Inaction in combat, in a combat situation or in preparation for hostilities is unacceptable, since it makes it easier for the enemy to destroy our soldiers. If you do not act, then the enemy is at work.
Inaction leads to defeat and death. This is a self-evident truth. It would be logical to assume that the infantry in any situation will do everything possible to inflict damage on the enemy and reduce damage to their units. However, practice shows that inaction was and is a widespread phenomenon in the army.
The infantryman must reduce military inaction. How to explain the reasons for military inaction and what are the ways to reduce it?
Actions in battle are determined by decisions made in accordance with the situation. However, the desire to avoid making combat decisions in every possible way is not uncommon. It arises from the unwillingness to bear the great psychological burden that inevitably arises in connection with the adoption of a combat decision.
The huge differences between the processes of decision-making in everyday life and decision-making in battle is one of the most important reasons for the severe psychological stress on the soldier when making a combat decision and, accordingly, the desire to evade making it. There are the following differences between making a combat decision and making an ordinary, everyday decision:
1. Uncertainty of the situation. In battle, situations are very rare when the situation is completely clear: not all enemy firing points are known, it is not known how many enemy soldiers are taking part in the battle, its weapons are unknown, it is not known where the neighboring units are, it is not known whether additional ammunition will be delivered, etc. … For every pros there is a similar cons. In everyday life, a person rarely encounters this level of uncertainty, and in battle, you constantly have to make decisions based only on probable data. It was noticed that the soldier's psyche is strongly influenced not so much by the enemy's strength as by the novelty of what is encountered in a combat situation. On the battlefield, soldiers feel calmer after the enemy goes into an attack than before it starts. When people don't know what to expect, they tend to suspect the worst. When facts become known, they can counteract them. Therefore, in the course of preparation, one should reduce that new and unknown, with which a person can meet in battle.
2. The impossibility of achieving an "ideal" combat result, fear of mistakes. Even after complete and correct preparation for battle, actions can be unsuccessful or associated with losses. The enemy or nature may turn out to be stronger, in battle all sorts of surprises are possible that can confuse all plans. In everyday life, those around them expect the "right" actions from a person and expect the onset of the "right" result of these actions. People believe that the "wrong" result is a consequence of the "wrong" actions. In battle, even "correct" actions can lead to a "wrong" result, and, conversely, erroneous actions can end up with a "correct" result. In everyday life, a person can often choose from a number of possible actions the most correct and reasonable. In battle, as a rule, there is no single correct decision. More precisely, at the moment of making a decision to choose one of several options for action, it is impossible to determine whether this or that decision is correct or not. Only later, after the battle, when all the circumstances become known, it is possible to decide which decision in that situation would be the most correct.
3. Fear of responsibility. Responsibility can be different - to oneself, moral, to the authorities, criminal, etc. But in any case, a person does not want to have problems for himself because of the negative result of his actions. In everyday life, responsibility should arise for the “wrong” result. To avoid the risk of liability, you need to act "right". In battle, when it is almost impossible to achieve a "positive" result, that is, to complete a task without losses, the result is usually "wrong." Accordingly, it seems to the soldier that responsibility in one form or another comes almost for any action.
4. Lack of time to think and consider all possible options for action. Events can develop so rapidly that a decision must be made with lightning speed.
5. Unclear purpose of actions or apparent aimlessness of actions. Often, the general purpose of actions in battle is unclear, including it can be deliberately hidden by the command in order to avoid the enemy's guessing of the planned operation.
Another strong factor that exerts severe psychological pressure on the decision-maker is the fear of death or injury, the fear of being captured, including fear for others. This fear is a manifestation of one of the basic human instincts - the instinct of self-preservation. Fear has a so-called "tunnel" effect. All of a person's attention is focused on the source of fear, and all actions are focused on avoiding this source. Even a high-ranking commander, who is not used to danger, thinks first of all of himself, and not of control of the battle, although he is relatively remote from the source of danger.
