The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm

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The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm
The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm

Video: The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm

Video: The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm
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With all the auxiliary contingents, individual corps and detachments, the Allied ground forces numbered about half a million soldiers. However, they were dispersed over a large area and did not have a unified command. The French army, together with the Italian and Dutch contingents, numbered about 450 thousand people. But a significant part of the troops was involved in the defense of fortresses (garrisons), the coast, borders, etc. Napoleon could put no more than 250 thousand bayonets and sabers and 340 guns for the campaign. As a result, the field armies of France were significantly inferior to the forces of the coalition, but were concentrated in one grouping and subordinated to one will - the will of the emperor.

Napoleon did not wait for the Allies to squeeze the French forces out of their subordinate territories and invade France itself. “If I am not in London in 15 days, then I should be in Vienna in mid-November,” the emperor said. London escaped, but Vienna had to pay for it. Of the many particular tasks, the emperor immediately singled out the main one: to seize the strategic initiative, defeat the main enemy grouping and take Vienna. Napoleon planned in several battles to withdraw the central power of the enemy coalition - Austria and dictate peace terms to it. After that, the anti-French coalition lost most of its ability to fight France. As for the other directions - Hanover and Neapolitan, Napoleon treated these theaters of military operations as auxiliary, reasonably believing that successes in the main direction would compensate for possible losses. In Italy, there were 50 thousand. corps of Marshal A. Massena. Massena coped with the task quite well. He defeated Archduke Charles at Caldiero, then occupied Venice, Carinthia and Styria.

All at once, without hesitation, Napoleon accepts a new plan of war. On August 27, he immediately summoned Quartermaster General Daria and handed over the dispositions of a new war to him for handing over to the corps commanders. For several hours in a row, the emperor dictated the disposition of the new campaign. Orders were sent in all directions for a new recruitment to replenish reserves, on the supply of the army during its movement in France and Bavaria towards the enemy. To study the features of the theater of action, Napoleon sent Murat and Bertrand on a reconnaissance mission to Bavaria to the Austrian borders on 25 August. On August 28, Savari followed them, also incognito, but by a different route.

French army

Within a few days, a huge French war machine was set in motion. At the end of August 1805, Napoleon's "English Army" ("Army of the Ocean Shores"), which would be transformed into the "Great Army", began to move towards the Rhine and Danube. The French divisions left the camp of Boulogne and moved east. The troops moved wide apart inland and along the front. The infantry walked along the sides of the roads, leaving the roadway for artillery and carts. The average pace of the march was about 30 kilometers a day. A well-developed supply system made it possible, practically without stopping, to overcome the distance of 500-600 km, which separated the Camp of Boulogne from the theater of forthcoming actions.

In less than three weeks, in less than 20 days, a huge army at that time was transferred almost without serious sick and lagging behind to a new theater of hostilities. On September 24, Napoleon left Paris, on September 26 he arrived in Strasbourg, and immediately the crossing of the troops across the Rhine began.

The French army moved in seven streams, from different directions:

- The 1st corps of the "Great Army" was the former Hanoverian army of Marshal Bernadotte - 17 thousand people. Bernadotte's corps was supposed to pass through Hesse and Fulda, and then go to Wüzburg, where he was to join up with the retreating Bavarians under pressure from the enemy.

- The 2nd corps, the former right wing of the "Army of the Ocean Shore", under the command of General Marmont - 20 thousand soldiers, set out from Holland and climbed up the Rhine. He had to pass Cologne, Koblen and cross the river at Mainz, moving to join the 1st corps at Würzburg.

- The 3rd corps, the former camp in Ambletez, under the command of Marshal Davout - 25 thousand people, was supposed to go through Monet, Namur, Luxembourg and cross the Rhine at Mannheim.

- the 4th corps under the command of Marshal Soult - 40 thousand people, and the 5th corps, led by Marshal Lann - 18 thousand people, who were the main camps in Boulogne, were supposed to move through Mezieres, Verdun and cross the Rhine at Speyer and in Strasbourg.

