The following abbreviations are used in the article: AK - army corps, an - artillery regiment, IN - military district, GSh - General base, ZAPOVO - Western special VO, CA - Red Army, KOVO - Kiev special VO, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), mk - motorized body, pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), PribOVO - Baltic special VO, RM - intelligence materials, RO - intelligence department of VO, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, sc (sd) - rifle corps (division), TGr - tank group, td (TP, TB) - tank division (regiment, battalion).
In the previous section, it was said that instead of real enemy forces in East Prussia and in the northern part of the General Government, intelligence "discovered" a huge grouping in southern Poland, Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania. According to intelligence, by the evening of June 22, this group included up to 94-98 German divisions, of which 26 were motorized and tank divisions.
At the end of May, intelligence “for sure” knew about twenty one armored and motorized divisions, which were concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. In fact, at this time in East Prussia there were two TDs and another TD arrived on the territory of former Poland in the area of the city of Poznan.
Previously, the locations of the units that belonged to the mobile troops were considered. There are no coincidences between the actual disposition of the enemy's troops and the RM. Of all the places of deployment of tank units, which are listed in the reconnaissance report dated May 31, 1941, only one TP 21 (city of Letzen) turned out to be close to the actual location of the 1st TP. However, Letzen was not part of the territory of the concentration area of this division. The 21st TP in the 20th TD was at that time in Germany (Ohrdruf). The scouts could learn about TP from conversations of local residents or if they saw servicemen in tank uniforms with signs of the 21st regiment.
The 20th TD could start redeploying to the territory of East Prussia only after June 16. In the evening of June 19, until half of the 20th TD is located near Letzen, but the city itself does not fall into the division's concentration area again. Therefore, it can be argued that all the discovered locations of the 21st Panzer and Motorized Divisions are the mistakes of our intelligence or the result of German disinformation.
It was shown that, according to intelligence, until June 19 (inclusive) 5-7 German divisions were redeployed to the border. According to RU data for June 20 and 21, the number of divisions that appeared at the border was 22-24. However, these new 22-24 divisions simply did not exist in the areas where reconnaissance found them … It turns out that in June 1941, reconnaissance could not record the redeployment of more than 30 German divisions, the overwhelming number of which were tank and motorized divisions.
The transportation of 5-7 German divisions until June 19, discovered by reconnaissance, is even an estimate from above. Of the indicated number of divisions, 4-5 (of which two MD and two TD) arrived on the territory of East Prussia. According to the author, this number is overestimated. In accordance with the report of RU from 31.5.41, in East Prussia there were 23-24 divisions, incl. 18-19 pd, 3 ppm and 5 tp (2 td in total).
According to the document "Dislocation of German units …" dated 31.5.41, in East Prussia there were 15 headquarters of the infantry division, 3 headquarters of the infantry division, 63 infantry regiments, 12 mn, 22 ap, 5 tp, 6 tb and 11 infantry battalions. In addition to these troops, according to unverified data, the 161st MD was located in the city of Shilute, which, according to the RM on June 17 and 21, was in the same city. The enemy grouping in East Prussia on May 31 can be estimated at 28-28, 5 divisions (21 infantry division, 4 md, up to 3-3, 5 td), and according to reconnaissance data on June 19, there were 28 divisions there. If such an estimate is permissible, then the reconnaissance recorded from the end of May to June 19 the movement of only 2-3 pd (one in the ZAPOVO and 1-2 in the KOVO).
Intelligence data on enemy mobile forces in East Prussia
Maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces with the situation on the evening of June 16 and June 19, 1941 were posted on the English website and later appeared on Russian websites. The deployment of German troops on the evening of June 16, theoretically, could reach the RO of the PribOVO headquarters by the end of the day on June 17. Below, on a fragment of the map, RMs are plotted, which are given in the summary of RO PribOVO on the 17th.
