70 years ago, on February 10, 1945, the East Pomeranian strategic operation began. This operation, in terms of its scope and results, became one of the most important operations of the 1945 victory campaign. It ended with the complete defeat of the German grouping - Army Group Vistula and the liberation of Eastern Pomerania and the entire southern coast of the Baltic Sea - from Danzig (Gdansk) and Gdynia to the mouth of the Oder from the enemy troops. As a result of the defeat of the Pomeranian grouping of the enemy, the threat of a flank attack on the Soviet troops, which were advancing in the central (Berlin) direction, was eliminated, which became a prerequisite for the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, during the operation, Soviet troops completed the liberation of the Polish people, returning them to the original Slavic lands on the coast of the Baltic Sea, including Pomerania-Pomorie.
The situation before the battle
The East Pomeranian operation was carried out in the interval between the large offensive of the Soviet troops in January 1945, which culminated in the breakthrough of a powerful and deeply echeloned enemy defense between the Vistula and the Oder, the defeat of German troops in Western Poland, the withdrawal of the troops of the 1st Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian fronts on the Oder and Neisse rivers (Before the fall of Germany. Vistula-Oder operation; Part 2), encirclement of the enemy group in East Prussia (Second assault on East Prussia. Insterburg-Königsberg and Mlavsko-Elbing operations), Berlin operation of the 1st and 2nd 1st Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. In fact, the East Pomeranian operation arose in the process of the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian operations and became a continuation of the grandiose winter offensive of the Red Army.
By the beginning of the operation on the right strategic flank of the Soviet-German front, a peculiar and complex situation had developed. Army Group Courland was surrounded in the western part of Latvia. During the first stage of the East Prussian operation, the East Prussian enemy grouping was divided into three groups, including the Koenigsberg garrison. The Germans continued to control East Pomerania, where they concentrated a large grouping of troops to deliver a counterattack on the flank and rear of the 1st Belorussian Front, which threatened Berlin.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having broken through the enemy's defenses on the Vistula, with the forces of the armies of the center reached the Oder River and, crossing this last powerful water line on the approaches to the German capital, took bridgeheads on its left bank in the Kustrin and Frankfurt-on-Oder area. The armies of the center of the 1st Belorussian Front continued their struggle to expand bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder and to destroy the German garrisons in Kustrin and Frankfurt. The right wing of the front solved the problem of covering the flank and rear from the attack of the Pomeranian group of the enemy.
In early February 1945, a large 150-kilometer gap formed between the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of which were fighting heavy battles with the encircled East Prussian enemy grouping. It was covered by insignificant forces of the troops of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front. Without the defeat of the German troops in Pomerania, it was extremely dangerous to advance in the Berlin direction.
The command of the 1st Belorussian Front, in accordance with the prevailing situation on the right flank, was forced to take urgent measures in order to protect the troops from a flank attack by the East Pomeranian group of the Wehrmacht. The defeat of the enemy forces in Eastern Pomerania made it possible to withdraw the armies of the right wing to the line of the Oder River and continue the offensive in the Berlin direction. The general military-political situation required the immediate solution of the task of routing German troops in Eastern Pomerania and eliminating the encircled grouping in the Königsberg area.
The task of eliminating the East Prussian grouping was entrusted to the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. He was strengthened by handing over four armies of the right wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front to him. The Stavka of the Supreme Command ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front with the remaining forces to defeat the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping and occupy the whole of Eastern Pomerania - from Danzig (Gdansk) to Stettin (Szczecin), reaching the Baltic coast. Rokossovsky's armies went on the offensive on February 10, 1945, with little or no preparation.
Thus, initially, the task of eliminating the East Pomeranian grouping of the enemy was to be solved by the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky. However, Rokossovsky's troops were exhausted by fierce and prolonged battles (about a month) in East Prussia, the transfer of four armies to the 3rd Belorussian Front. The offensive began almost without preparation and took place in difficult conditions of the coming spring thaw, in a wooded and swampy area. As a result, the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front developed slowly and soon stalled. German troops not only held back the offensive of the 2nd Belorussian Front, but also continued to make stubborn attempts to break through to the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front, increasing the power of the Pomeranian group.
Therefore, the high command decided to involve the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Georgy Zhukov in the liquidation of the East Pomeranian grouping. The headquarters instructed the forces of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front to prepare a strike in the northern direction in the general direction of Kolberg. Zhukov's troops were supposed to repel the stubborn and fierce attacks of German troops trying to break through the defenses of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front east of the Oder, and go to the rear of the grouping of Soviet troops aimed at Berlin, at the same time prepare an attack to destroy in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian front of the enemy's East Pomeranian grouping. Zhukov's troops were to go on the offensive on February 24.
