The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, CA - Red Army, mk - mechanized corps, md - motorized division, RGK - reserve of the main command, RM - intelligence materials, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, sc (sd) - rifle corps (division), pd - infantry division, td - a tank division.
The article uses the designations of the VO or fronts: ArchVO - Arkhangelsk VO, DF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Transbaikal VO, ZakVO - Transcaucasian VO, ZAPOVO - Western special VO, KOVO - Kiev special VO, LVO - Leningrad VO (Northern Front - Northern Front), OdVO - Odessa VO, OrVO - Orlovsky VO, PribOVO - Baltic special VO, PrivO - Privolzhsky VO, SAVO - Central Asian VO, Siberian Military District - Siberian VO, SKVO - North Caucasian VO, UrVO - Ural VO, KhVO - Kharkiv VO …
Official version
79 years ago, the redeployment of the 16th Army from the ZabVO began. Most memoirs and books speak of her being sent west. For example, in the memoirs of G. K. Zhukova:
On May 13, the General Staff issued a directive to the VO to push troops westward from the inner districts. The 22nd Army marched from the Urals to the Velikiye Luki region; from the Privy Military District to the Gomel region - the 21st Army; from the North Caucasus Military District to the area of Belaya Tserkov - the 19th Army; from the KhVO to the border of the Western Dvina - the 25th sk; from Transbaikalia to Ukraine to the Shepetovka area - the 16th Army …
In 2018, historians discussed the events that took place on the eve of the war. During the discussion, the question was asked: While preparing the materials for the article, the author was unable to find documents that would unequivocally give an answer to this question.
When discussing pre-war events, they often refer to the book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions", using it as a reference. Let me give you an opinion about it: it seems that the authors have placed in the book only those materials for which they were given permission. The book does not destroy the version that existed for many years, according to which intelligence provided all the necessary RM about the enemy troops. On the basis of reliable RM, the SC command, while awaiting the start of the war in June, shrewdly tried to break through the permission to start the transfer of troops from the internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the troops of the western military units to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done. The reasons for this behavior of I. V. Stalin's names are different, but his behavior is not considered from the point of view of knowledge of the situation before the war.
In a series of articles on intelligence, the author presented a large amount of material showing that the pre-war RM turned out to be unreliable. However, in the book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions" there is not a word about the accuracy of the RM, which came to the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR in May-June 1941. The mention of intelligence data ends in April 1941. The authors deliberately did not address this issue. This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the received RM:
In March, the RM spoke about three variants of the attack plan, but only one of them was correct. In addition, the report of the head of the RU describes the fourth fantastic option:.
Even a month later (04.25.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events associated with the start of the war with the USSR:
The data leads me to believe that:
1. In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as another enemy.
2. The timing of the start of the collision - possibly shorter and, certainly within the current year … Another thing is that these plans and dates may bump into something similar to Matsuoka's trip …
3. The next upcoming events of the Germans seem to me as follows:
a) saddle Turkey the pact of three or something similar to it;
b) joining the pact of three Sweden, and, consequently, Finland, tk. the latter has long been ready to join him;
c) strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater;
d) whether the Germans are planning extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to say, although such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed …
The quote in the book that Germany refused to attack England is also a falsification of facts. Such information appeared in the Republic of Moldova, then again materials were cited confirming the preparation of German troops for the landing in England. Even the British intelligence services at the beginning of June 1941 could not say unequivocally whether there would be an attack on England or not.
The book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions" says the following about the transport of troops from the hinterland: [it should be about the DF. - Approx. auth.] and further indicates information about their destinations in the west.
German troops at our border
Let's try, on the basis of the published materials, to figure out whether there were prerequisites in May for the start of the transfer of troops of the 16th Army. The directive of the General Staff on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41, and on May 26, the dispatch of troops began.
Did something dangerous happen on the western border for the decision to transfer troops from ZabOVO? On 04/25/41, according to intelligence, there were 95 … 100 German divisions near our border, on May 15 - 114 … 119, on May 31 - 120 … 122. It can be seen that since May 15, the rate of transfer of German troops to the border has significantly decreased. From June 1 to June 19 (inclusive), no more than 7 divisions were transported to our borders.
