The personality of Admiral Rozhdestvensky is one of the most controversial in the history of the Russian fleet.
Some contemporaries presented him as a victim of circumstances, falling under the molok of an archaic system of government of the empire. Soviet historians and writers described him as a despot and tyrant, who, possessing almost dictatorial powers, had to bear sole responsibility for the defeat of the Russian squadron in Tsushima. In our time, a number of "researchers" are developing various conspiracy theories, making the admiral either an agent of the Bolsheviks, or a henchman of the Freemasons.
The purpose of this article is not a complete and comprehensive description of the life of this historical character, only the placement of some accents, let's say, adding a few touches to the portrait written earlier.
I. Sources
When discussing a person who died more than a hundred years ago, it is impossible not to touch upon the topic of the sources on the basis of which these arguments are based.
History has preserved for us several important types of documents:
1. Orders and official correspondence of the admiral.
2. Private correspondence of the admiral, letters from other participants in the campaign of the Second Pacific Squadron.
3. Testimony given by ZP Rozhestvensky and other officers during the investigation of the causes of the Tsushima disaster.
4. Memoirs left to us by the captain of the second rank Semyonov, mechanical engineer Kostenko, sailor Novikov and other authors.
5. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji.
Almost every source has certain characteristic shortcomings associated either with the incompleteness of the events described in it, or with the bias of this description, or simply with the error that occurs due to the time gap between the event itself and its description.
Be that as it may, we have no other sources at our disposal and will not appear anymore, so the ones named above will be taken as a basis.
II. Admiral's career before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War
Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky was born on October 30 (November 12, new style) 1848 in the family of a military doctor.
In 1864 he passed the exams for the Naval Cadet Corps and graduated four years later as one of the best graduates.
In 1870 he was promoted to the first officer rank - midshipman.
In 1873, Z. P. Rozhestvensky graduated with honors from the Mikhailovskaya Artillery Academy and was appointed to the commission of naval artillery experiments, which was at the Artillery Department of the Naval Technical Committee.
Until 1877, the future admiral sailed only sporadically on the ships of the Baltic Fleet Practical Squadron.
This state of affairs changed after the outbreak of the war with Turkey. Zinovy Petrovich was sent to the Black Sea Fleet as a flagship artilleryman. While in this position, he made regular trips to the sea on various ships, including the steamer Vesta, which gained all-Russian fame after an unequal battle with the Turkish battleship Fethi-Bulend. For his courage and valor, ZP Rozhdestvensky received the next rank and the Order of St. Vladimir and St. George.
However, the further development of the career of the newly-minted lieutenant commander stalled. After the end of the war, he returned to the commission at the MTC and continued to work there without any promotions until 1883.
From 1883 to 1885, Zinovy Petrovich commanded the Bulgarian Navy, after which he returned to Russia.
Since 1885, already in the rank of captain of the second rank, ZP Rozhdestvensky held various positions on the ships of the Baltic Fleet Practical Squadron ("Kremlin", "Duke of Edinburgh", etc.).
In 1890, that is, twenty years after receiving the first officer rank, Zinovy Petrovich was first appointed commander of a ship, namely the clipper "Rider", which he soon changed to the same type "Cruiser". Thanks to this appointment, ZP Rozhdestvensky first came to the Far East. There the clipper "Cruiser", as part of a squadron of four ships, made the transitions from Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk and back.
In 1891, the "Cruiser" was returned to the Baltic. The captain of the second Rozhdestvensky was expelled from him and appointed to the post of naval agent in London. Already in England he was awarded the next rank.
For three years, Zinovy Petrovich collected information about the British fleet, oversaw the construction of ships, their individual units and devices for the Russian fleet, and also carefully avoided communication with representatives of foreign intelligence services.
Returning to Russia, ZP Rozhdestvensky received command of the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, on which he first made the transition from Kronstadt to Algeria, and then to Nagasaki. In that campaign, Zinovy Petrovich had to make a number of voyages in the Yellow Sea associated with the war between Japan and China, including commanding one of the squadrons of the Pacific Ocean squadron, which consisted of nine ships.
