SAM "Krug": service, testing at American proving grounds, use and possible role in local conflicts

SAM "Krug": service, testing at American proving grounds, use and possible role in local conflicts
SAM "Krug": service, testing at American proving grounds, use and possible role in local conflicts

Air defense system "Circle"

Anti-aircraft missile systems "Krug" of all modifications were in service with anti-aircraft missile brigades (zrbr) of the army and front (district) subordination. Serial production of the Krug air defense missile system was carried out from 1964 to 1980. The release of anti-aircraft missiles continued until 1983. According to information published in open sources, a total of 52 anti-aircraft missile brigades were equipped with Krug complexes of all modifications. Some managed to re-arm themselves from the early versions ("Circle" and "Circle-A" to the more advanced "Circle-M / M1"). A number of sources also mentions "Krug-M2". Apparently, this was the semi-official designation of the Krug-M1 air defense system with the latest modification of the 1S32M2 guidance station and the 3M8M3 anti-aircraft missile.

According to the memoirs of the officers who served in the "Krugovskiy" brigades, the early versions of the complexes during major overhauls were brought to the level of later modifications. When designing the guidance station, the modernization potential was initially laid down and there was free space for the installation of additional electronic units. The antenna post and microwave equipment required a more significant alteration.

SAM "Krug": service, testing at American proving grounds, use and possible role in local conflicts

As new modifications of the complex were created, its operational and combat characteristics improved. A partial transfer to solid-state electronics was carried out, which had a positive effect on reliability. Whereas on the Krug and Krug-A complexes there were difficulties with the capture of low-flying targets with a small EPR, the Krug-M / M1 could quite confidently fight against such difficult targets as cruise missiles. Taking into account the operating experience of the complexes of the first options on the SNR 1S32M2, several new modes were added, which increased the likelihood of hitting the target. The possibilities of work in the conditions of active electronic countermeasures have been greatly improved. On the latest modifications of the SNR, a television-optical sight was installed, which, in favorable conditions, made it possible to detect and track a target without using a radar channel. Taking into account the experience of hostilities in Vietnam and the Middle East, the protection against anti-radar missiles has been improved. The firing range increased to 55 km, and the near border of the affected area decreased from 7.5 to 4 km.

Although the Krug air defense missile system was originally created to cover troops in places of concentration, headquarters, large bridges, warehouses and other important facilities in the frontline zone, units and formations of the air defense of the ground, stationed 200 km in the border zone, were involved in combat duty in peacetime … For this, a battery on duty was assigned from the anti-aircraft missile battalion (zrdn). In most cases, the watch was carried out near the place of permanent deployment in positions that were well equipped in engineering terms. At the same time, self-propelled launchers and guidance stations were in caponiers, and the command post was located in a concrete shelter buried in the ground.

As mentioned in the previous part of the review, an important advantage of the Krug air defense system was its high mobility, and the battery's ability to turn around and fold in 5 minutes.This was its advantage not only over the C-75 (which, even by cutting the cables, could not be completed in less than 20 minutes), but also over the American Improved Hawk MIM-23B air defense system. The latter had deployment / folding times of 45 and 30 minutes, respectively. Last but not least, this was achieved due to the ability to control the actions of the Krug air defense missile system by radio. It took a few seconds to lift and clean the wireless antennas. The radio link was used to transmit digital information from SOC 1C12 to SNR 1C32 and had a range of 4-5 km. The data transmission line from the SNR to the SPU had a range of up to 500 m. However, when it was possible, in order to increase secrecy, cable communication lines were used.


In the late 1960s, the transfer of the Krug air defense missile system was practiced by heavy military transport aircraft An-22. For the unhindered loading of self-propelled launchers into the cargo compartment from anti-aircraft missiles, the upper tail fins were dismantled. The wings and stabilizers of the 3M8 missiles located on the SPU were also removed during storage in hangars (otherwise they would not fit into the gates) and on the march in wooded areas, when there was a risk of damage from tree branches.


Usually, the SPU 2P24 was moved by air and ground vehicles without missiles, additional travel mountings were folded along the travel one. At the same time, the missiles were in transport containers or ready (assembled, tested, refueled) on the TPM and transport vehicles of the transport platoon of the technical battery and TPM batteries.


Due to the design features, the visual visibility of the Circle battery on the ground was quite high. But in any case, it turned out to be significantly less than that of the S-75 medium-range air defense system, which until the second half of the 1960s was also used in the air defense forces of the NE.