In the absence of sufficient information, a person under the influence of fear begins to speculate in order to restore the full picture of what is happening, that is, to fantasize towards the causes of fear. Often the soldier begins to think that he is fighting alone against many opponents. Often there is a desire to just wait until it all ends by itself.
It seems that enemy soldiers are shooting more accurately and efficiently. Fulfilling combat decisions involves getting closer to the source of fear and paying attention to phenomena other than the source of fear. It is known that only a small proportion of soldiers, having come under enemy fire, conduct any kind of targeted fire (about 15%). The rest either do not shoot at all, or shoot just to shoot, into the void, wasting precious ammunition. The soldiers are trying to stop the bullets flying at them with their fire. People tend to immediately open fire as soon as they lie down, not even deciding on the purpose and installation of the sight. It is very difficult to stop such a useless fire.
A significant part of the soldiers participate in the battle mechanically. Combat activity is only imitated, but not carried out. With the expenditure of a lot of effort to fight the fear of strength, there is no left in the battle for independent meaningful actions.
Taking into account the factor of "stupidity" during the battle, it is necessary to simplify the actions performed as much as possible, and during preparation to learn and bring to the automatism actions in standard situations. Note that "stupidity" arises not only in connection with fear, but also in connection with actions in the group. As you know, the level of intelligence of the crowd is lower than that of the individual people who make it up.
Actions that only imitate combat activity are the best gift for the enemy.
The same thing happens in the field of decision making. When they get under fire, they don’t think about completing the task, all thoughts focus on imitating actions or avoiding combat.
By the way, the "tunnel" effect of focusing on one thing can be used to combat fear. When a person's attention is focused on an activity or on something that distracts him from the source of fear, fear recedes into the background. One of the distractions can be the activities of the commander. You can organize the counting of ammunition, deepening trenches or determining the settings of the sight. Often, the simple repetition of a rhymed phrase can help relieve fear. Many soldiers note that with the beginning of the battle, when it becomes necessary to do something, the fear decreases.
Combat stress or psychological exhaustion is also a factor hindering decision-making. The manifestations of combat stress can be varied, since each person reacts in his own way to a large mental stress. The result of combat stress can be overactiveness and attempts to ignore the difficulties of the situation. But if the reaction to combat stress is the depression of the nervous system, then the consequence will be inaction, lack of initiative and negligence.
A serious psychological factor hindering the inclusion of the decision-making mechanism is the effect of war at a distance - the soldier, not seeing the enemy, considers him as if unreal and non-existent, despite the exploding shells and whistling bullets. The soldier cannot believe that someone wants to do him real harm.
Finally, there are also universal reasons for the desire to evade making a combat decision - ordinary human laziness and unwillingness to get out of a state of relative comfort, the perception of combat activity, as, indeed, of any work, as a punishment, the desire to maintain one's own prestige (to show that there is no need in the advice of subordinates that the previously given order is correct), following irrational motives (prejudice towards the enemy, in particular about the general superiority of the enemy, pessimism, following in the wake of absolutized personal experience).
All these factors contribute to the emergence of a tendency in behavior aimed at avoiding decision-making.
And one more remark. It often turns out that the more difficult the task, the less losses. Potential risks and hardships spur people to plan and take more action. And simple tasks, on the contrary, relax and cause unpreparedness and, as a result, losses.
In human behavior, evasion from making combat decisions can be expressed in the following forms:
1. Pushing the solution - from oneself to another.
Transfer of the severity of the decision "down". This method of pushing the solution implies the actual removal of the task from the unit as a whole and its transfer to some separate element.
For example, the entire burden of fulfilling the assigned task is shifted to the forces assigned to the main unit. In particular, the execution of the classic infantry tasks of storming enemy positions is assigned to the reconnaissance unit, whose true and main task is to collect information.
The task of destroying an enemy sniper is assigned only to a special sniper, and the main infantry unit does not take part in this.
Arrangement of troops in the field is entrusted exclusively to support units, and prior to their approach, no elementary steps are taken for their own arrangement.