In 1896, Rozhestvensky returned to Russia on his ship, surrendered his command and moved to a new position as head of the Training and Artillery Team. In 1898 he was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral. In 1900, Admiral Rozhestvensky was promoted to head of the Training and Artillery Detachment, and in 1903 he headed the Main Naval Headquarters, thus becoming one of the most influential people in the naval hierarchy.
Correcting this very position, Zinovy Petrovich met the beginning of the war with Japan in January 1904. It is noteworthy that during his more than thirty-year career, he only commanded a battleship for a little more than two years, and even less - a formation of warships in a non-training environment.
Regarding the personal qualities of the admiral, most of the people who served with him noted the extraordinary diligence of ZP Rozhdestvensky, conscientiousness in doing business and incredible willpower. At the same time, he was feared for his tough temper and caustic, sometimes even rude, expressions that he did not hesitate to use in relation to subordinates who made mistakes.
For example, what Lieutenant Vyrubov wrote about this in his letter to his father.
"You have to bother to arrange for yourself a more or less decent existence for the summer, otherwise you will find yourself in an artillery detachment to the fierce Admiral Rozhestvensky, where not only you will not get a vacation, but you still risk being swallowed by this monster."
III. Appointment as squadron commander. Organization of the trip. Shooting and maneuvering training
By the beginning of 1904, in the ruling circles of both Japan and Russia, the opinion was already established that a war between these two powers was inevitable. The only question was when it would start. The Russian leadership was of the opinion that the enemy would not be ready until 1905. However, Japan managed, due to the tough mobilization of material and human resources, to outstrip these forecasts and to attack our country at the beginning of 1904.
Russia turned out to be not ready for war. In particular, the navy was divided into three formations that had no connection with each other, each of which was inferior in strength to the United Fleet of Japan: the First Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur, the Second Squadron, which was preparing in the Baltic ports, and a detachment of cruisers, based in Vladivostok.
Already at the outset of hostilities, the Japanese fleet managed to lock the First Squadron in the shallow inland roadstead of Port Arthur and thereby neutralize it.
In this regard, a meeting was held in April 1904, in which, among others, Emperor Nicholas II, Admiral Avelan, head of the naval ministry, and also Admiral Rozhdestvensky took part. The latter expressed the opinion that it was necessary to prepare the Second Squadron as soon as possible to be sent to the Far East for joint actions with the First Squadron. This opinion was supported and the work on the completion and testing of the ships included in the squadron was given a significant acceleration. In addition, ZP Rozhestvensky himself was appointed to the post of commander.
A second meeting was held in August of the same year. On it, a decision was made about the optimal time for sending the squadron on a campaign: immediately or after the start of navigation in 1905. The following arguments were made in favor of the second option:
1. Port Arthur will most likely not hold out until the Second Squadron approaches in any case. Accordingly, she will have to go to Vladivostok, the bay of which may not be cleared of ice at this time.
2. By the spring of 1905, it would have been possible to have time to complete the construction of the fifth battleship of the Borodino (Glory) series, as well as to carry out the entire series of necessary tests on the ships already built.
Supporters of the first option (including Zinovy Petrovich) said that:
1. Even if Port Arthur does not hold out, it would be better to engage in battle with the United Fleet immediately after the fall of the fortress, until it has time to restore its combat effectiveness.
2. Already after the squadron left the Baltic, "exotic" cruisers will have time to join it (negotiations on their acquisition were conducted with Chile and Argentina).
3. At the time of the meeting, contracts had already been signed with coal suppliers and a large number of steamers had been chartered for the same purpose. Their dissolution and re-training would have cost the Russian treasury a significant amount.
ZP Rozhestvensky especially focused on the last argument and eventually defended his point of view. Thus, the meeting decided to send the squadron, primarily on the basis of economic considerations, apparently forgetting that the miser pays twice.