It is impossible to effectively disguise the standard position of the C-75 division. Of course, in order to increase the combat survivability, the control cabs were placed in shelters, the launchers were covered with camouflage nets, but the radial roads from the missile storage to the launcher are clearly visible from the air.

For all Krug divisions in their area of ​​responsibility, reserve starting positions with topographic reference and engineering training were provided, and, if possible, false positions (mainly in defense).


In the course of hostilities, after shelling a target, the battery needed to immediately change its firing position. According to expert estimates, 3-4 missile launches from one starting position were guaranteed to lead to the destruction of the complex.


If necessary, separate air defense units could be attached to motorized rifle or tank regiments and divisions and operate autonomously, in isolation from the main forces of the air defense brigade. In this case, target designation was carried out from the general warning network or from the nearest radio engineering unit and the air defense command post of the attached unit.

After the collapse of the USSR and the launch of the process of "optimization" and "reform" of the Russian armed forces, a landslide reduction of air defense units and formations began. For the most part, this affected the country's air defense forces. So, in the second half of the 1990s, all the S-75 and S-125 first-generation air defense systems were removed from combat duty in Russia. But at the same time, the seemingly hopelessly outdated "Circle" was in service with the Russian army until 2006.

In the 21st century, it has become very difficult to maintain the elements of the Krug air defense system that have largely exhausted their resources. The electronic blocks of the guidance station, built on an outdated element base, required constant close attention. But the main problem was missiles with expired service lives. SAM 3M8 did not have fuel pumps, fuel was supplied from the tanks due to the supply of compressed air between the wall of the tank compartment and the rubber bag, and so, after long-term storage, this rubber lost its elasticity and cracks appeared in it. Such "crying" missiles were not uncommon in training firing, where old missiles were fired, the warranty period of which had expired.However, the replacement of rubber bags did not require sending to the factory and could be carried out by the technical battery or the district arsenal (missile storage base), this problem was not decisive for limiting the service life of the missile defense. The main reasons for the loss of missile performance were: oxidation of the 1st stage fuel (isopropyl nitrate), loss of performance by lamps and semiconductor electronic components, metal fatigue and damage during operation. In this regard, the surviving complexes of the latest modifications for the most part were in "storage". In many respects, the protracted service of the "Circle" is explained by the fact that in the air defense missile systems of the front and army subordination it was not possible to replace the air defense missile system "Circle" in the same proportion with the universal air defense systems S-300V. The launch of the final version of the S-300V into serial production took place in 1988, and before the economy was transferred to market rails, it was possible to build a few anti-aircraft systems of this type (about 10 times less than the S-300P).

The Krug air defense missile system, despite its fairly widespread use in the Armed Forces of the USSR, was supplied abroad very limitedly. Historically, buyers of Soviet air defense systems received mainly various modifications of the S-75 medium-range facility complex, and foreign operators of the Krug military air defense systems were the closest allies under the Warsaw Pact. In 1974, Czechoslovakia received the Krug-M. Since the second half of the 1970s, the Krug-M1 complexes have been supplied to Hungary, the GDR and Poland. Bulgaria received this version in 1981, after the end of its serial production.


Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia used a brigade structure similar to the Soviet one. To increase information awareness, some air defense missile systems were given additional radar equipment, and from air attack weapons that broke through at low altitude, they were protected by batteries of 23-mm ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns and platoons of Strela-2M MANPADS. In the GDR and Hungary, "Kroogi" were brought together into separate anti-aircraft missile regiments (zrp), which had two, not three anti-aircraft missile battalions (zrn).


In the countries of Eastern Europe, where the Krug air defense systems were supplied, their operation was basically completed in the second half of the 1990s. Former allies in the Warsaw Pact, in the face of a decrease in international tension, hastened to get rid of surplus Soviet weapons. The exception was Poland, where the Krug-M1 complexes served until 2010.


The last time the Polish crews of the Krug-M1 air defense missile system carried out control-training firing in 2006. At the same time, converted P-15M Termit anti-ship missiles were used as targets.

