The only Russian aircraft carrier meets the tasks for which it was created
The opinion that our Navy does not need aircraft carriers is quite widespread. Someone says the opposite, but at the same time emphasizes: the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAKR) "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" is so ineffective that it should be removed from the combat composition of the fleet. This opinion sometimes makes its way even in naval circles.
It is obvious that it is necessary to figure out what exactly the Kuznetsov TAKR gives our fleet. It is well known that not a single aircraft carrier in the world operates independently without communication with other forces of the fleet. It is always the nucleus of a large group. Accordingly, an analysis of the significance of an aircraft carrier makes sense only in the context of its influence on the course of combat operations of the corresponding scale. And the criterion of necessity is the increase in the combat effectiveness of the grouping of forces to which it is included.
Anti-aircraft by birth
Initially, one should turn to history and determine what such ships were intended for in the Soviet Navy. Distinctive features of our aircraft carrier at the time of its creation was that it had a sufficiently powerful strike missile armament in the form of 12 launchers for anti-ship missiles of the "Granit" complex and much more effective air defense systems in comparison with foreign "classmates". The air group was also specific - 24 Su-33 fighters, which could potentially be equipped for the use of Moskit anti-ship missiles (successful tests were carried out).
Such views on the purpose of the aircraft carrier were based on our concept of armed warfare at sea: enemy surface forces, primarily large ship formations, the most important of which were considered aircraft carrier, should be hit by anti-ship missiles of various classes, among which long-range missiles occupied the first place in importance. At the same time, everyone clearly understood that it was aviation that posed the main threat to our strike forces. For surface ships - deck and tactical, partly strategic, and for submarines - basic patrol.
The solution to the air defense problem by saturating the formations with ships with missiles did not fully justify itself. First, the limited range of use of missiles, even the most long-range ones, virtually ruled out the possibility of inflicting damage on air groups before the launch line of their anti-ship missiles. This meant that the enemy was able to attack unimpeded and in the most effective manner. Secondly, the limited ammunition load of the SAM (and the MZA) made it possible to repel only a small number of enemy air strikes. Then he could shoot our ships as unarmed targets. The only salvation was the cover of our ship groups by the forces of fighter aircraft. It is capable of defeating enemy attacking groups before the missile launch line and disorganizing the strike. And this meant not only a significant reduction in the number of anti-ship missiles produced by our ship formation, but also the infliction of losses that prevented subsequent attacks. In addition, the very fact of the presence of fighters forced the enemy to reduce the share of strike aircraft in the group, since it had to include fighters for clearing the airspace and direct escort. However, the cover of surface forces by coastal-based aircraft was and remains possible only at a distance of 150-200 kilometers.
There is one more problem - our long-range and anti-submarine aviation does not have effective fire means of self-defense, and electronic warfare systems only reduce the effectiveness of missile attacks, without preventing them. The only way to prevent heavy losses is to escort our heavy vehicles and cover the areas of their combat use by fighters. When using shore-based fighters, this is possible at a distance of only up to 350 kilometers, which is completely insufficient for operations in the far sea zone.
Thus, by the end of the 60s it became clear: without air cover by ship-based fighters, our oceanic fleet would be tied to the shore. To solve the problem, it was decided to create a "anti-aircraft" aircraft carrier, which was the project 1143.5 - aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov".
Today the situation has changed somewhat. There is evidence that the Granit complex from Kuznetsov has been dismantled. Su-33s in its air group are replaced by MiG-29K / KUB with the ability to strike anti-ship missiles and high-precision ammunition at sea and ground targets. However, the general purpose and role of our aircraft carrier in the structure of the Navy remain unchanged. In this context, its possible contribution to the solution of combat missions at sea should be assessed.
Kuznetsov is part of the Northern Fleet. With the outbreak of hostilities, it is most likely that the aircraft carrier will be included in the heterogeneous strike force created to defeat the enemy aircraft carrier groups in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea. It is also likely to be used to repel an enemy air defense unit with operational subordination for this period of its air group to a coastal formation or a VKS formation. "Kuznetsov" will be the most important component of the forces and assets that, in cooperation with the coastal formation (formation) of the Aerospace Forces, cover the fleet forces in the Barents and Kara Seas in the general air defense system.
The estimated increase in the combat effectiveness of these groupings will allow us to give a well-grounded conclusion about the advisability of retaining the aircraft carrier as part of our Navy.
TAKR did its job
It is advisable to start the analysis with the most complex form of the use of the forces of our Federation Council - combat operations to defeat the enemy aircraft carrier group. Its composition is well known and analyzed in sufficient detail. This is an aircraft carrier of the Nimitz class, three or four missile cruisers (Ticonderoga) and a destroyer (Orly Burke), three or four destroyers (Spruence) and frigates, one or two multipurpose nuclear submarines, as well as an air group of about 100 aircraft, including up to 60 fighters / attack aircraft F / A-18C. The Northern Fleet can put up against this AUG a strike formation of dissimilar forces as part of two or three nuclear missile submarines (SSGN) of project 949, two or three multipurpose nuclear submarines of project 971, 945, two missile cruisers - one each of projects 1144 and 1164 and up to 8-10 surface ships of the destroyer classes (project 956), a large anti-submarine ship (project 1155), a frigate (project 22350). These forces will be supported by missile-carrying aircraft on the Tu-22M3 with the Kh-22 resource of one or two regimental sorties. Consider the possible course of hostilities with and without the participation of our aircraft carrier as part of this formation.