- The 6th corps under the command of Marshal Ney - 19 thousand people, was supposed to follow through Arras, Nancy and Saverne.

- The 7th corps under the command of Marshal Augereau - the troops of the left wing of the "Army of the Ocean Shores" stationed in Brest - about 14 thousand people, followed behind other formations as a general reserve.

These corps were accompanied by large formations of reserve cavalry, which moved ahead on the right flank of the main group. These were more than 5 thousand cuirassiers and carabinieri in the d'Haupoul and Nansouti divisions, as well as four dragoon divisions with a total number of more than 10 thousand people, accompanied by a division of foot dragoons Baraguay d'Illier - 6 thousand people. From Paris set out the Imperial Guard, an elite formation under the command of Marshal Bessière - 6-7 thousand soldiers. Together with the Bavarian, Baden and Württemberg contingents, the total strength of Napoleon's army was 220 thousand people with 340 guns. However, in the first line, Napoleon could use about 170 thousand people.

The peculiarity of Napoleon's army was that each corps was an independent combat unit ("army"), which had its own artillery, cavalry and all the necessary institutions. Each corps had the opportunity to fight in isolation from the rest of the army. The main artillery and cavalry forces did not depend on any of the marshals, were not part of any of these corps. They were organized as special units of the Great Army and were placed under the direct and immediate command of the emperor himself. So, Marshal Murat, who was appointed commander of the entire cavalry, which consisted of 44 thousand people, was the executor of the will of the emperor. This allowed Napoleon to concentrate the main power of artillery and cavalry in one sector.

A special part of the army was the guard, which consisted of regiments of foot grenadiers and foot rangers, of horse grenadiers and horse rangers, of two squadrons of horse gendarmes, of one squadron of Mamelukes recruited in Egypt, and of the "Italian battalion" (it had more French than Italians). Only the most distinguished soldiers were taken to the Imperial Guard. They received salaries, were better supplied, enjoyed good food, lived in close proximity to the imperial headquarters, and wore smart uniforms and high bear hats. Napoleon knew many of them by sight and their life and service. At the same time, the soldiers loved Napoleon and believed that the words "in the knapsack of each soldier lies the marshal's rod" is not an empty phrase; after all, many officers and even generals and marshals began serving as ordinary soldiers. The discipline introduced by Napoleon was peculiar. He did not tolerate corporal punishment in the army. The military court sentenced in the case of major misconduct to death, to hard labor, in lighter cases - to a military prison. But there was one particularly authoritative institution - a comradely court, when the soldiers themselves could, for example, for cowardice, sentence a comrade to death. And the officers did not interfere.

Napoleon was very attentive to the commanding staff and did not hesitate to praise talented commanders. Napoleon surrounded himself with a whole retinue of brilliantly gifted generals. Almost all of them were decisive and independent, had "their own" talents and at the same time were excellent performers, perfectly understanding Napoleon's thought. In the hands of the strategist Napoleon, this magnificent cohort of generals and tacticians was a formidable force. As a result, the top commanding staff of the French army was head and shoulders above the command of the same Austria. And Napoleon himself during this period was at the peak of his talents.

The French army had a high fighting spirit, as it was an army of victors, confident in the justice of the war that France was waging. “This army,” noted Marmont, “was powerful not so much in the number of its soldiers as in their nature: almost all of them had already fought and won victories. The inspiration of the revolutionary wars still remained, but it entered the direction of the channel; from the commander-in-chief, from corps and division commanders to ordinary soldiers and officers, everyone was battle-hardened. 18 months spent in the camps gave her additional training, unprecedented cohesion and boundless confidence in her soldiers."

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The offensive of the Austrian army

While the troops marched through the dramas of France, Napoleon closely watched the actions of the enemy from Paris. Marshal Murat with his headquarters located in Strasbourg, from where he constantly informed the emperor about the actions of the Austrian army.

