The fact that the political leadership of the USSR had a crisis in the first days of the Great Patriotic War has not been in any doubt since the XX Congress of the CPSU. After that, the testimonies of the direct participants were published, and starting from the 80s. last century and documents confirming the fact of the crisis.
The question of the crisis usually boils down to the fact that I. V. Stalin lost for some time the ability - or desire - to govern the state in difficult wartime conditions.
In his memoirs A. I. Mikoyan gives (as in the words of V. M. Molotov) a definition of this state of Stalin:
“Molotov, however, said that Stalin was so prostrate that he was not interested in anything, lost the initiative, and was in a bad state” [62].
However, questions about the timing of the duration of such a state, the degree of depth of the so-called. "Prostration", and its very existence in the form in which it is described in the memoirs of former associates of I. V. Stalin - A. I. Mikoyan, V. M. Molotov (from the words of A. I. Mikoyan), N. S. Khrushchev, L. P. Beria (according to NS Khrushchev), demand rethinking in something, and in something - comprehension.
First of all, let's define the terms of Stalin's "prostration". There are several versions about its duration.
The first version says that Stalin fell into "prostration" in the very first days of the war, hid in a dacha near Moscow and did not show up from there until members of the Politburo came to him with a proposal to create a GKO (and Stalin was afraid that they had come to arrest him), but the members of the Politburo did not arrest him, but persuaded him to head this body of supreme power in the belligerent country.
This myth was born by N. S. Khrushchev during the XX Congress of the CPSU, when N. S. Khrushchev stated the following.
“It would be wrong not to say that after the first heavy setbacks and defeats on the fronts, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of the conversations these days, he stated:
- What Lenin created, we have irretrievably lost it all.
After that, for a long time, he did not actually lead military operations and did not get down to business at all and returned to leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that such and such measures must be taken urgently in order to improve the state of affairs at the front. "[63].
And in his memoirs N. S. Khrushchev adhered to this version, moreover, he creatively developed it.
“Beria said the following: when the war began, members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin's. I do not know, all or just a certain group, which most often gathered at Stalin's. Stalin was morally completely depressed and made the following statement: “The war has begun, it is developing catastrophically. Lenin left us the proletarian Soviet state, and we fucked it up. " I literally put it that way. “I,” he says, refuse the leadership, “and left. He left, got into the car and drove to Blizhnyaya dacha”[64].
This version was taken up by some historians in the West. P. A. Medvedev writes:
“The story that Stalin in the first days of the war fell into a deep depression and gave up the leadership of the country“for a long time”was first told by NS. Khrushchev in February 1956 in his secret report "On the cult of personality" at the XX Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev repeated this story in his "Memoirs", which his son Sergei recorded on tape at the end of the 60s. Khrushchev himself was in Kiev at the beginning of the war, he did not know anything about what was happening in the Kremlin, and in this case referred to Beria's story: "Beria told the following …". Khrushchev claimed that Stalin did not rule the country for a week. After the XX Congress of the CPSU, many of the serious historians repeated the version of Khrushchev, it was repeated in almost all biographies of Stalin, including those published in the West. In a well-illustrated biography of Stalin, published in the United States and England in 1990 and serving as the basis for a television series, Jonathan Lewis and Philip Whitehead, without reference to Khrushchev and Beria, wrote about June 22, 1941. “Stalin was in prostration. During the week, he rarely left his villa in Kuntsevo. His name disappeared from the newspapers. For 10 days, the Soviet Union had no leader. Only on July 1, Stalin came to his senses. " (J. Lewis, Philip Whitehead. "Stalin". New York, 1990. P. 805) [65].
But still, most historians were not so gullible, and in addition to the version of N. S. Khrushchev was operated on with other materials, fortunately, since the mid-1980s. more and more of them appeared - archives became available, some memoirs were published in editions devoid of opportunistic edits.
The same cannot be said about some Russian historians, for example, about the authors of the textbook "Course of Soviet History, 1941–1991" A. K. Sokolov and B. C. Tyazhelnikov, published in 1999, in which the same mythical version is offered to schoolchildren:
“The news of the beginning of the war shocked the leadership in the Kremlin. Stalin, who received information from everywhere about the impending attack, regarded it as provocative, with the goal of drawing the USSR into a military conflict. He did not rule out armed provocations at the border either. He knew better than anyone to what extent the country was not ready for a "big war." Hence the desire to delay it in every possible way and the unwillingness to admit that it has broken out after all. The Stalinist reaction to the attack by German troops was inadequate. He still counted on limiting it to a military provocation. Meanwhile, the immense scale of the invasion became clearer with each passing hour. Stalin fell into prostration and retired to a dacha near Moscow. To announce the beginning of the war, it was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov, who at 12 o'clock. On the day of June 22, he spoke on the radio with a message about the treacherous attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany. The thesis of the "treacherous attack" clearly came from the leader. It seemed to them to emphasize that the Soviet Union did not give a pretext for war. And how was it to explain to the people why a recent friend and ally violated all existing agreements and agreements?
Nevertheless, it became obvious that it was necessary to take some action to repel the aggression. The mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918 was announced. birth (1919–1922 were already in the army). This made it possible to put an additional 5, 3 million people under arms, who were immediately sent to the front, often immediately in the heat of battles. An Evacuation Council was established to evacuate the population from the areas affected by the fighting.
On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was formed, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. K. Timoshenko. Stalin actually shied away from taking the lead in the strategic leadership of the troops.
The leader's entourage behaved more decisively. It took the initiative to create an emergency governing body of the country with unlimited powers, which Stalin was invited to head. After some hesitation, the latter was forced to agree. It became clear that it was impossible to evade responsibility and it was necessary to go to the end together with the country and the people. On June 30, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed”[66].
However, in recent years, thanks to the efforts of some researchers [67] dealing with this issue, as well as the publication of the Journals of records of visits to the office of I. V. Stalin's [68] the myth that Stalin on the first or second day of the war "fell into prostration and retired to a dacha near Moscow," where he stayed until the beginning of July, was destroyed.