Such a fight can last from 10-12 hours to a day or a little more. Accordingly, the available resource of the TAKR air group is about 52 sorties (with the existing composition of 12 Su-33 and 14 MiG-29K / KUB).
The dynamics of hostilities will include several stages.
In the course of the first, the main task of our formation will be to repel air strikes on surface ships and submarines. At this stage, we can expect opposition to our combination by forces of up to 30-34 carrier-based aircraft and one or two tactical squadrons, up to 6-9 UAV aircraft from Norwegian airfields. With the allocation of 16–20 sorties, it is possible to ensure the combat stability of surface ships of the nucleus (cruisers and aircraft carrier) with a probability of about 0.9, and submarines with a probability of at least 0.9, whereas without the support of naval aviation, these indicators will be significantly lower - 0, 5-0, 7 and 0, 6-0, 7, respectively. At the same time, most of the ammunition of the ship's ZOS will be used up.
At the second stage, the main task will be to identify the construction of AUG and ship orders with an attack on the ships of the anti-missile barrier (PRB) by the forces of one SSGN. Target designation can be issued from a reconnaissance aircraft, from a satellite or from a nuclear submarine of a reconnaissance and strike group. It is not possible to place the details of the calculation in the article. Therefore, we present the final result. In the presence of an aircraft carrier in the composition of the formation and the allocation of four to six sorties to ensure this strike, the probability of its successful application is up to 0.95, while without an aircraft carrier it will not exceed 0.4-0.5. our SSGN for a communication session to receive target designation and can destroy it) and fighters of the combat air patrol AUG, capable of shooting down our reconnaissance aircraft. As a result, in the first case, the probability of neutralizing the PRB is 0, 7–0, 8, and in the second, 0, 3–0, 4.
The main attack (the third stage) will most likely be delivered by the Tu-22M3 forces with Kh-22 missiles and one or two SSGNs, with the support of their actions by reconnaissance aircraft. The limited strike time allows counting on a resource within 16 sorties by shipborne fighters, which will have to neutralize the AUG airborne aircraft and the groups being lifted from the position of duty on deck in readiness number 1 - only 6-10 aircraft, up to 4-6 shore-based fighters from Norwegian airfields and 2-3 BPA aircraft. In the presence of a fighter cover, its result can be estimated at 0, 7–0, 8 of the probability of incapacitating an aircraft carrier with the loss of the possibility of carrier-based aviation operations and sinking, or at least three or four ships from the escort. At the same time, the combat stability of our SSGNs will be at least 0.8–0.85, and the losses of missile-carrying aircraft will not exceed two vehicles (they may not exist at all). In the absence of fighter support for our strike forces, their losses will increase significantly. The combat stability of the SSGN will decrease to 0.5–0.55, and the losses of the DA air regiment may exceed a third of its composition, reaching half or more under unfavorable conditions. At the same time, the probability of the destruction of the aircraft carrier will not exceed 0.2–0.25.
For the development of success, long-range and short-range anti-ship missiles will be launched by the main forces of surface ships, possibly with limited involvement of naval aviation. But all this is possible if the main blow is effective. Otherwise, the curtailment of hostilities with the departure of the compound to the bases is quite likely, which will occur under the fire of deck and tactical aviation. The main content of this stage is the exchange of missile strikes by surface ships of the Russian formation and the surviving cruisers and destroyers of the United States, with the subsequent return of our forces to the base. The influence of carrier-based aircraft on the course of an armed struggle will be associated mainly with repelling attacks from enemy tactical aviation, for which the entire remaining resource can be allocated - from 10 to 16 sorties. This will allow us to maintain the combat stability of our surface ships at the level of 0, 8. In the absence of air cover, taking into account the complete use of the ZOS ammunition, it is unlikely to exceed 0, 2–0, 25.
Thus, in the presence of aircraft carrier, the probability of destroying an enemy aircraft carrier reaches 0.8 with the sinking of up to three to five escort ships out of six to eight. At the same time, our compound suffers more or less acceptable losses: surface ships - up to three or four units (including a missile cruiser with a relatively low probability of a disabled missile cruiser), 1-2 SSGNs and nuclear submarines, up to 10-12 aircraft, including 1-2 long-range aviation. That is, in the presence of the aircraft carrier, the SF may well cope with the AUG. But in the absence, the task is practically not solved: the probability of the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier will not exceed 0, 2–0, 3 plus one or two sunken escort ships. Our losses will turn out to be catastrophic: 6-8 surface ships, including both missile cruisers, up to 3-4 submarines, 10-12 DA aircraft.
The conclusion is unambiguous: the aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" is necessary. Talk about the advisability of keeping it in the fleet should be stopped.