In fact, over 40 divisions arrived on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were td and md. However, our reconnaissance did not manage to detect their appearance at the border, although the transportation was partially recorded. In June, according to intelligence, the situation with the increase in the concentration of German troops near the border almost stabilized.
Also in June, RM began to arrive with references to various conditions and ultimatums from Germany to the USSR. The RM spoke either about the imminent start of the war with the Soviet Union, then about the attack on England, then about the German expansion to the Middle East and the African coast, then about the postponement of the start of the war with our country to July-August 1941.
Could the leadership of the spacecraft on May 20-25 frighten the presence of about 120 German divisions near the border? Could the leadership of the spacecraft at this time break through the permission for the transfer of troops of the 16th Army?
The number of spacecraft divisions that should have been concentrated in the western military units was determined by the General Staff based on the number of German divisions that Germany could deploy in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1940, when considering options for military operations by German troops against the USSR, the enemy grouping was defined in 180 or more divisions (not counting the troops of Germany's possible allies).
According to intelligence, new divisions were formed in Germany during the winter. On the basis of the RM in the General Staff, as of 11.3.41, it was believed that Germany would deploy 200 divisions for the war with the USSR. To counter this threat, the number of spacecraft divisions was determined, which should have been in the western districts, in the LMO and in the troops of the RGK. Based on the concentration of 200 divisions near the border, in April 1941, the General Staff issued Directives to develop plans to cover the western districts.
An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):
I order to start developing a plan for the operational deployment of the armies of the Western Military District, guided by the following instructions.
1. Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy currently, it can be assumed, provide a peaceful situation on our western borders … The USSR does not intend to attack Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. However, given:
a) ongoing events in Europe - the occupation of Bulgaria by the Germans, their declaration of war on Yugoslavia and Greece;
b) the suspicious behavior of the Germans in Finland and Romania;
c) concentration of significant forces by Germany to the borders of the USSR;
d) the conclusion of a German-Italian-Japanese military alliance, the spearhead of which, in the presence of the above circumstances, can be directed against the USSR - it is necessary, when developing a plan for the defense of the USSR, to keep in mind not only such opponents as Finland, Romania, England, but also such possible opponents as Germany, Italy and Japan …
2. In the event of a war with us, Germany from its 225 pd, 20 td and 15 md will be able to send against our borders up to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 pd, 20 td and 15 pd …
The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of the signing of the non-aggression pact with Japan. It does not follow from the document that the war is unambiguously expected in the summer of 1941, and it is not unambiguously said that Romania and Finland will enter the war on the side of Germany. The document states that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany will send all its tank and motorized divisions against our borders. Among the opponents is England, with which the USSR has no treaty obligations. The country's leadership should not have forgotten that in the spring of 1940, plans were being prepared in England to bomb Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.
On April 13, 1941, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed with Japan, which was ratified on April 25. The next day, the Directives of the General Staff on preparations for redeployment to the west from the ZabVO of the 16th Army (32nd RC and 5th MK) are sent to the ZabVO and the DF, from the DF of the 31st RC, 21st and 66th Rifle Divisions, 211st and 212nd airborne brigades.
On May 25, the office of the 31st SC arrived at KOVO. In May, the 212th Brigade arrived at the OdVO and became part of the 3rd Airborne Corps. It is likely that the 211st brigade also arrived at KOVO in May 1941. The 21st Rifle Division was sent to the west only in August 1941, while the 66th Rifle Division remained in the Far East. All DF SDs had a strength of about 10 thousand people, and before the start of the war, there was no call-up of the assigned personnel for training in the indicated divisions.
In May 1941, a draft Memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff was being prepared with considerations on a plan for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the event of a war with Germany and its allies. The document contains a link to the report of the RU dated May 15, which could have reached the performer of the note somewhere on May 16-17. The preparation of the note and its editing took place sometime after May 17th. Let's see what was said in the note about the number of German divisions in the event of a German attack on the USSR.