* * *
Another version of Stalin's "prostration" is such that the "prostration" lasted not a week, but several days, at the very beginning of the war, on June 23-24. By the fact that on June 22, 1941, Molotov, and not Stalin, spoke on the radio, they sometimes try to prove that Stalin did not speak because he was confused, could not, etc.
Khrushchev writes (already on his own behalf, and does not convey the words of Beria) about the first day of the war:
“Now I know why Stalin did not act then. He was completely paralyzed in his actions and did not collect his thoughts”[69].
And here is what Mikoyan writes about June 22, 1941: “We decided that we need to speak on the radio in connection with the outbreak of the war. Of course, it was suggested that Stalin should do it. But Stalin refused: "Let Molotov speak." We all objected to this: the people would not understand why, at such a crucial historical moment, they would hear an appeal to the people not by Stalin - the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Chairman of the Government, but his deputy. It is important for us now that an authoritative voice be heard with an appeal to the people - all to rise to the defense of the country. However, our persuasion did not lead to anything. Stalin said that he could not speak now, he would do it another time. Since Stalin stubbornly refused, they decided to let Molotov speak. Molotov's speech was delivered at 12 noon on June 22.
This was, of course, a mistake. But Stalin was in such a depressed state that at that moment he did not know what to say to the people”[70].
A. I. Mikoyan writes about June 24:
“We slept a little in the morning, then everyone began to check their affairs along their own lines: how is the mobilization going, how the industry goes on a war footing, how with fuel, etc.
Stalin was in a depressed state at a nearby dacha in Volynskoe (in the Kuntsevo region)”[71].
And here is what Mikoyan writes about June 22:
“Further, he [Molotov] told how, together with Stalin, they wrote an appeal to the people, with which Molotov spoke on June 22 at noon from the Central Telegraph.
- Why me and not Stalin? He didn’t want to be the first, we need to have a clearer picture, what tone and what approach. He, like an automaton, could not answer everything at once, it is impossible. Man, after all. But not only a person - this is not entirely accurate. He is both a man and a politician. As a politician, he had to wait and see something, because his manner of speeches was very clear, and it was impossible to get his bearings right away, to give a clear answer at that time. He said that he would wait a few days and speak when the situation on the fronts became clear.
- Your words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours”- became one of the main slogans of the war.
- This is the official speech. I composed it, edited it, all members of the Politburo participated. Therefore, I cannot say that these are only my words. There were amendments and additions, of course.
- Did Stalin participate?
- Of course, still! Such a speech simply could not be passed without him in order to approve, and when they do, Stalin is a very strict editor. What words he introduced, the first or the last, I cannot say. But he is also responsible for editing this speech.
* * *
- They write that in the first days of the war he was confused, speechless.
- I was confused - I can't say, worried - yes, but did not point out. Stalin certainly had his own difficulties. That I didn't worry is ridiculous. But he is not portrayed as he was - as a repentant sinner is portrayed! Well, that's absurd, of course. All these days and nights he, as always, worked, there was no time for him to be lost or speechless”[72].
Why Stalin did not speak on the first day, at 12 noon, giving this right to Molotov, it is understandable - it was not yet clear how the conflict was developing, how wide it was, whether it was a full-scale war or some kind of limited conflict. There were suggestions that some statements, ultimatums might follow from the Germans. And most importantly, there were reasons to believe that the Soviet troops would do with the aggressor what they were supposed to do - strike a crushing retaliatory blow, transfer the war to the enemy's territory, and it is possible that in a few days the Germans will request an armistice. After all, it was the confidence in the ability of the Soviet Armed Forces to cope with a surprise attack that was one of the factors (along with the understanding of the incomplete readiness of the troops for a major war and the impossibility, for various reasons, to start a war with Germany as an aggressor) that gave Stalin reason to abandon the development of a preemptive strike by the Germans in 1941
But what is the answer to the words of A. I. Mikoyan and N. S. Khrushchev? After all, the words of V. M. Molotov is not enough. Of course, it is possible (yes, in general, and it is necessary) to scrupulously analyze the activities of the Soviet leadership in the first days of the war, collect cross-eyewitness accounts, memoirs, documents, newspaper reports. But, unfortunately, this is not possible within the framework of this article.
Fortunately, there is a source with which it is possible to establish precisely whether Stalin was "completely paralyzed in his actions", whether he was "in such a depressed state that he did not know what to say to the people," etc. This is the Record Log visitors to the office of I. V. Stalin [73].
The journal of recording visitors to the office of I. V. Stalin testifies:
June 21 - 13 people were accepted, from 18.27 to 23.00.
June 22 - 29 people were accepted from 05.45 to 16.40.
June 23 - 8 people were accepted from 03.20 to 06.25 and ^ people from 18.45 to 01.25 on June 24.
June 24 - 20 people were accepted from 16.20 to 21.30.
June 25 - 11 people were accepted from 01.00 to 5.50 and 18 people from 19.40 to 01.00 on 26 June.
June 26 - 28 people were accepted from 12.10 to 23.20.
June 27 - 30 people were accepted from 16.30 to 02.40
June 28 - 21 people were admitted from 19.35 to 00.50
June 29.
The tables can be seen in full in the appendix to the article.
Good; if Stalin was not in prostration from the very beginning of the war until July 3, then when did he fall into it? And what is this prostration or depression, because the depressed state can be of varying severity. Sometimes a person experiences depression, but at the same time fulfills his duties, and sometimes a person drops out of life for a while completely, doing nothing at all. These are very different states, such as the waking state and the sleep state.
The same Journal of records of visitors to the office of I. V. Stalin testifies that until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensely (like all, presumably, military and civilian leaders). There are no entries in the Journal on June 29 and 30.
A. I. Mikoyan writes in his memoirs:
“On the evening of June 29, Molotov, Malenkov, me and Beria gathered in the Kremlin at Stalin's. Detailed data on the situation in Belarus had not yet been received. It was only known that there was no communication with the troops of the Belorussian Front. Stalin called Tymoshenko's People's Commissariat of Defense. But he could not say anything worthwhile about the situation in the Western direction. Alarmed by this course of affairs, Stalin invited all of us to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense and deal with the situation on the spot”[74].
