Almost the only tank battle of the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War of 1939-40, also known as the battle at the Honkaniemi halt and which ended in an impressive victory for Soviet tank crews from the 35th Light Tank Brigade, has been studied quite well. The second case of a military clash between Soviet and Finnish tankers at the Pero station is somewhat less known, but it ended in the same way - the crews of the 20th heavy tank brigade of the Red Army prevailed. In the Russian military history literature, several studies are devoted to these episodes, which can be easily found in electronic form, so here special attention will be paid to documentary and photographic material related to these events.
However, first - a brief information about the armored forces of the sides, who met in a hot battle on the snowy and icy expanses from the Karelian Isthmus to the Barents Sea.
In the Red Army. For offensive operations, the Soviet command involved a very impressive grouping of tank units and formations.
Only as part of the 7th Army, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus - the "hottest" direction of the Winter War, did the 10th Tank Corps and the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade, which were originally planned to be used as independent operational formations, as well as three tank brigades and ten separate tank battalions distributed to support rifle divisions.
Soviet light tanks T-26 are moved to combat positions during the Soviet-Finnish war:
The 34th Light Tank Brigade was included in the combat strength of the 8th Army, operating north of Lake Ladoga, and, in addition, the 8th, 9th and 14th armies had up to seventeen separate tank battalions.
In total, at the beginning of hostilities in the Red Army troops in the Soviet-Finnish theater of operations, there were more than two thousand tanks (data from various sources differ somewhat - 2,019, 2,289, and even 2,998). At the same time, the tank park was very diverse. Heavy tank units were equipped with three-turret T-28 medium tanks and heavy five-turret T-35 tanks.
Medium tanks T-28 of the 20th heavy tank brigade on the march to the front, November 1939:
The tank brigades and battalions had light tanks BT-7 and BT-5 of various modifications. The most common Soviet tank of this company was the light T-26, also in a wide variety of variations. In addition, the troops initially had a large number of small amphibious tanks T-37 and T-38. The combat use of the excellent KV-1 heavy tank (the question of participation in the "Finnish War" KV-2 remains open) and a number of other prototypes were of a limited and essentially experimental nature, although it brought "shock and awe" to the enemy (and the "hot Finnish guys "are not really shy!).
"Three tankmen, three funny friends, the crew of a combat vehicle" BT-7 from the 13th light tank brigade. Karelian Isthmus, December 1939:
The saturation of the tanks of the Soviet rifle divisions of the Red Army, which was to attack the well-equipped defensive positions of the Finns, was quite high. As of November 30, 1939, each division was supposed to have a tank battalion of 54 (according to other sources - 57) vehicles. Based on the experience of hostilities, which showed low efficiency in winter conditions of small amphibious tanks T-37 and T-38 (which accounted for up to two companies per "divisional" tank battalion), by the directive of the Main Military Council of the Red Army dated January 1, 1940 in rifle divisions it was established to have a battalion of 54 light tanks T-26, incl. 1 company of "chemical", i.e. flamethrower tanks (15 vehicles). The rifle regiment had a company of 17 T-26 tanks.
However, taking into account the losses and the inevitable under-supply in front-line conditions, this prescription was not always fulfilled. For example, at the beginning of the war, there were only 38 tanks for two rifle divisions of the Soviet 14th Army that fought in the Arctic.
Small amphibious tank T-38 in a captured village on the Karelian Isthmus, February 1940:
The T-26 flamethrower tank is fighting:
The most common combat mission of Soviet tankers in the Winter War was to escort and provide fire support for the advancing infantry with the inevitable overcoming of the Finnish engineering structures under fire. During the battles, Soviet tankers fought bravely and courageously (as in all their other campaigns - they simply could not do otherwise!), Often demonstrated a good level of professional training, although they also had regrettable "shoals".
Light tanks T-26 from the 35th light tank brigade in all variety of modifications:
Assisting a wounded Soviet tanker, the first day of the war - November 30, 1939 on the Karelian Isthmus:
Losses in equipment and personnel in the Soviet armored units were very high - probably more than 3,000 vehicles. Soviet tanks went out of order from the targeted fire of Finnish artillery at pre-targeted approaches to fortified areas and positions, they were blown up in minefields … The cold-blooded evil Finnish infantryman, armed with an anti-tank grenade or a bottle with a Molotov cocktail, was also dangerous in close combat. that this name came into use precisely during the Winter War with the light hand of the Finnish army wits).
