How do people far from history imagine the First World War? The most common sources of knowledge are vague memories from school lessons, some fragmentary information from publications and feature films, snatches of discussions, and opinions accidentally heard. All together they form certain stereotypes in their heads.
The very presence of stereotypes is not a bad thing. This is nothing more than a dry extract from the historiography that dominates the domestic and foreign scientific community. And also historiography can be diluted and spiced with remarks of rebels from historical science, of which there are few, and amateur historians who are not bound by corporate ethics, of which there are now much more.
Another thing is that historiography is often one-sided. In Soviet times, it was one-sided for the sake of ideology, and in modern times - for the sake of someone who is unclear. However, you can look for beneficiaries.
Interpreting history in the right way is profitable for the interpreters. But it is often difficult to call it history. The stereotype first turns into a myth, and then, with the help of a cunning selection of facts, into outright disinformation.
It is understandable why WWI was slyly interpreted during the Soviet era. It was necessary to show the rottenness and reactionary nature of the tsarist regime. But why are modern, no, not historians doing the same thing, but disseminators of new, democratic myths?
One could refer to the irrelevance and insignificance of the topic, and as a result of this, the lack of interest among historians. But no, there is interest, as evidenced by the broad discussion that began 15 years ago regarding the existence of the Schlieffen plan.
So, if you wish, you can find those who benefit from the continuation of the Bolshevik myths and the creation of new myths. And this is beneficial to those who are not satisfied with either the Bolsheviks or the autocracy. And there are such. They are the ideological heirs of the Provisional Government of 1917. Moreover, it is they who are in charge of ideology in our de-ideologized country. Therefore, they not only did not reject the historical legacy of the Bolsheviks in this matter, but they are developing it to the best of their ability. And to our home-grown myth-makers, you can add American ones. Where can we go without them?
With regard to the First World War in Russian historiography and popular literature, the following myths are most often encountered and replicated.
Myth No. 1. The goals of the Russian Empire in the First World War.
Back in Soviet times, it was argued that Russia entered the war to seize the Black Sea straits. The reason for the assertion is simple: it was necessary to bite the recently overthrown tsarism, exposing its anti-popular predatory essence. Sometimes this is added to the desire to seize the Polish lands of Germany and Austria.
For a long time and often it has been argued that Russia got involved in an unnecessary clash of the Western powers, as it sat tightly on the French financial hook. It was absolutely not necessary to enter the war, despite the pushing of the French. It would be right to stay on the sidelines. And the Europeans let themselves bleed as much as they like.
Finally, a new research that appeared in the 2000s of our century: the assertion that the "Schlieffen Plan" never existed. Germany was not preparing for war at all. The throw to Paris through Belgium happened quite by accident.
Myth No. 2. The country's unpreparedness for war.
Russia, unlike civilized countries, was not ready for war. Evidence of this is the lack of heavy artillery and the small number of ammunition harvested, which led to known problems when the war entered the positional phase. Plus the lack of ammunition, machine guns, rifles and everything in general.
Myth number 3. Suicidal attack.
Russia, to please creditors, without completing the mobilization, rushed into a suicidal unprepared offensive in East Prussia, where it was naturally defeated because - see paragraph 2.
Let's analyze the points.
Myth number 1. The goals of the Russian Empire in the First World War
All statements about the goals in the war are killed on the spot by the chronology of the events of the first week of August.
The empire enters the war with the aim of capturing the straits. What is she doing? Looking at the facts, we see that nothing.
Here is the chronology of 1914:
It turns out that first Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, then Germany attacked Russia. Two days later, Germany attacks Belgium and France. A day later, England stands up for the allies, and a day later Austria-Hungary attacks Russia. Some kind of strange Russian aggression. How does the declaration of war by Germany and Austria-Hungary help Russia to seize the Black Sea straits, which (what a surprise) belong to Turkey, which is not participating in the war?
Only 2 months later, namely on October 29 and 30, 1914, the Turkish fleet under the command of the German admiral fired at Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk.
In response to this, on November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. Is this the very evidence of Russia's aggression against Turkey in order to seize the straits? What if the Turks had stayed smarter and hadn't attacked? What about the straits then?
Thus, the statement about entering the war for the sake of the Turkish straits is not just wrong, but false. Why is it repeated if the Bolsheviks who invented it have long since died in the Bose? I think the answer is obvious. This is the simplest way, having blabbed the facts, to declare Germany and Russia co-instigators and guilty of WWI and forget about the British, who did their best so that the Kaiser did not change his mind and did not turn on the back.
Doesn't it look like anything?
As for the plans to seize Polish lands, this is an obvious remake. There were no Polish lands at that time. There was Germanic Silesia with Pomerania and Austrian Krakovia with Galicia. And by no means everywhere the Poles made up the majority of the population. I suspect that this discourse was launched by the Poles, actively convincing themselves that they, the Poles, are badly needed by Russia, and with these shamanistic incantations they are summoning American troops to their land.