It should be noted that Admiral Rozhestvensky generally attached decisive importance to the issue of providing his ships with fuel. The grueling loading of the cardif in the most difficult climatic conditions is colorfully described in the memoirs of all, without exception, the participants in the hike.
Let's pay tribute to the organizational skills of the commander: for the entire period of the eight-month voyage, the squadron has never encountered a coal shortage. Moreover, according to the historical commission that studied the actions of the fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, as of the end of April 1905, about three weeks before the Battle of Tsushima, Zinovy Petrovich had truly colossal reserves at his disposal: about 14 thousand tons on auxiliary cruisers and transports of the squadron itself, 21 thousand tons on steamers moving from Shanghai to Saigon (to the location of the squadron), 50 thousand tons on steamships chartered in Shanghai. At the same time, about 2 thousand tons (with a normal reserve of about 800 tons) were already loaded on each EDB of the Borodino type, which made it possible to make a crossing with a length of at least 3, 000 miles or almost 6 thousand kilometers without additional fuel acceptance. Let's remember this value, it will be useful to us in the course of reasoning, which will be given a little later.
Now let us note such an interesting fact. From the mid-19th century to the early 20th century, global shipbuilding made an unprecedented leap forward. Literally every decade, wooden battleships, armored battery frigates, monitors and casemate battleships alternated one after another. The last type of ship was replaced by a battleship with turret-barbet installations, which was so successful that it became widespread in the fleets of all the leading naval powers.
Steam engines, becoming more powerful and more perfect, have earned the right to become the only power plants for ships, having sent sailing equipment to museum shelves. At the same time, ship guns, their sights, target guidance and fire control systems were improved. The defense of the ships was also steadily strengthened. From the 10-centimeter planks of the wooden shipbuilding era, a gradual transition was made to the 12-inch Krupp armor plates, capable of withstanding direct hits from the most powerful shells of that time.
At the same time, the tactics of naval battles did not at all keep up with technical progress.
Like a hundred and two hundred years ago, the decisive action for mastering the sea was to be the victory in a general battle of the line fleets, which, lined up in parallel columns, were to subject each other to the most severe shelling. In this case, the highest skill of the commander was the ability to put the opponent "a stick over the Ti", that is, to make the enemy column abeam (perpendicular) of his own column. In this case, all the ships of the commander were able to hit the lead enemy ships with all the artillery of one of the sides. At the same time, the latter could only conduct a weak return fire from tank guns. This technique was far from new and was successfully used by such renowned naval commanders as Nelson and Ushakov.
Accordingly, with the quantitatively and qualitatively equal naval composition of the two opposing squadrons, the advantage was gained by the one that made evolutions (maneuvered) better and more accurately and whose gunners fired more accurately from guns.
Thus, Admiral Rozhdestvensky first of all had to concentrate on practicing the above skills of the unit entrusted to him. What success was he able to achieve during the eight-month voyage?
Zinovy Petrovich conducted the first evolutionary teachings after the arrival of the squadron on the island of Madagascar. The ships of the squadron that preceded him 18 thousand kilometers made exclusively in the formation of the wake column. After the war, the commander explained this by the fact that he could not waste time on training maneuvers, as he tried to move as quickly as possible to Port Arthur.
A certain amount of truth in this explanation was certainly present, but simple calculations show that to cover a path of 10 thousand miles, a squadron, having an average speed of about 8 knots, had to spend about 1250 hours, or about 52 days (excluding the parking time associated with coal loading, forced repairs and waiting for the resolution of the Gul incident). If ZP Rozhestvensky devoted 2 hours to the teachings in each of these 52 days, then the arrival in Madagascar would take place only 5 days later than the actual one, which was hardly critical.
The results of the first training exercises are colorfully described in the admiral's order issued the next day:
"For a whole hour, 10 ships could not take their places at the smallest head movement …".
“In the morning, everyone was warned that around noon there would be a signal: to turn everything suddenly by 8 points … Nevertheless, all the commanders were at a loss and instead of the front they depicted a collection of ships that were alien to each other …”
Subsequent exercises were not much better. After the next maneuvers, Rozhestvensky announced:
“The maneuvering of the squadron on January 25th was not good. The simplest turns by 2 and 3 rumba, when changing the course of the squadron in the wake formation, no one succeeded ….