There is one thing in common for all three cases - the evading person, referring to the special training of the assigned units, to their deeper possession of this or that skill, avoids making independent decisions and from involving the main unit in the implementation of appropriate actions. The flaw in this approach is that any assigned subdivision should be applied not instead of, but together with the main subdivision. The infantry must storm the enemy targets itself, must carry out counter-sniper measures and provide for themselves.
Another situation, in which the decision is pushed down, are the cases when the evader tries to avoid making decisions aimed at completing the task, tries to demonstrate the impossibility of its fulfillment.
For such a demonstration, not the entire unit is sent, but its small separate element, which obviously cannot complete the task. After the defeat of this element or even its death, the evader gets the opportunity to say that he tried to complete the task, but the situation did not allow.
Transfer of the decision "upward". The essence of this method is that the evading person does nothing, believing that all decisions must be made by higher-ranking officials, who must fully ensure the implementation of decisions. And the business of the evading person is only to carry out the orders. The flaw in this approach lies in the fact that no one even the most ingenious boss can physically think about everything. The control ladder exists in order to distribute the entire volume of issues to be solved at different levels. The superior superior must solve more general tasks than the inferior one. If a higher-level boss tries to solve all local problems, then the work on developing solutions at the level of this boss will be completely paralyzed due to its volume.
Sideways transmission of the solution. The essence of this method is to transfer the task to a neighboring unit. Its viciousness lies in the fact that neighboring units must interact. False “successes” of the evader in pushing the solution “sideways” destroy the basis of interaction, giving rise to the desire to avoid providing assistance and evade further interaction.
2. Following the combat manual or other instructions.
Following the provisions of combat manuals, manuals and other instructive documents also often becomes a way of evading decision-making. It is necessary to understand that the combat manual or manual is designed for a certain average combat situation. They are the result of a generalization of previous combat experience and attempts to extend it to future battles. The statutes reflect the state of the art at the time of their writing. They are associated with the specific armament of their troops and the troops of the alleged enemy, with the tactics used by the enemy, with the conditions of the proposed theater of military operations. And, finally, they are influenced by the dogmatic ideas of this or that society about "correct actions" in war. Statutes suffer from attempts to fix the "most correct and rational" tactics of action. Consolidation of the averaged rules of combat inevitably gives rise to some primitivism.
All these factors indicate that the combat manual, in principle, cannot answer all questions and contain solutions for any combat missions. Any combat manual or manual should be considered not as a universal law that does not allow for derogation, but as a collection of methodological recommendations.
Patterned solutions are often unsuccessful and are big enemies in leadership. The charter is a good tool for organizing a quick battle, for example, for the actions of hastily put together units. Since all soldiers of such a unit know tactical patterns, the use of the provisions of the regulations will greatly reduce inconsistency and inconsistency in actions. In conditions where there is an opportunity to work out the order of interaction between soldiers and units, the decision to follow the statutory provisions should be made in each specific situation according to the circumstances. There should be no presumption of the correctness of the statutory decision.
An example of inappropriate use of the charter is the use of artillery barrage. Situations often arise when it only warns the enemy about an impending attack, causing him minor damage, and misleads its troops about the degree of suppression of the enemy defense.
An example of an unsuccessful attempt to consolidate the "most correct and rational" tactics of action in the combat manual is the question of infantry combat groups. Before the start of World War II, an infantry unit in battle was divided into two groups: a group performing a maneuver and a fire support group. While one group was firing, suppressing the enemy's firing points, the other approached him. According to the results of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, the pre-war division of the infantry into groups was abandoned. During the course of the war, it became clear that as a result of the division into groups, the force of the infantry strike was weakening. It turned out that the fire support group took part in the battle only for a limited time at the initial stage, and then lagged behind the maneuvering group. The latter had to fight on their own. Post-war Soviet regulations did not provide for the division of infantry units into fire and maneuver groups. Based on the experience of the Chechen campaign, the use of combat groups is being reintroduced into combat training. It is believed that the division into groups helps to reduce infantry losses, since a separate fire support group performs the task of suppressing enemy firing points better than an infantry unit, all of whose soldiers simultaneously approach the enemy. It seems that the question of the use of combat groups should be decided on the basis of the specific conditions of a particular battle. Attempts to consolidate the "most correct" solution to the issue are doomed to failure.