After the division of the Soviet military legacy, the Krug air defense missile system went to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. In almost all independent republics, these complexes have already been decommissioned. It is reliably known that the Kazakh Krug division until 2014 covered the Ayaguz military airfield in the East Kazakhstan region. According to information published on the First Law Enforcement Site of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Krug air defense missile system participated in the second stage of the Combat Commonwealth air defense exercise, held at the Saryshagan training ground in August 2017. It is possible that during these exercises, the Virazh target missiles converted from the 3M8 missiles were launched from the 2P24 SPU. Taking into account the fact that Russia handed over several S-300PS divisions to Kazakhstan, the Krug air defense system is most likely already withdrawn from service in this republic.


Until recently, the Krug complexes played a significant role in providing air defense in Armenia and Azerbaijan. These countries got the equipment and weapons of the 59th Airborne Brigade (Artik, Armenia) and 117th Airborne Brigade (Khanlar, Azerbaijan). In the past, military experts drew attention to the fact that the number of Krug air defense systems in the Armenian armed forces significantly exceeded the number initially available in the 59th brigade.


Apparently, in the late 1990s, Armenia received additional anti-aircraft systems that were being removed from service in Russia.SAM "Krug-M1" were located in mountainous areas in the southeast of the country and in the vicinity of the settlement of Gavar, not far from Lake Sevan, and were on alert until 2014. S-300PS anti-aircraft systems have been deployed on some of the former Krug positions. At present, the Krug air defense missile system in Armenia, apparently, has been transferred to the armed forces of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.


Judging by satellite images, the last Krug-M1 battalion in Azerbaijan in the vicinity of the city of Agjabedi was on combat duty at a stationary position until 2013. However, at present, the obsolete and physically obsolete systems have been replaced by the Buk-MB medium-range air defense systems received from Belarus.

Tests of the Krug air defense system in the USA

Although in the 1990s the Krug air defense system was already considered outdated, the Americans took it quite seriously and did not miss the opportunity to learn more about the real capabilities of this complex. For this, from an unnamed Eastern European country, the following were delivered to the Eglin test site in Florida: SOC 1S12, SNR 1S32 and SPU 2P24 with 3M8 missiles.


It is not known whether real launches of 3M8 anti-aircraft missiles at air targets are being carried out in the United States, but it is safe to say that American specialists thoroughly tested the capabilities of the "circle" radars to detect and track US Air Force and Navy combat aircraft in various conditions, and also worked out radar techniques. suppression. Until the mid-2000s, elements of the Krug air defense system were used to designate the enemy during military exercises held at a training ground in the vicinity of Eglin airbase. Subsequently, special multi-mode radar simulators appeared at American training grounds, reproducing the radiation of guidance stations of Soviet and Russian-made anti-aircraft complexes. Taking into account the fact that the Krug air defense system was decommissioned in Russia in 2006 and until recently was operated in a number of CSTO states, these measures can be considered quite justified.

Combat use of the Krug air defense missile system

Due to the fact that abroad air defense systems of modifications "Krug-M / M1" were available only in Eastern European countries, which after the fall of the "Iron Curtain" became allies of the United States, unlike the widespread C-75, the military "Circle" did not have a chance to demonstrate its combat characteristics in combat operations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Allegations that the Krug air defense system was used during the Vietnam War and in the Arab-Israeli wars do not correspond to reality.


However, in one conflict, "Krug" participated or at least was present in the combat zone. The matter concerns the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) in 1991-1994. If at the first stage of the conflict, air hostilities were sporadic, and the sorties of several aircraft and helicopters were quite rare, then from about mid-1992 the situation changed dramatically. After the division of Soviet military property, Azerbaijan received several dozen combat aircraft, and Armenia - air defense systems. To be more precise, Azerbaijan also got the radar and air defense system, but this did not really matter, since the Armenians actually did not have their own military aviation at that time.

Since the second half of 1992, the air defense forces of Armenia have operated the S-75M3, S-125M1 object air defense systems, as well as the Krug-M1, Kub-M3, Osa-AKM, Strela-10 and Arrow-1 ". Since the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Artsakh at that time was already controlled by Armenian armed formations, a significant part of these air defense systems ended up on the territory of the unrecognized republic.


It is difficult to speak about the exact quantitative composition. For example, some sources write about 20 divisions of the Krug air defense missile system that were in the Armenian armed forces in 2001. But, most likely, this number is greatly overestimated, and we can talk not about divisions and not even about batteries, but about the total number of self-propelled launchers.A common mistake of technically illiterate journalists is to count air defense systems by the number of launchers.