Soviet artillerymen fire from a 122mm A-19 howitzer on Danzig Street. Photo source:
Operation plan
Before the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front on February 8 were instructed to go on the offensive with the center and left wing to the north and reach the mouth of the river by February 20. Vistula, Dirschau, Butow, Rummelsburg, Neustättin. At the second stage of the operation, the 1st Belorussian Front, having received a fresh 19th Army, was supposed to advance to the west, in the general direction of Stettin and liberate Danzig and Gdynia with its right flank. As a result, Rokossovsky's troops were to occupy all of Eastern Pomerania and the Baltic Sea coast.
At the first stage of the operation, the 65th Army was supposed to advance from the Vistula bridgehead in the northwestern direction, to Chersk and further Byutov. The 49th Army received the task of developing an offensive in the direction of Baldenberg, the 70th Army with one tank and one mechanized corps attached to capture the Schlochau, Preuss-Friedland line, and then move in the general direction to Tempelsburg. To strengthen the blow from the left flank, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps received the task of occupying the Chojnice and Schlochau area, then advancing on Rummelsburg and Baldenberg.
However, the 2nd Belorussian Front, for a number of objective reasons, could not independently solve the strategic task of liberating Eastern Pomerania from Nazi troops. Therefore, Zhukov's armies were involved in the operation. During this period, the 1st Belorussian Front had to solve several tasks: 1) to repulse the strikes of the East Pomeranian grouping, which was trying to break through to the rear of the Soviet grouping concentrated for an offensive in the Berlin direction; 2) to eliminate the encircled enemy groups in the areas of Poznan, Schneidemühl, Deutsch-Krone and Arnswalde; 3) to destroy strong enemy garrisons on the right bank of the Oder in the areas of the cities of Küstrin and Frankfurt an der Oder; 4) to maintain and expand the bridgeheads captured on the western bank of the Oder. In addition, the front was preparing for the continuation of the offensive against Berlin. As the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced in the northwestern direction, the formations of the 1st Belorussian Front that held the defense in the Pomeranian direction were released and, moving into its second echelon, moved to the Berlin direction.
Now the 1st Belorussian Front was connected to the elimination of the enemy's Pomeranian grouping. This decision of the Headquarters was due to the fact that the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, due to the increased resistance of the enemy forces, suspended the offensive. The German High Command continued to reinforce Army Group Vistula in an effort to prevent a Soviet advance on Berlin. For this, the Germans formed a powerful grouping in Eastern Pomerania, which hung over the flank of the 1st Belorussian Front and did not give it the opportunity to go on the offensive in the Berlin direction. With the success of the counteroffensive of the East Pomeranian grouping, the Germans hoped to eliminate the successes of the January offensive of the Soviet troops between the Vistula and the Oder. In addition, while holding Eastern Pomerania behind them, the Germans retained the opportunity to withdraw their troops from East Prussia and evacuate the Courland grouping.
The Soviet Headquarters, in order to put an end to the enemy grouping in Eastern Pomerania as soon as possible and continue the offensive on Berlin, decided to throw the forces of two fronts into battle. On February 17 and 22, Stavka gave instructions to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts to carry out a further offensive. The general plan of the operation was to cut the enemy grouping in the general direction of Neustettin, Kozlin, Kohlberg by strikes from the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts and, developing an offensive with a common right wing to the west, to reach the Oder, and with the left wing to the east to Gdansk, destroy the German troops.
Rokossovsky decided to attack Kozlin with the left flank of the front, where the 19th Army, reinforced by the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, was withdrawn. The left wing of the front was to reach the sea, and then turn east and advance on Gdynia. The troops of the right wing and the center of the front - the 2nd shock, 65th, 49th and 70th armies, continued their offensive in the northern and northeastern directions, to Gdansk and Gdynia. They were supposed to finish off the German grouping surrounded by a blow from the 19th Army.
On February 20, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front decided to first go over to a tough defense and, within a few days (until February 25-26), bleed the enemy strike forces advancing from the Stargard area, and then go over to a powerful counteroffensive. To solve this problem, the armies of the right wing of the front were involved - the 61st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, and additionally the 1st Guards Tank Army from the second echelon. By the beginning of the offensive, the 3rd Shock Army was also transferred. The main blow was delivered in a general direction to the north and north-west, to Kohlberg and Cummin. Auxiliary strikes were delivered by the 1st Army of the Polish Army on the right flank and the 47th Army on the left flank, in the direction of Altdam.
For the fastest breakthrough of the enemy's defenses and the development of a high rate of offensive, Zhukov planned to throw two tank armies into battle on the very first day of the front offensive. The troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army received the task of occupying the Vangerin, Dramburg region, then advancing in the general direction of Kolberg, towards the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The troops of the 2nd Guards Tank Army were to advance in the northwestern direction, at the beginning of the offensive, capture the Freienwalde, Massov area, then advance on Cummin. Powerful blows by the armies of the front were to lead to the defeat of the 11th German army.