3. Delay in making decisions.
The name of this form of decision avoidance speaks for itself. The well-known army proverb “having received an order, do not rush to carry it out, as the cancellation will come” may well reflect some aspects in the work of the bureaucratic army mechanism, but in combat conditions it is often a deliberate way of evading military decisions in the hope that appropriate actions will be taken by someone else.
4. Setting that there are no tasks.
The meaning of this form of evasion is reduced to the formula "there is no order - it means that I do not need to do anything." Senior commanders may not always be able to or find it necessary to issue an order. It must be remembered that in combat conditions, everyone must assess the situation for himself and make the maximum possible effort to change it in his favor. The lack of direct guidance should not be a reason for inaction. If there is no order from the authorities, then the order must be given to oneself.
5. Blind following orders.
Thoughtlessly following the letter of the commander's order can be a manifestation of the desire to evade making an independent decision. The evader refers to the presence of the order of the senior commander and makes him follow it literally, without delving into its tactical meaning. You need to understand that, while executing an order, the lower-ranking commander must make independent decisions in the development of the decisions of the higher-ranking commander.
An order to attack a settlement occupied by the enemy at 15.00 should not be understood as meaning that the infantry must be driven across a flat field to the enemy's unsuppressed machine guns, the main thing is not to be late with the start of the attack. It means that by 15.00 the attack must be prepared in such a way that it will be completed successfully with minimal losses.
The order to march does not mean that you just have to sit down and go. It is necessary to carry out all the preparatory measures for counter-ambush actions or any other meeting with the enemy.
Following an order psychologically relieves the burden of responsibility for making a decision, and it is very often resorted to, referring to the fact that "the army rests on the order." It would be more correct to say that the army is based on initiative. The above does not mean that orders can be ignored. No, it is impossible to change the decision made without the presence of good reasons, since the interaction gets lost and it turns out even worse. However, you need to understand the tactical purpose of the order (the plan of the battle) and interpret the order precisely in accordance with this goal, and not simply as a duty to perform a certain sequence of actions.
Having shown the main forms of evasion from making combat decisions, let us move on to describing the ways to combat this negative phenomenon.
I would like to note that the constant calls in the combat manuals and instructions for the manifestation of initiative in battle, as well as its glorification in literature, do little to increase the initiative of soldiers. If the initiative in real life remains punishable, and inaction often does not have negative consequences, then the natural result will be evasion of decision-making and inaction.
Ways to facilitate the adoption of independent combat decisions.
1. Permanent order for activity and decision making.
In a combat situation, it is necessary to proceed from the fact that at any moment of time each soldier has an order to independently assess the situation and make an independent combat decision, even in the absence of any instructions and orders from above. The soldier must understand that there are psychological reasons that push him to evade decision-making, to inaction, that the most frequent forms of evasion are known.
Any soldier or commander must constantly ask himself if he is trying to evade a combat decision. It is necessary to proceed from the premise that responsibility for a decision that has not been made should be stricter and more inevitable than responsibility for a decision made that turned out to be wrong. Even in an environment where nothing seems to be happening, we can find ways to improve the position of our troops - this can be training, strengthening the system of engineering equipment of positions, conducting patrols, etc.
An additional effect of the activity will be to reduce fear, since the person focuses on the action being performed, and not on the source of the fear.
So: in a combat situation, everyone always has an order to take actions that improve the position of our troops. Evasion of decisions and actions is punishable.