The Austrian army was supplied and organized incomparably better than before. The Mac's army was destined for the first encounter with the leading forces, and particularly high hopes were pinned on it. A lot depended on the first battle. In Austria, Russia and England, they believed in the success of Poppy's Danube army. This verap occurred not only because of the knowledge of the good condition of the Austrian army, but also due to the assumptions of the allied command that Napoleon would not be able to transfer the entire "English Army" at once and send part of it, and even if he sent the entire army, he would not be able to quickly transfer and focus her on the Rhine.

On September 8, 1805, Austrian troops under the command of Archduke Ferdinand and Mack crossed the Inn River and invaded Bavaria. A few days later the Austrians occupied Munich. The Bavarian Elector hesitated and was in constant fear. He was threatened, demanding an alliance, by a powerful coalition of Austria, Russia and Britain, he was threatened, also demanding an alliance, by the French emperor. The ruler of Bavaria first entered into a secret alliance with the anti-French coalition, promising Vienna assistance in the outbreak of the war. However, a few days later, after thinking it over, he took his family and government and, together with the army, fled to Würzburg, where Bernadotte's troops were sent. So, Bavaria remained on the side of Napoleon. As a result, the anti-French coalition suffered its first diplomatic defeat - Bavaria could not be forced to oppose France. The Elector of Württemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden also sided with Napoleon. As a reward for this, the electors of Bavaria and Württemberg were promoted to kings by Napoleon. Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden received territorial awards at the expense of Austria.

After the Austrians failed to force Bavaria to side with the anti-French coalition, Mack, instead of stopping and waiting for the approach of the Russian army, continued to lead troops to the west. On September 21, the advance units of the Austrians reached Burgau, Günzburg and Ulm, and after receiving the first information about the approach of the French army to the Rhine, it was decided to pull the stragglers to the front line - the line of the Ipper River. At the same time, the Austrian army was upset by a forced march on bad roads, the cavalry was exhausted, the artillery barely kept up with the rest of the troops. Thus, before the collision with the enemy, the Austrian army was not in the best condition.

It must also be said that Karl Mac went from soldier to general. Possessing certain abilities and, without a doubt, courage and perseverance, he was not a good commander and especially brilliant military operations were not noted for him. Mack was more a theorist than a practitioner. In 1798, commanding 60 thousand. the Neapolitan army was defeated by 18 thousand. French corps. In this case, Mac himself was captured. However, this was not blamed on him, since the low combat qualities of the Italian troops at that time were well known. But Mack liked the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor Ludwig von Cobenzel, since he did not belong to aristocratic generals, was not a supporter of Archduke Karl and shared the militant views of the Vice-Chancellor. Thanks to this, Mack made a dizzying career, taking the place of quartermaster general under the formal commander-in-chief of the young Archduke Ferdinand.

The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm
The disaster of the Austrian army at Ulm

Austrian commander Karl Mack von Leiberich

By September 22, the Danube army in four detachments - Aufenberg, Werpeck, Risch and Schwarzenberg, was located along the banks of the Danube and Ipper in the Günzburg-Kempten sector. The right flank was supported by Kienmeier's 20,000-strong corps, scattered from Amberg to Neuburg with detachments on the Danube crossings. Kutuzov's army at that time was 600 kilometers from the Danube army and a forced march went to the aid of the Austrians. Russian troops were partially transferred on carts to speed up their movement. However, Mac's army itself did everything so that the Russians did not have time to help.

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Ulm surrender

Ulm operation

Napoleon decided to send the corps in independent columns and, gradually narrowing the front of the offensive, cross the Danube between Donauwerth and Regensburg, bypassing the right flank of the Austrian army. The deep coverage meant that the "Great Army" would enter the enemy's operational line, which inevitably led to the defeat of the Austrian army. On October 1, Napoleon made an alliance with Bavaria, on October 2, with Württemberg, receiving auxiliary German contingents and securing his lines of operation.