Anti-tank weapons produced by the Finnish industry during the Winter War:
Burned down Soviet medium tank T-28 on the Karelian Isthmus:
Two-turret T-26, killed in a minefield:
Somewhat less than half of all losses were caused by technical malfunctions and emergencies not related to the enemy's combat impact. However, the evacuation and repair measures that were competently established in the Red Army made it possible to promptly pull to the rear, restore and return to service most of the lost vehicles. For example, in the 20th heavy tank brigade during the hostilities, out of 482 tanks that were out of service, only 30 burned out on the battlefield and 2 captured by the Finns were irretrievably lost.
The "Comintern" tractor pulls out wrecked tanks from the battlefield. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940:
In the Armed Forces of Finland. The President of the State Defense Committee of Finland (since 1931) and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (since 1939-30-11) Carl Gustav Mannerheim, the former cavalier of the Russian Life Guards and the adjutant wing of Nicholas II, a military man to the core and roots of a mustache, cannot be blamed for neglect defense construction. However, in the 1920s and 30s. the government and the majority of the members of the Seim (parliament) of Finland systematically disrupted programs for financing defense activities, and Mannerheim had to develop the country's armed forces on the basis of the sad principle: "defense capability is cheap."
The armored vehicles of Finland were the brainchild, or rather, the victim of just this state of affairs.
In 1919, when the bloody civil war between the local reds and whites had just ended in Finland (the whites won) and the country was still at war with Soviet Russia, cavalry general Mannerheim, who commanded the young Finnish army, initiated an order in France for 32 light tanks Renault FT-17 and FT-18. By July of the same year, the "French" were delivered to Finland - 14 in the cannon version and 18 in the machine-gun version. For their time, these were good infantry support fighting vehicles that passed the test of fire of the First World War. They proved their amazing strength in the Finnish service, in which they happened to be until the Winter War.
Renault light tanks in service in the Finnish army at their prime in the 1920s:
During this time, the initially formed (in 1919) tank regiment, for reasons of economy, was first turned into a battalion (1925), then into a separate company (1927). The training of tank crews was reduced accordingly. Cars occasionally went on exercises, more often - at parades, and most of the time they rusted in hangars, even without receiving proper maintenance.
Mannerheim managed to push through a relatively adequate program for the construction of armored forces only in 1938 (according to some sources - a year earlier), when 38 (according to other sources - 33) light Vickers tanks were ordered from the famous British company Vickers-Armstrong. 6 tons, the most "fashionable" in the 1930s. in countries that did not have their own tank building, machines.
It was planned to re-equip and arm the Vickers already in Finland. Thirty-three 37mm Bofors arr. 1936 guns (produced in Finland under license) for tanks were ordered at the state artillery plant VTT, Zeiss TZF sights and observation devices were to be purchased in Germany, and the Marconi SB-4a radio stations for command vehicles - in Italy.
One of the Vickers delivered to Finland during testing. The gun has not yet been installed on it:
However, fatal bad luck continued to plague this program as well. Due to delays in the production of vehicles and guns for them, as well as the cancellation by Germany of the contract for the supply of tank optics, of the 28 "English boxes" that reached Finland by the beginning of the hostilities of the Soviet-Finnish war, only 10 were in combat readiness and were being tested.
6-ton "Vickers" in a standard color (on the tower - an identification mark, a white-blue stripe of national colors) in the exposition of the military museum, Finland:
The situation was no better with the training of tank crews and subunits. Only in October 1939, the armored company that was in the armed forces was reorganized into an armored battalion consisting of five companies. But the staff was sorely lacking, and the 1st company was formed only on December 5, 1939, when the hostilities with the USSR were already in full swing. In addition, she was armed with 14 old Renault tanks. only these were the Finnish tank crews able to master well. The 2nd company also consisted of 14 antique "Frenchmen".
