Escape from the Lubyanka

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Escape from the Lubyanka
Escape from the Lubyanka

Video: Escape from the Lubyanka

Video: Escape from the Lubyanka
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Escape from the Lubyanka
Escape from the Lubyanka

The Soviet ransomware met with American intelligence officers in the Moskva pool.

Betrayal in the form of treason to the motherland has existed since the community of people turned into a state and with espionage it follows foot to foot, shoulder to shoulder.

In the history of earthly civilization there are countless examples when traitors treacherously violated the military oath, neglected the duty of honor and morality, and violated the laws of human society.

For example, 300 Spartans led by King Leonidas during the Greco-Persian war staunchly defended Thermopylae and would have resisted, but all died a heroic death as a result of treachery, when a double-dealer led Xerxes' soldiers to their rear. Athenian strategist-traitor Alqviad left the army at a turning point in the Peloponnesian War and went over to the side of Sparta. The werewolf hetman Mazepa betrayed Peter the Great and went over to the Swedish king Charles XII.

There are a great many examples of treason by servicemen of the distant past, but in the proposed essay, based on the publications of the Italian magazine Panorama, the American edition of Time and declassified materials of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, a case is being traced, which, on the one hand, is impressive in the amount of material benefit received by the traitor, on the other - inexplicable from the point of view of ordinary human logic and psychology.

UNRELEVANT SEARCHES

In the summer of 1980, photos of the Sheimovs' family - Viktor, Olga and their five-year-old daughter - were handed out to all employees of the security structures of the USSR. To stimulate interest in finding them, a rumor was spread through the agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB that the head of the family was a responsible employee of the central apparatus of the State Security Committee. In support of this message, it was announced that the Investigative Department of the KGB of the USSR opened a criminal case into the disappearance of the family.

After several months, the search for the family surprisingly intersected with another criminal case: on December 28, 1980, employees of the 5th department (Tagansko-Krasnopresnenskaya line) of the Moscow City Executive Committee's Metro Security Department detained at the Zhdanovskaya station and killed the deputy head of the USSR KGB secretariat, Major Afanasyev … On January 14, 1981, the USSR Prosecutor General's Office issued an arrest warrant for the suspects, who soon confessed. Following this, a version appeared in the State Security Committee about the involvement of the arrested in the disappearance of the Sheimov family.

During interrogations, the ex-policemen, with difficulty remembering the details, got confused in the details, gave contradictory testimonies about the atrocities they had committed. One of the malefactors mentioned the murder of a family. So, within the framework of the criminal case "Murder of Major Afanasyev" a version about the murder of the Sheimovs appeared. They began to check it. The only way to establish the truth was by finding the corpses.

At the disposal of the prosecutor's office, a regiment of conscripts was allocated (!) To search the forest for possible burial places of corpses. With special probes, they drilled wells up to one and a half meters deep at a distance of two to three meters from each other. Despite all the efforts made, the bodies were not found, and the version of the murder of the Sheimovs was never confirmed. However, over time, indirect evidence appeared that Sheimov, alive and well, was in the camp of the enemy, but the fate of his wife and daughter remained unknown.

RUN WITH THE WHOLE FAMILY

In 1969, Viktor Ivanovich Sheimov, after graduating from the Moscow State Technical University named after V. I. Bauman, got to work in a closed research institute of the Ministry of Defense, where he was engaged in the development of missile guidance systems from space satellites. There recruiters from the committee laid eyes on him. They decided that Sheimov, this reflective intellectual, was in all respects suitable for work at a higher level, and in 1971 he began work in the most secret division of the KGB - in the Eighth Main Directorate, which ensured the safety and functioning of the entire encryption communication of the Soviet Union and was also responsible for government communications at home and abroad.

Personally, Sheimov specialized in the protection of encryption communications in the conditions of our embassies and residencies abroad. In foreign countries, as you know, the local special services go out of their way to push "bugs" into our missions and, if you're lucky, get into the altar of the embassy - into the encryption room.

The work in the Eighth Central Administration is highly paid, prestigious, not associated with the recruitment of agents, conducting searches or sitting in ambushes. Of course, talented scientific and technical personnel were drawn there. They were checked up to the fourth generation, collecting reviews from both friends and foes.

After a period of adaptation, employees found themselves in an atmosphere of work that was important for the USSR, they were generously encouraged with orders for success, created conditions for them to acquire scientific degrees and titles - creatively wealthy individuals “settled down” in passing, preparing and defending candidate and doctoral dissertations on the job. many became laureates of State prizes …

At the same time, the life of the cipher took place in its own hermetically sealed space. It was difficult not only because of grueling painstaking work - it pressed on secrecy, especially abroad, where they were under the special supervision of their own security service and were forced to follow strict rules of conduct. After all, other people's ciphers are a treasure for any intelligence. If the secret service is faced with a dilemma: whether to recruit a minister or a cryptographer, it will prefer the latter. Ministers come and go, and the secrets of cryptography have remained unchanged for many years. In addition, the ransomware can provide access to many secret communications and provide an opportunity to get acquainted with all previously intercepted telegrams …

Sheimov's career in the Eighth Headquarters of the KGB was as swift as the flight of a bullet: in eight years of service, he was a major and (!) The head of the department in charge of the encryption communications of our embassies. On the party line - deputy secretary of the party organization. But, despite all the external achievements, he was oppressed by a feeling of internal dissatisfaction. This feeling, as he admits in his memoirs, "turned into a denial of everything soviet" …

How to live on? Adapt, do your job and, closing your eyes and mouth, wait for everything to change by itself? Submit your resignation letter and say goodbye to the KGB? Openly oppose the regime, like Sakharov? Create an anti-communist organization?

In his memoirs, he pompously tells about the reasons and motives for his flight. A lot of everything: discussion of literary works of authors banned in the Union during night gatherings with Moscow dissidents, who became its surrogate fathers; hypocrisy of the authorities and leaders; dissatisfaction with your lifestyle; pessimistic outlook on the future of the country; the desire not just to be indignant with the existing system, sitting, like many, staring into a glass in the kitchen, no! - the desire to participate in its complete defeat, and even on a global scale. According to Sheimov, when he felt that “the flame of a true opposition was burning in him,” he decided to step on the opposite lane of fate, and the dominant feature of his existence was the idea of making his legs out of the Union.

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Knowing first-hand the capabilities of the KGB and soberly assessing his strength, the pragmatist Sheimov chose the most rational, albeit the most risky, option in all respects - to flee to the West. And with my wife and daughter! The material side of the exodus from the USSR did not bother him at all - he knew for sure that his family and even his grandchildren would be provided for until the end of his days after he sold the Americans the baggage of information that he had.

The question was how to run? The whole family was not allowed to go abroad, even to Bulgaria. There was only one thing to do: contact a strong intelligence service. With whom? From the English ICU or from the CIA? The British? No, you can't cook porridge with these arrogant schemers! Better - the Americans. It is necessary to somehow contrive and get out to them, and after leaving, interest in their position and convince them to organize an escape. Make an appointment by phone? It is excluded - they will immediately tie it up. Write a letter? They will intercept and imprison. One thing remains: to personally get in touch with the Americans. And fate gave him such a chance during his second business trip to Poland.

For several days of his stay on the territory of the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, Sheimov thoroughly studied the routine of the life of the Russian colony and, waiting for the evening, when the next fresh film from Moscow would be shown, he carried out reconnaissance and calculated everything. After lunch on the same day, he conducted a blitz preparation: he complained to the guard assigned to him about an upset stomach due to stale food. The latter enthusiastically picked up the theme: “These bastards Poles are poisoning us, they are constantly trying to sell products with an expired shelf life, and it’s high time to sort it out with the commandant of the embassy, he buys, you know, this swindler is on the cheap, whatever he gets. It feeds its suppliers, with whom it shares. All hands do not reach this backbone, so that he was empty!"

In the evening, the employees moved in thick chains to the cinema hall of the cultural center. Sheimov, talking with the guard on the go, seemed to have accidentally dropped a lighter. It is stupid and useless to look for her in such a commotion, and he threw to his guard: "I'll go to the toilet, I'll be right back!" At the same time, he made such a painful face that doubts would disappear from the most zealous guard by themselves …

Closing in the cockpit, he squeezed for three minutes until he removed from the rectum the thinnest glass capsule - a homemade preparation - with five rolled-up tubes of 10 dollar bills. Using the pliers hidden behind the toilet cistern, he opened the window. He glued on his beard and mustache, put on dark glasses. He was lucky: a truck stopped on the street nearby, blocking the window opening from the Polish police officer guarding the embassy, and jumped onto the sidewalk unnoticed. Then - a taxi, of which darkness is dark on the streets of evening Warsaw. He casually threw the driver in English: "American Embassy!" Paid in dollars.

So on October 31, 1979 in Warsaw, Sheimov, having deceived a vigilant guard, made a dagger throw to the American embassy, where the CIA station officers immediately opened their arms to meet him, as soon as he named his position. Which is quite understandable, because someone else's ciphers are a treasure for any intelligence. If there is an alternative before the secret service: to recruit a resident or a cipher officer, then even the trainee will point his finger at the latter. Why? Because the ransomware can provide a key to unraveling many secrets, not only of the current day, but also of those that have accumulated in archive files over the past 10–20 years. This is, first of all, the exchange of cipher telegrams between the resident and the Center, which promises direct access to the "moles" hidden in the depths of the native special services, and encrypted correspondence through the diplomatic channel, and … But you never know, what secrets of the enemy can be penetrated with the help of a defector-cryptor!

In general, when Sheimov appeared, the American intelligence officers from the CIA station in Warsaw, who met him, had a slight dizziness: not many have a stake in accepting such a guest who brings gifts. It's not just some code tables, no - a cipher in flesh and blood!

But reason quickly prevailed over emotion. A few control questions: who is the head of line "X" - scientific and technical intelligence? What is your position and pay? What do you do in Moscow? How many years have you been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the KGB system?

Having written down the home address and telephone number of the visitor, the Americans suggested that he immediately leave for the United States.

But this did not suit Sheimov, he set his own conditions: a personal meeting with a courier after returning to Moscow and the organization of the export of himself, his wife and young daughter to the States.

After reaching an understanding between the secretly negotiating parties, everything that night happened according to the scenario worked out for years: the removal of the "initiator" from the American embassy in a "clean", that is, not belonging to the scout car, a high-speed rodeo for 30-40 minutes along the empty night streets of Warsaw for checking if there is a "tail" …

AT LOW START

According to Sheimov, his Moscow espionage session was limited to three meetings with an employee of the "deep cover" of the CIA station operating in the capital under the "roof" of the US embassy. The turnouts took place in the Moskva swimming pool in the late evening. The place was not chosen by chance - the conspirators are inaccessible for "outdoor": it is impossible to photograph them and track the conversation in the water! Yes, and from the outside, everything looks natural: two rubber caps are floating next to each other, of which darkness is in the pool, guess what, they are spies!

At the meetings, Sheimov transmitted only strictly dosed information about his work. He categorically refused to give out strategic secrets, as he feared that in this case the Americans would force him to remain in the Union as a "mole".

During the second meeting, the courier told Sheimov that the CIA leadership and the US presidential administration had authorized the organization of the escape. Sheimov was only required to transfer photographs for documents and provide full anthropological data, both his own and family members: exact height, chest volume, weight, size of clothes and shoes. At the same time, the messenger asked how the ward and his household endure the sea rolling? Sheimov decided that they would be illegally transported abroad by sea. He immediately asked a clarifying question. However, the messenger, without confirming, but also not refuting the guesses, demanded one thing: not to fuss and wait for the signal.

Most likely, the messenger did not know how the fugitives would move. As for Sheimov, he, by his own admission, was absolutely indifferent - let the Americans have a headache. The only thing he warned the courier about was that a flight from the Sheremetyevo-2 international airport using false documents was fraught with the failure of the entire enterprise: the KGB officers who knew him by sight could be at the airport. In parting, the American promised to come up with something out of the ordinary.

Having received assurances, Sheimov and his wife, who by that time had been privy to her husband's plans, began to actively prepare for their escape, taking all the necessary interim measures. So, Olga immediately removed some things from the mezzanine so as not to do it on the eve of the flight - the mezzanine should remain dusty. I wanted to take with me both family albums and things loved from childhood, but Sheimov was adamant: nothing should indicate preparation for departure, everything should look like the inexplicable disappearance of the whole family. Family photos were copied at a photo studio.

The cunning Sheimov came up with the idea to present the disappearance as an accident, as the death of the whole family. Subsequently, this would exclude the persecution of their parents by the KGB. But the main thing is that nothing should have forced the authorities to immediately take decisive measures to replace or modify the entire volume of technical information that the traitor was going to transfer to the Americans.

The parents remained. How to deal with them? They will die of grief upon learning of the sudden disappearance and death of their beloved son, daughter-in-law and granddaughter! But you cannot devote them to plans. The father is an orthodox communist, he will not understand anything, and the mother … It is a pity for the mother. And then, on his birthday, Viktor stopped by his parents and, incidentally, said: “Mom, I have a business trip … Difficult, in some ways even dangerous. Please don't believe me if you hear that I am lost. Don't believe it until you see my corpse. The mother was very surprised, but did not dare to ask about anything - such is the work of her son. Absolutely secret!

It was decided to carry out the operation on Friday - the work will not be missed until Monday. To confuse possible pursuers and confuse traces, Olga bought tickets for the Moscow-Uzhgorod train, and Viktor warned his superiors that he was leaving for the Moscow region, to a friend's dacha, where there was no telephone connection.