The entries for June 29 in the Journal, from which it would follow that the named persons were at Stalin's in the Kremlin in the evening, are absent. Maybe A. I. Mikoyan was mistaken and what he wrote about the meeting concerns June 28, when in the evening of that day Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin's house, and the last three left the office at 00.50 on the night of June 29? But then other witnesses who write about the visit of Stalin and members of the Politburo to the People's Commissariat of Defense on June 29 are mistaken. It remains to be assumed that, for some reason, records of the visits to Stalin by Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria were not made in the Journal.
On June 29, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued a Directive to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions on the mobilization of all forces and means to repel the German fascist invaders. However, most likely it was prepared on the evening of June 28th.
According to G. K. Zhukova, “June 29 I. V. Stalin twice came to the People's Commissariat of Defense, to the Headquarters of the High Command, and both times he reacted extremely sharply to the situation in the western strategic direction”[75].
On the evening visit, we know what happened during and after it. And with the second visit (or the first in chronology) is unclear. What was discussed when he was, there is no evidence. Perhaps the first visit to the People's Commissariat of Defense took place precisely at night (early in the morning) on June 29, the surrender of Minsk was not yet known, and therefore the members of the Politburo, and I. V. Stalin, among other things, went to sleep.
It should also be noted that the People's Commissariat of Defense was located on Frunze Street. And the Headquarters of the High Command, where, according to Zhukov, Stalin also came twice during
June 29, was, from the moment of creation, in the Kremlin office of Stalin. It was with the beginning of the bombing of Moscow that she was transferred from the Kremlin to st. Kirov (besides, an underground center for strategic management of the Armed Forces was prepared at the Kirovskaya metro station, where the offices of IV Stalin and BM Shaposhnikov were equipped and the operational group of the General Staff and departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense was located). But the first bombing of Moscow was on the night of July 21-22, 1941. It turns out that Stalin, in addition to the fact that he twice came to st. Frunze, to the People's Commissariat, twice more came to the Kremlin, where the members of the Headquarters gathered. Perhaps this is the key to what Mikoyan wrote: "On the evening of June 29, Molotov, Malenkov, me and Beria gathered in the Kremlin at Stalin's."
On the afternoon of the 29th, rumors (including reports of foreign news agencies) about the fall of Minsk became more solid, there was no information from the military about the actual state of affairs (by phone), there was no communication with the troops of the Belorussian Front, Stalin reasonably suggested that the capital Belarus, perhaps, has already been captured by German troops. And the second (according to Zhukov) visit of Stalin and members of the Politburo to the People's Commissariat of Defense on June 29 was far from so peaceful.
Here is what his direct participant, A. I. Mikoyan:
“Alarmed by this course of affairs, Stalin invited all of us to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense and investigate the situation on the spot.
Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin were in the People's Commissariat. Stalin kept calm, asking where the command of the Belarusian military district was, what was the connection.
Zhukov reported that the connection was lost and for the whole day they could not restore it.
Then Stalin asked other questions: why they allowed the breakthrough of the Germans, what measures were taken to establish communications, etc.
Zhukov answered what measures had been taken, said that they had sent people, but how long it would take to establish a connection, no one knows.
We talked for about half an hour, rather calmly. Then Stalin exploded: what kind of General Staff, what kind of chief of staff, who was so confused, has no connection with the troops, does not represent anyone and does not command anyone.
There was complete helplessness at the headquarters. Since there is no communication, the headquarters is powerless to lead.
Zhukov, of course, was no less worried about the state of affairs than Stalin, and such a shout from Stalin was insulting to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran into another room. Molotov followed him.
We were all depressed. After 5-10 minutes, Molotov brought outwardly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were still wet. We agreed that Kulik would go to contact the Belarusian Military District (this was Stalin's suggestion), then other people would be sent. This task was then given to Voroshilov. He was accompanied by an energetic, courageous, agile military leader Gai Tumanyan. I made the proposal for an escort. The main thing then was to restore the connection. The affairs of Konev, who commanded the army in Ukraine, continued to develop successfully in the Przemysl region. By then, the troops of the Belorussian Front found themselves without a centralized command. Stalin was very depressed”[76].
This quote is from the manuscripts of A. I. Mikoyan, stored in the RCKHIDNI, that is, this text can be considered original. And here is a story about the same from the book "It Was", published in 1999 by the publishing house "Vagrius":
“Tymoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin were in the People's Commissariat. Zhukov reported that the connection was lost, said that they had sent people, but how long it would take to establish a connection - no one knows. For about half an hour they spoke rather calmly. Then Stalin exploded: “What is this General Staff? What kind of chief of staff, who on the very first day of the war was confused, has no connection with the troops, does not represent anyone and does not command anyone?"
Zhukov, of course, was no less worried about the state of affairs than Stalin, and such a shout from Stalin was insulting to him. And this courageous man literally burst into tears and ran into another room. Molotov followed him. We were all depressed. After 5-10 minutes, Molotov brought outwardly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were wet.
The main thing then was to restore communication. We agreed that Kulik would go to contact the Belarusian Military District - this was Stalin's suggestion, then other people would be sent. This task was then given to Voroshilov.
Business for Konev, who commanded the army in the Ukraine, continued to develop relatively well. But the troops of the Belorussian Front were then without a centralized command. And from Belarus there was a direct route to Moscow. Stalin was very depressed”[77].
According to the publisher, the son of A. I. Mikoyan, S. A. Mikoyan, the text of the third volume of memoirs, which was at the time of the author's death in Politizdat, served as the basis.
“The third volume, which began from the period after 1924, was in work at Politizdat, when his father died, he died on October 21, 1978, before he was 83 years old. A few weeks later I was summoned to the publisher and told that the book was excluded from the plans, and soon I learned that it was a personal instruction from Suslov, who was afraid of his father until his death and now emboldened. Comparison of the father's dictations with the text subjected to the execution of the editors showed that in a number of cases the author's thoughts were distorted beyond recognition”[78].