It can be seen that the actual locations of the enemy tank and motorized units do not coincide with the reconnaissance data. The 21st tp is also listed not far from the concentration area of the 7th td.
Let me remind you that in the event of a redeployment of units of a division, its area on the maps is marked with a dotted line. All areas of concentration of formations shown on the map are outlined with a solid line, i.e. they are not moving anywhere as of the evening of June 16. Consequently, even June 17-18, RMs are unreliable. Let us compare the RMs that were received on May 31 and on the eve of the war.
The RM mentions numerous TB. On the eve of the war, there were only three separate TB units near our western border: the 100th (as part of the 47th MK of the 2nd TGr), the 101st (in the 39th MK of the 3rd TGr) and the 102nd as part of the 1st th TGr. Therefore, there could be only one TB in East Prussia.
From the data presented in the table, it can be seen that the enemy grouping consists of 3 MD headquarters and up to 18 regiments. On the eve of the war, all 3 MD headquarters did not change their location. Up to 28% of the regiments were redeployed or disappeared (two TP, two MP and two TP).
Thus, more than 70% of the mythical group, "discovered" by intelligence at the end of May, remained in the same places before the start of the war. If our reconnaissance watched these formations, then they could not notice the beginning of their exit to the border due to the fact that these dummies were not supposed to move anywhere …
Dislocation of German troops in East Prussia
The figure below shows fragments of maps with the deployment of mobile troops for June 16 and 19.
On June 16, on the territory of East Prussia there are: 1st, 6th, 7th, 12th, half of the 19th TD, SS division "Dead's Head", 3rd, 14th, 18th, 20th and 36th MD. On June 19th, the 8th and half of the 20th TD were added to them.
By the evening of June 19, the formations of the 4th TGr moved towards the Soviet-German border. The 8th TD began its concentration at the border behind the infantry formations. Divisions of the 3rd TGr from June 16 to June 19 do not move towards the border. I just finished the concentration of the 19th TD and the 20th TD began to relocate.
It seems that the German command paid special attention to the surprise of the strike from the Suwalki salient, since until the 20th, the movable joints were not brought to the ledge. The figure below shows the deployment of enemy troops on June 22.
District information on German mobile troops on the eve of the war
Did the reconnaissance discover that the enemy mobile forces were moving to their initial positions to the border?
On June 21, PribOVO prepared a document "Information of the PribOVO headquarters on the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia by 6 pm on 21.6.41."
The document lacks any information about the imminent start of the war at dawn on June 22. 10 hours before the war, the RO does not have information about the places of concentration and the directions of the attacks of the microns of the 3rd and 4th TGr. The district leadership and intelligence are not even aware of the presence of these corps and groups on the territory of East Prussia. In the document, all "discovered" tank units are smeared along the entire border:. The management of the PribOVO at 19-50 got acquainted with this document, which could not cause any particular concern in them. The figure below shows the presence of divisions and regiments by sector in accordance with the above document.
It can be seen from the figure that 10 hours before the start of the war, in the prepared document of the RO of the headquarters of the PribOVO, there are no tank divisions on the Suvalka ledge. Even in the reserves (in the Letzen group) there is only one tp. This is probably the same 21st TP.
A stronger grouping of mobile troops is located in the vicinity of Tilsit: td, tp, and over two md. However, a little later, a report of RO is being prepared, according to which in Tilsit they continue to be up to one MD and part of the 20th TD. Parts of the 20th TD are located over a fairly large area. For example, one of the TB division is located in the city of Shilute.
Two hours later, a new document is being prepared at RO PribOVO, which again does not contain anything alarming:
Conclusions:
1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border.