Why did Russia enter the world war?
The most interesting thing is that no one started any world war and was not going to start even in the face of confrontation between the two military blocs.
Austria attacked Serbia with a completely local mission. Russia announced a partial mobilization against Austria in order to prevent the destruction of the ally, but was not going to fight with Germany, because there was no need.
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia by direct telegram and on the same day began shelling Belgrade. Nicholas II sent a message to Berlin that a partial mobilization would be announced on July 29. In a new telegram on the same day, the emperor proposed to Wilhelm to transfer the Austro-Serbian conflict to the Hague Conference for consideration in order to prevent bloodshed. Kaiser Wilhelm II did not consider it necessary to answer.
On the morning of July 30, the emperor, in a telegram, again urged Wilhelm II to influence Austria. In the afternoon, Nicholas II sent to Berlin with General V. S. Tatishchev. another letter to the Kaiser asking for assistance in peace. Only in the evening, under pressure from military officials, the emperor gave permission to begin a general mobilization.
On the morning of August 1, Nicholas II tried to convince the German ambassador that Russian mobilization did not mean a threat to Germany. Here and sit down at the negotiating table. Moreover, on July 26, the British Foreign Minister proposed that Britain and Germany, with the participation of France and Italy (without Russia. - Author's note), act as mediators to reconcile Serbia and Austria, but Germany rejects this option. But in the afternoon the German ambassador Lichnovsky reports from London to Berlin: "If we do not attack France, England will remain neutral and guarantee France's neutrality." Having received numerous reports of a high probability, almost a guarantee of British neutrality, the Kaiser declares war on Russia on August 1 at 17.00.
And where is the French credit hook here? Where is the Entente's pushing Russia to enter an unnecessary world slaughter? It was England that pushed Germany to war with Russia, and only with Russia.
But France could well have stayed on the sidelines and not come to the aid of an ally who would definitely not have resisted the Triple Alliance. But the French on August 2 announced mobilization, after which the Kaiser decided to act in accordance with the "Schlieffen Plan". And then the British had to fit in to prevent the defeat of the allied France. The defeat of the allied Russia was fully tolerated by them.
Much is said that the death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia saved Paris. This is true. But after announcing mobilization after a daily hesitation, France thwarted the British plan to leave Russia alone with the German-Austrian alliance and almost herself was defeated. Why is nobody talking about this? Yes, we all understand that if Russia were defeated, France would be next. But here, as they say, options are possible. However, researchers are not interested in this direction. The cultivated myth is interesting and its purpose is interesting.
The assertion that Russia, which was attacked by Germany, did not have to participate in a world war could be attributed to lack of education. Well, how can you not participate in the war, if this war has been declared to you? But it's not that simple. When they say that Russia should not have gotten involved in the war of England and France against Germany and Austria-Hungary, something quite different is meant. The idea is latently pushed that it was not even necessary to try to protect the Serbs from the Austrian attack and generally participate in European affairs. And in this I suspect a deliberate and thoughtfully disguised call for a historic surrender to the West from the series “We would drink Bavarian now.”
An implicit but logical chain is being built: it was necessary to capitulate in 1812, and the good Napoleon would abolish serfdom for us. In 1914, it was necessary to surrender, and instead of revolution, industrialization, flights in a skew, they would crunch a French bun. In 1941, it was necessary to capitulate, and they would have drunk on beer. It is necessary to capitulate now in order to taste the cheeses and jamon.
In 2002, the book "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" was published. Its author is Terence Zuber, a retired US Army soldier and, judging by his last name, an ethnic German. The retelling of the book and even more the criticism are beyond the scope of the article. It is not difficult to find materials for the discussion that has developed widely in narrow historical circles. I will confine myself to presenting the essence.
Zuber's key claim is that the Schlieffen plan did not exist. So, nothing special, non-binding notes from a retiree. In support of this, the reader is presented with an extensive evidence base. That is, according to Zuber, the campaign in the West in the summer of 1914 is nothing more than a hasty improvisation by Moltke the younger in the face of a threat from the east. Hurry, because Germany had no offensive plans, and for some reason refused defensive plans, if there was one. As a result, Germany was the victim. If she declared the first war, it was solely as a response to the Russian mobilization in order to deliver a preemptive blow. Delbrück was the first of the famous historians to put forward the idea of Germany as a victim, in 1941 it was developed by Hitler, and now Zuber is pursuing his asceticism in this field.
It would seem, so what? You never know who said or wrote what? But in the 21st century, nothing is done just like that.
What do we get as a result?
First, the early assertion that Nicholas II did not intercede for Serbia at all, but sought to take the straits from Turkey, makes Germany and Russia the instigators of the war equally.
The second, about French money, directly misinforms people, claiming that the country got into a foreign war that has already begun. This discourse by its very existence denies us the right to take part in European affairs as an independent political force, but only as an executor of someone else's will.
