April 8, 1986, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev paid a visit to the city of Togliatti. It was then, during a speech in front of the staff of the Volga Automobile Plant, that the need for restructuring was first clearly announced. True, even before that, during his visit to Leningrad (May 15-17, 1985), Gorbachev told the local party activists: “Apparently, comrades, we all need to rebuild. Everyone."
But the very word "perestroika" from the lips of the secretary general sounded precisely in Togliatti. Then the secretary general said: “You need to start first with a restructuring in thinking and psychology, in organization, in style and ways of working. Frankly, if we ourselves do not rebuild, I am deeply convinced of this, then we will not rebuild both the economy and our social life."
The new word was almost instantly replicated by the media. And Gorbachev himself was very optimistic. At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which took place on April 10, he stated: “The people believed in perestroika, society began to move. A depressing situation in capital construction, in equipping light industry enterprises. Tensions in the social sphere (lack of housing, food coupons). The shots are podzayalis, there is no pain for the people. People demand to strengthen discipline and fight against drunkenness."
Indeed, the course of perestroika has generated a wave of enthusiasm among the masses - not as strong, however, as the previous waves. Although even at first there was some skepticism. Connoisseurs of Lenin's quotes have unearthed one statement, which is very inconvenient for the "superintendents of perestroika":
“We have an awful lot of people willing to rebuild in every way, and these rebuildings result in such a disaster that I never knew a greater disaster in my life.”
("On the domestic and foreign policy of the republic. Report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 23, 1921").
These caustic Leninist words were then disseminated in typewritten form, almost as secretly as dissident leaflets. Perestroika had already begun, but pluralism was still a long way off.
Acceleration without conversion
Before "perestroika" began, the main emphasis was on "acceleration." This new strategy was announced back on April 23, 1985, at the famous plenum of the Central Committee, from which Gorbachev's reforms are counted. Although here we can still recall the Andropov plenum of the Central Committee (November 1982), when the party and the country were informed: “It is planned to accelerate the pace of economic development, to increase the absolute size of the growth of national income … ".
Acceleration strongly resembled another slogan: “catch up and overtake”. Sometimes he is attributed to N. S. Khrushchev, but he has nothing to do with it. Nikita Sergeevich used it in 1959, meaning the need to "make" the United States in the field of "food policy" - for the production of meat, milk and butter. And the slogan itself was formulated by V. I. Lenin, and even before the October Revolution, in the article "The Coming Catastrophe and How to Fight It". Then the leader put the party before a choice: "Either perish, or catch up with the advanced countries and overtake them also economically." And in 1929, at the November Plenum of the Central Committee, this slogan was thrown into the "masses" by I. V. Stalin:
“We have caught up and surpassed the advanced capitalist countries in terms of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. It's good. But this is not enough. In order to achieve the final victory of socialism, it is still necessary to catch up and overtake these countries also in technical and economic terms."
By the way, researchers are inclined to believe that the "acceleration" was an attempt to modernize the country on an authoritarian-mobilization basis. Even parallels are drawn with the Stalinist era, which was characterized by the supermobilization of various resources. There is indeed some similarity, but it is insignificant. Before carrying out his "acceleration" (industrialization), Stalin reorganized the entire system of managing the national economy. Thus, the All-Union Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was replaced by industrial people's commissariats, which served as the engines of industrial modernization. That is, Stalin just carried out his restructuring, while the acceleration took place in the presence of old structures.
You can also draw parallels with the Stalinist purges, pointing to the "cadre revolution" in the party and state apparatus, which began just at the height of the acceleration. So, in September 1985, N. A. Tikhonov, who was replaced by N. I. Ryzhkov. Further, the frames were updated in an accelerated order. By 1987, 70% of the Politburo, 40% of the Central Committee, 70% of the regional committee secretaries had been replaced. Such rates are, in fact, reminiscent of Stalin's. However, under Stalin, the top was "cleaned out" in 1937-1938, after the creation of the industrial base. And here they combined the beginning of the acceleration and the personnel revolution - without any structural changes. Here is how A. P. Shevyakov: “After a long stagnation in the staff, their continuous rotation began. She went under the banner of replacing the corrupt and decayed elite. But it was carried out very selectively, precisely adjusted. They took people to Moscow who did not always match their new job. After all, leadership, or at least work in the central office, requires other skills, an understanding of the scale of the entire country. And given that the USSR was also a superpower, then such a leadership was responsible for the solution of global problems. This implies that such people should have an understanding of the political space and its expansion to the scale of the entire Earth!
