Commander Yudenich was able to stop only 1917
In his appearance there was neither the chivalrous beauty and entourage inherent in Lieutenant General Baron Peter Wrangel, nor the refined intelligence characteristic of the cavalry general Alexei Brusilov, nor the romance and mystery that many saw in Admiral Alexander Kolchak. However, it is Yudenich who will remain in history as the best commander of the Imperial Army at the beginning of the 20th century.
The general's name has been undeservedly forgotten. He is, of course, remembered as the commander of the White North-Western Army, which almost took red Petrograd. On the pages of Soviet textbooks, Yudenich appeared as one of the cohort of "monsters" of the White Guard counter-revolution, trailing, as it was then customary to write, in the wagon train of the imperialist Entente.
The most striking thing here is that absolutely all leaders are genuine leaders, and not individual, as they would say now, field commanders - of the White movement, did not advocate the revival of the autocracy. But this is by the way.
The article offered to the readers' attention is devoted to the combat path of Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich - in the First World War, first of all, because his activity as commander-in-chief of the White North-Western Army is very multifaceted and requires a separate story. I wanted to paint a historical portrait of the general in the context of the era, surrounded by people who were his comrades-in-arms and opponents.
Yudenich was born in 1862 into a civilian family of a collegiate assessor. Parents did not seek to give their son a military education. This alone distinguishes Nikolai Nikolaevich against the general background. Most of the generals of the Russian army are hereditary military men. A striking exception here, along with Yudenich, was Baron Wrangel, the son of an art scientist.
The future commander initially, presumably, did not intend to follow the military path. According to Vasily Tsvetkov, the author of the most complete and objective biography of Yudenich, “he marked his majority by entering the Land Survey Institute. However, after studying there for less than a year, he transferred to the Alexander military school. " It was considered elite, suffice it to say that outstanding historians Sergei Soloviev and Vasily Klyuchevsky taught here. The school is famous for its graduates. Let's name a few names captured in the history of the Civil War. Whites: ataman of the Siberian Cossack army Boris Annenkov, writer Alexander Kuprin, who volunteered for the North-Western army of Yudenich and worked as editor of the military newspaper "Prinevsky Krai", Kuban Lieutenant General Mikhail Fostikov, after the Novorossiysk evacuation of Denikin's army continued to fight in the Caucasus, in the Bolshevik rear. Reds: Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic, former Colonel Sergei Kamenev, Commander of the Southern Front, former Major General Vladimir Yegoriev, Deputy People's Commissar of the Red Army Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who, with a wave of a magic wand in the hands of Nikita Khrushchev, turned into a "genius" commander. Let's add to this list Lieutenant General Nikolai Dukhonin, the last commander-in-chief of the Russian army.
Yudenich graduated from college with honors. This gave him the right to serve in the guard. And the young lieutenant went to Warsaw to command a company of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian Infantry Regiment. Then he studied at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff: Lieutenant-General Anton Denikin left wonderful memories of its inner life at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries in his book "The Old Army". Yudenich graduated from the Academy in the first category, after which he was expected to serve in the staff and combatant positions - life was calm and predictable until the 1904 Russo-Japanese War broke out.
Not poisoned by the "general"
Yudenich was offered to stay in the rear - the duty general of the Turkestan military district. However, a real Russian officer could not do that. Yudenich went to the front as the commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Brigade of the 6th East Siberian Division.
Note that Yudenich's future comrades-in-arms in the White movement could also sit out in the rear, but they preferred the front. Lavr Kornilov resigned from the post of clerk of the General Staff in St. Petersburg. Anton Denikin, who had injured his leg shortly before the war, literally begged him to be sent to the active army - in Manchuria one of the hills received his name. Pyotr Wrangel, of his own free will, changed the costume of an official for special assignments under the Irkutsk Governor-General for the uniform of an officer of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army. Peter Krasnov went to the war as a front-line correspondent, but he was engaged not only in describing the hostilities, but also took part in battles with the Japanese.
At the front, Yudenich demonstrated both military talent and personal courage. Under Sandepu he was wounded in the arm, under Mukden - in the neck.
The war with the Japanese clearly revealed one of the serious ailments of the Russian army officers - lack of initiative, which Denikin wrote with bitterness in his memoirs: “How many times have I met in the army - at high and low posts - people, of course, brave, but afraid of responsibility . Yudenich was an exception to this sad rule: once he personally led the retreating chains of the 5th Rifle Brigade into a bayonet counterattack, without having the appropriate order, but being sure that the situation required just such a decision. The result of the combat work of Colonel Yudenich - the golden St. George weapon, the Order of St. Vladimir of the 3rd degree with swords, St. Stanislav of the 1st degree with swords and blood, deserved general's shoulder straps.