Thus, the main blow was delivered by the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies (61st, 3rd shock armies, 1st guards tank and 2nd guards tank armies), while the flanks were delivered by the 1st Polish and 47th I am an army.
Plans of the German command
The main goal of the German command was to disrupt the offensive of Soviet troops on Berlin at any cost, to try to push them back across the Vistula in order to gain time. Berlin still hoped to find a common language with the Anglo-American leadership, conclude a truce with the Western powers and preserve the core of the Nazi regime in Germany and Austria. After the armistice with the West, it was possible to transfer all forces to the Eastern Front. Continuing the war, Berlin hoped for a change in the political situation in the world (a quarrel between the allies) and for a "miracle weapon". Thus, there is an opinion that by the fall of 1945 or a little later, Germany could have received nuclear weapons.
To achieve this goal, the German command planned to hold the Courland bridgehead in the Baltic States, the Königsberg area at any cost, tying up significant Soviet forces for a long time by blockading these areas. In addition, Soviet troops hoped to bind them with focal defenses in large cities and former fortresses located on the territory of Silesia (Breslau, Glogau), in the Oder Valley (Küstrin and Frankfurt), in East Prussia and Pomerania. At the same time, the German command transferred all possible forces and reserves, including removing units from the Western Front, to Eastern Pomerania. Having concentrated a strong grouping in Pomerania, mainly from mobile formations, the Germans hoped to deliver a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the Soviet troops advancing in the Berlin direction. With the successful development of the offensive, it was hoped to return the line of the Vistula River, eliminating the results of the January offensive of the Red Army.
At the first stage of the operation, while the shock group was being concentrated, the troops of the first echelon of the Vistula group were assigned the task of conducting a tough defense, preventing the Soviet troops from breaking through into the depths of Eastern Pomerania, exhausting and bleeding them.
In addition, there was a more extensive counter-offensive plan. German troops were to inflict a strong blow not only from Pomerania, but also from Glogau to Poznan. The converging attacks of the Wehrmacht should have led to the evacuation of Soviet troops from Western Poland, across the Vistula. However, the German command could not carry out this plan, since there was neither time for preparation, nor appropriate forces and means.
It is also worth remembering that Eastern Pomerania played an important role in the German economy - a large number of military enterprises were located here, the region was an important agricultural base, supplying the Reich with bread, meat, sugar and fish. Large bases of the military and merchant fleet of the German Empire were located here.
German troops on the march in Pomerania
German easel 88-mm anti-tank grenade launchers "Puppchen" (Raketenwerfer 43 "Puppchen"), captured by the Red Army in one of the cities of Pomerania
Soviet forces
At the beginning of the battle, the 2nd Belorussian Front included four combined-arms armies - the 2nd shock, 65th, 49th and 70th armies, supported by 2 tank, mechanized and cavalry corps. The front was later reinforced by the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps. From the air, the offensive was supported by the 4th Air Army. The front consisted of 45 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 3 tank, 1 mechanized and 1 cavalry corps, 1 separate tank brigade and 1 fortified area. In total, the front consisted of more than 560 thousand people.
Of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, six armies took part in the operation - the 47th, 61st, 3rd Shock, 1st Polish, 1st Guards Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Armies. From the air, the ground forces were supported by the 6th Air Army. The right wing of the front included 27 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 4 tank and 2 mechanized corps, 2 separate tank, 1 self-propelled artillery brigades and 1 fortified area. In total, more than 359 thousand people, plus more than 75 thousand Polish soldiers (5 infantry divisions, cavalry and tank brigades).
Thus, the Soviet forces (together with the Poles) numbered about 1 million people (78 rifle and cavalry divisions, 5 Polish infantry divisions, 10 mechanized and tank corps, 2 fortified areas, etc.).
Soviet heavy tank IS-2 on the street in Stargard in Eastern Pomerania
Germanic forces. Defense
Eastern Pomerania was defended by Army Group Vistula under the command of SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler. It consisted of the 2nd, 11th armies, the 3rd tank army, which had more than 30 divisions and brigades, including 8 tank divisions and 3 tank brigades. Already during the battle, the number of divisions was increased to 40. In addition, the East Pomeranian grouping included a significant number of separate regiments and special-purpose battalions, brigades, regiments and divisions of reinforcement artillery, and militia battalions. On the coast, the land forces were supported by coastal and naval artillery. From the air, the ground forces were supported by a part of the 6th Air Fleet (300 vehicles).