And at the table, from where the whole world can be seen, a person appears, with the mind of a district committee secretary or even less … Newcomers were brought up from the hinterland, who were then used by the capital's puppeteers.
The hand of an experienced director chose someone, pulled out of the provincial wilderness, brought a newcomer to the stage, and at first he only looked around, finding himself in the center of attention to his person. This newcomer began to think that now the country could not do without him, he began to build a big boss out of himself, everyone was frightened, but he was unable to do anything. They begin to point fingers at him, criticize him, then get rid of him - and this happens relatively easily. He retires without understanding anything. And he was simply summoned to the stage to play his role, discrediting his post, his office, after which he is not needed and instead of him a new actor plays his exactly the same role. " ("How the USSR was killed." The greatest geopolitical catastrophe ").
"The revolution has no end"
On August 2, 1986, at a meeting with a party activist in Khabarovsk, Gorbachev said that he was putting "an equal sign between the words perestroika and revolution." This was a very serious claim, which especially shocked those who delved into the essence of the official terminology, correlating it in the "eternally living teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin." After all, the revolution meant a change in the entire social system. It turned out to be something incongruous - does it mean that the Soviet system needs to be changed ?!
Gorbachev himself reassured people, in his book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World" the following explanation was given: "Of course, we are not going to change the Soviet power, we will not retreat from its fundamental foundations. But changes are necessary, and those that strengthen socialism, make it politically richer and more dynamic."
It turns out that some began to doubt whether perestroika would preserve Soviet power (as subsequent events will show, not without reason). By the way, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet A. A. Gromyko (who did a lot for Gorbachev's “accession”), in a conversation with his son, noted that this statement of the secretary general is “lightweight” and “misleading”: “Instead of creating, we can again go with this approach to destruction. Much needs to be changed in the country, but not the social system."
An experienced diplomat and apparatchik, Gromyko realized that it was precisely a matter of changing the entire device. And the dissident A. A. Zinoviev expressed himself quite sharply:
"When the Soviet party apparatchiks who have become proficient in Marxism and the Marxist-Leninist theorists who justify their activity begin to so easily deal with the most important categories of Soviet state ideology, then a doubt involuntarily creeps in: are these people in their right minds?"
Nobody openly objected to Gorbachev, although the inconsistencies were simply obvious. Doubts began to be expressed later, in a somewhat veiled form. “In fact, Soviet social scientists noticed sedition,” writes N. Eliseeva. - In June 1988 … the Progress publishing house published a collection of articles by leading Soviet scientists under the symbolic title "There is no other way" … In the article "On the revolutionary restructuring of state-administrative socialism," the Soviet philosopher A. Butenko wrote: aspects of our social life, they call perestroika a revolutionary process or simply a revolution … however, expressing all this, they pretend not to notice, or deliberately turn away from the fact that as a result of such formulas, slogans and calls in Soviet social science, an ever-growing complex of logical contradictions is accumulating, a number of perplexities and unresolved issues remain that disorient not only novice propagandists, but also many … social scientists … Why do we call perestroika a revolution, if we know K. Marx's idea, according to which after the political revolution of the working class … “when there will be no more classes and class antagonism, social evolution per There can be no political revolutions "… It must be admitted: either Marx was wrong, or we call perestroika a revolution not according to Marx." (“Revolution as a reform strategy for restructuring the USSR: 1985–1991” // Gefter. Ru).
It turned out that the USSR was oriented towards a revolutionary change in the social system back in 1986, when perestroika was just proclaimed, but nothing was really rebuilt yet. Of course, the question arises, is it just "lightness" or a conscious desire to somehow program the coming explosion in consciousness and subconsciousness? Many researchers are convinced that the "perestroika superintendents" sought to dismantle socialism from the very beginning. Be that as it may, but the very word "revolution" sounded.
