd and 59th armies located in the Volkhov cauldron.
The intentions of the Volkhov front.
The Volkhov front wanted to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the Volkhov cauldron to the east and concentrate it in the Malaya Vishera area for restoration, while holding the Volkhov bridgehead.
After the restoration of the 2nd Shock Army, it was planned to deploy it in the northern part of the Volkhov bridgehead in order to advance to Chudovo with the 2nd Shock Army from the south and the 54th and 4th armies from the north. Due to the development of the situation, Lieutenant General Vlasov does not believe in the implementation of this plan.
According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, the plan for the military release of Leningrad will continue to be implemented.
The implementation of this plan will essentially depend on the restoration of the divisions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and on the arrival of new forces.
Vlasov believes that with the forces available at the present time, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts are not in a position to launch a large-scale offensive in the Leningrad region. In his opinion, the available forces are barely enough to hold the Volkhov front and the line between Kirishi and Lake Ladoga.
Lieutenant General Vlasov denies the need for commissars in the Red Army. In his opinion, in the period after the Finnish-Russian war, when there were no commissars, the command staff felt better.
Part II
interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov
Acquisition.
The older age group from among the conscripts, known to him, is born in 1898, the younger age group is born in 1923.
New formations.
In February, March and April, new regiments, divisions and brigades were deployed on a large scale. The main area of the new formations should be in the south, on the Volga. He, Vlasov, is poorly oriented in new formations within Russia.
Military industry.
In the Kuznetsk industrial region, in the southeastern Urals, a significant military industry has been created, which is now reinforced by industry evacuated from the occupied territories. There are all the main types of raw materials: coal, ore, metal, but no oil. In Siberia, there may be only small, underutilized oil fields. The production of products is increased by reducing the duration of the production process. Vlasov's opinion is that the industry in the Kuznetsk region will be sufficient to meet the minimum needs of the Red Army in heavy weapons, even with the loss of the Donetsk region.
Food situation.
The food situation can be said to be stable. It will be completely impossible to do without Ukrainian grain, but Siberia has significant land areas that have recently been developed.
Foreign supplies.
The newspapers pay great attention to supplies from England and America. According to newspaper reports, weapons, ammunition, tanks, airplanes, and food are allegedly received in large quantities. He only had American-made telephones in the army. He did not see foreign weapons in his army.
He heard the following about the creation of a second front in Europe: in Soviet Russia there is a general opinion, which is also reflected in the newspapers, that the British and Americans will create a second front in France this year. This was supposedly a firm promise to Molotov.
Operational plans.
According to Stalin's order No. 130 of May 1, the Germans were to be finally expelled from Russia during this summer. The beginning of the great Russian summer offensive was the offensive near Kharkov. To this end, a large number of divisions were transferred to the south in the spring. The northern front was neglected. This can explain the fact that the Volkhov Front was unable to obtain new reserves.
Tymoshenko's offensive failed. Vlasov, despite this, believes that perhaps Zhukov will launch a medium or large offensive from Moscow. He still has enough reserves.
If Tymoshenko's new tactics, "elastic defense" (to escape in time), had been applied on the Volkhov, then he, Vlasov, would probably have come out of the encirclement with his army unharmed. He is not competent enough to assess how widely these tactics can be applied, despite the current attitudes.
According to Vlasov, Tymoshenko is at least the most capable leader of the Red Army.
When asked about the significance of our offensive on the Don, he explained that the supply of gasoline from the Transcaucasus could be critical for the Red Army, since a replacement for Transcaucasian oil can hardly be found in Siberia. Gasoline consumption in Russia is already strictly limited.
In general terms, he notes that it is quite remarkable that, as commander of the army, he was not informed of the operational situation on a broader scale; it is kept so secret that even the army commanders have no knowledge of the command plans in their own areas of responsibility.
Armament.
He had not heard of the construction of super heavy 100 ton tanks. In his opinion, the T-34 is the best tank. The 60-ton KV, in his opinion, is too bulky, especially considering that its armor protection needs to be strengthened.
Relatives of the defectors.