2. The general grouping of forces continues to remain in the same areas.
3. It is required to install:
- the reliability of the deployment in Konigsberg of the headquarters of the 3rd army corps, the headquarters of the 1st army (our data for a long time noted the headquarters of the 18th army; data on its departure were not received);
- Do the parts that are not indicated in this summary, previously noted by us, still remain (our intelligence report No. 15 [summary of RO PribOVO dated 6.6.41. - Author's note]) …
Nothing alarming is contained in the document of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO dated 21.6.41 (as of June 20):
Output:
1. Earlier received data on intensive transfers of German troops to the borders of the USSR, mainly to the regions of Suwalki and Sedlec, are confirmed.
2. Data on the redeployment of the headquarters of the Eastern Group to Otwock and on the 18th and 38th TDs require additional verification.
3. In recent days, there have been numerous cases of desertion and non-observance of orders in the army, but the army as a whole is a powerful stronghold of German fascism. Selected units of the army believe that they will win new wars too …
The "depressing situation" in the German army has previously been reported from intelligence, which is very similar to another line of German disinformation.
… On May 16, in Konstantinów (6 km north of Warsaw), 5 officers, 7 sub-officers and 39 soldiers were shot for desertion. There is a massive desertion throughout the army …
… Many soldiers of the border garrisons say: "As soon as the Bolsheviks shout hurray, then we are a bayonet in the ground and a tsurik nahause" …
Advancement of the 3rd Panzer Group
On June 20, the troops of the 3rd TGr begin to move to the Suvalkinsky ledge. The advance of these troops was not detected by reconnaissance on 20 and 21 June. This is evidenced by the records of A. K. Kondratyev:
New divisions are being pulled up from our rear to the state border. The 85th Rifle Division comes to us with Major General Bandovsky. The 17th RD is moving, which I met on the 16.6 on the march; the 37th Rifle Division set off from Vitebsk and Lepel and the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Division - from Vitibsk.
What does this all mean ???
Yes, apparently the clouds are gathering, serious days are approaching!
21.6.41 … Why, however, there are no instructions on the command line?..
Recently, during my report to Pavlov, I asked him what to do with the families of the command personnel in case of any complications.
Oh, what a question I was!.. “Do you know that I have 6 tank corps at the ready ?! I forbid not only talking, but also thinking about evacuation!"
“I'm listening,” I replied, but the thought remains in my head: aren't we too arrogant ?!
In the notes of General A. K. Kondratiev does not say a word about his concerns about the approach to the border of the 3rd TGr compounds. Most likely, he doesn't even know about them. After the war, General A. K. Kondratyev answered the questions of Colonel-General A. P. Pokrovsky:. It can be seen that the answer coincides with his notes, which were made before the start of the war.
On the evening of June 20, the sounds of engines were detected when enemy troops were advancing to the Suvalkinsky ledge. At 2-40 on June 21, an encrypted message is sent to the General Staff:
Hand over immediately.
First. On June 20, in the direction of Augustow, there was a violation of the state border by German aircraft: in 17-41 6 aircraft deepened by 2 km, in 17-43 9 aircraft by 1 1/2 km, in 17-45 10 aircraft were at the border, at the same time 3 aircraft deepened our territory by 2 km. According to the border detachment, the planes had suspended bombs.
Second. According to the report of the commander of the 3rd Army, the barbed wire barriers along the border near the Avgustov, Sejny road, which were still in the afternoon, were removed by evening. In this area of the forest, it is as if the noise of ground motors is heard. The border guards have reinforced the outfit. 345th Rifle Regiment (Augustow) ordered to be ready. Klimovsky
Our border guards and army men heard the hum of engines behind the forest on enemy territory, but the message went to the General Staff with a word. Probably, they did this so as not to irritate the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff once again …
I. G. Starinov in his memoirs describes a conversation with his friend Lieutenant General N. A. Klich (chief of artillery ZAPOVO) held on June 20:
In the evening of June 22, the last peace report is being prepared in the RO of the headquarters of the Western Military District.