Since the memoirs of A. I. Mikoyan are extremely important as a source, it would be necessary to refer to their undistorted version. And the fact that the widespread version is quite distorted can be easily seen by comparing these two quotes. Moreover, in the future, such discrepancies and inconsistencies are so one-sided that there are grounds to assume that these memoirs were prepared by the author for publication during the reign of N. S. Khrushchev. Perhaps the original text was revised at that time, so all the additions were made to reinforce the reader that Stalin's “prostration” was prolonged, many days the authorities and his associates had to persuade him to take the reins in hand.
So, Stalin became convinced of how bad everything was at the front, that the army leadership did not justify trust, lost command of the troops in the most important sector of the front, and there was a conflict between the political and military leadership, some kind of misunderstanding. Perhaps this stirred up in Stalin the suspicions that guided him when he exposed and rooted out the military-fascist conspiracies in the army. After all, the repressed military leaders were also accused of going over to the side of the enemy in the event of war, undermining the defense capability, deliberately giving bad command and doing harm in every possible way. And what was happening at the front looked like sabotage - the Germans were advancing at almost the same pace as in Poland or France, and the leadership of the Red Army, despite the fact that they regularly assured Stalin of their ability in the event of an attack by an aggressor to keep him and after a short time go in a decisive counteroffensive, it turned out to be untenable.
With such (possibly) thoughts, Stalin left the People's Commissariat of Defense and said a famous phrase to his comrades-in-arms. According to Mikoyan's recollections, it was like this:
“When we left the People's Commissariat, he said this phrase: Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - pissed away all this. We were amazed at Stalin's statement. It turns out that we have lost everything irrevocably? They considered that he said this in a state of passion …”[79].
Molotov also recalls this:
“We went to the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, Beria, Malenkov and me. From there I and Beria went to Stalin's dacha. It was on the second or third day [80]. In my opinion, Malenkov was still with us. I don’t remember exactly who else. I remember Malenkov.
Stalin was in a very difficult condition. He did not swear, but he was not at ease.
- How did you manage?
- How did you manage? How Stalin is supposed to hold on. Firmly.
- But Chakovsky writes that he …
- What Chakovsky writes there, I don't remember, we were talking about something else. He said, "Fucked up." This applied to all of us put together. I remember this well, that's why I say it. "They all fucked up," he simply said. And we fucked up. It was such a difficult condition then. “Well, I tried to cheer him up a little” [81].
Beria, according to Khrushchev, told him that it was like this:
“Beria said the following: when the war began, members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin's. I do not know, all or just a certain group, which most often gathered at Stalin's. Stalin was morally completely depressed and made the following statement: “The war has begun, it is developing catastrophically. Lenin left us the proletarian Soviet state, and we fucked it up. " I literally put it that way. “I,” he says, “refuse the leadership,” and left. He left, got into the car and drove to Blizhnyaya dacha. We, - said Beria, - stayed. What to do next? " [82].
NS. Khrushchev, quoting Beria's words, is inaccurate. As follows from Mikoyan's recollections, Stalin made his statement after leaving the People's Commissariat, after which, together with a group of comrades, he left for the dacha. Mikoyan was not at the dacha, so if Stalin had declared: “The war has begun, it is developing catastrophically. Lenin left us the proletarian Soviet state, and we fucked it up. I refuse leadership - at the dacha, Mikoyan would not have heard either the first or the second part of it. And he heard the first part, about which he wrote in his memoirs.
Khrushchev is also inaccurate in the following: Beria allegedly said that he stayed, and Stalin left for his dacha, but Beria himself, referring to Molotov in 1953, definitely writes that he and Molotov were at Stalin's dacha.
But the most important thing is not this, all this could be attributed to an aberration in the memory of N. S. Khrushchev and its fragmentation, the main thing is Stalin's words that he refuses leadership. This is a very important point. Is it permissible to accept Khrushchev's interpretation of the alleged words of Beria that Stalin really refused the leadership?
In everything else told in this story, Khrushchev is somewhat inaccurate. Khrushchev's words - not an eyewitness - are not confirmed by the recollections of Molotov and Mikoyan, eyewitnesses. Neither the first nor the second said a word about Stalin's relinquishment of power. And that would have been stronger than the word "pissed off". This would definitely have been remembered and noted, if not by Molotov, who to some extent whitewashed Stalin, then by Mikoyan for sure, especially if we recall the anti-Stalinist orientation of the editing of his memoirs.
The American researcher I. Kurtukov, who dealt with this issue, said that Khrushchev's words were enough to draw a conclusion: Stalin abdicated power at some point on June 29-30, 1941;, or deliberately - to test his comrades-in-arms, to force them to ask him to return to power, like Ivan the Terrible forced his boyars to bow to him.
"It is difficult to say whether this was a sincere impulsive act or a subtle move, calculated just for the fact that the Politburo would meet and ask him to return to power, but the fact clearly took place" [83].
Considerations that Khrushchev's memoirs, due to the apparent dislike of Stalin by their author and a general inclination
NS. Khrushchev to distort the historical truth, cannot be considered a sufficient basis for drawing such a conclusion, Mr. Kurtukov disavows as follows: Khrushchev's memories (more precisely, a retelling of those words of Beria) consist of the same fragments as Molotov's memoirs and a note Beria Molotov, it's just that Khrushchev has these fragments mixed up. Kurtukov admits that “Khrushchev works like a deaf telephone” and “knows the story only from the words of Beria”, telling it “much later than the events,” but believes that the further development of events confirms the correctness of Khrushchev's words about Stalin's refusal from power.
Let us assume that the events described by Khrushchev are chronologically confused, but they took place separately. But neither Molotov nor Beria says that Stalin announced his resignation from power. They do not have such fragments.
I. Kurtukov quotes from a conversation between Molotov and Chuev:
“For two or three days he did not show up, he was at the dacha. He was worried, of course, was a little depressed. / … / It is difficult to say whether it was on the twenty-second, or on the twenty-third it was, such a time when one day merged with another "(Chuev F. Molotov. The semi-sovereign. - M.: Olma- Press, 2000. S. 399) [84].