State acceptance against the economy
The introduction of a system of state inspectors to supervise the quality of industrial products was perhaps the only structural transformation of the era of "acceleration" and the earliest perestroika. On May 12, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On Approval of the Regulation on State Acceptance of Products in Associations and Enterprises." At factories and plants, state acceptance was introduced, which was intended to replace the so-called. "Departments of technical control" (QCD). They were subordinate to the administration, therefore they could not be a reliable barrier on the path of distribution of low-quality products. However, they themselves did not need any rigor. Indeed, in the event of a defect, the "controllers" were deprived of their bonuses - along with workers and engineers. But the "state acceptance" was a separate department, independent of the directorate. They got down to business pretty quickly, and by 1987 state inspectors were operating at every large enterprise.
However, the state acceptance did not give the expected effect and brought only one harm. A powerful blow was dealt to Soviet industry. “A whole army of state receivers has deployed its activities at all the most important industrial enterprises, rejecting and returning products that do not meet industrial standards for revision in large numbers,” writes I. Ya. Froyanov. - Of course, this could have been foreseen in advance, since the “shaft” of low-quality products has grown noticeably in the conditions of the so-called “acceleration”. Therefore, the top officials knew about the consequences, but, nevertheless, they went exactly on such a command method of “improving” its quality. As expected, due to the accumulation of “arrested” products that did not reach the consumer (at times, it was estimated at 80-90%), the country's economy suffered severe damage. Often, due to the lack of components, related industries were stopped. The industry was in a state of disarray. " ("Diving into the Abyss").
But everything could have been done differently. First, they would raise the quality of the products, and then they would speed up the production itself. But this is not so bad - keep the same enthusiasm for the state receivers. However, in the end, the administration was able to persuade the controllers to "mutually beneficial cooperation."
This, by the way, was greatly facilitated by the fact that the state receivers were registered with the party at the enterprises whose work they also controlled. For some reason, this "trifle" was forgotten when organizing an "independent" state acceptance procedure.
Economic failure
At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February 25 - March 6), an ambitious task was set - to ensure the outstripping (as much as 1, 7 times) development of mechanical engineering in relation to the entire Soviet industry. It was supposed to keep the annual growth rate at least 4% per year.
Alas, all these "huge plans" remained only on paper. Huge investments were made in heavy industry and in import purchases for it. However, this did not have any positive effect on the commodity and food market. On the contrary, the "acceleration" hit the Soviet consumer painfully. The fact is that an increase in purchases of imported equipment led to a decrease in imports of food and consumer goods. Probably, in the ascetic times of Stalin's industrialization, it was relatively easy to force people to tighten their belts, but the Soviet people of the 1980s were already accustomed to a fairly high standard of living. And he quite naturally demanded his increase.
As a result of a very expensive experiment with acceleration, the state budget deficit tripled (back in 1985 it was about 18 billion rubles).
Of course, it wasn't just about acceleration. The Chernobyl accident dealt a huge blow to the budget. The state was forced to spend 14 billion rubles only to eliminate its consequences. The decline in world oil prices led to a decrease in income from its imports by one third. The "anti-alcohol campaign" also had an effect - in 1985-1988 the budget was missing 67 billion rubles.
By the way, about this campaign. Gorbachev was not at all so original here. And before him, Soviet general secretaries considered it necessary to conduct noisy campaigns against the "green serpent", during which the latter invariably won. In 1929, many hot spots, converted into canteens and tea houses, were closed in the USSR. In addition, a special edition “Sobriety and Culture” was opened. Khrushchev also fought for a sober lifestyle, under which in 1959 the sale of vodka was prohibited in all catering establishments located near train stations, airports, etc. (an exception was made only for restaurants). In addition, it was no longer possible to sell vodka near factories, schools, kindergartens, etc. Finally, L. I. Brezhnev, under which the prices for alcohol were increased, limited the time for the sale of strong alcohol from 11 to 19 hours, and also introduced the famous medical and labor dispensaries (LTP).
