The following abbreviations are used in the article: A - army, IN - military district, GSh - General base, railway - railway, CA - Red Army, Mongolia - Mongolian People's Republic, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), RGK - reserve of the main command, RM - intelligence materials, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, sd - rifle division, SD - fortified area, td - tank division, PMC - Member of the Military Council.
The article uses the designations of military districts: ARVO - Arkhangelsk VO, ZabVO - Transbaikal VO, ZakVO - Transcaucasian VO, ZapVO - Western special VO, KOVO - Kiev special VO, OVO - Oryol VO, URVO - Ural VO.
In the previous part, in the memoirs of veterans, it was said about the redeployment of troops from Transbaikalia to the ZakVO. It was also planned to move troops from the Ural Military District to the southern direction. On June 10, when discussing plans to move the 16th A, Stalin made a decision to change its route from Transcaucasia to the road to the OVO. On June 12, the army unloading stations were changed again: it was decided to send troops to KOVO.
This version is presented in the book "Commander Lukin" by the authors V. V. Muratova and Yu. M. Gorodetskaya (Lukina) and in the commentaries of historians. This version is partially confirmed by the memoirs of the PMC Army Lobachev and Marshal A. I. Eremenko. During the battle for Smolensk, the deputy commander of the Western Front, Eremenko, communicated with M. F. Lukin and A. A. Lobachev. From them he could learn the details related to the plans to use the army.
If from May 25, the troops from the ZabVO were actually planned to be used in the ZakVO, then the official position on the redeployment of the troops of the 16th A and 57th TD to the West is deliberately distorted. This distortion of events might have been required to create the image of the visionary leaders of the spacecraft and employees of the General Staff. In particular, the Operational Management. According to the official version, the culprit in all the events turns out to be Comrade. Stalin. The head of the country, of course, is responsible for everything. Are the military experts who advised him guilty?..
If it can be shown that the 16th A was sent to the ZakVO, then the statement about the planning of the movement of the Ural Military District troops to the south may also turn out to be true. In this case, the transportation of the troops of the two armies of the RGK to the southern direction instead of the western one may clearly indicate that at this time and in the near future, the General Staff does not expect the start of a war with Germany.
Based on circumstantial evidence, we will try to confirm the above version, which is fundamentally different from the official point of view. Further in the text, the author's assumptions will be accompanied by the word "probably" or the sign "?".
Historians on the route of the 16th Army
Historians know a lot about the pre-war events, incl. and on the movement of troops from internal military units. However, descriptions of not all events have already been included in their books. Here is an excerpt from the discussion of historians about the transport of troops.
M. F. Timin: "[Wrong. - Approx. auth.].
A. V. Isaev: in April [Nobody from the Ural Military District. - Approx. author] did not send … Where was the 16th A going?”
M. F. Timin
A. V. Isaev
M. F. Timin
A. V. Isaev: [16th A - Approx. auth.]
O. Yu. Kozinkin: [nominate - Approx. auth.]
A. V. Isaev
When discussing the events in May - early June 1941 at the forum "Military Literature" historian S. L. Chekunov wrote to the writer O. Yu. Kozinkin: [ talk. - Approx. auth.]
Start of redeployment
The decision to redeploy troops from Transbaikalia could not be made without the consent of ComradeStalin and the People's Commissar of Railways. A directive to the headquarters of the ZabVO about the beginning of the movement of troops was sent from the General Staff on the night of May 25-26. Therefore, on the morning of the 26th, the chief of staff calls the commander of the district troops, who since May 25 has been at the location of the 16th A.
Based on the log of the visit to Stalin's office, it can be said that the question of redeploying troops from the ZabVO could be considered on May 23. To discuss issues related to railway transportation, the People's Commissar of Railways L. M. was summoned by 20-00. Kaganovich. Probably something needed to be clarified. On May 24, among other issues, the leaders of the spacecraft reported on the transport of troops from Transbaikalia. Since the encryption was sent only on the night of May 26, it can be assumed that there was no particular hurry to move the army …
On May 26, General Lukin and Divisional Commissar Lobachev learn about the beginning of the transfer of the army to the West.
At the headquarters of the district or in the directive of the General Staff it was indicated that in order to conceal the fact of the redeployment of troops, the dispatch of echelons should be carried out at night. Tanks and sentries on the platforms need to be disguised. During transportation, personnel are prohibited from opening the doors and hatches of the wagons. The chief of staff of the army, Colonel M. A. Shalin and PMC Lobachev. It was decided to send in the first place the 17th TD for deployment, which required 40 echelons.