After the war, Nikolai Nikolayevich only briefly commanded a division and assumed the post of quartermaster general of the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District.
A very accurate portrait of Yudenich was left by General BP Veselozerov: “No one heard from him how he commanded a regiment, since the general was not very talkative; St. George's lanyard and rumors of a serious injury that came eloquently said that the new quartermaster general had gone through a serious battle. Soon everyone around them became convinced that this chief did not look like the generals that Petersburg sent to the distant outskirts, who came to pull up, teach from above and looked at the service in the Caucasus as a temporary stay …
In the shortest possible time, he became both close and understandable for Caucasians. As if he was always with us. Surprisingly simple, lacking a poison called generalin, indulgent, it quickly won hearts. Always welcoming, he was widely hospitable. His comfortable apartment saw numerous comrades in the service, the combatant commanders and their families, joyfully rushing to the gentle invitation of the general and his wife. Going to the Yudenichs was not just serving a number, but it became a sincere pleasure for everyone who loved them heartily."
As Quartermaster General Nikolai Nikolaevich met the First World War …
Sometimes you can hear: they say, Yudenich achieved victories, fighting with a weak Turkish army, battered by Italians and Slavic states during the Balkan Wars. But would the general have been able to fight the Germans just as successfully? To begin with, we note: judgments about the weakness of the Ottoman army are not groundless, but still exaggerated.
War of ambition
Sultan Mahmud V was against the war with Russia, but his power was formal. The country was ruled by the so-called Young Turkish government. Before the war, it carried out the militarization of industry with the involvement of German specialists. At the head of the Ottoman army deployed in the Caucasus was one of the leaders of the Young Turks, the ambitious Enver Pasha, the ideologue of Pan-Turkism, an admirer of the German military school and the future leader of the Central Asian Basmachi. Then, in 1914, he was not yet thirty. Despite the ardor characteristic of the Turks, Enver looked at things soberly and knew perfectly well all the shortcomings of the Ottoman Empire's military machine.
What was he hoping for? On the alliance with Germany and its military assistance, on the German instructors who served in the Turkish army - the chief of the General Staff, Colonel Bronsar von Schellendorff. The fact that the best Russian troops are chained in Poland, Galicia and East Prussia. Finally, on his talent as a commander, which, however, Enver did not manage to demonstrate.
So, in October 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey - in a situation that was strategically disadvantageous for itself. Enver correctly believed that the Russians would transfer their best troops to the west. Taking advantage of this, the Turks achieved a significant numerical superiority in the Caucasus, where at the beginning of the campaign we faced another problem: command.
Formally, the Russian Caucasian army was headed by the governor in this region, the cavalry general, Count Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov. He met the year 1914 as a very elderly 74-year-old man. Once he fought bravely in Central Asia and during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). But he had no experience in planning and conducting strategic operations, in essence he was a type of military leader with the mindset of the 19th century. Therefore, with the first volleys in the Caucasus, the count made, it would seem, the most reasonable decision - he transferred command to the general from infantry, Alexander Myshlaevsky. And he was a military theorist and historian, but not a military leader. And if Vorontsov-Dashkov had at least combat experience, then Myshlaevsky did not fight at all until 1914.
And the Turks seriously prepared for the campaign, because, in fact, for the first time since the second half of the unlucky for the Ottoman weapon of the 18th century, they had the opportunity to regain their lost possessions and revive the former greatness of Porta. The main Turkish force in the Caucasus was the 3rd Army, consisting of 12 infantry and six cavalry divisions. German Major Guze became its chief of staff. The Ottomans were opposed by the 1st Caucasian Corps of Infantry General Georgy Berkhman. The main direction was considered to be Sarakamysh.
In December, Enver threw his divisions into the offensive and quickly reached the Kars-Ardahan line. A particularly difficult situation for our troops developed near Sarakamysh, where Vorontsov-Dashkov sent Myshlaevsky and Yudenich. Probably, the count realized that Myshlaevsky could not cope without his chief of staff. And so it happened: supported by Berkhman and fearing encirclement, the commander spoke in favor of a retreat to Kars.
At first glance, a reasonable solution - it made it possible to stabilize the front with the enemy's numerical superiority. But here's what you need to take into account: both Myshlaevsky and Berkhman thought in this situation as well-trained generals, nothing more. Yudenich saw the situation through the eyes of a talented commander, and this is something more than just knowledge of the art of war. And he proposed a different solution: to abandon the retreat and act on the flank of the Turkish group.