In fairness, I must say that these measures still brought a certain effect, the serpent received tangible wounds. This also applies to the Gorbachev campaign, which was accompanied by a reduction in mortality, an increase in the birth rate and life expectancy.
During the period of the anti-alcohol decree, 500 thousand more people were born each year in the country than in the previous 30 years. The life expectancy of men increased by 2, 6 years - and this was the maximum in the entire history of Russia.
However, the campaign itself was too ridiculous. What is only the cutting down of vineyards! And most importantly, no mechanisms have been found that made it possible to fully compensate for the economic losses from the sharp contraction of the alcoholic beverages market.
On the threshold of the Market
In the first half of 1986, there was no serious movement towards economic reforms in the spirit of "market socialism" in the country. The only exception was two timid steps in this direction made by the country's leadership. So, on February 1, 1986, a resolution was adopted on measures to develop consumer cooperation. Now cooperatives are allowed to create and in order to improve supplies. Thus, on a very small scale, non-state trade was allowed.
And on March 27, the decree "On the transfer of associations, enterprises and organizations of individual ministries and departments to material and technical supply in the order of wholesale trade" was published. Directive fund allocation was now replaced (in part) by wholesale trade.
However, very soon there was a pullback from the "market". On May 15, the Council of Ministers adopts a resolution "On measures to strengthen the fight against unearned income." It was even backed up by the relevant decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU of May 28. “In fact, people who understood the market actions of the party leadership as an announcement of a new NEP and tried to sell their services fell under the new campaign,” writes A. V. Shubin. - However, the prohibitive legislation was not canceled, and the law enforcement agencies received a signal to crack down on semi-legal artisans, drivers who competed with taxis, sellers of flowers grown on their land, etc. sprouts of market relations. Private entrepreneurship, which began to appear from the underground under the guise of cooperatives and individual labor activity (the term will enter into official use at the end of the year), has now been defeated and gone underground, under the wing of criminal groups. The rejection of the declarations of Perestroika to the authoritarian practice of "acceleration" was obvious. " ("The paradoxes of perestroika. A lost chance of the USSR").
However, then the pendulum swung again in the direction of economic reforms. So, on August 14, it was allowed to organize cooperatives under the local councils for the collection and processing of recyclable materials. And four days later, a resolution was adopted, according to which some ministries and enterprises were able to directly enter the foreign market and create joint ventures with foreigners.
This was already a breakthrough. And very soon a real race towards foreign capital began in this direction. Back in 1990, economist A. K. Tsikunov (who wrote under the pseudonym A. Kuzmich) remarked about this: “The first stage of perestroika can be called the period of the initial accumulation of capital. When the ship sinks, everything that comes to hand is dragged from it, and the more expensive, the better. In January 1987, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the restriction on foreign trade was partially lifted and without the DCK (differentiated currency coefficients), enterprises and individuals were allowed to sell abroad all scarce goods, food, consumer goods, raw materials, energy, gold, and chemical products. Even "meat horses" made it to this ill-fated list! By the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of September and October 1987, enterprises were already given "mandatory directives" on the sale of deficits abroad. This created disinterest in the domestic market, began to wash out goods, depreciate the ruble, and after the 1987 regulations on joint ventures with foreigners and the 1988 Law on Cooperation, our store shelves began to empty out, and international speculation took on unprecedented proportions. " ("Russia and the Market").
Finally, on November 19, 1986, the USSR Law on Individual Labor Activity was adopted. He gave the green light to private handicraftsmen and cooperatives involved in small-scale production, trade and provision of services to the population. True, this law came into force only on May 1, 1987.
The policy of acceleration and early restructuring was extremely contradictory, which led to its complete failure. The then leadership discredited the very idea of gradual transformations within the framework of the socialist system.
The excesses of the "emergency" (state acceptance, anti-alcohol campaign, the fight against unearned income, etc.) caused disgust for the very administrative measures that could be used wisely.
Now society was ready for the "revolutionary restructuring" that was announced in January 1987. However, this is already a topic for another conversation.