According to rather fragmentary data, confirmed, however, by photographs of the Soviet-Finnish war, these companies were sent to the defense of the so-called. Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus. There, the old Finnish FT-17 and FT-18 were used mainly as fixed firing points and, most likely, soon almost all were destroyed or captured by the Red Army. In any case, Soviet propaganda photographs capture the victorious Red Army soldiers examining the captured Renault vehicles, and an unknown Finnish photographer in the first post-war summer filmed almost an entire FT-17, abandoned in the forest and surrounded by lush greenery …
The 3rd and 5th companies were actually training companies and at different times had one - 2-3 Vickers tanks without weapons, the other - 12-16 Vickers tanks in the same condition. The only relatively combat-ready unit was exactly the 4th company, manned by the best crews and as of January 22, 1940, which had 6 armed Vickers tanks. In the process of additional equipment, combat vehicles were transferred to the 4th company. By February 10, 1940, the company had already received 16 armed vehicles and, at the very least, completed combat coordination.
There is no reason to doubt the personal courage of the Finnish tankers ("Yes, the enemy was brave. All the more our glory!" K. Simonov). However, it is obvious that their tactical and technical training, carried out in a hurry against the background of developing hostilities, to put it mildly, left much to be desired.
Tank battle on February 26, 1940
At the end of February 1940, the Finnish 4th Tank Company under the command of Captain I. Kunnas finally received the order to advance to the front. She arrived at the position on the Karelian Isthmus with 13 Vickers light tanks.
Finnish "Vickers" in camouflage white paint of the Winter War. This is what the tanks of the 4th company looked like, which the Red Army tankmen had a chance to meet on the battlefield:
The first combat mission of the company was set on February 26, 1940 - to support the counterattack of units of the 23rd Infantry Division in the direction of the Honkaniemi (now Lebedevka) halt, occupied by the troops of the Soviet 123rd Infantry Division with the support of the 112th Tank Battalion of the 35th Light Tank Brigade. Eight Vickers tanks moved forward to carry out the order, but two of them fell behind on the road due to technical malfunctions and did not participate in the battle.
The remaining six moved forward in battle formation, but the Finnish infantry for some reason did not follow them. Either she did not have time to receive the appropriate order, or, untrained in interaction with such a rare "beast" in the ranks of the army of the country of Suomi, like a tank, she simply "slowed down".
The Vickers crews, most likely, did not orientate themselves on the terrain, did not have intelligence about the enemy's position, and moved virtually at random.
T-26 tanks of the 35th light tank brigade of the Red Army in positions, February 1940:
In this chaotic onslaught, they unexpectedly came across three Soviet T-26 tanks, on which the company commanders of the 112th tank battalion advanced for reconnaissance. The opponents were at a very close distance from each other and, probably, at first they mistook the enemy tanks for their own - the T-26 and the Finnish 6-ton Vickers are really very similar. Soviet tankers were the first to assess the situation, who took up the battle and in a matter of minutes shot all six Finnish tanks from their 45-mm cannons.
The Finns were able to evacuate only one of the wrecked cars, but it was no longer subject to restoration and went for spare parts.
Finnish tanks "Vickers", knocked out in the battle at the Honkaniemi station on February 26, 1940:
The factor of luck cannot be completely ruled out, but this clash revealed a significant advantage of experienced Soviet combat crews, which, moreover, were headed by career commanders (three company commanders for three tanks!) Over unfired and half-trained Finnish tankers. The twofold numerical advantage of the Finns was nullified by the decisive actions of the soldiers of the Red Army.
However, according to the recollections of a participant in that battle, Art. Lieutenant V. S. Arkhipov (then - the company commander of the 112th TB of the 35th LTBR, later - twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General), significantly more Soviet crews could participate in the collision of tanks at the Honkaniemi halt.
V. S. Arkhipov - at the end of the 1930s. and in the post-war years:
Here are these memories, containing a very interesting, albeit questionable story about the events described:
“On February 25, the vanguard of the 245th regiment - the 1st rifle battalion of Captain A. Makarov with our tank company attached to it, - moving along the railway to Vyborg, captured Kamyara station, and by the end of the day - the Honkaniemi half-station and the nearby Urhala village.