When editing the Note, the number of German divisions was specified from to. In early May, General Staff Directives were sent to the western military units to develop cover plans. Based on information from the draft Note, prepared after May 17, we can say that the plans should have been developed based on the presence of 189-200 German divisions at our borders. In May-June, the leadership of the spacecraft could be sure that the German army had not yet completed its concentration before the grouping of 180 divisions. Therefore, on May 25, the grouping near our border did not have more than 60 divisions to the value specified in the General Staff. With a significant reduction in the rate of the transfer of troops to our border, it was too early to give an order to begin redeployment on May 25 …
Confirmation that the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the spacecraft expected to see at the border at the beginning of the war the number of divisions significantly exceeding the number of 122 can be seen in the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan at 20-00 on 22.6.41. In the summary, the number of German troops concentrated towards the front (i.e., towards the border) is estimated at 167-173 divisions. Missing up to 180 (or more) divisions are probably disguised in the following text: [17 divisions in Central Germany. - Approx. Auth.] RU smoothly summed up the opinion of those reading the report to the presence of up to 173 divisions near the border, that is, to the number of divisions close to 180. The Germans just decided to start a war without completing the redeployment of their troops …
Grouping of Soviet troops in the west
The planned number of spacecraft divisions, which should have been concentrated in the west, as part of the Northern Fleet and in the armies of the RGK from March 11 to May 17, 1941, practically did not change. This may indicate that the same divisions (armies) from different military units should have moved to the west. The difference lies in the disbandment of some SD and the formation of anti-tank and airborne brigades.
In the specified draft of the Note, the presence of three armies in the Federation Council and the North-Western Front is considered, and 4 armies as part of the Western Front. These armies are part of the military, although two of them are in the stage of formation (13th and 27th).
The Southwestern Front includes eight armies, while there are only four armies in the district. In accordance with the Certificate on the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West (13.6.41), the KOVO included the troops of the ODVO, OVO, KhVO and PrivO (9th, 18th, 20th and 21st armies).
The RGK should have five armies. In the future, four armies will be formed: the 19th - on the basis of the North Caucasus Military District, the 22nd - in the Ural Military District, the 24th - in the Siberian Military District, and the 28th - in the ArchVO. The author does not know where the fifth army was supposed to come from. It is possible that it was formed on the basis of the troops of the ZakVO and SAVO being transferred to the west.
The German group at the border on May 25 was not supposed to cause serious fears among the leadership of the spacecraft. At the same time, an interesting question is how long it would take for the German command to concentrate another 60 divisions near the border.
This time depends on the variant of concentration of the main grouping of German troops: in the north or in the south. If the Germans would concentrate the main grouping in the north (against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO), then the throughput of the railway allowed them to complete the concentration within 12 days. In the case of the southern option, taking into account the deployment of part of the German troops in Romania, Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, it would take 18 days for an additional concentration of about 52 divisions in southern Poland. Since it was assumed that in the event of a war with the USSR, the Germans would choose the southern option, then there should be enough time for the transfer of troops from the internal military units located near PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO …
When considering options for concentrating spacecraft forces in March 1938, Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote:
Our intelligence carried out by our potential adversaries, the transportations to concentrate will determine where their main forces will be deployed, and therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change the options for our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of Polesie …
Before the outbreak of the war, leaders at all levels were confident in the absolute accuracy of the intelligence data. Unfortunately, by 22.6.41 our reconnaissance services could not fully reveal the plans for waging war between Germany and the USSR, the composition of the invasion group and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops near our border … It can be assumed that the General Staff decided on May 25 in advance to begin transporting the troops of the 16th Army to the west, masking its transfer by a route through Central Asia. We will look at this version in the next two parts.
Intelligence information about German plans
10.3.41 there is a message from Sophocles about the plans of Germany:
The capture of Baku can only be carried out from the side of the border with Turkey or Iran. From that time on, extensive German misinformation began about a possible attack on the Soviet Union from the Caucasus, the purpose of which could be to divert the attention of our intelligence from the western border and the desire to increase the grouping of spacecraft forces in the ZakVO.