After the modern air defense systems appeared on the territory of the NKR, and the hostilities took on a wide scale, the losses of the Azerbaijani aviation increased sharply. Of course, there are no exact statistics of losses to this day. In the most optimistic version, the air defense forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic announced 28 downed aircraft (including 10 MiG-25 and 7 Su-25) and 19 helicopters. Now the numbers have changed somewhat: the Armenian side writes about about 20 planes and the same number of helicopters, while the Azerbaijani side admits the loss of 11 planes. There are also differences in the types of aircraft shot down. The Armenian side mentions only Su-17, Su-24, Su-25 and Mig-25, while the Azerbaijani side notes that some of the shot down "dryers" were actually training "twin" L-29 and L-39, on hastily converted into light attack aircraft. In most cases, it is not specified what the aircraft was shot down with. For about 25-30% of cases, it is said that they were shot down with the help of MANPADS, MZA or small arms, but no information is provided on the use of "large" air defense systems. According to the Armenian military expert Artsrun Hovhannisyan, possibly incomplete, the Krug air defense missile system shot down 3 or 4 planes:

October 11, 1992 - Su-17 near Stepanakert.

January 12, 1994 - Su-24 or Su-25 in the Hadrut-Fizuli area.

March 17, 1994 - an Iranian S-130 was shot down by mistake, the crew of which plotted a flight course over the combat zone. In a number of sources, the shooting down of this aircraft is attributed to the Osa-AKM air defense system. But it is known that the SOC "Wasps" is experiencing problems with target detection at an altitude of more than 5000 m. It is also possible that the Iranian "Hercules" was shot down not by the "Circle", but by the S-125.

April 23, 1994 - MiG-25RB in the Goris-Lachin-Fizuli region. A group of 7 MiG-25RB conducted a stellar raid from different heights and directions, and the top speed was 650-700 m / s.


According to other testimonies, the active operations of the Azerbaijani aviation ceased after several Krug-M1 batteries were deployed in the conflict zone. In the near future, it is not necessary to count on the appearance of reliable data on the use of the Krug air defense missile system on the territory of the NKR, but if these complexes stopped the aerial bombardment only by the fact of their presence, then this is already a very good result. As you know, the main task of the air defense forces is not to destroy enemy air attack weapons, but to prevent damage to the covered objects.


Judging by the freely available satellite images, several batteries of the Krug air defense missile system were on alert in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2019.


Stationary positions are easily identified; two batteries were found. Perhaps a certain amount of SPU and SNR is stored in closed hangars.

Possible influence of the Krug air defense missile system on the course of local conflicts

At various military-historical forums, one can often find a discussion, for example, of how the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia would develop in 1999 if the latter had been included in its own air defense forces of the S-300P air defense system. We, in turn, will try to simulate the use of the Krug air defense system in the conflicts of the late 1960s - early 1990s.

As you know, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was actively preparing for a global “hot” war, and therefore some types of equipment and weapons were either not supplied abroad at all, or were supplied in export modifications, with “cut down” characteristics. Foreign customers, as a rule, received Soviet weapons on credit, and sometimes for nothing, therefore they put up with this state of affairs.

As mentioned earlier, only the closest allies in the Warsaw Pact received the Krug-M / M1. Moreover, this happened shortly before the termination of mass production of the main elements of the complex. This was due both to the desire to keep the characteristics of the military "Circle" secret from a potential enemy, and to the high complexity of the SNR 1S32.Let me quote a person familiar with the Circle firsthand:

Each zamkombat - the head of the station was selected especially and carefully, on the basis of the conclusions and characteristics of the immediate commanders and the brigade commission, for "pull", etc. there is nothing to do with this technique. Each station manager (at one time he was) was proud of his car, considered it a living being and talked to it during the hours of constant communication with it. Each station had its own "character", two were not alike. In terms of work and behavior, the station "responded" to the treatment with it, there were real cases when it "pulled" out of its last strength, seemingly when such behavior was impossible, or "fiddled" with all normal readings, and when reproaching it, it suddenly started perfectly work. Without exception, the SNR always "checks" the new chief, for example, I spent the first year in it for days, the soldiers carried food to the park, slept there. Only when she begins to trust and feel love and respect for herself, then she will give all her rather big strength and open up completely, sometimes leading to confusion and bewilderment. The complex is good with proper operation and timely maintenance, it is very reliable and durable, had great potential, capabilities and until recently was relevant. I l / s constantly repeated that the machine should always feel the warmth of human hands, not feel abandoned and forgotten, then it will pay back in full and in the most difficult and critical time will not fail.