2. You need to order WHAT to do, but not HOW to do it.
Another proven way to increase initiative in the troops is to introduce a system in which the leadership does not issue detailed orders, and the subordinates know this and themselves determine the order of execution of orders. The only exceptions are cases when the senior commander is better acquainted with the terrain or the situation, as well as when organizing especially difficult types of combat - crossing rivers, night combat, withdrawal, etc. Fighting over large areas, rapid changes in the situation often make the issuance of detailed orders meaningless, and waiting for a detailed order on the part of subordinates leads to passivity and inaction. The subordinate should not expect detailed orders from the commander. And the commander should not train subordinates to overly detailed instructions. It is necessary to follow the principle of "set a task, give funds and let me complete it yourself."
Even in the case when circumstances require the issuance of detailed orders, the general purpose of the battle should be indicated so that in the event of unexpected changes in the situation, the recipient of the order could correct his actions. If detailed orders are required, it is advisable to consult with those who will carry them out.
3. Responsibility not for the consequences of the decision, but for the shortcomings in the preparation of its adoption.
The most significant, but far from the most obvious way to increase initiative is to change the approach to the responsibility of those who give orders. As mentioned above, in a battle, surprises are possible, and even complete preparation for conducting a particular type of battle does not guarantee 100% success. The result of actions in battle, in general, in the overwhelming majority of cases is "wrong" - even when performing the assigned task, it is far from always possible to completely avoid losses. In everyday life, responsibility is assigned according to the following rule: “if there are negative consequences of the activity, it means that the activity was“wrong”, which in turn means that the person who ordered the commission of these actions made a mistake and should be punished.
In combat conditions, the use of the same approach to assigning responsibility often leads to the fact that the performers are afraid to do anything at all. The logic here is approximately the following: if I do nothing, then there are no consequences, including negative ones, which means there is no responsibility. As a result, it turns out that a soldier or commander is ready to give his life for the Motherland, but are panicky afraid of reprimand for mistakes in the actions taken. The fear of responsibility for failure is harmful; instead of an incentive for initiative, it forces people to stay inactive.
The only way out of this situation is to change the approach to imposing responsibility. The main question for its imposition is the following: has this or that person taken all REASONABLY POSSIBLE and POSSIBLE measures in the given situation to achieve success in battle? Even in the event of defeat in battle and failure of the mission, responsibility should not be imposed upon taking all measures. Responsibility comes not "by the result", but "by the efforts made." It can be assigned even if there was success, but this success was accidental and was not predetermined by the efforts made by this or that person.
It is necessary to dwell on the issue of non-observance of the order. Orders must be followed. This is an axiom. However, sooner or later a situation will arise when the situation will require retreating from the order. In this case, one must be guided by the following: as a general rule, the performer has the right to change the methods of accomplishing the assigned task, but not to deviate from achieving the tactical goal, which must be achieved in accordance with the order. The prohibition on deviating from the chosen method of performing the task should be specifically negotiated by the person giving the order and be justified by tactical considerations. A commander who deprives his subordinates of the choice of how to accomplish the assigned task should be fully responsible for such a decision.
A complete refusal to fulfill the task is possible only if the tactical situation has changed so much that the goal that must be achieved in the process of executing the order has obviously disappeared.
Of course, there are still situations when, due to objective reasons, it is impossible to carry out an order. To distinguish cases of evasion from decision-making from the actual impossibility of completing the task, one should consider the set of measures taken to prepare for its implementation. The contractor is obliged to take all possible actions that can only be taken to prepare for the task. And only after that he gets the right to refer to the complete impossibility of its implementation.
I would like to emphasize the following. One person can effectively exercise visual and voice control on the battlefield over a group of about 10 people (approximately the size of one squad). Radio communication expands the commander's area of control, but it is not the complete equivalent of personal visual and voice control. Therefore, all commanders from the platoon and above are forced to delegate the authority to make at least some of the decisions down. The problem of the impossibility of control is solved by instilling the habit of making independent decisions, knowing the general plan of actions. Therefore, the ability to make independent decisions is a key skill of a soldier and an officer, more important than technical skills.
