There is such an opinion - with approximately equal technical equipment and morale, it is not heroism, not willpower, but logistics and supplies that wins, generals can be smart, soldiers are brave, weapons of the best world standards, but if the theater of war is not prepared, if the delivery of goods and reinforcements are not established, then you will lose. You have to understand that the Far East for Russia is a terrible place from the point of view of logistics - it takes a week from Moscow to Vladivostok, even today, and Sakhalin and Kamchatka are still accessible only by air and sea. In addition, the low population density did not allow, as it does not allow now, to deploy all the necessary industry there and to supply the army and navy at the expense of local resources.
As a result, the events before the war become decisive in the fate of the war - just like we won Khalkhin Gol BEFORE it began, we lost Mukden and Tsushima long before. And the name of these victories and defeats sounds short and understandable - Transsib, from the same Trans-Siberian railway, which was built under two emperors, rebuilt under all secretaries general and is still being supplemented, already under presidents. Even the beginning of the history of conflicts with Japan is tied to the same Trans-Siberian, which, for purely geographical reasons, was straightened through the territory of China, thanks to which they got deeply into Chinese affairs, and the desire to end the road with an ice-free port led to what it did.
Failed exam
But, perhaps, it is better in order, and you need to start with the facts:
“Our most important task at the beginning of the war should be the concentration of our troops. To achieve this task, we should not value any local points, any strategic considerations, keeping in mind the main thing - not to give the enemy the opportunity to defeat our scattered troops. Only having strengthened enough and prepared for the offensive, to go over to that, securing itself as much success as possible."
It is customary to ridicule Kuropatkin's plan, but did he have a choice? The Japanese a priori seized the sea in the first weeks of the war, a priori controlled their way of supply - the Tsushima Strait, and Kuropatkin has 122 thousand people and 320 guns, if taken together with the forces of the Security Guard. From these modest forces, it is necessary to allocate garrisons for Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Nikolaevsk and Sakhalin and, in fact, for the protection of the CER and YuMZhD themselves. Japan, however, could easily field and supply 150 thousand people before mobilization, and 350 thousand after. Again, supply and reinforcements - possessing a powerful fleet and a developed network of bases and ports, the Japanese could bring everything they needed in the shortest possible time, but we have 3-4 pairs of military trains per day at the beginning of the war, and 12 at the end. These are 60-80 cars at the beginning, and 240 at the end. With all this, this is a real miracle, the road was single-track and in many sections it was built on a living thread.
The rest - battles, arrows on the maps and everything else - from the evil one, taking into account the fact that even food had to be brought from European Russia. The war was lost before, reinforcements entered the battle scattered, and supply by sea was impossible, our fleet itself was largely dependent on railways. And the Kwantung mousetrap absorbed 25% of the ground forces available at the time of the outbreak of the war. The Empire finally accomplished a miracle and an army of up to a million was collected and supplied … by the fall of 1905. But by that time the fleet was gone, and there was no point.
I must say - the lesson went for the future and the communication with the Far East began to be actively developed back in the years of the Russian-Japanese. By 1917, the Transsib had become largely double-tracked, and electrification began under Stalin. In addition, there was an active development of the network of highways, airfields and ports already on its territory. A local industry is being created, local oil production and oil refining, Siberia and the Far East are actively populated, which makes it possible not to carry those recruited into the ranks of reservists for thousands of kilometers.
Intermediate exam
And it struck. In 1938, Khasan, where a small border conflict nevertheless occurred, and Khalkhin Gol in 1939. And again - the victory and the defeat were determined by the industry and logistics.
So, in the 57th building of Feklenko at the time of the beginning of the conflict, there were 2,636 cars. Tanks, airplanes, the mass of infantry - this is all good, but all this consumes fuel, spare parts, ammunition, foodstuffs that need to be brought up. And the tools of the delivery, 34 years after the Russian-Japanese, the USSR had. And in parts of the same cars, and in general - the Transsib has grown. According to the memoirs of Zhukov:
“To carry out the upcoming very complex operation, we had to drive the following along dirt roads from the supply station to the Khalkhin-Gol River at a distance of 650 kilometers:
- artillery ammunition - 18,000 tons;
- ammunition for aviation - 6500 tons;
- various fuels and lubricants - 15,000 tons;
- food of all kinds - 4000 tons;
- fuel - 7500 tons;
- other cargoes - 4000 tons."
All this was safely and smoothly delivered to Transbaikalia by railway, and from there by road directly to the troops. In addition, the following was transferred from the European part of the USSR:
“Additionally, two rifle divisions, a tank brigade, two artillery regiments and other units were brought up. Bomber and fighter aviation was strengthened."
And this was not the limit, the number of troops and funds in 1 army group could be increased yet, there was no need, for a limited conflict they collected more than. And the result was also brilliant - the Japanese were defeated. But if Zhukov had 3-4 pairs of trains per day on the Trans-Siberian Railway and horse-drawn vehicles for delivery to the front line, it is unlikely that his talent and the heroism of the troops would have played any role. Just as Kuropatkin did not lose because of a fool, Zhukov won not because of his talent. It's just that in the first case, Russia failed the exam for building up and supplying a group in a distant theater of operations, in the second it passed.
Final exam
The war against Japan is interesting primarily not in military operations, although they were brilliant, but all the same damned logistics, and an example of the fact that you can fight without a fleet. Throughout the war in the Far East, the USSR contained and supplied a huge grouping of troops in dozens of divisions and was ready to defend the coast without a fleet - that is, to complete the task that they could not accomplish in 1904 with the presence of ships, moreover, this group became a source of replenishment, resources and everything necessary for the army in action, while the decline was covered by local resources. When the time came, they concentrated in the Far East:
“The transfer of troops was carried out at a distance of 9-12 thousand kilometers. In total, by the beginning of August, a powerful group of Soviet troops of 1,669,500 people was concentrated in the Far East and on the territory of Mongolia, which had over 26 thousand guns and mortars, 5, 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 3900 combat aircraft."
For just three months. We can say that under Kuropatkin, the technique was worse, but the Japanese also had fewer opportunities. So such a grouping at such a distance for only three months is a kind of miracle. And not only on the continent - powerful groupings were created on the island of Sakhalin, which forty years before that they had not been able to properly prepare for defense, and in Kamchatka, where there were no troops at all. Moreover, not having a normal fleet, we carried out a number of landing operations, proving that it is not the ships and divisions that matter, but the rear, on which the troops rely, and without it they simply sag in the air, forced to operate along the railway on land, constantly retreating in order to reduce the shoulder of his supply and lengthen it for the enemy, and dragging behind him the floating rear at sea, because in his port there is nothing.
Conversely, disrupted logistics with the mother country doomed the Japanese troops to defeat, despite any possible measures. The result is somewhat predictable - having entered the war on August 8, Soviet tanks approached Port Arthur on August 23, ending the history of Russian-Japanese conflicts of the 20th century. And the lessons of this confrontation are very simple - the territory, not provided with reliable transport links with the Center, is only conditionally yours. And the troops placed there are placed in a mousetrap. And no heroism will help, coupled with the art of war, if the generals are forced to count resources, and the admirals - to save every shell and save on the speed and range of transitions. We have learned this lesson … I want to believe, because any war without reliable logistics is a gamble with a completely predictable end. Neither Kuropatkin nor Otozo Yamada will allow you to lie.