The infantrymen dug trenches in the snow and rested in them in shifts. We spent the night right in tanks in the forest. We were on duty by platoon, camouflaging the cars on the clearing. The night passed calmly, and when a tank platoon of Lieutenant II Sachkov came out on duty and it began to dawn, a nap fell on me. I am sitting in the car, in my usual place, by the cannon, and I don’t understand, whether in a dream, or in reality, I think that we have pulled out far ahead, there is no connection with the neighbor on the right. What is there? There is a good position: on the left is a lowland - a swamp under snow or a swampy lake, and on the right there is a railway embankment and a little behind us, near the half-station, a crossing. There is the rear of the battalion - the medical unit, the field kitchen … The engine of the tank worked at low revs, suddenly I stopped hearing it. I fell asleep! With an effort I open my eyes, and the roar of a tank engine bursts into my ears. No, not ours. It's nearby. And at that moment our tank jerked violently …
So, with the incident, the first and last battle with enemy tanks began. Remembering him today, I come to the conclusion that he was equally unexpected both for us and for the enemy. For us, because until that day, until February 26, we did not meet enemy tanks and did not even hear about them. This is the first thing. And secondly, tanks appeared in our rear, from the side of the crossing, and Lieutenant Sachkov took them for his own, for Kulabukhov's company. And it was not surprising to confuse, since the light British tank "Vickers" was outwardly similar to the T-26, like a twin. Only our cannon is stronger - 45-mm, and that of "Vickers" - 37-mm.
Well, as for the enemy, then, as it turned out soon, his reconnaissance worked poorly. The enemy's command, of course, knew that yesterday we had captured the station. Not only did it know, it was preparing a counterattack at the halt and, as a starting position, outlined a grove between the lowland and the embankment of the railway, that is, the place where we, the tankmen and riflemen of Captain Makarov, spent that night. Enemy intelligence overlooked the fact that after the capture of Honkaniemi, having put on the armor of the battalion headquarters and up to a hundred infantrymen, at dusk we advanced another kilometer-meter and a half north of Honkaniemi.
So, our tank was jerked by a blow from the outside. I threw back the hatch and leaned out of it. I heard Sergeant Korobka downstairs express his opinion about the driver of the tank that hit us:
- Here's the hat! Well, I told him!..
- Not our company car! No, not ours!”Said radio operator Dmitriev confidently.
The tank, which hit our caterpillar with its own (our car was on the side of the clearing, camouflaged with a spruce tree), moved away. And although I knew that it could only be a tank from Kulabukhov's company, anxiety seemed to stab my heart. Why - in this I figured out later. And then I saw around the morning grove, the frost was falling, and, as always, when it suddenly gets warmer, the trees stood in a snow lace - in a kurzhak, as they say in the Urals. And further, at the crossing, a group of infantrymen could be seen in the morning fog. Gusko, dressed in sheepskin coats and felt boots, they walked towards the forest with bowlers in their hands. "Kulabukhov!" - I thought, examining the tanks that appeared at the crossing and began to slowly overtake the infantrymen. One of the shooters, having contrived, put the bowler hat on the tank's armor, on the engine, and hurried alongside, shouting something to his comrades. Peaceful morning picture. And suddenly I understood the reason for my alarm: there was a blue stripe on the turret of a tank moving away from us. Soviet tanks did not have such markings. And the guns on the tanks were different - shorter and thinner.
- Sachkov, enemy tanks! - I shouted into the microphone. - On the tanks - fire! Armor-piercing! - I ordered Dmitriev and heard the click of the closed shutter of the cannon.
The turret of the tank, which was the first to overtake our infantrymen, turned slightly, a machine-gun burst went through the forest, through the nearby bushes, hit the roof of my turret hatch. Small fragments cut my hands and face, but at that moment I did not feel it. Diving down, he fell to the sight. I see infantrymen in the optics. Tearing off the rifles from behind, they throw themselves into the snow. They figured out on whose engines the pots of porridge were heated. I catch the right side of the Vickers in the crosshair. Shot, another shot!
- It's burning! shouts the Box.
Shots of Sachkov's tanks are thundering nearby. Others will soon join them. This means that Naplavkov's platoon also joined the action. The tank that hit us stood up, knocked out. The rest of the enemy vehicles lost formation and dispersed, as it were. Of course, it is impossible to say about tanks that they panic - the crews panic. But we see only cars that rush in one direction or the other. Fire! Fire!
On that day, 14 Finnish British-made tanks were knocked out in the area of the Honkaniemi half-station, and we captured three vehicles in good working order and, by order of the command, sent them by rail to Leningrad."