The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 is determined:
1. East Prussian direction. Within the borders on the right - Suwalki, Heilsberg; left - Shuchin, Naidenburg: the headquarters of the 9th Army Allenstein, four headquarters of the army corps - Elk (Lykk), Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine frontline headquarters - Sejny, Bryzgel, Suwalki, Oletsko (Troyburg, Margrabovo), Elk (Lykk), Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava (Lebau), Lidzbark; up to two infantry divisions, two MD (data from PribOVO), 10 artillery regiments (up to two heavy artillery regiments); presumably two SS divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four cavalry regiments …
The report contains the already familiar non-existent 17th and 37th MD in Suwalki, as well as two SS divisions. It was previously shown that information about the SS divisions was obtained from rumors at the end of May 1941. Until the first days of the war, PribOVO and ZAPOVO did not attach much importance to this information. Continuation of the summary of RO ZAPOVO:
5. The bulk of the troops is located within a 30-kilometer strip from the border. In the area of Suwalki, Aris continues to pull up troops and rear services to the border. Artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki), heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there.
Output:
1) According to the available data, which are verified, the main part of the German army in the zone against the ZAPOVO took its starting position.
2) In all directions, the pulling up of parts and means of strengthening the border is noted.
3) All means of reconnaissance are checking the disposition of troops near the border and in depth …
The scouts of the ZAPOVO, the only of the three districts (PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO), decided to write about the withdrawal of German troops to their initial positions near the border. Only they were forced to insert the text of listing 3 into the conclusions. The encryption went to RU on June 15-20 on 22 June.
The specified encryption could not fix something, even if it arrived on time. The RU information did not raise any concerns. The impression was that everything was under control … The problem was that intelligence was watching non-existent units and divisions … Therefore, Moscow did not pay special attention to the fears of the commander of the Western Military District, General of the Army Pavlov …
Historian Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov wrote:
A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff … No gag. Only the execution of orders …
Documents of the first day of the war about tanks in East Prussia
The figures below show the reporting maps (prepared after the start of the war) of the headquarters of the North-Western and Western Fronts with the position of the sides on June 21, 1941.
It can be seen that there are no strike groups of the 3rd and 4th TGr near the border of the PribOVO. This has been presented in other documents cited above as well.
On the map of the Western Front, there is also no strike group of the 3rd TGr on the Suvalka ledge. Two TD CCs are accompanied by a signature, tk. at the front headquarters they do not yet know that in RU these words have already been removed from their summary regarding these divisions.
The fact that Moscow did not know about the concentration of the troops of the 3rd and 4th TGr near the border is confirmed by the documents prepared by the General Staff and the Republic of Uzbekistan on June 22, 1941.
According to information from the districts received by the General Staff on the morning of June 22, the enemy is leading an offensive against the North-Western Front. Since in this area, according to intelligence, there is one TP, someone "knowledgeable" has corrected the number to. 200 tanks is, according to intelligence, about one tank regiment. From the side of Tilsit there are 3-4 infantry divisions and an unexplained group of tanks, i.e. mobile groupings as part of tank and motorized divisions are not entered into combat operations …
An unknown group of enemy forces is fighting against the 3rd Army of the Western Front.
At 22-00 on June 22, the information is being clarified: 2-3 TD are active against the North-Western Front and another TD is against the 3rd Army of the Western Front.
The information in the report of the RU at 20-00 on June 22 is also based on the incorrect RM received before the start of the war.
Thus, the intelligence data received before the start of the war did not make it possible to reveal the directions of the attacks of the 3rd and 4th TGr of the enemy, as well as their concentration and advance to the border on the eve of the war
Strikes by two TGrs from East Prussia were unexpected both for the leadership of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, and for the leadership of the spacecraft in Moscow. The misunderstanding of the situation at the border on June 22 by the leaders of the spacecraft should have led to their erroneous actions in planning further operations. Erroneous actions in planning operations, in turn, led to the fact that they had to convince the Politburo and Comrade Stalin of the correctness of their decisions. Subsequently, the military declared Comrade Stalin to be the culprit of the tragic events of June 22.