From Sarakamish to Erzerum
Thus, if Myshlaevsky saw the main task in maintaining positions on the Kars-Ardahan line, then Yudenich strove to destroy the enemy's manpower. And the whole military history from ancient times indisputably testifies: mediocre military leaders are concerned about the seizure and retention of territories, real generals - about the defeat of the enemy.
However, Myshlaevsky ordered to retreat. And he left for Tiflis. Yudenich remained to carry out the order. And as we already know, he was not one of those who are ready to put up with the erroneous orders of his superiors. Yudenich, at his own peril and risk, decided to defend Sarakamysh and defeat the enemy. Although our two brigades were opposed by five enemy divisions. And there was nowhere to go. Even Enver admitted: "If the Russians retreat, they are dead." Around Sarakamysh, lifeless mountain peaks littered with snow, shackled by a twenty-degree frost. Another thing is that Yudenich was not going to retreat. He wrote to Berkhman: "It is not enough for us to throw the Turks away from Sarakamish, we can and must completely destroy them."
Yudenich not only made decisions in Suvorov's offensive spirit, but also imitated the Generalissimo - perhaps unconsciously - in his actions. Nikolai Nikolaevich is always on the front line, in full view of soldiers and officers, often under enemy fire. And there was no bravado in this, it is simply impossible to do otherwise in the Russian army, because, as Denikin wrote, the Russian soldier is calmer when his commander is under fire.
On the eve of Christmas, Yudenich broke through the blockade with a powerful blow and defeated two Turkish corps. It must be admitted: the enemy fought bravely to the end, even when Enver, just like Napoleon, abandoned the agonizing divisions near Sarakamish. Yudenich would never have done that. And this is the profound difference between the Russian mentality, based on Orthodox traditions, and the Western one, and Enver was in many ways a European, both by education and partly by upbringing.
Let's pay tribute to Vorontsov-Dashkov. He appreciated the talent of his chief of staff, presenting him to the rank of infantry general. Soon Yudenich headed the Caucasian army. First of all, the new commander returned the Russian troops to Persia, withdrawn from there by order of Myshlaevsky. However, the Turks defeated near Sarakamish were not going to sit out in defense. On the contrary, having concentrated large forces in the Euphrates valley, they decided to defeat the left flank of the Caucasian army. And again Yudenich acted in Suvorov style: without waiting for the enemy's offensive, he preempted him with a powerful blow from the 4th corps, whose command, alas, did not show sufficient tactical literacy.
The Turks nevertheless struck a blow on the left flank of the Caucasian army and achieved some success. And again, Yudenich accurately assessed the situation and made the right decision: he allowed the enemy to go deeper into the mountains (the left flank of the Caucasian army was concentrated there) and then with a swift blow cut his path of retreat. Moreover, the details of the operation were hidden from Vorontsov-Dashkova - the elderly count could not understand the courage of his commander's plan and prohibit the offensive. Our blow came as a surprise to the Turks and led to a brilliant success.
But in the same 1915, the Dardanelles operation ended in failure for the British troops. The threat to Istanbul passed, and the Turks decided to transfer significant forces to the Caucasus. Moreover, these were the troops that had just defeated the British and therefore had a high fighting spirit. In this situation, the only correct decision for the Russian command is a swift attack and defeat of the main enemy forces before the arrival of reinforcements.
The Erzurum operation, brilliantly carried out by Yudenich, began. It was carried out in the most difficult conditions: the Turkish flanks rested on the ridges of the Pontic Taurus and Dram-Dag. But skillfully maneuvering, the troops of the Caucasian army broke through to Erzurum. And like Suvorov once near Izmail, Yudenich decided to storm the seemingly impregnable fortress. The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who replaced Vorontsov-Dashkov's governor, hesitated. In the end, the army commander managed to convince him of the need for decisive action. Thanks to the unparalleled valor of the Russian troops, the assault ended in success (for more details - "VPK", No. 5, 2016).
Yudenich began pursuing the defeated enemy. New successes awaited the army commander. As well as Russia as a whole. But the tragic year of 1917 came, with the bloody chaos of the revolution and the collapse of the army, canceling out all the victories of Russian weapons. It was not for nothing that Churchill wrote: “Fate has never been so cruel to any country as to Russia. Her ship went down when the harbor was in sight."
In the cycle of the Civil War, destinies collapsed, and Yudenich was no exception … Sharing with the soldiers - that is, with the common people - the hardships and deprivations of the war, he was called the enemy by the Bolsheviks