(V. S. Arkhipov. Time of tank attacks. M., 2009)
The author shows the number of destroyed Finnish tanks much more than there was left to stand in the snow near Honkaniemi. However, it cannot be ruled out that in the heat of battle, Soviet tankers "knocked out" each of the Finnish tanks several times.
There is no word in the text about the reconnaissance of three Soviet company commanders on three T-26s. On the contrary, the author writes that other units of his tank company took part in the battle.
And here is how the clash on February 26, 1940 was described in the operational summary of the 35th Light Tank Brigade:
"Two Vickers tanks with infantry reached the right flank of the 245th Infantry Regiment, but were knocked out. Four Vickers came to the aid of their infantry and were destroyed by fire from three company commanders' tanks on reconnaissance."
In the brigade's war log, we find some other details of the events:
"On February 26, the 112th Tank Battalion with units of the 123rd Infantry Division entered the Honkaniemi area, where the enemy offered stubborn resistance, repeatedly launching counterattacks. Two Renault tanks and six Vickers were knocked out, including 1 Renault. and 3 Vickers were evacuated and handed over to the headquarters of the 7th Army. " It is mentioned here that the Finns used not only the new Vickers, but also the old Renault. Moreover, one of them appears in the list of trophies sent to the army headquarters, which leaves no doubt about the correctness of the assessment of the enemy by the command of the 35th brigade.
It remains to find out in what capacity the Finnish "Renault" participated in the battle - as firing points or on the move. And by whom they were incapacitated. Alas, there are no answers yet.
Finnish "Vickers" shot down near Honkaniemi, evacuated by the Red Army from the battlefield:
Outdated Renault tank, used by the Finns as a fixed firing point, destroyed by Soviet troops:
Finnish sources paint a slightly different picture of the battle, embellished in their favor (and this is understandable!), But describe in detail the fate of each of the knocked out Finnish crews.
Version one:
Vickers No. 644, commander Corporal Russi. Tank got stuck, crew abandoned. Destroyed by Soviet artillery.
Vickers No. 648, commander Lieutenant Mikkola. Destroyed two enemy tanks until the tank caught fire from a direct hit. The commander survived.
Vickers No. 655, Commander Feldwebel Juli-Heikkilä. The tank was destroyed by an enemy anti-tank gun, the crew was killed.
Vickers No. 667, commander Junior Sergeant Seppälä. Destroyed two enemy tanks until he was destroyed himself.
Vickers # 668, commander Sergeant Pietilä. The engine exploded from the hit of the anti-tank rifle, the driver, Private Saunio, survived, the rest were killed.
Vickers No. 670, commander Junior Lieutenant Virnio. He destroyed one tank, the engine caught fire, the crew got to their own."
Version two:
“Tank with number R-648 was hit by fire from several Soviet tanks and burned down. The tank commander was wounded, but managed to get out to his team. Three other crew members were killed.
Vickers R-655, crossing the railroad, was hit and abandoned by the crew. This tank was successfully evacuated, but it could not be restored and was subsequently dismantled.
Vickers R-664 and R-667 received several hits and lost their speed. For some time they fired from the spot, and then were abandoned by the crews.
Vickers R-668 stuck trying to knock down a tree. Of the entire crew, only one person survived, the rest were killed.
Vickers R-670 was also hit."
And separately about the fate of the Vickers R-668 crew:
"One of the tanks with tactical number R-668 lost its speed after hitting a tree. Tankman Junior Sergeant Salo died with an ax in his hands, trying to chop a tree. The tank commander, senior sergeant Pietila, ordered to leave the car and jumped out of it with a machine gun, but was shot. Private Alto, who left the tank, was taken prisoner, and only the tanker, Private Saunio, managed to get to his own."
When the crew of this tank was destroyed, according to Soviet data, Lieutenant Shabanov from the 1st battalion of the 245th Infantry Regiment distinguished himself by shooting one of the Finnish tankers (probably the commander) with rifle fire and taking another prisoner with the soldiers of his platoon.
So, the Finnish version of events contains several interesting points.
First, the assertion that part of the Vickers were hit by Soviet artillery and anti-tank guns suggests that the Finnish tankers in the battle on February 26, 1940 were completely disoriented and did not really have time to figure out who they were fighting with.