This decision could be due to the better combat training of the 17th TD or the presence of more vehicles: 1429 versus 1034 in the 13th TD. From Chita, Shalin and Lobachev went to junction 77, near which the 17th TD was stationed. M. F. Lukin remains in Chita, where, together with the commanders of the district headquarters, he prepares documents for the General Staff on the composition of the army. In the morning, with secret documents and security, he leaves by courier to Moscow.
PMC Lobachev will leave Chita at 7 a.m. on June 4 and arrive in Moscow late in the evening on June 10. It turns out that the travel time of the courier train was just over 6.5 days. If M. F. Lukin left in the morning of May 27, then arrived in Moscow late in the evening of June 2. From 3.6.41, the commander of the 16th A could get acquainted with the documents in the General Staff and learn about the place of concentration of the army, about its tasks for the near future, etc.
Some information about military trains
A military train is a specially designated and prepared echelon for the movement of troops, equipment and other military cargo. Before the outbreak of the war, the railways of the Soviet Union operated in a peaceful regime.
I. V. Kovalev (Deputy People's Commissar of State Control for Railway Transport): In May - early June 1941, the transport system of the USSR had to transport about 800 thousand conscripts from the reserve and transfer from the internal districts to the border 28 rifle divisions and 4 army directorates. This redeployment of troops had to be carried out covertly and without changing the usual train timetable on the railways …
L. M. Kaganovich wrote in his memoirs:
It was charged [22.6.41. - Approx. ed.] … contact the chiefs of the roads, warn them about the introduction of a military schedule and the adoption … of measures provided for by the military mobilization plan.
The military schedule differed from the peaceful one in that it was parallel - all trains, incl. passenger, which were reduced, had the same speed and the same technical parking …
On June 23 … an order was signed … on the introduction of a military schedule on all 44 roads of the railway network of the Soviet Union … The new military schedule established a unified weight of a military train - 900 tons …
The planned speed of the military trains was 500 km per day. Trains following to replenish troops during the battle near Moscow and in Stalingrad were provided with a speed of advance of 800-1000 km / day. It is mentioned that there were up to 50 cars in the military echelon.
It was not possible to find information on comparing the speed of movement of echelons on double-track and single-track railways during the war. In Soviet times, the transportation of troops by trains was carried out at a speed on double-track railway lines up to 800 km or more, and on single-track lines - up to 600 km per day. Those.the speed of transporting troops on a single track was 25% lower than on a double track.
Military trains could be formed from two-axle or four-axle covered wagons and platforms with a carrying capacity of 20 or 50 tons. If the platforms were 20-tonnes, then they were loaded with one tank or tractor, one 152-mm howitzer-gun, three cars on two platforms …
On the diagram, you can see that the route for transporting troops of the 16th A and 57th TD from junction 77 (300 km east of the Chita station) to Novosibirsk runs along a double-track railway. After turning to the south, the movement of the echelons continued along the single-track road, the speed of movement should have decreased. If the echelons went to the West, then Stalin, sending troops to Central Asia, increased the shoulder of troop transportation by 2200 km. But Comrade Stalin was a good business executive …
Estimated time of movement of the first echelons
Let's try to check the first point of the version - this is a change in the route of echelons of the 16th A and 57th TD from south to west on 10.6.41.
According to the official version, the dispatch of trains began on May 26. The loading of parts of the 17th TD should have begun immediately after the call from the leaders of the 16th A from the district headquarters. In accordance with the instructions, the echelons were required to be sent at night. May 26 in Chita night falls at 22-13. When carrying out calculations, we assume that the 1st echelon of the 17th TD left after dark at 23-00 on May 26.
This train arrived at Shepetovka by the morning of June 21. By definition, morning is between 6:00 and 12:00. Suppose the train arrived at 8-00. Taking into account the 5 hour difference, the travel time was about 25.6 days. The distance from junction 77 to Shepetivka along the Central Asian route is 9904 km and the average speed of the echelon is 387 km / day.
The commander of the 57th TD indicates the departure time of the 1st echelon. An urgent directive from the General Staff should have been brought to him as quickly as possible. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the 1st echelon of the division was also supposed to leave on the night of May 26-27.
We accept that the 1st echelon of the 114th TP of the 57th TD departed from Bayanturme station (Mongolian People's Republic) after dark - at 23-00 on May 26. Bayanturme station from to junction 77 is located at a distance of 370 km. The train arrived at Proskurov on June 21 after dark. Taking into account the difference in time zones, the travel time was 26.2 days. The distance from Bayanturme to Proskurov is 10406 km and the speed of the train was 397 km / day.
The speeds of movement of both echelons are quite close to each other (387 and 397 km / day), but less than the planned speed (500 km / day). Why? Initially, the author would answer that this is due to the movement on a single track railway, and that would be the wrong answer …
Estimated timing of movement of trains sent in a few days
Let's calculate the speed of the headquarters echelon, which arrived in Chita after midnight on June 4. PMV Lobachev reported to the commander of the ZabVO about the dispatch of echelons and learned that he should leave for the General Staff in the morning on a courier train. A. A. Lobachev arrived at the station, where a train was waiting for him, said goodbye to the staff of the 16th A headquarters, and the train left. Suppose that the train departed on the route at 3-00 on June 4. From the book "Commander Lukin" we learn about the next time mark during the movement of this echelon:
Yes, I strayed with the headquarters, - Shalin sighed. - From Chita to Novosibirsk, from there the headquarters echelon turned to Semipalatinsk, then Alma-Ata, Dzhambul … In Arys we turned north to Aktyubinsk. They found out about the beginning of the war at a small station, I can't even remember the name …
"Novokhopersk", - prompted Sorokin …
The distance from Chita to Novokhopersk along the Central Asian route is 8313 km. Travel time taking into account the time difference before V. M. Molotov (12-15) - 18.6 days. The speed of the train was 449 km / day. It turns out that the decrease in the speed of the first echelons is not associated with their movement on a single-track road.
Let's check this statement for another echelon, which moved in the middle of a line of military trains. This is the echelon of the 404th artillery regiment of the 109th MD (5th mechanized corps), which arrived at the Chita station on 5.6.41.
In accordance with the entries in the diary of I. U. Moskvin's train departed from the Chita station at 16 o'clock on June 5 and arrived in Saratov early in the morning on June 22. The author calculated that early in the morning is 6 o'clock. Travel time taking into account the time difference - 16, 8 days. The distance between the stations of Chita and Saratov is 7867 km and the speed of the echelon is 468 km / day. This speed is comparable to the speed of the headquarters echelon (449 km / day).
According to I. U. Moskvin, you can even determine the speed of transportation of trains along the double-track Trans-Siberian Railway. The diary indicates that the train departed from Chita at 4 pm on June 5, and arrived in Irkutsk on June 7 in the evening. We accept that in the evening it is at 17 o'clock. With a travel time of 2, 04 days and a distance of 1010 km, the speed of the echelon was 495, 1 km / day, i.e. turned out to be close enough to the planned speed (500 km / day). It turns out that when the trains moved along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Novosibirsk and further along the single-track Central Asian railway, the train speeds were 449 and 468 km / day! This is also a fairly high speed of movement of military trains.
Maybe the secret of the lower speeds of the first echelons is related to the time delay when changing their route? And when was the 1st echelon of the 17th TD supposed to arrive at the Arys station?
Depending on the speed of 449-468 km / day, he was supposed to arrive at the Arys station (the distance from the 77th siding to the Arys station is 5554 km) from 23-00 on June 7 to 11-00 on the 8th. If the speed of the echelons was slightly lower, then the estimated time of arrival is shifted and the echelon could arrive later.
As the echelons of the 17th and 57th TD approached the Arys station, they slowed down or stopped at halts, awaiting a decision on their further route from the People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and the head of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin.
This assumption is confirmed by the memories of the veterans. In accordance with them, the first echelons followed without stopping at large stations and stopped only at half-stations for food and for maintenance or replacement of steam locomotives. Food was brought to the carriages in buckets. According to the standards, the stop for food was 1 hour. Let's go back to the diary of the platoon commander I. U. Moskvin:
Arrived in Irkutsk on June 7 in the evening … At noon on June 8, the train moved to Krasnoyarsk …
The stop in a large city lasted about 19 hours! Servicemen of other echelons even walked around the station, walked their horses … From that moment on, no one is in a hurry for some time … Not in Transcaucasia, not to the war with Hitler …
I. U. Moskvin
We arrived in Novosibirsk on June 13. On the way, for some reason, we were kept at the stations for a long time … They did not stay in Novosibirsk for long, somewhere not more than an hour …
The train arrived in Novosibirsk on June 13. The diary does not note whether it is morning, or afternoon, or evening. Let's say it's 10-00. Then the travel time is 4, 96 days. With a distance of 1850 km, the echelon's speed was 373 km / day. If the train arrived later, then the speed of movement will decrease even more.