And accompanies this quote with a comment:
“Don't be embarrassed by 'Twenty-second or twenty-third', they emerged from Khrushchev's version, which Chuev and Molotov discussed. Of course, it is impossible in 43 years to remember exactly the date of the events; it is important to confirm the fact of "prostration" [85].
In this case, one cannot but agree with the opinion of I. Kurtukov about the dating of the quote, and in this case it makes sense to reproduce this quote without cuts:
“- Well, of course, he was worried, but he doesn't look like a rabbit, of course. For two or three days he did not show up, he was at the dacha. He was worried, of course, was a little depressed. But it was very difficult for everyone, and especially for him.
- Allegedly, Beria was with him, and Stalin said: "All is lost, I surrender."
- Not this way. It is difficult to say whether it was on the twenty-second or twenty-third, such a time when one day merged with another. “I give up” - I have not heard such words. And I think they are unlikely."
Indeed, Molotov's recollection refers to the time of his and Beria's visit to Stalin's dacha on the night of June 29-30, 1941, and Molotov directly confirms that he did not hear any refusals of Stalin from power. And since he, unlike Khrushchev, was an eyewitness, on the retelling of Beria's alleged words, which I. Kurtukov builds evidence that Stalin nevertheless renounced power, his testimony will be, in any case, no worse. And most likely, more thoroughly.
I. Kurtukov summarizes his work as follows:
“On the morning and afternoon of June 29, 1941, Stalin worked: he signed some documents and visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, having learned there the depressing news.
In the evening of June 29, 1941, after visiting the People's Commissariat, Stalin, Molotov, Beria and others went to Blizhnyaya Dacha, to Kuntsevo, where the Secretary General made a historic statement that “we fucked everything up” and that he was leaving power.
On June 30, 1941, Molotov gathered members of the Politburo in his office, they outlined a decision on the creation of the State Defense Committee and went to Stalin's dacha with a proposal to head this committee.
During this time, Stalin probably withdrew, accepted the offer of his comrades, and from July 1, 1941 returned to the usual rhythm of labor activity."
I. Kurtukov's version is quite plausible, with the exception of a few fragments:
♦ Stalin said “we all fucked up” not at the dacha, but after visiting the People's Commissariat of Defense, before leaving for the dacha;
♦ Stalin returned to the "normal rhythm of work" not on July 1, but on June 30, since he took an active part in the work of the newly created GKO, conducted telephone conversations, made personnel decisions, etc.;
♦ The fact that Stalin said that he was “leaving power” looks like a somewhat intuitive conclusion, because the source (Khrushchev’s memoirs), on the basis of which such a definite conclusion is made, is extremely unreliable, moreover, it is refuted by Molotov’s recollections. One could assume that such a phrase could have sounded in one form or another (for example, "I am tired"), but it is hardly correct to say so categorically that Stalin voluntarily renounced the leadership and said: "I am leaving."
* * *
So, in the evening of June 29, maybe already on the night of the 30th, Stalin, Molotov and Beria (and, possibly, Malenkov) arrived at Stalin's Blizhnyaya dacha in Kuntsevo, there a conversation took place, about the content of which Beria wrote in 1953 in his a note to Molotov:
“Vyacheslav Mikhailovich! […] You remember very well when it was very bad at the beginning of the war and after our conversation with Comrade Stalin at his near dacha. You put the question bluntly in your office in the Council of Ministers, that it is necessary to save the situation, it is necessary to immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, then I fully supported you and suggested that you immediately summon Comrade Malenkov G. M. to a meeting, and later for a short period of time, other members of the Politburo who were in Moscow also came. After this meeting, we all went to see Comrade Stalin and convinced him of the immediate organization of the Country Defense Committee with all rights”[86].
This note should be perceived, along with the journals of records of visitors to the Stalinist cabinet, as the most valuable source on this issue, since people usually write memoirs in safety and are not particularly afraid of blurred memory, and even if the memoirist embellishes something, it will cause only the displeasure of those who know how it really was. But Beria wrote a note, trying to save his life, and there was no way to lie to him about the facts - he, of course, flattered the addressees, but circumstances contributed to sincerity.
It can be assumed that it was during this conversation that Stalin's depression reached its extreme point. Of course, the conversation was about the difficult situation in which the country found itself. It is unlikely that the conversation could not touch upon the recent visit to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the issues of army management. Perhaps it was also said that not all the enemies had been withdrawn from the army, because the repressions in the Armed Forces continued. In June 1941, Smushkevich, Rychagov, Stern were arrested, and after the outbreak of the war - Proskurov and Meretskov. The tendency to build branched "conspiracies" also persisted, since some of the arrested, for example Meretskov, in addition to being linked with the Stern case, they tried to attach to Pavlov, who was arrested a few days later and who was still a front-line commander. Once the country found itself in a difficult situation, there must be those responsible for it, and who was more suited to the role of scapegoats than the military, who did not fulfill their duties. Against this background, Stalin could have fears that the military might get out of control, try to change the political leadership, carry out a coup, or even enter into negotiations with the Germans. In any case, it was clear that in order to try to get out of this difficult situation, it was necessary to continue to fight, and for this it was necessary to resume command and control of troops and command of military leaders - complete and unconditional.
* * *
On June 30, probably at 14 o'clock, Molotov and Beria met in the Molotov office. Molotov told Beria that it was necessary to "save the situation, we must immediately organize a center that would lead the defense of our homeland." Beria "fully supported him" and suggested "to summon Comrade Malenkov GM immediately to the meeting," after which "after a short period of time, other members of the Politburo who were in Moscow also came."
Mikoyan and Voznesensky were invited to see Molotov at about 4 pm.
“The next day, at about four o'clock, Voznesensky was in my office. Suddenly they call from Molotov and ask us to visit him.
Come on. Molotov already had Malenkov, Voroshilov, Beria. We found them talking. Beria said that it is necessary to create a State Defense Committee, which should be given full power in the country. Transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the Party. Voznesensky and I agreed with this. We agreed to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, but did not talk about the rest of the composition of the GKO. We believed that in the name of Stalin there is so much power in the consciousness, feelings and faith of the people that it would facilitate our mobilization and leadership of all military operations. We decided to go to him. He was at the Blizhnyaya dacha”[87].
Questions arise - was not the creation of the GKO discussed with Stalin during the night conversation? It cannot be completely denied that the creation of the GKO was agreed - between Stalin, Beria and Molotov, or between Stalin and Molotov - a step. There is no direct evidence or refutation of this, but if you remember that Molotov, without Stalin's knowledge, did not undertake any global initiatives and was always only an executor, it is strange why he suddenly decided on such an extraordinary action - to create a government body with dictatorial powers. It is also possible that Molotov spoke with Stalin on the phone on June 30 and at least in general terms discussed the creation of the GKO. Or maybe, in the conversation, Stalin made it clear, without specifying, that such a body is definitely needed. And Molotov and Beria urgently developed a plan, explained its essence to everyone and came to Stalin with a ready-made decision. This version (that the creation of the GKO was Stalin's initiative) was put forward by I. F. Stadnyuk.
“Stalin returned to the Kremlin in the early morning of June 30 with a decision made: to concentrate all power in the country in the hands of the State Defense Committee, headed by himself, Stalin. At the same time, the "trinity" in the People's Commissariat of Defense was disunited: Tymoshenko was sent to the Western Front on the same day as its commander, Lieutenant General Vatutin - Deputy Chief of the General Staff - was appointed Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. Zhukov remained at his post as chief of the General Staff under the watchful eye of Beria.
I am deeply convinced that the creation of GKOs and official movements in the military leadership are the result of a quarrel that broke out on June 29 in the evening in the office of Marshal Tymoshenko”[88].
The fact that the creation of the GKO was somehow the result of a quarrel in the People's Commissariat of Defense can hardly be questioned. But the fact that Stalin arrived in the Kremlin on the morning of June 30 and began to create GKOs there is extremely unlikely.
In any case, even if Molotov initiated the creation of the GKO, this cannot indicate that Stalin voluntarily renounced power, but that Stalin was depressed by the insufficient concentration of power in his hands in such a difficult wartime and about said this to Molotov with Beria during a meeting at the dacha, this may well testify. And Molotov (who told Chuev that he “supported” Stalin just these days) understood the task correctly. Moreover, the GKO was not something extraordinary.
On August 17, 1923, the Labor and Defense Council of the USSR (STO) was formed from the Council of Labor and Defense of the RSFSR. Its chairmen were successively Lenin, Kamenev and Rykov, and from December 19, 1930 - Molotov.
“On April 27, 1937 (almost simultaneously with the organization of narrow leading commissions in the Politburo), the Politburo decided to create a USSR Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The new committee actually replaced the USSR Labor and Defense Council (which was abolished by the same decision of April 27) and the joint commission of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars on defense, which had been operating since 1930. The Defense Committee, chaired by Molotov, included seven members (V. M. Molotov, I. V. Stalin, L. M. Kaganovich, K. E. Voroshilov, V. Ya. Chubar, M. L. Rukhimovich, V. I. I. Mikoyan, AA Zhdanov, N. I. Yezhov). Thus, the composition of the Defense Committee largely coincided with the narrow leading commissions of the Politburo. Compared to the previous Defense Commission, the Defense Committee had a more significant apparatus. In December 1937, a special decision of the Defense Committee was adopted on this matter, then approved by the Politburo, which provided that the apparatus of the Defense Committee should prepare for consideration in the Committee issues of mobilization deployment and armament of the army, preparation of the national economy for mobilization, and also check the implementation of decisions Defense Committee. To control the implementation of decisions, a special main inspection of the Defense Committee was created, which received broad rights, including through the abolished defense department of the State Planning Commission and military control groups of the Party Control Commission and the Soviet Control Commission”[89].
Since the existence of the Soviet country, there was a body whose functions, in addition to defense tasks, included control over the economy, and in the event of war, it was supposed to organize the defense of the USSR. The composition of the KO practically coincided with the party elite, that is, in the event of a war, the country's defense was to be organized by the party and the military was to be in command, too. And it was not for nothing that the STO was transformed into KO in April 1937, before the start of the process of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization ("the Tukhachevsky case"), which, according to the investigation, was planning a military coup on May 15, 1937. The army had to be "cleaned", and without Party supremacy over the army seemed difficult.
Until May 7, 1940, the head of the Defense Committee was Molotov, who replaced Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, while Molotov was replaced by Voroshilov. Members of the Defense Committee were, in particular, Kulik, Mikoyan and Stalin. In 1938, the Main Military Council of the Red Army was created, of which I. V. Stalin.
In the future, as Stalin moved towards combining the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, that is, to concentrate in his hands both the party and Soviet branches of power in the country, the construction of a new, extra-constitutional body that, if necessary, could take all the power in the country - establish a practical dictatorship
“On September 10, 1939, the Politburo approved the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which more clearly divided the functions of the Defense Committee and the Economic Council, primarily in the defense sphere. / … /
The tendency to strengthen the role of the Council of People's Commissars was especially clearly manifested in the pre-war months. On March 21, 1941, two joint resolutions were adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the reorganization of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which significantly expanded the rights of the leadership of the government. […]
The final legitimation of the transfer of the rights of the Council of People's Commissars as a collective body to the highest leaders of the Council of People's Commissars took place thanks to the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of March 21, 1941 "On the formation of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars." This new body of power, although it was not provided for by the Constitution of the USSR, on the basis of a resolution of March 21, was "invested with all the rights of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR." […] V. M. Molotov, H. A. Voznesensky, A. I. Mikoyan, H. A. Bulganin, L. P. Beria, L. M. Kaganovich, A. A. Andreev.
In fact, the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars took over a significant part of the responsibilities that were previously performed by the Defense Committee and the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars. Therefore, the Economic Council was abolished by a decree from the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, and the composition of the Defense Committee was reduced to five people. The functions of the Defense Committee were limited to the adoption of new military equipment, consideration of military and naval orders, the development of mobilization plans with their submission for approval to the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars […]
On May 7, the Politburo approved the new composition of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars H. A. Voznesensky, deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov, A. I. Mikoyan, H. A. Bulganin, L. P. Beria, L. M. Kaganovich, L. Z. Mehlis, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee of A. A. Andreev. On May 15, 1941, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars K. E. Voroshilov and First Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions N. M. Shvernik. May 30, 1941 - Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the USSR (b) A. A. Zhdanov and G. M. Malenkov. […]
Under Stalin, there was a further expansion of the rights of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars. For example, on May 30, 1941, the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars was abolished and a permanent Commission on Military and Naval Affairs was organized under the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, consisting of: Stalin (chairman), Voznesensky (deputy chairman), Voroshilov, Zhdanov and Malenkov " [90].
In general, by the beginning of the war, the party and the Soviet - and in general, all power belonged to the same people, and I. V. Stalin.
When Molotov proposed creating a GKO, he did not offer anything new. He proposed creating a temporary, emergency body, “to which to give all the power in the country. Transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the party. " And the power in the GKO should belong to the "five of the Politburo" - Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria [91]. But this new body, in fact, formally united the already existing party and Soviet bodies.
So, at about 4 pm Mikoyan and Voznesensky came to Molotov, the discussion took some time, then they decided to go to Stalin's dacha. This is how the arrival at the dacha looks like in Mikoyan's “original” memories:
“We arrived at Stalin’s dacha. They found him in a small dining room sitting in an armchair. He looks at us inquiringly and asks: why did they come? He looked calm, but somehow strange, no less strange was the question he asked. After all, in fact, he himself had to call us.
Molotov, on behalf of us, said that it was necessary to concentrate power, so that everything would be resolved quickly, in order to put the country on its feet. Such a body should be headed by Stalin.
Stalin looked surprised, did not raise any objections. Okay, he says.
Then Beria said that it was necessary to appoint 5 members of the State Defense Committee. You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and I (Beria)”[92].
And here's how in the "edited".
“We arrived at Stalin’s dacha. They found him in a small dining room sitting in an armchair. Seeing us, he seemed to shrink into a chair and looked inquiringly at us. Then he asked: "Why did you come?" He looked wary, somehow strange, no less strange was the question he asked. After all, in fact, he himself had to call us. I had no doubts: he decided that we had come to arrest him.
Molotov said on our behalf that it was necessary to concentrate power in order to put the country on its feet. To do this, create the State Defense Committee. "Who is in charge?" Stalin asked. When Molotov replied that he, Stalin, was in charge, he looked surprised, did not express any considerations. “Good,” he says later. Then Beria said that it was necessary to appoint 5 members of the State Defense Committee. "You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and I," he added "[93].
The question arises in essence - maybe Stalin was going to convene everyone? I would come to the Kremlin, whom I need to call. Stalin often came to the Kremlin at 7 o'clock in the evening, for example, on June 23 he arrived at 18.45, on June 25 - at 19.40, and on June 28 - at 19.35.
And a group of comrades arrived at that time, or even earlier. Moreover, why would Stalin go to the Kremlin and gather everyone there, if he, most likely, knew that members of the Politburo were going to him in such a wide composition at the time when they were about to leave the Kremlin. They probably called Stalin before going to see him.
The words that, they say, Mikoyan “had no doubts: he [Stalin] decided that we had come to arrest him,” are of the same type as Khrushchev's words:
“When we arrived at his dacha, I (says Beria) saw in his face that Stalin was very frightened. I suppose Stalin wondered if we had come to arrest him for giving up his role and doing nothing to organize a rebuff to the German invasion? " [94]. And they do not cause anything but persistent doubts.
Further, it is quite possible that the comrades (Beria with Molotov) gave Stalin's depression (in a conversation at the dacha on the night of June 29-30) much more importance than Stalin himself attached to it and what it really was. How few people in the evening wave their hand and say - everything is tired, but in the morning they calmly continue to do their job? Of course, Stalin hardly often showed his feelings in front of his comrades-in-arms, and their more or less vivid manifestation (and there were enough reasons) could seriously scare Molotov and Beria, but this does not mean that Stalin felt exactly what they attributed to him. From this point of view, Stalin's surprise at the unexpected visit is quite understandable. Perhaps, after the departure of his comrades, Stalin decided to drink wine, get some sleep, and get down to business the next day. And then the next day - such a delegation.
“Molotov, on behalf of us, said that we need to concentrate power, so that everything can be resolved quickly, in order to put the country on its feet. Such a body should be headed by Stalin.
Stalin looked surprised, did not express any objections. Okay, he says.
Then Beria said that it was necessary to appoint 5 members of the State Defense Committee. You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and I (Beria).
Stalin remarked: then Mikoyan and Voznesensky should be included. Only 7 people to approve.
Beria says again: Comrade Stalin, if we all work in the State Defense Committee, then who will work in the Council of People's Commissars, the State Planning Committee? Let Mikoyan and Voznesensky do all the work in the Government and the State Planning Commission. Voznesensky opposed Beria's proposal and proposed that the GKO include seven people, taking into account those named by Stalin. Others did not comment on this topic. Subsequently, it turned out that before my arrival with Voznesensky in Molotov's office, Beria arranged so that Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and he (Beria) agreed on this proposal and instructed Beria to submit it to Stalin for consideration. I was agitated by the fact that we were playing for time, since the question concerned my candidacy as well. He considered the dispute inappropriate. I knew that as a member of the Politburo and the Government I would still bear great responsibilities.