The third statement, about the absence of offensive plans in Germany, completely removes that from the list of organizers of the massacre. She is now a victim, like Austria-Hungary, about which, by the way, they generally try not to remember once again.
The result for the mass consciousness: Russia, and only Russia, is to blame for unleashing a world war. Germany and Austria are victims of unprovoked aggression. England and France, because of the falsely understood knightly nobility to Russia, entered into a fratricidal war with kindred peoples. Russia is to blame for everything. And few people will go into subtleties.
That's all there is to know about historical myths in order to understand who and why planted them, and not pay attention to verbal husks.
Myth number 2. The country's unpreparedness for war
Is the unpreparedness for war an objective reality or is it also a myth, only a military-historical myth? And why are we used to talking about the unpreparedness of Russia alone? Were other countries ready? Who, for example? The strategists of all sides got into a puddle. And this is an indisputable fact.
The Germans failed with their Schlieffen plan, even though they were initially successful. They were unable to defeat the French and free up forces to strike to the east.
Similarly, Russian strategists made a mistake in their calculations to defeat Austria-Hungary with one blow and free up forces to storm Berlin.
The Austrians were unable to defeat the Serbs with the Montenegrins and, having transferred troops to the east, to hold back the Russian army on the border while the Germans were crushing the French.
The French also hoped to tie the Germans in Alsace in an oncoming battle and wait for the Russian offensive.
And many more countries completely overestimated their strength, deciding that it was their entry into the war on one side or the other that would be decisive, they would get all the glory, and the allies would owe them the grave. These are England, Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania.
In 1914, only the Serbs achieved the planned result. They fulfilled their task by completely holding the front. And it is not their fault that Russia failed to defeat Austria-Hungary by the New Year.
Oh yes, there are still the Japanese who picked up the German colonies in China.
That is, no one was ready for a war that took place in reality, and not in the minds of the generals. And this is taking into account the lesson of the Russo-Japanese War, where all technical, tactical, and strategic elements were manifested, with the exception of perhaps the role of aviation. If Russia is to be blamed, it is a lack of industrial potential, which deficiency in 1913 was not at all as obvious as in 1915.
From the very first day, all key states used an attacking strategy. All were going to achieve success in the oncoming battle and end the war before the autumn thaw. Accordingly, from these considerations, the very stocks of shells were created. Do not forget that the stocks of shells for a gun in our army were approximately equal to the French, surpassed the Austrian ones and were inferior to the German ones. However, the Germans were preparing for two wars. First with France, then with Russia. And for each of the wars separately, they stockpiled less shells than we did. It turns out that within the framework of the chosen strategy, our artillery was provided very well (not more than 40% of the ammunition resource was shot by 1915). That is, the shell hunger was actually organized.
So, the pre-war strategy did not justify itself.
Does this mean that the First World War was doomed to transform from a maneuverable into a trench, in which the one with the most powerful industry and more resources wins? Or did one of the belligerents and countries, under better circumstances or better governance, have a chance of a quick victory?
Germany? Unlikely.
Schlieffen's plan stalled at once - on the Belgian fortresses. It was not possible to take them on the move. True, the obstacle to the blitzkrieg was partially cut off by Ludendorff. He managed to secure the capture of Liege. But there were many such obstacles, and there were not enough Ludendorffs for everything. As it turned out, for all its gloomy beauty, Schlieffen's plan did not have a margin of safety in case of unforeseen circumstances.
Plus, a creative reworking of the plan by Moltke Jr., which has been criticized by historians more than once. In addition, the Belgians opposed Schlieffen's mathematics with intractability, and the French with a quick maneuver with reserves. And do not forget that the loss of East Prussia was fully tolerated by Schlieffen's plan. While the Russians were busy in front of the forts of Konigsberg, Graudin, Thorn, and stormed the Carpathians, France would have been defeated. In fact, Moltke exchanged a strategic victory near Paris for a tactical one near Königsberg, retaining the cadet estates, but losing the war.
After the massacre, various recipes for victory were put forward for the Germans. Including our General Svechin. But as far as the Svechinskaya alternative was logical and accurate from the point of view of military strategy, it was just as impracticable from the point of view of politics. In general, using the afterthought, it can be argued that there was no winning strategy for the Axis powers.
The Entente's strategy was that Britain and France were holding back Germany, while Russia was crushing Austria-Hungary. Then they squeeze Germany together. And if events in Galicia developed as a whole according to plan, then the North-Western Front was defeated, and the eastern blitzkrieg did not take place. That is, in fact, the Entente's war plan turned out to be as unrealizable as Schlieffen's plan. It would seem that everything. What to talk about next?
However, for the sake of the purity of the experiment, it is worth looking at what would have happened if the East Prussian operation (without taking into account the alternative version of the start of the war) ended in success? But first it is necessary to determine whether the North-Western Front really had no chance, or whether the General Staff's plan was quite viable.