Thus, the speed of movement decreased, and long-term stops at large stations appeared. They even organized an unscheduled washing of personnel, which previously washed only at the Arys station … The delay could be due to the traffic jam from the military trains that had accumulated from Krasnoyarsk to the Arys station in anticipation of their fate …
If the echelons immediately moved not to Transcaucasia, but to the West, then it would not be necessary to reduce the speed of the trains and waste time on their long downtime. All this confirms the version that, before June 10, Moscow again receives some shock information as a result of the discussion, which is a change in the routes of the 16th and 22nd armies from the south to the west. But not to the western VOs! Historians familiar with archival documents also spoke about this. The echelon of the 333rd artillery regiment of the 152nd SD, which set off later, followed without major stops.
Probable events in Stalin's office
When was the decision to change the route of the 16th A and 57th td echelons made?
On June 7, the military and the people's commissar of the oil industry, Sedin, remained in Stalin's office. Beria and Malenkov came out and came in. Taking into account the increased secrecy measures associated with the development of plans by the army commanders Lukin and Ershakov, it can be said that most likely these plans were reported to Stalin on June 9 from 16-00 to 17-00. Taking into account the new RMs, Stalin finally closed the issue with the Iranian military plans …
After the turn of the echelons of the 16th A and 57th TD, the railway communication of the Central Asian republics with the whole country became sharply difficult. Presumably, the decision to change the route of transporting troops is associated with some RM, who questioned the reliability of the long-standing materials of the RC General Staff of the KA …
On June 10, the NKGB received an urgent request to clarify the data:
Who is the initiator of this request? The task could have come either from Comrade. Stalin or it was initiated by the leader through RU. If it went through the RC GSh KA, then the task was formulated to them on June 9th.
Movement of the 16th Army along the Trans-Siberian Railway
About the movement of the 109th md in many sources there is information that the first echelons with the division headquarters, units of the 381st regiment, part of the units of the 602nd regiment and some special forces unloaded at the Berdichev station on June 18 and were located 10 km from it in the Skruglevskys camps.
These echelons left somewhere around June 3rd, and arrived earlier than the first echelons of tank divisions? How could this be? After all, the first echelons of tank divisions arrived on June 21?
The distance between the stations Kharanor (the location of the 109th md) and Berdichev along the Trassibirskaya highway is 7517 km. If any echelons of the 16th A followed the Trans-Siberian Railway, then they had to go along it to the West on June 10 or 11. In this case, they could arrive on June 18 in Berdichev. Echelons would have to move at a speed of 450-500 km / day.
This assumption coincides with the timing of the change in the final point of the route of the troops from Transbaikalia. Now they did not need to move along the Central Asian route. However, from June 13, the Trans-Siberian Railway should have been filled with echelons of the 22nd A, which received an order to advance to the Western Military District …
Some intelligence reports
Message from Extern (20.5.41):
“Turkey and Persia will be occupied in the near future. A few days ago, cadres of German agents were sent to Turkey for subversive work and military espionage …"
From the report of the German agent in the Soviet embassy in Berlin "Peter" (27.5.41):
Last night … passed a message to Filippov … Schmidt expressed the opinion that the main issue at the moment is the question of the Arab peoples and the establishment of a new order in the Arab world … Germany is striving to achieve in the Middle East the same comprehensive, long-term solutions that it has achieved in the Balkans, and wants peace and stability in the Arab world as well …
Message from Ramsay (June 1941):
Berlin informed Ott that the German attack against the USSR would begin in the second half of June … Reasons for the German attack: the existence of a powerful spacecraft does not allow Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, the spacecraft must be driven away as soon as possible …
W. Churchill
June 10 [intelligence community. - Approx. author] said: "In the second half of June we will witness either a war or an agreement" …
And finally, on June 12, it reported: "Now there is new evidence that Hitler decided to end the interference caused by the Soviets and attack" …
Message from the Chief (11.6.41):
The leading circles of the German Ministry of Aviation and the Aviation Headquarters claim that the question of an attack on the Soviet Union has been finally resolved. Göring's main headquarters was moved from Berlin, presumably to Romania. On June 18, Goering is to leave for the new headquarters …