I said - let there be 5 people in the GKO. As for me, besides the functions that I perform, give me wartime duties in those areas in which I am stronger than others. I ask you to appoint me as a specially authorized GKO with all the rights of the GKO in the field of supplying the front with food, clothing allowance and fuel. So they decided. Voznesensky asked to give him leadership in the production of weapons and ammunition, which was also accepted. The leadership in the production of tanks was entrusted to Molotov, and the aviation industry and aviation in general, to Malenkov. Beria was left with the maintenance of order inside the country and the fight against desertion”[95].
After discussing these issues, a decree was prepared on the formation of the GKO (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 30, 1941), then Stalin, already being the head of the GKO, took up personnel issues.
By Zhukov G. K. in his memoirs: “On June 30, I. V. Stalin and ordered to call the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlova.
Was removed from command of the Western Front by D. G. Pavlov. Instead of Pavlov, S. K. Tymoshenko. Vatutin was appointed chief of staff of the North-Western Front. Also on this day, June 30, the State Defense Committee adopted a number of resolutions on the mobilization of women and girls to serve in the air defense forces, communications, internal security, on military highways, etc.
Stalin did not go to the Kremlin that day, and the next day, July 1, he received 23 people in his office from 4.40 pm to 01.30 am on 2 July.
* * *
What conclusions can be drawn.
1. "Prostration" of Stalin, if by this we mean the inability to fulfill one's duties, falling out of life, exactly what was implied in the myth invented by NS. Khrushchev, was absent altogether. There was no her.
2. "Prostration" of Stalin, if we count by this a depressed state, a pronounced bad mood, lasted from June 29 to 30, and it should be noted that on June 29 - Sunday - Stalin's working day differed from the previous ones only by the absence of entries in the Visitors' Register. although Stalin made several trips that day to NGOs and SGK.
3. Stalin's refusal from power is confirmed by the words of Khrushchev and refuted by the words of Molotov, if we talk about the sources.
Indirect evidence that Stalin did not give up power can be considered:
♦ the absence of any mention of this, in addition to the memoirs of Khrushchev, which, in comparison with the memoirs of other participants in the events, are extremely tendentious and unreliable;
♦ personal characteristics of I. V. Stalin in no way characterize him as a person capable of giving up power, but on the contrary, extremely power-hungry.
Application
EXTRACT FROM THE JOURNAL OF VISITS TO THE OFFICE OF I. V. STALIN (22-28 JUNE 1941)
62 "Political education". 1988, No. 9. P. 74–75.
63 Khrushchev N. S. Report at a closed session of the XX Congress of the CPSU on February 24-25, 1956 (Khrushchev N. S. On the personality cult and its consequences. Report to the XX Congress of the CPSU // Izvestia Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989, No. 3)
64 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - M.: PIK "Moscow News", 1999. S. 300-301.
65 Medvedev R. Was there a crisis in the country's leadership in June 1941? // "State Service", 3 (35), May - June 2005.
66 Sokolov A. K., Tyazhelnikov B. C. Course of Soviet history, 1941–1991. Tutorial. - M.: Higher. shk., 1999.415 p.
67 Medvedev R. I. V. Stalin in the early days of the Great Patriotic War // New and Contemporary History, No. 2, 2002; Was there a crisis in the leadership of the country in June 1941? // "State Service", 3 (35), May - June 2005; Pykhalov I. The Great Blunder War. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. S. 284-303; Kurtukov I. Stalin's flight to the dacha in June 1941
68 Gorkov YA The State Defense Committee decides (1941-1945). Figures, documents. - M., 2002. S. 222–469 (APRF. F. 45. On. 1. V. 412. L. 153-190, L. 1-76; D. 414. L. 5-12; l. 12-85v.; D. 415. L. 1-83 ob.; L. 84-96 ob.; D. 116. L. 12-104; D. 417. L. 1-2v.).
69 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - M.: IIK "Moscow News", 1999. S. 300-301.
70 Mikoyan A. I. So it was. - M.: Vagrius, 1999.
71 Ibid.
72 Chuev F. Molotov. Half-power overlord. - M.: Olma-Press, 2000.
73 Gorkov YL. The State Defense Committee decides (1941-1945). Figures, documents. - M., 2002. S. 222–469 (APRF. F. 45. On. 1. V. 412. L. 153-190. L. 1-76; D. 414. L. 5-12; L. 12-85v.; D. 415. L. 1-83 ob.; L. 84-96v.; D. 116. L. 12-104; D. 417. L. 1-2v.).
74 Mikoyan A. I. So it was. - M.: Vagrius, 1999.
75 Zhukov G. K. Memoirs and Reflections: In 2 volumes - M.: Olma-Press, 2002, p. 287.
76 1941. T. 2. - M., 1998. P. 495–500 (RCKHIDNI. F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118–126).
77 Mikoyan A. I. So it was. - M.: Vagrius, 1999.
78 Ibid.
79 1941. T. 2. - M., 1998. P. 495–500 (RCKHIDNI. F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118–126).
80 This is about June 29, as the novel by Chakovsky, which describes this visit, is being discussed.
81 Chuev F. Molotov. Half-power overlord. M.: Olma-Press, 2000.
82 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - M.: IIK "Moscow News", 1999. S. 300-301.
83 Kurtukov I. Stalin's flight to the dacha in June 1941 …
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents. - M.: MF "Democracy", 1999. S. 76 (AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 463, L. 164-172. Autograph. Published: "Source", 1994, No. 4).
87 1941. vol. 2. - M., 1998. pp. 495–500 (RCKHIDNI. F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118–126).
88 Stadnyuk I. F. Confession of a Stalinist. - M., 1993. S. 364.
89 Khlevnyuk O. V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 30s. - M.: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 1996.
90 Ibid.
91 Earlier (in 1937, for example) the five included Kaganovich and Mikoyan, but by the beginning of the war they were replaced by Malenkov and Beria.
92 1941. T. 2. - M., 1998. P. 495–500 (RCKHIDNI. F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118–126).
93 Mikoyan A. I. So it was. - M.: Vagrius, 1999.
94 Khrushchev N. S. Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - M.: IIK "Moscow News", 1999. S. 300-301.
95 1941. vol. 2. - M., 1998. pp. 495–500 (RCKHIDNI. F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118–126).