"Sudden turns were especially bad …".
It is characteristic that the admiral conducted the last training maneuvers on the day preceding the Tsushima battle. And they walked just as far imperfectly. The commander even signaled his displeasure with the second and third armored detachments.
Based on the above, one might get the impression that the commanders of the ships that made up the formation were so hopelessly mediocre that, despite the regularly conducted training, they could not learn anything. In reality, there were at least two circumstances, the overcoming of which was beyond their competence.
1) The squadron's maneuvers were carried out using flag signals, which in turn were deciphered from signal books. These operations required a lot of time, which, with the frequent change of signals on the flagship, led to misunderstanding and confusion.
In order to avoid such situations, the headquarters of Admiral Rozhdestvensky should have developed a simplified signaling system that would make it possible to quickly give orders to perform certain, previously explained and worked out maneuvers.
However, this was not done, including for the following reason.
2) Admiral Rozhestvensky was a consistent supporter of one-way communication with his subordinates by sending them written orders. He rarely held meetings of junior flagships and ship commanders, never explained his requirements to anyone and did not discuss the results of the exercises.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the combination of ships that jointly traveled about 30 thousand kilometers did not learn well-coordinated joint maneuvering, which, as we will see later, led to the most dire consequences.
As for the training artillery shooting, they were carried out four times. Admiral Rozhestvensky assessed their results as unsatisfactory.
"Yesterday's squadron firing was extremely sluggish …"
"Valuable 12-inch shells were thrown without any consideration …"
"Shooting with 75mm cannons was also very bad …"
It would seem logical to assume that the squadron was completely unprepared for battle and needed numerous further training. Unfortunately, they did not follow, and for a very prosaic reason: the stocks of practical shells taken by ships from Russia dried up. An additional consignment of them was expected on the Irtysh transport, which arrived in Madagascar later than the main forces, but they were not there either. As it turned out, the shells that the squadron needed were sent to Vladivostok by rail, which caused the strongest indignation and anger of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. However, the subsequent detailed study of the correspondence between the squadron commander and the Main Naval Headquarters, which was responsible for the acquisition of the Irtysh with cargo, did not reveal any written requirements for the transfer of practical shells to Madagascar.
Admiral Rozhestvensky still had the opportunity to continue training gunners, using either the small-caliber guns of battleships and cruisers (there was an abundance of shells for them), or large-caliber guns installed on the auxiliary cruisers of the formation (reducing the ammunition of auxiliary cruisers would not have a significant effect on the combat capability of the squadron in overall). However, both of these possibilities were not used.
IV. Strategy and tactics
When in December 1904 the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky came to the shores of Madagascar, they were overtaken by two gloomy news.
1. The first squadron ceased to exist without causing any significant damage to the enemy.
2. Negotiations on the acquisition of cruisers in Latin America ended in complete failure.
Thus, the initial task facing Zinovy Petrovich, namely the seizure of the sea, became much more complicated in comparison with what it was presented at the August meeting of the top naval leadership.
Apparently, this consideration so struck the minds of the people who made the decision about the future fate of the Second Squadron that they kept it for a long two and a half months in the Madagascar Bay of Nossi-Be, despite the commander's insistent requests to continue moving forward in order to interact with the ships the Japanese fleet before their weapons and mechanisms worn out during the siege are repaired.
"Having delayed here, we give the enemy time to put the main forces in full order …"
At the end of January 1905, these considerations had already lost their relevance, but were replaced by new ones.
“A further stay in Madagascar is unthinkable. The squadron eats itself up and decomposes physically and morally , - this is how Admiral Rozhdestvensky described the situation in his telegram to the Head of the Naval Ministry dated February 15, 1905.
Russian ships left Nossi-Be on 03 March. Zinovy Petrovich was ordered to go to Vladivostok, at the same time reinforced by the detachment of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who was on the way from Libava to the Indian Ocean.
Realizing all the complexity of the task, Admiral Rozhestvensky quite openly telegraphed the tsar that "the second squadron … the task of seizing the sea is now beyond its strength."
I believe that if ZP Rozhestvensky, for example, S. O. Makarov were in the place of Z. P.
However, Zinovy Petrovich refrained from sending such a request.
The author of the book "Reckoning", captain of the second rank Semyonov, explains this contradiction romantically: the admiral did not want anyone to doubt his personal courage, so he continued to lead the squadron towards inevitable death.
However, something else seems to be more reliable. By April 1905, the Russian army, which suffered painful defeats along Liaoyang and Mukden, dug in in the area of the city of Jirin and did not have the strength to launch a counteroffensive. It was quite obvious that the situation would not change as long as the enemy troops regularly receive material and manpower from Japan. Severing this connection between the islands and the mainland was only within the power of the fleet. Thus, Rozhdestvensky's squadron became Russia's main and only hope for a successful end to the war. Nicholas II himself telegraphed to the commander that "All Russia looks at you with faith and strong hope." Having refused the post, Zinovy Petrovich would have put both the tsar and the Naval Ministry in such an embarrassing and ambiguous position that it would certainly have crossed out any possibility of continuing his career for him. I dare to suggest that the realization of this very fact kept the admiral from resigning.
The connection between Rozhdestvensky's squadron and Nebogatov's detachment took place on April 26, 1905. As Novikov-Priboy wrote: “Russia gave us everything it could. The word remained with the 2nd squadron."
Having gathered together all his forces, Admiral Rozhdestvensky had to make a strategic decision about which way to go to Vladivostok. True to himself, Zinovy Petrovich did not become interested in the opinion of either the members of his headquarters or the junior flagships, and single-handedly decided to take the shortest route through the Korea Strait. At the same time, clearly realizing that in this case he will definitely meet the main forces of the enemy.
After the war, the squadron commander explained that, in general, he had no choice: the supply of fuel available on the ships did not allow them to go a roundabout way along the east coast of Japan without additional coal loading, which would be difficult to carry out in difficult weather conditions outside equipped bases.
Now let's return to the value of coal reserves, which we considered a little higher. As already mentioned, battleships of the "Borodino" type were able to pass with the available reinforced coal supply of at least 6,000 kilometers. Moreover, the entire route from Shanghai to Vladivostok around the Japanese islands would be about 4500 kilometers. Battleships of other types and cruisers of the first rank had better seaworthiness and were more adapted to ocean voyages, so they were also quite capable of such a distance. Also, there was no doubt about transports and auxiliary cruisers. The destroyers could well have made this journey in tugs. The weak link in this logical chain was only the light cruisers Zhemchug, Izumrud, Almaz and Svetlana, as well as the battleships of the coastal defense of Nebogatov's detachment. However, taking into account the fact that these ships were clearly not the main striking force of the squadron, they could well be risked.
It is likely that if the squadron chose this path for itself, then on the approach to Vladivostok, the ships of Admiral Togo would already be waiting for it. However, in this case, the Japanese, aware of their remoteness from their own bases, would probably have been more careful in battle. For our sailors, the proximity of Vladivostok should have given strength and confidence in the successful completion of the voyage. In general, the Russian squadron could gain a clear psychological advantage, which, however, did not happen at the behest of its commander.
So, ZP Rozhestvensky decided to take the shortest route through the eastern arm of the Korea Strait. What tactics did the admiral choose to accomplish this breakthrough?
Before answering this question, let us recall the composition of the squadron subordinate to him:
- squadron battleships of the "Borodino" type, 4 units. ("Eagle", "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino");
- battleship-cruiser of the "Peresvet" class, 1 unit. ("Oslyabya");
- armadillos of obsolete types, 3 units. ("Sisoy", "Navarin", "Nicholas I");
- armored cruisers of obsolete types, 3 units. ("Nakhimov", "Monomakh", "Donskoy");
- battleships of coastal defense, 3 units. ("Apraksin", "Senyavin", "Ushakov");
- cruisers of rank I, 2 units. ("Oleg", "Aurora");
- cruisers of rank II, 4 units. ("Svetlana", "Diamond", "Pearl", "Emerald").
In addition, 9 destroyers, 4 transports, 2 dewatering steamers and 2 hospital ships.
A total of 37 vessels.
The first thing that catches your eye is the presence of a detachment of non-combat ships in the squadron going to the breakthrough.
It is known that the maximum speed of connection of several ships cannot exceed the maximum speed of the slowest of them, reduced by 1 knot. The slowest transports in Rozhdestvensky's squadron had a maximum speed of about 10 knots, so the entire connection could move no faster than at a 9-knot speed.
It is quite obvious that in this case the Japanese detachments, moving at a speed of 15-16 knots, were able to maneuver in relation to our column so as to occupy any position most favorable to them. What made Z. P. Rozhdestvensky to take the transports with him into the breakthrough, which significantly slowed down the progress of the squadron?
“A considerable difficulty was created … by a warning from the Main Naval Staff: not to burden the poorly equipped and equipped Vladivostok port and not to rely on transportation along the Siberian road. On the one hand, the elementary rules of tactics prescribed to go into battle light and, of course, not to have transports with the squadron that impede its actions, on the other - this is a kind warning ….
This explanation was offered by the author of the book "Reckoning", captain of the second rank Vladimir Semyonov.
The explanation is very ambiguous, since it is based on the assumption that Russian ships will reach Vladivostok anyway and, acting from there, may experience a shortage of coal and spare parts.
What was the basis for this paradoxical confidence that the breakthrough would take place?
Here is the answer to this question, given by Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself: "… by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships …".
Figure 6. Battleships "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" of the First Pacific Squadron
For a number of reasons, the correctness of the analogy proposed by Zinovy Petrovich is very controversial.
Firstly, in the convoy of Russian ships leaving Port Arthur for Vladivostok, there were no transports that could hold back its course.
Secondly, the mechanisms of the erupted ships were not worn out, and the crews were tired of the many months of crossing three oceans.
Thanks to this, the squadron of Admiral Vitgeft could develop a speed of up to 14 knots, which was only slightly less than the speed of Japanese ships. Therefore, the latter were forced to fight on parallel courses, without taking an advantageous position in relation to the Russian column.
But the main thing is not even all these reservations, but the fact that the outcome of the battle in the Yellow Sea was unfavorable for the Russian squadron. After the failure of the flagship battleship "Tsesarevich", she crumbled into fragments that did not represent a significant combat force: some of the ships returned to Port Arthur scattered, the other part disarmed in neutral ports, the cruiser "Novik" broke through to the island of Sakhalin, where it was sunk crew after the battle with the Japanese cruisers Tsushima and Chitose. Nobody got to Vladivostok.
Nevertheless, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided that this experience can, on the whole, be considered positive, since during the almost three-hour battle not a single ship was killed, and that there was a chance of breaking through the location of the enemy's main forces.
He organized his squadron as follows.
He divided the twelve armored ships into three groups:
I - "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle".
II - "Oslyabya", "Navarin", "Sisoy", "Nakhimov".
III - "Nikolai I", "Ushakov", "Senyavin", "Apraksin".
Near "Suvorov" there were also light cruisers "Pearls" and "Izumrud", and four destroyers.
On the flagship of each detachment there was to be an admiral - the commander of the detachment: Rozhestvensky himself - on "Suvorov", Felkerzam - on "Oslyab" and Nebogatov - on "Nikolay".
Three days before the Tsushima battle, Rear Admiral Felkerzam died. However, for reasons of secrecy, this information was not disclosed and was not communicated even to Rear Admiral Nebogatov. The duties of the junior flagship were transferred to the commander of the battleship "Oslyabya", captain of the first rank Ber.
In principle, this fact did not have any special significance for the management of the formation, since Admiral Rozhestvensky did not endow his assistants with any additional powers, did not allow their units to take independent actions and did not take into account the opinions of other admirals when deciding on the route of the squadron and the time of its exit. Also, Zinovy Petrovich did not consider it necessary to discuss with them the plan for the upcoming battle, which he himself considered inevitable.
Instead, two directives were communicated, which Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, apparently, considered exhaustive:
1. The squadron will follow to Vladivostok in the wake formation.
2. Upon the departure of the flagship, the convoy must continue to move after the next matelot until it is reported to whom the command has been transferred.
A detachment of cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist, along with five destroyers, were ordered to stay close to the transports and protect them from enemy cruisers.
In the event of the start of a battle with the main forces of the Japanese, the transports had to withdraw to a distance of about 5 miles and continue moving along the previously indicated course.
V. Entry of the squadron into the Korea Strait. The outset and general course of the Tsushima battle
The squadron entered the Korea Strait on the night of May 13-14, 1905. By order of the commander, warships and transports went with extinguished lights, but the hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" carried all the required lights.
Thanks to these fires, the Eagle, and after it the entire squadron, were opened by the Japanese auxiliary cruiser, who was in the guard chain organized by Admiral Togo.
Thus, the chance for covert penetration into the strait was not used (which was favored by the darkness and haze over the sea), which, with a successful coincidence, could allow Russian ships to avoid the battle and reach Vladivostok.
Subsequently, Admiral Rozhdestvensky testified that he ordered the hospital ships to carry lights, as required by international rules. However, in reality, such requirements did not exist and there was no need to risk the secrecy of the location.
After sunrise, the Russian ships discovered that they were accompanied by the cruiser Izumi. Zinovy Petrovich graciously allowed him to follow a parallel course (at the same time reporting data on the order, course and speed of our ships to his flagship), without giving the order to either fire it from the battleships or drive the cruisers away.
Later, several more cruisers joined the Izumi.
At 12:05 the squadron lay down on the course Nord-Ost 23⁰.
At 12:20, when the Japanese scouts disappeared into the foggy haze, Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the 1st and 2nd armored detachments to make a sequential turn to the right by 8 points (i.e. 90⁰). As he explained in the post-war investigation, the plan was to reorganize all the armored detachments into a common front.
Let's leave out of the brackets the question of what was the meaning of such a rebuilding, if it could be completed, and let's see what happened next.
When the 1st Armored Detachment performed the maneuver, the fog became less frequent and the Japanese cruisers became visible again. Not wanting to show his changes to the enemy, the commander gave a canceling signal to the 2nd armored detachment, and ordered the 1st detachment to turn again by 8 points, but now to the left.
It is very characteristic that no attempts were made to drive the Japanese cruisers away from the squadron at a distance from which they could not observe our rebuilding, and still complete the evolution that had begun.
The result of these half-hearted maneuvers was that the 1st armored detachment was on a course parallel to the course of the entire squadron at a distance of 10-15 cables.
At about 13:15, the main forces of the United Fleet appeared on the collision course, consisting of six battleships and six armored cruisers. Since Admiral Rozhestvensky deliberately did not put any combat outposts in front of the squadron, their appearance was somewhat unexpected for the commander.
Realizing that it was completely unprofitable to start a battle in the formation of two columns, Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered the 1st armored detachment to increase the speed to 11 knots and make a turn to the left, intending to put him at the head of the common wake column again. At the same time, the 2nd armored detachment was ordered to stand in the wake of the 1st armored detachment.
At about the same time, Admiral Togo ordered his ships to make a 16-point turn in succession in order to lay on a course parallel to the course of our squadron.
When making this maneuver, all 12 Japanese ships had to pass through one specific point within 15 minutes. This point was relatively easy to target from Russian ships and, developing intense fire, inflict significant damage to the enemy.
However, Admiral Rozhestvensky made a different decision: at about 13:47 the signal "one" soared over the flagship of the squadron, which, in accordance with Order No. 29 of January 10, 1905, meant: "… the number of the enemy ship is indicated in the account from the lead … This number follows concentrate fire if possible … ". In other words, Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered to shoot not at the fixed turning point, which was clearly visible from all of his battleships, but at the Japanese flagship, the battleship Mikasa, which, having completed the turn, quickly went forward, making it difficult to zero in.
Due to miscalculations made in the implementation of the maneuver of rebuilding two columns into one, the lead ship of the second armored detachment - "Oslyabya" - began to press on the end ship of the first armored detachment - "Eagle". To avoid a collision, "Oslyabya" even turned aside and stopped the cars.
The Japanese were quick to take advantage of the mistake of the Russian command. Enemy battleships and cruisers, barely passing the turning point, opened a hurricane of fire on the practically motionless Oslyab. During the first twenty-five minutes of the battle, the ship received several extensive holes in the weakly protected bow end and lost more than half of the artillery. After that, the battleship, engulfed in fire, rolled out of action and, after another twenty minutes, sank.
About five minutes earlier, the flagship battleship Suvorov, which had been under the fierce fire of four Japanese lead ships, stopped obeying the helm and began to describe the circulation to the right. Its pipes and masts were knocked down, many superstructures were destroyed, and the hull was a giant bonfire from bow to stern.
Admiral Rozhestvensky had already received several wounds by this time and could not give orders. However, he lost the ability to control the actions of the squadron even earlier - as soon as the halyards of his ship, necessary for raising flag signals, burned down.
Thus, within forty minutes after the start of the battle, our squadron lost two of the five best battleships, and also, in fact, lost control.
Following the order of the commander, after the Suvorov was out of order, for several hours the formation of Russian ships was alternately headed by the battleships Emperor Alexander III and Borodino. Twice they made attempts, hiding behind the mist of fog and smoke of fires, to slip to the north, cutting off the stern of the enemy ships. And both times the enemy successfully stopped these attempts, skillfully maneuvering and using the superiority in speed. Time after time leaving our lead ships abeam their columns, the Japanese fell on them with destructive longitudinal (enfilade) fire.
Deprived of the ability to conduct effective retaliatory fire and lacking any reasonable plan of action, our squadron at that time, according to the Japanese side, was "several ships huddled together."
Only at about seven o'clock in the evening, Rear Admiral Nebogatov took command. Having raised the signal "Follow me", he led the surviving ships along the course Nord-Ost 23⁰.
At 19:30, after being hit by several mines of Whitehead, the battleship Suvorov sank. Admiral Rozhestvensky was no longer aboard - earlier he and his headquarters had been rescued by the Buyny destroyer and later transferred to another destroyer, Bedovy.
On the night of May 14-15, Russian ships were subjected to numerous mine attacks. It is quite significant that of the four ships that were under the command of Admiral Nebogatov (battleships of the coastal defense and "Nicholas I"), none of them suffered from these attacks. Of the four ships, the crews of which were trained by Admiral Rozhestvensky, three were killed ("Sisoy the Great", "Navarin" and "Admiral Nakhimov"). The fourth ship, the Eagle, would certainly have suffered the same fate, had it not lost all its combat lighting searchlights during the day's battle.
The next day, at about 16:30, the Bedovy destroyer was overtaken by the Sazanami destroyer. Admiral Rozhdestvensky and the ranks of his staff were captured by the Japanese.
After returning to Russia, Zinovy Petrovich was brought to trial and acquitted by him, despite his admission of guilt.
The admiral died in 1909. The grave at the Tikhvin cemetery in St. Petersburg has not survived.
In conclusion, I would like to quote from the work of the military-historical commission, which studied the actions of the fleet during the Russo-Japanese war.
“In the actions of the squadron commander, both in the conduct of the battle and in his preparation, it is difficult to find even one correct action … Admiral Rozhestvensky was a man of strong will, courageous and ardently devoted to his cause …, but devoid of the slightest shadow of military talent. The campaign of his squadron from St. Petersburg to Tsushima is unparalleled in history, but in military operations he showed not only a lack of talent, but also a complete lack of military education and combat training …"