Secondly, the behavior of the R-668 crew, who first tried to "cut down" from a tree with an ax under fire, and then climbed "on foot" into close combat with the Soviet infantry, testifies to reckless bravery, but not high training.
Thirdly, it is not clear where the commander of the 4th Finnish tank company, Captain Kunnas, was when his subordinates fought and died near Honkaniemi. Among the names of the tank commanders who participated in that battle, he is not.
And, finally, the Finnish side's assertion about the destruction of five Soviet tanks is most likely based either on the reports of the surviving crews (who in the confusion of the battle really thought that they had knocked out someone), or simply on the desire to present the fiasco of their tankers in a not so disastrous light.
All the tanks of the Red Army came out of this battle unharmed. Most likely, the only Soviet loss was Senior Lieutenant V. S. Arkhipov, slightly wounded by a machine-gun burst from a Finnish tank, when he inadvertently leaned out of the hatch.
The commanders of the Red Army inspect the captured Finnish tank "Vickers", February 1940:
The fate of the three Finnish "Vickers", evacuated by the Red Army from the battlefield as trophies, is interesting.
It is known that after the end of the Winter War, one of them was transported to Moscow and became an exhibit of the Museum of the Red Army, and two were exhibited in the Leningrad Museum of the Revolution at the exhibition "The Defeat of the White Finns".
Vickers with tactical number R-668 was subsequently tested at the Kubinka tank range. It is logical to assume that it was precisely a "Moscow" museum exhibit.
Trophy Vickers R-668 tested at the Kubinka training ground, filmed from different angles:
The fate of the "Leningrad" "Vickers" was much more dramatic. We meet the story about this again in the memoirs of V. S. Arkhipov:
“Then I saw them - they stood in the courtyard of the Leningrad Museum of the Revolution as exhibits. And after the Great Patriotic War, I did not find the Vickers there. The Museum staff said that in the autumn of 1941, when the Nazi blockade of the city began, the tanks were repaired and sent to the front with the crews."
It is known that one of them entered the 377th separate tank battalion, which had been operating since the spring of 1942 on the Karelian front.
Tank battle on February 29, 1940
Remaining in the ranks after the defeat of the 4th Finnish tank company "Vickers" for the next three days continued to fight, supporting their infantry.
On February 29, 1940, during the fierce battles for Pero station, the second and last known clash of Soviet and Finnish tanks in the Winter War took place. Two "Vickers" - R-672 and R-666 - were thrown by the Finnish command to support the counterattacking infantry. During the attack, they suddenly came out on the advancing Soviet tanks of the 91st tank battalion of the 20th heavy tank brigade and were hit by fire on the move.
Finnish Vickers tanks knocked out at Pero station on February 29, 1940. A Soviet T-28 is seen in the background:
The combat log of the 91st TB of the 20th TTBR testifies:
"During the attack of the Pero station, one kilometer northwest of Värakoski, two Vickers tanks were shot on the move."
The report of the commander of the Finnish 4th tank company about this battle, in turn, reads:
"2040-29-02 At 14:00, the Russians, with the support of tanks, launched an attack on the Pero station (now Perovo - M. K.). The 2nd platoon, consisting of two tanks, fought in this area. BT tanks fired from the Soviet side in this battle. -7. At a critical moment, the track of Sergeant Lauril's tank was killed. The crew defended the tank from the Russians, but then abandoned it. Only Sergeant Laurilo came out to their own, the other three were missing."
It seems that the Finnish tankers again had a problem with identifying the enemy (if they saw him at all): T-28 medium tanks operated in this battle as part of the 91st tank battalion of the Red Army, 76-mm guns of which dealt with the Vickers.
We add that the crew of the second damaged Vickers managed to leave the car in full force and escaped.
Tankers of the 91st tank battalion of the Red Army examine the Finnish tank helmet after the battle at Pero station:
The battle at Pero station only confirms all the conclusions that can be drawn from the more famous confrontation at Honkaniemi. Higher professionalism of the tank crews of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40. when meeting with Finnish tanks, he literally did not leave the latter a chance.
Unfortunately, there were few such episodes, and Soviet tank crews had to do mostly dangerous and thankless daily combat work in breaking through the strong Finnish defense "in that unremarkable war."
Anti-tank fortifications of the Mannerheim Line:
