Strategic isthmus

Strategic isthmus
Strategic isthmus

Video: Strategic isthmus

Video: Strategic isthmus
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We once wrote in one of the articles on "VO" about the Perekop-Chongar operation. Now let us focus on one of its elements - the defense of the Perekop Isthmus by units of the Russian army of P. N. Wrangel.

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At the beginning of November 1920, the Whites, having suffered a severe setback in the battles with the Red troops in Northern Tavria, retreated to the Crimean peninsula, separated from the mainland by two isthmuses: in the west with Perekop and in the east with Chongarsky. If the defense of the narrow Chongar isthmus (spit) was not difficult; on the contrary, Perekop, which was up to 10 km wide, was much more difficult to defend. White paid special attention to his defense, creating positions in 2 places on Perekop, on the old Turkish shaft and on the Yushunsky lakes.

The terrain throughout the Perekop - Yushun area is an almost flat steppe, without any hills or elevations. Artillery could not find even camouflaged positions here. The only line rising above the terrain was the so-called Turkish shaft 10 km long, about 6 - 8 meters high, 2 - 4 meters wide at the top, with a moat 6 - 10 meters deep. This shaft was once supposed to provide the Crimea from invasions; the position on the Yushunsky lakes was completely flat, but the isthmuses between the lakes, 1 - 3 km wide, were very convenient for defense.

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White built two positions: one on the Turkish shaft, the other on the defile, formed by the line of salt lakes near the village. Yushun. The first position, about 10 km long, rested with both flanks in the sea, its main line of resistance was located on the rampart itself and was clearly visible from the plain, along which the Reds passed, but strong shelters were created under the rampart, in which the troops were securely sheltered from artillery fire. On the same shaft there were observation posts for artillery, which were located in closed positions behind the shaft. Only the observation posts were in sight of the attacker. The line of sight was north of the rampart, and the line of supports was behind it.

The left flank was firmly secured by the Black Sea. The Sivash, covering the right flank, was shallow, and periodically the water left the Sivash for the Sea of Azov. Therefore, in order to secure this flank, the Whites occupied and fortified the Lithuanian Peninsula and placed their general reserve in the same area.

For defense, the whites had: 1) the Kuban infantry brigade of 1,500 bayonets, 20 machine guns and 28 guns; 2) Barbovich's cavalry corps, consisting of 4,000 horsemen, 168 machine guns, 24 guns and 20 armored vehicles; 3) the Drozdov division with a force of 2,700 bayonets, 150 machine guns and 36 guns; and 4) a combined guards regiment and some small units with a force of 1,000 people, 60 machine guns, 11 guns, and, in addition, 12 6-inch guns and 4 -my 8-inch cannons.

In addition, Kornilovskaya and Markovskaya divisions and the 1st Kuban Cossack division approached Yushun, in the general reserve, with a force of 2,400 bayonets, 1,400 sabers, 190 machine guns, 54 guns and 28 armored vehicles.

The decision of the white command: to put the Drozdovskaya division, the combined guards regiment, small units and heavy artillery in position. In total, in the passive area there are 1,600 soldiers, 126 machine guns and 60 guns.

The rest was assigned to the Lithuanian Peninsula to defend the latter. The cavalry joined the general reserve behind the right flank.

Thus, for active operations on the threatened right flank, the white command decided to allocate all the cavalry and armored vehicles, only about two-thirds of the fighters, more than half of the machine guns and guns; the rest, like all the heavy artillery, gave the fortified position.

On November 1, for the first time, red units appeared in front of the Perekop position, and until November 7 inclusive they conducted reconnaissance and prepared for the operation.

The reconnaissance found out that: 1) the position is very strong and well equipped from an engineering point of view, 2) that the Sivash was freed from water and in places we pass, but the enemy occupies the opposite bank, and therefore it is better to cross at night, and 3) that the position can be taken in flank with artillery fire from the west - from the side of the village. Adaman.

Aerial reconnaissance, via aerial photography, was unsuccessful, and the rear of the position was unknown in red.

The forces of the 6th Red Army, which was entrusted with the attack of Perekop, consisted of the 1st, 15th, 52nd and 51st rifle divisions, as well as the Kozlenko cavalry brigade - a total of 30.5 thousand bayonets, 3, 5 thousand sabers, 833 machine guns, 169 guns and 11 armored cars. The strongest was the 51st division, which had recently arrived from Siberia, replenished and better equipped than the others. It consisted of 4 brigades, and the 4th brigade (fire brigade) was abundantly supplied with light and heavy machine guns, flamethrowers and tanks.

The attackers lacked artillery, especially heavy artillery. Therefore, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, 8 heavy divisions were sent to Perekop. There were also very few engineering tools, scissors, pyroxylin blocks for breaking the wire.

By the evening of November 7, neither artillery nor engineering equipment had yet arrived. Nevertheless, the red command decided to attack - not wanting to give their enemy time to strengthen, and also fearing that the wind might overtake the water in Sivash.

The plan of attack of the Reds was as follows: to attack the Turkish shaft from the front (with two brigades: 152nd and Ognevoy) and 2 brigades (151st and 153rd) - to bypass the Sivash.

At the same time, the 52nd and 15th divisions deliver the main blow, throwing them directly across the Sivash, from the Vladimirovka area to the Lithuanian peninsula, to the rear of the Turkish shaft.

Heavy artillery of the 52nd and 15th divisions was attached to the 51st division to attack the rampart - thus, 3 heavy divisions (12 heavy guns) were assembled.

The artillery used to attack the rampart was combined in the hands of the 51st division's start (55 guns in total). The artillery was divided into 3 groups: the right and middle - 37 guns - supported the 152nd brigade, the left - 18 guns - the Fire brigade.

In the 15th and 52nd divisions, teams were formed that were supposed to move ahead of the division, conduct reconnaissance and cut a passage in the wire on the Lithuanian peninsula. The teams included scouts, demolition men and communists. In order not to go astray, on the bank of the Sivash, in Vladimirovka, fires were prepared - which were supposed to serve as landmarks for movement at night.

Thus, the red command sent two-thirds of the forces around the position, and only 2 brigades, supported by all available heavy artillery, were sent to attack from the front. They decided not to wait for the arrival of the heavy artillery of special purpose (TAON).

On 1 km of the front on the Turkish shaft, the Whites had: 206 bayonets, 16 machine guns, 7, 5 guns; red - 775 bayonets, 17 machine guns, 7 guns.

On the Lithuanian peninsula, whites had 500 bayonets, 7 machine guns, 4 guns per km. The red command concentrated 6, 5 thousand bayonets and sabers, 117 machine guns and 12 guns.

On the night of November 8, the red troops launched an offensive. The strike group, crossing the Sivash, by 2 o'clock in the morning approached the Lithuanian peninsula and, despite the fact that its approach was discovered and it was met with strong fire, nevertheless burst into the peninsula. The 153rd brigade of the 51st division, which bypassed the Turkish shaft through the Sivash, also successfully completed its detour.

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The 152nd and Fire brigades, which attacked from the front, despite enemy fire, made passes in the wire at night, and when the fog cleared, by 10 a.m. the artillery began preparing for the attack. By 14 o'clock, observation indicated that the artillery fire had achieved known results, and the 51st division went on the attack - but stumbled into the moat on the 3rd not destroyed line of obstacles, and was met with the strongest fire from machine guns, rifles and melee weapons. Having suffered heavy losses, she withdrew. The 2nd attack, after a new artillery preparation, did not yield results - the division was again repulsed. Thus, the artillery preparation was unable to suppress the fire of the enemy infantry and destroy the wire.

The dispersion of the guns due to the worn-out barrels was too great.

On the morning of the 8th, the white reserves - the Barbovich corps, as well as the 13th and 34th infantry divisions, supported by 48 armored vehicles, launched a counter offensive and pushed the bypass units of the Reds (15th, 52nd divisions and, especially, 153- the 1st brigade of the 51st division, whose position by the evening of the 8th was very serious). But, having introduced the reserves into the battle, the 15th and 52nd divisions moved forward and besieged the Whites on the 1st line of the Yushun positions, between Sivash and Krasnoye Lake, to Karpovaya Balka, where the Whites began to pull up reinforcements. The raid attack of this position was unsuccessful. And at this time, in the rear on the Sivash, water began to arrive, threatening to cut off the retreat paths of the 15th and 52nd divisions.

Thus, by the evening, red and white had to make a decision - and in a very difficult situation, which was depicted in the following lines:

1) The attack of the position was unsuccessful.

2) The bypass column of the 153rd Brigade of the 51st Division was in a very difficult position under enemy pressure.

3) The shock groups of the 52nd and 15th divisions, although they overturned a group of whites on the Lithuanian peninsula, but reinforcements were drawn up to the whites - and it was not possible to break them. The position of the Reds was complicated by the fact that the water in the Sivash was advancing, threatening to cut off their rear.

4) The position of the Whites, although successful in the Perekop positions, was difficult on the eastern (right) flank, where their strike group, after a stubborn battle, was pushed back 15 km to the south - opening the rear of the Perekop positions.

5) The Kornilov and Markov divisions have not actually been put into action yet.

What decisions did the opponents make?

White decided to end the battle for Perekop and retreat to the Yushun positions. The Reds, on the contrary, in spite of everything, decided to continue the battle - the revealed withdrawal of the Whites was immediately used and the Reds proceeded to pursue.

Although White was only talking about a change of position for the time being, the fate of the operation and the White Crimea was actually decided.

We know the result.

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