In principle, they stopped being shot in Russia, with the exception of the relatives of the commanders who defected. (Here Vlasov deliberately or accidentally misinformed the Germans. Order No. 270 of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of August 16, 1941 provided only for the arrest of the families of defectors, that is, those who voluntarily surrender to the enemy, and even then only if the defectors are commanders or commissars. G. K. Zhukov, when he was the commander of the Leningrad Front, sent a code number 4976 dated September 28, 1941 to the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet: “Explain to all personnel that all families who surrendered to the enemy will be shot and upon their return from captivity they will also be shot. It is unlikely that this threat was not brought to the attention of the servicemen on the Leningrad front. However, it had only propagandistic significance. In practice, Zhukov had few hands to shoot the families of defectors. After all, the NKVD was involved in the executions, and it was guided by Order No. 270, so severe repression was not Vlasov could hear something about Zhukovsky's order, formally canceled m as illegal only in February 1942. Perhaps he also knew about Stalin's telephone message to the military council of the Leningrad Front on September 21, 1941, in which the leader demanded, without hesitation, to use weapons against women, old people and children, whom the Germans allegedly sent to the front lines of Soviet troops in order to persuade them to surrender. … However, it did not say anything about the possible execution of the families of the defectors. It is possible that the former commander of the 2nd Shock Army was already thinking of joining the service of the Germans and was filling himself up: they say, then I would have to risk the life of my family and friends. - B. S.).
Attitude towards Russian prisoners of war in Germany.
People do not believe that Russian prisoners of war are being shot in Germany. Rumors are spreading that under the influence of the Fuhrer, the attitude towards Russian prisoners of war has recently improved.
Leningrad.
The evacuation of Leningrad continues day and night. The city will be held by military means under all circumstances for reasons of prestige.
Personal information.
For about three months, Colonel-General Vasilevsky has been the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
Marshal Shaposhnikov resigned from this post for health reasons.
Marshal Kulik is no longer in command. He was stripped of his marshal rank.
Marshal Budyonny, according to unconfirmed information, received a new appointment - to form new formations in the army rear.
Voroshilov is a member of the Supreme Military Council in Moscow. He no longer has troops under his command."
Commentary afterword
In principle, it cannot be said that the interrogation of the ex-army commander helped the Germans obtain any particularly valuable information. From June 24, when communication with the front headquarters was lost, and until the capture on July 12, Vlasov did not have any information about the position of the troops. It is no coincidence that the 2nd shock formations listed by the general were not even entered into the protocol: German intelligence had already identified them long ago.
The characteristics of certain Soviet military leaders were not of interest to the enemy either. What's the use of the fact that Meretskov is "a very nervous, absent-minded person" (will you be nervous after spending several months visiting Beria)? And how did the German command benefit from the message that Army-52 Yakovlev was drinking heavily? All the same, you cannot guess an attack on the positions of this army under the drinking bout of its commander. And the information about Lend-Lease and the timing of the opening of the second front, set out by Vlasov, was at the level of rumors.
But historians of the Great Patriotic War, I think, should pay attention to the analysis of the Luban operation. Vlasov placed the main blame for her failure on the command of the front and neighboring armies. Moreover, there are certain reasons in the testimony of the captured general. After all, the lack of interaction between the 2nd shock and the armies that tried to rescue it, the fact that Vlasov was not subordinate to the divisions of neighboring formations, which ended up with him in the "cauldron", is the fault of the front command. And Stalin did not seem to bring charges against the army commander surrounded by the army he led, since he successively dismissed the front commander Meretskov and Khozin precisely for not providing assistance to Vlasov. The failure of the supply of the 2nd shock, which Vlasov pointed out as one of the main reasons for the defeat, was predetermined by the weakness of the Soviet transport aviation.
It is curious that Vlasov put Timoshenko as a commander higher than Zhukov, although it was under the command of the latter that the general managed to achieve the greatest success. Probably, Andrei Andreevich was more impressed by Timoshenko's "elastic defense", which largely saved the Red Army during the implementation of the Blau plan, than Zhukov's desire to attack at any cost. It is possible that Vlasov and Zhukov had some kind of conflict and Georgy Konstantinovich tried to fuse the obstinate commander to the Volkhov front.
I think Vlasov did not hide anything from the Germans and told the enemy everything he knew or heard. However, nothing, except for testimony about the executions of the families of the defector commanders, indicated the possibility of his transfer to the service of the enemy. In this, Andrei Andreevich significantly differed, for example, from Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin, taken prisoner at Vyazma, who, at the very first interrogation with the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, on December 14, 1941, proposed to form an anti-Bolshevik government in Russia, which "Can become a new hope for the people."The collaborationist Mikhail Fedorovich was saved from the fate of the fact that von Bock was soon removed from his post and could not do anything to support the initiative of the commander-19. Vlasov, as you know, ended his life on the gallows.