Yeshchenko reported on March 15:
Socor concludes: “The Germans are afraid of the USSR's actions the moment when they will go to Turkey … Wanting to forestall the danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to seize the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine …
This message was considered quite important, since.a quote from it was inserted into the Report of the Head of the RU (20.3.41):
On April 4, another message comes from Sophocles about the concentration of troops near our border and about the possibility of disguising the conduct of German operations in the Balkans:
The concentration of German troops on the entire border with the USSR from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, the undisguised revanchist statements of Romania about Northern Bukovina, … the fact of the transformation of the Balkan countries into allied states does not allow us to exclude the idea of Germany's military intentions against our country …
However, given that the information comes from German sources, their dissemination gained the greatest scope during the period of activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans, it can be assumed that Germany, when preparing the next action in the Balkans, had psychological impact makes up for the lack of real strength …
W. Churchill on 7.4.41 wrote about the unlikely likelihood of a war between Germany and the USSR:
Our joint intelligence agency … announced that rumors were spreading in Europe about the intention of the Germans to attack Russia. Although Germany … has significant forces in the East and it can be expected that Sooner or later she will fight with Russia, it seems incredible that it should decide to open another big front now. According to the Joint Intelligence Agency, its main goal in 1941 remained the defeat of the United Kingdom.…
On April 17th, a message from the Petty Officer states that
Yeshchenko on April 23 clarifies his information of March 15 about the German invasion of Ukraine and the Caucasus:.
The refusal to attack the USSR in the near future is also said in the message of the Petty Officer on April 24:
In the RU Summaries of April 26, the number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania is determined at 95-100 divisions. The armies in Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Egypt include up to 71 divisions. …
In the message of Zeus on April 27, it is indicated that the Germans are preparing a strike against the USSR. It is noted that "".
Sava's message (April 27):
Colonel of German intelligence Berchtold … reported: actions against us will begin on May 15 … An uprising is prepared in Ukraine at the time of the conflict … ultimatum to Moscow to join the pact of three, with the secession of Ukraine … Germans threaten Turkey with war in case of refusal to join the pact of three … Ukrainian nationalists have an army of 100 thousand people trained and trained by the Germans, manned by captured soldiers of Ukrainian nationality …
There are marks: ""
On April 30, a Note of the NKGB was prepared, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. A note citing a message from the Corsican states that
Numerous reports about the interest of the Germans in Turkey and our borders in the Caucasus should have caused increased attention of the leadership of the Soviet Union to this issue.
On April 29, Mars reported on the movements of German troops after the end of the operation in Yugoslavia. The head of the RU left a mark on the document:. Three days later, Mars announced German plans that were not related to an attack on the USSR in the near future:
Intensive air operations of the German army and the war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline supplies … The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs speed up the offensive on Iraq for the occupation of oil sources. For this purpose, an intensified transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and the concentration of troops in the Balkans is currently underway.
The attack on Iraq is supposed to be carried out from the side Egypt and through Turkey or by transferring troops through the Dodecanev Islands and further by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors are circulating in the circles of the high command that in the event of a successful offensive against Iraq, an offensive against the USSR will be undertaken. to the Caucasus from Turkey and to Ukraine from the west …
In the RS Summaries of May 5, it is noted:
The essence of the regrouping of German troops … after the successful completion of the Balkan campaign and up to the present is reduced to:
1. To strengthen the grouping against the USSR along the entire western and southwestern border, including Romania, as well as in Finland.
2. For the further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North. Africa …
The available forces of German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 are in Greece and 15 are in Bulgaria. For the same purposes, up to two parachute divisions are concentrated with their probable use in Iraq …
In the Balkans and Egypt, according to intelligence, there is a fairly large grouping of German troops, which is about 45% of the grouping concentrated at our border.
On May 5, the NKGB sent a Note with the text of the intercepted telegrams from the British ambassador to the USSR dated 04.23.41:
Late in the evening of May 10, Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could find out about this on May 11, which should have increased fears about the beginning of negotiations between Germany and England. Now the leadership of the USSR should have pursued an even more flexible policy in order to postpone the war with Germany, during which our country could be left alone against all of Europe, including England …
Ramsay's message from May 6:
Ott told me that Hitler was determined to crush the USSR and get the European part of the Soviet Union into his own hands as a grain and raw material base … The ambassador and attaché agreed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia, two critical dates are approaching in Germany's relations with the USSR.
The first date is the time of the end of sowing in the USSR. After the end of the sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment so that Germany will only have to reap the harvest.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR will create any difficulties in the issue of Turkey's acceptance of the German requirements, then war will be inevitable … The possibility of a war breaking out at any moment is very high because Hitler and his generals are confident that a war with the USSR will not in the least interfere with the conduct of a war against England …
It was completely incomprehensible to our military leadership why the German command was not afraid of a war on two fronts, having a little more than a hundred divisions at the border against a large number of spacecraft troops and a huge mass of tanks …
On May 9, Zeus's message first mentions the movement of German troops through Turkey:
From Western Macedonia through Turkey, German troops are officially marching into Iraq. There are 60 German divisions on the Soviet-Polish border.
Germany is preparing to start military operations against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In 2 months, incidents should begin on the Soviet-Polish border. The blow will be delivered simultaneously from the territory of Poland, from the sea to Odessa and from Turkey to Baku …
I think the first point is plausible. The rest of the points are difficult to check …
There are notes: Probably Zeus was asked to clarify the information, and on May 14 he additionally reported:
Belvedere claims that there are German troops in Turkey. He believes that at least 3-4 divisions are in Turkey on the way to Syria. Belvedere was located 30 km from the Greek-Turkish border in the Dede Agach area and itself observed the movement of large columns of troops for three days in the direction of the Turkish border. There is only one road in this area, and it goes directly to Turkey …
In the report of the RU on May 15, it again refers to the grouping of German troops in Bulgaria, numbering up to 15-16 divisions, of which 6 are located directly on the Turkish border. The army is allegedly commanded by General Reichenau.
On May 19, Costa reports:
On the same day, Dora reported about a possible German attack on Ukraine (but not on the entire Soviet Union!):
Information about the alleged campaign of the Germans in Ukraine comes from the most reliable German circles and corresponds to reality. The performance will take place only when English fleet will not be able to enter the Black Sea and when the German army will gain a foothold in Asia Minor. The next goal of the Germans is the occupation of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal in order to expel the English fleet from the Mediterranean Sea …
Our scouts do not have exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not. For example, Ramsay on May 21 reports:.
Mars May 28 reports: [Sources]
Yeshchenko's message (May 28):
Germany's military action against the USSR continues to systematically prepare … The military preparations are like clockwork and make the start of the war possible in June of this year. Whether this huge mechanism, which works against the USSR, is only a maneuver or a prelude to an already decided war, no one knows, except for Hitler and his closest circle …
How Germany should get its hands on … oil from Baku and Batumi is not entirely clear. On the German side, an illegal action is being prepared in the Caucasian region, as well as airborne troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil regions by sabotage …
In the Republic of Moldova, the strengthening of the grouping of German troops near our western border is noted. It is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion from these messages about the beginning of the war in June. There is a growing flow of misinformation through various sources about the preparation of a German strike against the British communications and to seize oil fields. Quite a lot of reports come with information about Germany's flirtation with Turkey with the movement of German troops through Turkey, about a strike with the Soviet Transcaucasia.
Until the end of May, the British still have no clarity in relations between the USSR and Germany. W. Churchill:
May 23 [joint intelligence agency. - Approx. Auth.] reported that rumors of an impending attack on Russia have died down and there is information that these countries intend to conclude a new agreement … The management considered this probable, since the needs of the protracted war required the strengthening of the German economy. Germany could receive the necessary assistance from Russia either by force or as a result of an agreement. The Office believed that Germany will prefer the latteralthough the threat of the use of force will be brought into play to facilitate this. Now this power was accumulating …
May 31. The Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia. By using them as a threat, they are likely to will demand concessions that could prove to be very dangerous for us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will act …
From Goebbels's diary:
