After Soviet jet fighters appeared in the skies of Korea and began to participate in air battles, the situation in Korea changed significantly. The very first battle against the American B-29 bombers, which were called "Super Fortresses", showed that this is only a name. The US Air Force command was forced to admit that their bombers were very vulnerable and noted the effectiveness of the 23 and 37-mm cannons, which were in service with the MiG-15 fighters. Only a few shells that hit the bomber could have killed him. The meeting of the B-29 with Soviet fighters was lethal for the latter, and the losses from such battles were quite significant for the United States, since each bomber was worth a fortune. It should not be disregarded the fact that with each plane its crew of 12 people often perished, which was an even greater blow to the Americans.
"Black Tuesday" for the US Air Force
"Black Tuesday" for the American strategic aviation was the day of October 30, 1951, when the flying fortresses that took off to bomb the Korean airfield in Namsi suffered very heavy losses, and the raid ended in nothing. This defeat marked the complete collapse of the use of strategic aviation in the daytime. After this battle, the United States was forced to reconsider its views on the use of B-29 bombers in Korea.
On the American side, about 200 cover fighters of various types and 21 B-29 bombers took part in the raid. They were opposed by 56 MiG-15 fighters, which were located at the Miaogou and Antong airfields. Directly in the air battle, 44 aircraft took part, while another 12 were left in reserve to cover airfields in case the enemy broke through to them.
MiG-15
Considering the fact that the screen of F-86 fighters was late with the exit, as well as the unsuccessful formation of the covering forces directly, the Soviet pilots did not allocate any special groups to tie up the American fighters. All the available "moments" were focused only on the attack on bombers. It was also decided that the fighters would not operate in large groups, but with a large number of pairs, which would be given independence in the choice of targets - B-29. In fact, this allowed the MiG-15 to develop its maximum speed, freely maneuver and act with maximum initiative.
American aircraft were intercepted on the approaches to Namsi. While the F-86 barrier was looking for Soviet aircraft near the Yalu River, the fate of the air battle was actually a foregone conclusion. 22 pairs of Soviet fighters in a swift dive through the formation of American cover fighters at a speed of about 1000 km / h attacked strategic bombers, opening fire from their 132 cannons. The very first attack of the MIGs was crushing. The B-29 had not yet reached the goal, losing the falling and burning machines, and quickly turned to the sea that would save them. Since the route of the "flying fortresses" passed only 20-30 km. part of the bombers managed to escape from the coastline, beyond which Soviet aircraft were prohibited from operating. According to the testimony of the navigator of one of the B-29s, who participated in this raid and was later taken prisoner, all planes that survived the attack of Soviet fighters were killed and wounded.
At the same time, not a single bomb fell on the Namsi airfield on October 30. American bombers turned around on the approaches to the airfield and fled. In the same flight, a reconnaissance officer was also shot down, who was supposed to confirm the results of the bombing with photographs. According to Soviet information, the Americans lost 12 B-29 bombers and 4 F-84 fighters in battle, many American aircraft were damaged, while the Soviet side lost only one MiG-15 in a battle with the F-86 already over the territory of the PRC, the border of which American planes violated.
B-29
In an effort to somehow justify their losses, after almost every air battle with Soviet "Migami" the Americans reported their high losses from the B-29 fire. In fact, Soviet fighters practically did not suffer from the fire of the "super-fortresses". Moreover, the reason for this is not that it was impossible to shoot down the MiG-15 with the fire of 12, 7-mm heavy machine guns. Soviet planes were shot down using such machine guns mounted on American fighters and fighter-bombers. However, it was the confrontation between the B-29 and the MiG-15 that was always in favor of the latter for a number of reasons. The guns with which the "Migi" were armed (caliber 37 and 23 mm) had a significantly longer effective range of fire, as well as destructive power compared to the large-caliber B-29 machine guns. In addition, the B-29s had insufficient survivability. It is also worth noting the fact that the calculating mechanisms and the machine-gun installations themselves, installed on the bombers, could not provide effective fire and aiming at aircraft that attacked at a convergence speed of 150-160 m / s. At the same time, the entire attack took no more than 3-4 seconds.
The Black Tuesday results alarmed senior US military officials and shocked US Air Force commanders. A special commission arrived in Korea to investigate the circumstances of such a heavy defeat. Within 3 days, not a single American plane appeared in the zone of action of the Soviet "MIGs". After about a month, the Americans decided, apparently, to check their conclusions about the possibility of daytime use of the B-29. A group of Soviet fighters intercepted 3 B-29 aircraft, which were covered by several dozen F-86 on the approach to the crossings at Anei. All bombers were shot down. After that, the Americans completely abandoned the use of the B-29 in the daytime.