To mislead the enemy, Napoleon ordered the troops of Lannes and Murat to demonstrate in the direction of the Kinzig river valley to the Black Forest passages, giving the impression of the movement of the main forces of the French from the Black Forest, from the west. As a result, Mack believed that the French were going as planned with west, and stayed in place. He did not organize long-range reconnaissance and was not aware of how the French corps were moving. Mack did not know about the threatening bypass, and the news of the appearance of an enemy near Würzburg led him to the conclusion that the French had put up a barrier against Prussia here. The movement of the French corps was carried out in secret from the Austrians. The corps were covered with a cavalry curtain. Only Ney in the center openly went to Stuttgart in order to disorient the Austrians. In the process of movement, the common front of the French corps, which was 250 kilometers on the Rhine, gradually narrowed. Therefore, if the Austrians tried to attack one of the French corps, then in a few hours they would be hit by several corps.

Only on October 5, when the French reached the Gmünd-Ellingen line, did the Austrians discover a flanking enemy maneuver. However, even then Mack remained in place, not believing that the main forces of the French army were making the rounds. It seemed to him that the French were demonstrating coverage to force him to leave a strong position and open the flank of the Austrian forces in Tyrol and Italy. In reality, Napoleon was afraid that Mack would have time to retreat and deprive him of the opportunity to impose a battle on the enemy on his terms, that the Austrians would have time to unite with the Russian army. He even spread a rumor that an uprising had begun in Paris and that French troops were preparing to return to France.

On October 6, French troops reached the banks of the Danube behind the right flank of the main Austrian forces. The grand strategic reach was a success. "The little corporal seems to have chosen a new way of waging war," the soldiers joked. "He fights with our feet, not with bayonets." On the evening of October 7, Murat's cavalry and Vandam's division from Soult's corps, having crossed at Donauwerth, were already on the right bank of the Danube. They threw back the weak Austrian units located here and moved on. Kienmeier's Austrian corps, not accepting the battle, retreated towards Munich. The rest of the corps of Napoleon and the Bavarians approached the Danube, preparing for the crossing. Only Ney's corps was to remain on the left bank of the river against Ulm in order to block a possible route of withdrawal of the Austrians to the northeast.

Napoleon's army pushed through the right flank of the Austrian army with a powerful wedge. What's next? Napoleon, overestimating Mack's determination, decided that the Austrians would break through to the east or south, into Tyrol. Napoleon almost ruled out the withdrawal of the Austrians along the left bank of the Danube in a northeastern direction, since they were in danger of being surrounded. The Austrian troops, sacrificing the rear, could concentrate their forces and break through to the east, crushing individual French columns. In this case, the overall superiority of the French army was compensated by the concentration of the Austrians in certain directions and the vigor of the onslaught. The withdrawal of the Austrians to the south was the safest option, but it was extremely disadvantageous strategically, since it took the Mac's army away from the main theater of operations, excluding the possibility of participating in the war for a long time.

On October 7, the Austrians received news that the enemy had crossed the Danube at Donauwerth. Mack realized that his army was cut off from Austria, but did not attach much importance to this, since he thought that the French army was approximately equal in size to the Austrian army (60-100 thousand people) and was not afraid of it. He planned to rely on the powerful stronghold of Ulm, to remain on the Danube, threatening the enemy's left or right flank. A detachment of General Auffenberg of 4,800 men was sent through Wertingen to Donauwerth to overturn Napoleon's "vanguard".

Meanwhile, the main forces of Napoleon's army were being transported to the right bank of the Danube. Murat transferred almost all of his divisions to the other side of the river, Soult's corps crossed the water barrier at Donauwerth, parts of Lann's corps were ferried across the Danube at Mupster. Davout crossed the river at Neuburg, followed by Marmont and Bernadotte. Soult rushed to Augsburg, Murat's cavalry rushed to Zusmarshausen.

Napoleon, seeing the inaction of the enemy, decided that Mack would break through to the east, through Augsburg. Therefore, he decided to concentrate troops around this city and block the enemy's path to the east. This task was to be solved by Soult's 4th corps, Lannes 5th corps, Murat's guard and reserve cavalry. The 2nd corps of Marmont was to go to the aid of these troops. The corps of Davout and Bernadotte were to serve as a barrier to the east, against the possible appearance of the Russian army. Ney's corps, with which the division of dragoons Baraguay d'Hillier was marching, it was decided to throw on the flank and rear of the retreating enemy army. Ney was supposed to cross the Danube at Günzburg.

On October 8, the Austrian detachment of Auffenberg slowly marched towards Vertingen, not imagining that the main forces of the French army were ahead. Murat's cavalry attacked the Austrians on the move. Beaumont's 3rd division broke into Wertingen. Klein's 1st Dragoon Division and a hussar regiment attacked the Austrian cuirassiers. It must be said that the Austrian cavalry was one of the best in Europe. The cuirassier regiments were especially famous, both for the coherence of actions and for the quality of the horse staff. Therefore, a stubborn battle ensued here with varying degrees of success. However, more and more troops approached the French, and soon the Austrian cuirassiers were swept from all sides and overturned with heavy losses. The Austrian infantry, threatened with a blow to the flank and rear, began to retreat. Then Oudinot's infantry approached, marching in the head of Lann's corps. The Austrians trembled and ran into the forest, trying to escape the broadswords of the advancing French dragoons and the cavalry rangers' sabers from the Lannes corps. Auffenberg's detachment was completely destroyed, losing about half of its strength in killed, wounded and prisoners. General Auffenberg himself was taken prisoner. So, the Austrian soldiers paid for the mistake of their command.

By the evening of October 8, French troops blocked the path to the east. Mack at this time could not decide what to do. At first I wanted to retreat to Augsburg. But after learning about the defeat of Auffenberg and the appearance of large forces of the French on the right bank, he abandoned this idea and decided to cross to the left bank of the Danube. At the same time, he believed that this would be a counteroffensive, with the aim of defeating the French army. On October 9, the Austrian commander-in-chief gave the order to concentrate the scattered troops at Gunzburg and restore previously destroyed bridges.

Marshal Ney, who was supposed to advance through Günzburg, did not know that the main forces of the enemy were located here. Therefore, he sent here only the 3rd division of General Mahler. On the approach to the city, Mahler divided his troops into three columns, each of which was instructed to capture one of the bridges. One of the columns got lost and came back. The second column in the afternoon went to the central bridge near the city, attacked the Austrians guarding it, but, having met strong fire resistance, withdrew. The third column of Brigadier General Labosse got lost, but nevertheless came out to the river. The French grenadiers with a surprise attack captured the bridge and took up a position on the right bank, where until nightfall they fought off enemy counterattacks. As a result, one French regiment recaptured the crossing under the nose of the entire Austrian army. The next day, confused, Mack withdrew a significant part of his troops to Ulm, including Jelacic's left flank corps.

As a result of all these maneuvers of the Austrian army, Napoleon could not understand the enemy in any way. He calculated the best options for the opponent. He himself, as a brave and decisive commander, would have preferred a breakthrough to the east. Therefore, he paid the greatest attention to this option, directing the main forces of the French army so as to block the path of retreat in the Vienna direction. On October 10 and 11, no news of the Austrian breakthrough movement was received. She did not enter into battle with the Austrians and occupied the designated crossings, that is, the Austrians were not going to cross to the left bank of the Danube. It turned out that Mack's army would go south. It was urgent to block this path. As a result, Napoleon divided the troops into three groups: 1) Bernadotte's corps and the Bavarians were to attack Munich; 2) the corps of Lann, Ney and units of the cavalry under the general command of Murat were to pursue the "retreating" Mac; 3) the corps of Soult, Davout, Marmont, two divisions of foot cavalry and the guard, had to occupy a central position until further clarification of the situation.

It never occurred to Napoleon that the Austrians were not taking any emergency measures to save the army in a catastrophic situation for them. Mack, instead of forced marches to withdraw troops to the south, or try to break through to the east, hesitated, which demoralized the army. On October 10, Mack concentrated his troops in Ulm, and on October 11, he again decided to withdraw along the left bank. From Ulm, the vanguard set out under the command of General Klenau, and the rest of the troops, except for Jelacic, followed.