It is clear that it would be extremely difficult for foreign operators to maintain the station in good condition, and this would have to be done by Soviet specialists. Without proper maintenance and tuning, the CHP would soon become inoperative. In addition, the production capacity involved in the construction of the most complex elements of the complex was rather limited. In other words, it was not enough ourselves. As a result, "seventy-fives" of various modifications became the most massive and most belligerent Soviet air defense systems abroad. Despite the low mobility, the impossibility of effectively masking the typical position and the difficulties with the operation of anti-aircraft missiles fueled with fuel and a caustic oxidizer, the S-75 family complexes have long been the basis of the ground component of the air defense system in many countries.

But still, let's take a short excursion into an alternative history and imagine that the "Circle" participated in the same local conflicts as the C-75. Of course, speaking of the air defense system, we also take into account the presence of modern automated control systems at that time. In reality, as you know, the USSR supplied ACS even more sparingly than air defense systems and radars. For example, Vietnam received only 2 ASURK-1ME, and even then not earlier than 1982. Therefore, there were cases when 8 SA-75M divisions fired at one American UAV AQM-34 Firebee at the same time.

Most likely, in Vietnam in the mid-1960s or in the Six-Day War of 1967, the still crude and unfinished, difficult-to-operate "Circle" would hardly have achieved great success. Unless its losses were also lower compared to the S-75. Perhaps the complex, by the very fact of its existence, would affect the enemy, forcing him to allocate an additional squad of forces and means to counteract him. It would be more difficult to detect the position of the Krug air defense missile system and, if possible, bypass it than in the case of the S-75. But what could be predicted with a great deal of confidence is that after being sent to Vietnam through the territory of the PRC, the Chinese revisionists would have an air defense system, surprisingly reminiscent of the Soviet complex. And if the "Circle" had been delivered to Egypt or Syria before 1967, then the Israeli aviation museum on the territory of the Hatzerim airbase near the city of Beer Sheva would probably have been replenished with one more exhibit.

"Krug-A" in the late 1960s in Vietnam could have achieved somewhat better results, although only one parameter has fundamentally changed - the minimum height of the defeat.But by the time of Operation Linebacker-II, that is, in December 1972, a "Krug-M" could have appeared in Vietnam - a much more sophisticated one and had a TOV. Of course, in an alternative history at this time in Vietnam, the S-75M2 could also have fought, especially since Soviet advisers since the end of the 1960s have been urging to send modern modifications of the seventy-five and twenty-five. Of course, subject to the massive deployment of the C-75M2 air defense system with its longer-range and maneuverable B-759 missile and anti-jamming modes, during the Linebacker-II operation, they could inflict much more serious USAF losses than the existing CA-75M, and they themselves were would be a more difficult goal, but a number of fundamental shortcomings of the complex still remained. Perhaps, to suppress the S-75M2, the Americans would have to spend a few extra days and lose even more Stratospheric Fortresses.

Under the same conditions it would have been incomparably more difficult to knock out Kroogi, especially since the Vietnamese air defense personnel, unlike their Arab counterparts, did not neglect either camouflage or redeployment. An additional advantage of the Krug-M over the S-75M2 at that time was the presence of TOV, but it did not really matter for Linebecker - during the entire operation there were only 20 hours of good weather, and the B-52 was bombed only at night. By the way, it was on the S-75 that the TV sight was installed much later than on other complexes: only in the second half of the 1970s on the S-75M3K and S-75M4 modifications. Prior to that, the so-called doghouse was used on the export CA-75M supplied to the DRV since 1969 - a small cabin located above the CHR-75 horizontal scanning antenna. It contained two operators with simple optics, who turned the station in the direction of the target without turning on radio emission and could theoretically accompany the target in angular coordinates. However, due to low tracking accuracy, short detection range and other reasons, the doghouse was practically not used for its intended purpose. Not to mention the fact that in summer the temperature in the booth reached 80 ° C, so even hardy Vietnamese could not stay in it for a long time.

Nevertheless, the presence of TOV and jam-resistant modes of operation of the station potentially increased the number of downed American aircraft of tactical, carrier-based and strategic aviation. Combined with the factor of new weapons, all these advantages could significantly increase the losses to the Americans and make it difficult for them to carry out the operation. It is unlikely to disrupt, only the Soviet air defense system was capable of this in those years. But in any case, the Vietnamese would say thank you very much for Kroogi.