The 2nd Field Army under the command of Walter Weiss (from March Dietrich von Saucken) held a defensive position in front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. On the left flank, the 20th and 23rd Army Corps and the Rappard corps group were defending. They had positions on the banks of the Nogat and Vistula rivers, and also held the Graudenz fortress. In the center and on the right flank, units of the 27th Army, 46th Tank and 18th Mountain Rifle Corps defended. In the first echelon there were up to 12 divisions, in the second, including reserves, 4-6 divisions.
The 11th Army of Anton Grasser (the newly formed 11th SS Panzer Army, the 1st formation army was killed in the Crimea) held a defensive position in front of the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. It consisted of formations of the 2nd Army, 3rd and 39th Panzer Corps, 10th SS Corps, Corps Group "Tettau", two Landwehr and three reserve divisions.
To strengthen these armies, the German command transferred formations to Eastern Pomerania, which previously held the defense along the rear line on the Oder from the Stettin Bay to Schwedt. Parts of the 3rd Panzer Army began to be transferred from East Prussia to Pomerania. The army administration of the 3rd Panzer Army subordinated the 11th Army, 7th Panzer Corps and 16th SS Corps, which were in the reserve of Army Group Vistula. The German High Command planned to strengthen the East Pomeranian grouping with the 6th Panzer Army, which was being transferred from the Western Front. However, due to the complication of the situation on the southern flank of the strategic Soviet-German front, the 6th Panzer Army was sent to Budapest. In general, the German grouping by February 10 had 10 corps, including 4 tank corps, united in three armies, two held the defenses in the first line, the third was in reserve.
In addition, surrounded enemy groups continued to resist in the Soviet rear: in the Schneidemühl area - up to 3 infantry divisions (about 30 thousand soldiers), in the Deutsch-Krone area - about 7 thousand people; Arnswalde - about 2 divisions (20 thousand people). According to Soviet intelligence, the East Pomeranian group was strengthened at the expense of troops in Courland and East Prussia.
Pomerania was a hilly plain covered by a third of forests. The Kashubian and Pomeranian Uplands, as well as a large number of lakes with narrow defiles between them, rivers and canals, hampered the maneuver of troops in general, and especially mobile ones. Rivers such as the Vistula, Warta and Oder were serious obstacles to the troops. In addition, in February and March, warm, slushy weather set in, which, in the conditions of a large number of reservoirs and swampy places, led to the fact that the troops could only move along the roads. As a result, the region, due to its natural conditions, was very convenient for organizing a solid defense.
Eastern Pomerania had a developed network of railways, highways and dirt roads. Most of the highways were paved. River and sea routes were also used as communication. Vistula, Oder, Bydgoszcz Canal and r. The Wartas were usually navigable almost all year round. There were large ports on the coast, especially Danzig, Gdynia and Stettin, which were the bases of the German fleet. Almost all cities and towns were connected by telegraph and telephone lines, including underground ones. This facilitated the maneuver, the transfer of German troops and their communication.
The corpses of the dead soldiers and the destroyed German tank Pz. Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Royal Tiger". Pomerania
The Germans were actively working on equipping fortifications and creating strong strongholds. These works involved not only field troops and special organizations, but civilians and prisoners of war. Back in 1933, the Pomeranian Wall was built on the Polish-German border. The left flank of the rampart adjoined the coastal fortifications in the Stolpmünde area, then the line passed through the fortified strongholds of Stolp, Rummelsburg, Neustättin, Schneidemühl, Deutsch-Krone (the southern part of the rampart was broken through by Soviet troops) and adjoined defensive structures on the banks of the Oder and Warta rivers. The basis of the Pomeranian line was made up of long-term military installations, which defended small garrisons from platoon to company. They were reinforced by field fortifications. Field installations were covered with a developed system of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles such as ditches, reinforced concrete posts, minefields and wire lines. A number of cities, including Stolp, Rummelsburg, Neustättin, Schneidemühl, Deutsch-Krone, were key strongholds. They were prepared for a perimeter defense, had many pillboxes and other engineering structures. On the coast there were coastal fortified areas - in the area of Danzig, Gdynia, the Hel, Leba, Stolpmünde, Rügenwalde and Kohlberg spits. There were specially equipped positions of coastal artillery.
Danzig and Gdynia had a defense system built by the front to the southwest. Danzig and Gdynia each had several lines of defense, which were based on both permanent structures and field fortifications. The cities themselves were prepared for street fighting. At the beginning of 1945, the Pomeranian Wall was supplemented with a defensive line along the western bank of the Vistula, from the mouth to the city of Bydgoszcz, with a front to the east and further along the rivers Netze and Warta to the Oder, with positions to the south. This defensive line, 3-5 km deep, consisted of two to five trenches and was reinforced with long-term firing points in the most dangerous areas.
Anti-tank barriers near the road in the vicinity of Danzig