On the same day, the French general Dupont received an order from Marshal Ney to move his division (6,400 men and 14 guns) to Ulm and occupy the city, while the rest of Ney's corps was about to cross to the right bank. Unaware that his division was going directly to the entire Austrian army, Dupont approached the village of Haslau, 6 kilometers north of Ulm, by noon, and here he collided with the Austrians. Dupont's troops engaged the superior forces of the enemy. The French lost 2 thousand people and retreated to Ahlbeck.

Disoriented by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, Mack decided that this was the vanguard of the main forces of the French army and decided to return to Ulm and the next day to begin a withdrawal to Bohemia (Czech Republic). Mack decided to cover this maneuver with a demonstration of Schwarzenberg's detachment along the right bank, and with Jelachich's troops along the left bank of the Iller River. However, when Jelachich was already in the transition from Ulm on October 13, Mack, under the influence of "confirmed" false rumors about the landing of an English landing on the coast of France and the withdrawal of the French army to the Rhine in connection with the "uprising" in Paris, ordered his troops to concentrate again in Ulm Fortress.

I must say that Mack was confused by the skillful spies sent by Napoleon, led by the most famous of them Schulmeister, who assured the Astrian general that he needed to hold on that the French would soon retreat, as an uprising broke out in Paris. When Mack began to doubt, the spy sent word to the French camp, and a special issue of a Parisian newspaper was printed there by means of a marching printing house, reporting on the alleged revolution in Paris. This number was given to Mack, he read it and calmed down.

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Defeat. Outcomes

On October 14, the French began to quietly surround the Ulm fortified area. In several skirmishes, the Austrians were defeated, the Mac's army lost several thousand people. By October 16, the encirclement was closed. Mack's position became completely desperate. The shocked Austrian general asked for an armistice. Napoleon sent an envoy to him demanding surrender, warning that if he took Ulm by storm, no one would be spared. In fact, there never was a general battle. After the artillery shelling of Ulm began, Mack on October 17 personally poisoned himself to the French emperor and announced his decision to surrender.

By October 20, 1805, the surviving Mack army with all military supplies, artillery, banners and with it the Ulm fortress were surrendered at the mercy of the victor. 23 thousand people were captured, 59 guns became French trophies. At the same time, part of the Austrian army still tried to escape. 8 thous. the detachment of General Werneck, pursued by Murat and surrounded by him at Trakhtelfilgen, was also forced to surrender. Jelachich with a 5 thousand detachment was able to break through to the south. And Archduke Ferdinand and General Schwarzenberg with 2 thousand horsemen managed to escape from Ulm to the north at night and go to Bohemia. Some of the soldiers just fled. These examples show that with a more decisive leader, a large part of the Austrian army had a good chance of breaking through. For example, it was possible to withdraw an army south to Tyrol. The army dropped out of the fight in the main (Vienna) direction, but remained.

Thus, 70 thousand. Mac's Austrian army ceased to exist. About 12 thousand were killed and wounded, 30 thousand were taken prisoner, some were able to escape or fled. Napoleon released Mac himself, and sent the surrendered army to France to do various jobs. The French army lost about 6 thousand people. Napoleon won this battle mainly by skillful maneuvering. Napoleon on October 21 addressed the troops: “Soldiers of the Great Army, I promised you a great battle. However, thanks to the bad actions of the enemy, I was able to achieve the same successes without any risk … In fifteen days we completed the campaign. He turned out to be right, this battle led to the collapse of the strategy of the third coalition and its defeat.

As a result, Napoleon completely seized the strategic initiative into his own hands, began to beat the enemy in parts and opened the way to Vienna. The French moved quickly to the Austrian capital and took many more prisoners. Their number has reached 60 thousand people. Austria could no longer recover from this blow and lost the war. In addition, the Austrians, with their mediocre planning, exposed the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov, which, after the hardest formed march on October 11, reached Branau and was alone against the main forces of the French emperor. The Russians again had to make a difficult march, now so as not to be hit by the superior forces of the enemy.

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Poppy surrenders to Napoleon at Ulm

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