The Americans also tried. In order to create a diversionary maneuver, as well as to pull apart the "outdoor" forces, all the CIA station officers in Moscow, operating from ambassadorial positions, tirelessly circled the city from 6 pm to 11 pm, imitating going to a meeting with their agents.

On Friday at 22.30, a NATO military transport aircraft took off from Vnukovo, which had arrived in Moscow the day before to pick up several tons of spent electronic equipment from the American embassy. Viktor Sheimov, dressed up and dressed in an American military uniform, took the place of the co-pilot. The wife and daughter were taken to the plane in containers.

Debriefing

Today it is not possible to determine how long the KGB leadership had no idea about Sheimov's escape. The statements of the former leaders of the committee on this score are also contradictory. In particular, F. D. Bobkov, a former deputy chairman of the KGB, writes in his book "The KGB and Power":

“To our great shame, it was soon established: neither in Moscow nor in the country of Sheimov and his family. We left. They themselves, of course, could not have done this. All three were taken out, apparently with their consent …

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Conducted a thorough investigation. And again a blow awaited us …

So, Sheimov, his wife and daughter were taken out. How? Counterintelligence could not answer this question, and, apparently, did not really strive - it is difficult to admit their failures!"

According to V. A. Kryuchkov, the ex-head of the KGB of the USSR, after being appointed in May 1982 as the chairman of the State Security Committee V. I. Fedorchuk, a re-investigation of the disappearance of the cryptographer Sheimov, his wife and child was carried out. Counterintelligence officers insisted on the version of the murder of the whole family and denied the version of its export from the USSR by the Americans.

Logic suggests that only after the recruitment of Colonel V. I. Cherkashin in April 1985, the head of the CIA counterintelligence unit, Aldrich Ames, it was precisely established that Sheimov and his family were taken by the Americans to the United States in May 1980.

Upon arrival in the United States, the Sheimovs were settled, of course, under a false name in a two-story cottage near Washington. Home and garden rent, food and servants are all at the expense of the CIA. Victor had his appearance changed with the help of facial plastic surgery and was awarded a medal. In addition, he was placed under the protection of the US federal law "On the Protection of Assistants for the Prosperity of the United States of America."

However, despite all the attempts, the Tsereush patrons did not manage to present Sheimov to the western man in the street as a disinterested fighter against the Soviet regime, that is, the canonization of the traitor did not happen.

“Sheimov’s selfish espionage, abundantly paid for by the CIA,” noted Philip Knightley, an authoritative researcher of the activities of Western intelligence services in his article in the Italian magazine Panorama, “is based equally on the buyer's (CIA’s) intention to purchase goods (information) and on the seller’s (Sheimova’s) desire) get cash. Ideological and political motives, which at one time guided the members of the "atomic spy group": Enrico Fermi, Klaus Fuchs, or members of the "Cambridge Five": Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald McLean, John Kerncross and Anthony Blunt, are simply alien ".

In the late 1980s, Sheimov, trying to justify his betrayal in the eyes of the American public, made a number of sensational revelations. In particular, he stated that from the materials of the KGB, to which he, as a cryptographer, had access, he learned that it was this department that organized the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II in 1981 and on the President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq in 1988.

For the “puppeteers” of Sheimov, the performance turned out to be a complete failure. After all, American journalists, experts in the special services, who tracked the movements of the werewolf ransomware, were aware that since May 1980 he had nothing to do with the KGB and was not admitted to any secrets. And the writing fraternity rejected the fraud, stating that "the so-called objective information about the assassination attempts" was concocted in Langley, and the defector only announced it.

Then the second double followed: in 1993, the publishing house Nevel institute press published Sheimov's book in Russian "The Tower of Secrets: A Documentary Spy Detective", where he talks in a third person about his work in the KGB and about his escape to the United States.

And again a bobble. Even American reviewers from the Washington Post found in the opus “narcissism, the depth and constancy of the love that the author has for himself. HE came up with an escape plan. HE accomplished it in spite of all obstacles. HE wiped his nose with the CIA and the KGB, showing both special services a master class. Downright unsurpassed creator of ingenious operations and a diamond in a heap of manure!"

Time magazine spoke more harshly about the traitor. An article about his book entitled "Shame on you, Victor!" - "Shame on you, Victor!" (in English shame means "shame, shame"), the FBI experts, who wished to remain anonymous, first chided the traitor for refusing to cooperate with the CIA on a long-term basis - he did not become his full-fledged "mole" in the KGB, but ended with an ultimatum passage: "Victor, don't make yourself a Snow Maiden when the CIA takes you to your rooms!"

It seems that with Sheimov his American masters did what they should do with the Moor …

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