Mistakes made by Americans
The first was that the B-29 bombers, which followed from the east coast, bypassing the radar field of our radars located at Anya and Pyongyang, were accompanied by a large number of F-84 and F-86 fighters, which were flying at an altitude of about 8000 m. Soviet radars detected large groups of fighters at high altitudes for 200-250 km. to the goal. The nature of their flight was given out by the bombers below, although the latter were not yet on the radar screens. American fighters moved at a speed of about 720-800 km / h on a zigzag course with a clearly visible route axis. The measurement of the total speed of aircraft displacement over the terrain showed that it is equal to 400-420 km / h. After that, everything became completely clear. The information received matched the cruising speed of the "superfortified". The correct conclusions were made that a group of B-29 bombers was sent from the east coast of Korea, which were covered by a large group of fighters.
The second mistake of the American was that the time of the screening out of the F-86 "Saber" fighters was calculated without taking into account the possibility of detection by the enemy of the B-29 and his decision to take off the MiG-15 fighters to intercept. At the moment when the F-86 and F-84 fighters were heading at maximum speed to the area of the Andong River in order to attack the Soviet fighters on takeoff and climb, the "Migi" were already in the air. Using the fuel of the outboard tanks, they already went to the strike group of the "super-fortresses". The Soviet side was listening to the radio exchange of American crews, which made it possible to find out that the operating fighters have the call signs "Malinovka" and "Tit", which belonged to two different fighter wings. The joint actions of the F-86 and F-84 of two different formations suggested that the Americans were planning a raid on some important object in the immediate vicinity of the Migi base. The place of the impact was precisely determined.
It should be noted that the Americans quite sharply and promptly reacted to all attempts to build new or repair destroyed airfields on the territory of the DPRK. Their opposition in this regard was very thoughtful and rational from a military point of view. The Americans conducted constant aerial reconnaissance of such objects and delivered their bombing strikes immediately at the time of completion of restoration work or construction. So they saved the strength of their bombers, while achieving the greatest effectiveness of strikes. On the eve of October 30, 1951, the Americans carried out intensive reconnaissance of the construction of the new Namsi airfield, which was moving towards completion. The flight axis of the strike group of bombers and other available indirect data made it possible to reveal the purpose of the raid, which was the Namsi airfield.
The third serious miscalculation that was made by the American side was that the escort fighters were concentrated in fairly dense groups in the immediate vicinity of the B-29. At the same time, they flew at fairly low speeds. All this allowed the Soviet "Migami" to take advantageous positions for an attack and carry it out, without any significant opposition from the enemy.
Soviet presence in Korea
The 64th Fighter Air Corps of the USSR Air Force took part in the hostilities in North Korea in 1950-1953. The corps included all Soviet flight and anti-aircraft units, which were concentrated on this theater of operations. The participation of the USSR in the war was secret, so the pilots were forbidden to fly over the sea and approach the front line. All planes had Chinese identification marks, the pilots were issued with Chinese documents and military uniforms. Initially, the pilots were even required not to speak Russian during combat missions. The pilots learned the Korean phrases they needed in battle, but already during the first battles, this requirement had to be abandoned, since it turned out to be practically impracticable. The fact of the participation of Soviet pilots in the war was made public in the USSR only in the 1970s and 1980s, while the UN pilots understood perfectly well against whom they had to fight in the air.
The main task of the corps was to cover the Suphun hydroelectric power station, as well as bridges on the Yalu River in the border zone between China and Korea, as well as economic and military facilities on the territory of the DPRK, rear communications of Korean and Chinese troops. In addition, Soviet pilots participated in the training of pilots for the Air Force of the PRC and DPRK.
According to the recollections of a participant in the hostilities in Korea, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation, retired Semyon Kramarenko, Korean and Chinese pilots could not independently resist the Yankees, they did not have enough experience. They fought bravely enough, but in a month it was impossible to prepare a real fighter pilot from a peasant guy who did not know Russian. The Americans, meanwhile, had a numerical superiority and the latest technology, behaved aggressively, even impudently, fought competently. Without our help, events in this region of the world could have taken a completely different turn.
F-86 Saber And MiG-15
Semyon Kramarenko praised the level of training of American pilots, emphasizing at the same time that it was difficult to call their behavior in battle knightly. Often American pilots shot ejected pilots in the air. At the same time, Soviet pilots did not behave like that. In December 1951, a group of fighters, which included Kramarenko, defeated the Australian squadron on "Gloucester Meteors", out of 16 aircraft, only 4 were able to escape. Kramarenko shot down two "Gloucesters" and could catch up and light the third, but did not, seeing that the pilot of the "Gloucester" was a young guy, he felt sorry for him. He decided that it would be better for him to return to the base and tell his people how they were "warmly" received here. According to Semyon Kramarenko, it would be quite appropriate to say that Soviet pilots fought only with those who wanted to fight. MiG-15s were painted in a silvery color, which was visible in the sun for many kilometers. This allowed the enemy to evade air combat in advance.
During their participation in the conflict from November 1950 to July 1953, pilots of the 64th corps flew about 64,000 sorties. Held 1872 air battles. The corps shot down 1,250 enemy aircraft. 150 aircraft were chalked up by anti-aircraft artillery, 1100 groups of fighters. The hull's own losses were 335 aircraft. In Korea, at least 120 Soviet pilots and 68 anti-aircraft gunners were killed.