It is difficult to say how the Krug-A air defense system would have performed during the 1969-1970 war of attrition. in the Middle East. Of course, the conditions there were somewhat different from those in Vietnam. The inclement weather is limited to 3-4 winter months, the fighting in the air was conducted almost exclusively during the day, and the level of interference, according to Soviet advisers, was lower than in Vietnam - from low to medium intensity. At the same time, Israeli aviation very actively used low and extremely low altitudes, anti-missile maneuvers, and the latter were somewhat different from those used in Vietnam and the actions of demonstration groups. I think that the Krug-A divisions under those conditions would have suffered less losses than the S-75, but they would not have achieved much success either.

Next comes the Middle East again, the 1973 war. As you know, in reality this war was a triumph for the military air defense system "Kub" and an actual failure for the object S-75. And we are talking about both the outdated SA-75M "Dvina" and the more modern C-75 "Desna". According to the article "Actions of Soviet-made air defense systems during the Yom Kippur War" published on, the Cube air defense missile system shot down 28 Israeli aircraft, and SA-2 (sic) - only 2. Of course, a significant share the success of the "Cube" is due to the factor of surprise.To illuminate the semi-active missile seeker, a 3-cm radar was used. At that time, neither the United States nor Israel had any means of jamming in this frequency range. Later, after the creation and adoption in the US of the container-type electronic warfare pendant stations, the "Cube" no longer achieved such success.

It can be assumed that the Krug-M air defense missile system could be used quite effectively, especially if this were their first use. First of all, due to the use of TOV and anti-jamming modes. Perhaps thanks to the "Kroogi" it would be possible to increase the width of the air defense umbrella. As you know, it was the presence of this umbrella that enabled the Egyptians to successfully cross the Suez Canal, and vice versa, its absence doomed to failure attempts to further advance into the depths of the Sinai.

In real history, in 1982, in the Bekaa Valley, the Syrian air defense system suffered a crushing defeat. There were plenty of reasons, both objective and subjective. For Israel, this was a war of a different level - with the use of 4th generation aircraft, AWACS aircraft, massive use of electronic warfare equipment, precision weapons, UAVs - in general, almost all the attributes of modern warfare. In the conditions prevailing then, Syria did not have a chance, especially since the existing weapons were actually the same as in 1973 and were not used very rationally. If the personnel does not equip reserve and false positions, neglects camouflage, does not observe shooting discipline, then even the most modern weapons will not help. At the same time, all responsibility cannot be placed solely on the Syrians themselves; Soviet advisers also made a number of serious mistakes. Some of the Israeli weapons systems, for example, the false targets of Samson and small-sized reconnaissance UAVs that transmit information in real time, were simply not known in the Soviet Union. In such conditions, the Krug-M air defense system, with the Polyana automated control system, could hardly change the situation. At this time in the Soviet Army, "Circle" was no longer the last word in science and technology. Some brigades have already begun to switch to the Buk air defense missile system and the tests of the S-300V1 air defense system were coming to an end. Perhaps, if the S-75 air defense system in the Syrian air defense group Feda had replaced the Krug-M in a timely manner, then Operation Artsav-19 would have taken more time and the Israeli aviation suffered losses, but nothing more.

During the Iranian-Iraqi war, "Circles", of course, could be used quite effectively - the enemy allowed it. Iranian F-4 and F-5 flew mainly during the day and mainly used unguided aircraft weapons. The interference situation was also not too difficult. However, since about 1984, almost all the activities of the Iranian Air Force were limited to the air defense of strategic objects, there was no longer any manpower and equipment left to support the ground forces.

During Desert Storm in 1991, the technological gap between the warring parties was even greater than in 1982 between Syria and Israel. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, Iraq was not a privileged client of the Soviet Union, and the Iraqi air defense technology was even less perfect than the Syrian one of the same period. Perhaps the only opportunity for the Iraqis would be to use ambush tactics at a time when, having defeated the centralized air defense system of the country, the Allied aviation switched to hunting for individual ground targets, for example, for the Scuds. For NATO aviation, this was the last conflict where conventional free-fall bombs were used in most combat missions in daytime conditions.

Thus, it can be argued that the Krug air defense system in local conflicts during the Cold War could not have a decisive influence on the course of hostilities, and its export supplies to third world countries would damage the USSR's defense capability.

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