The following abbreviations are used in the article: A - army, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZhBD - combat log, CA - Red Army, mk - mechanized (in spacecraft) or motorized (in the Wehrmacht) corps, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), Mongolia - Mongolian People's Republic, RGK - reserve of the main command, RM - intelligence materials, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, sc (sd) - rifle corps (division), Theater - theater of military operations, TGr - tank group, td (TP) - tank division (regiment).
The article uses the designations of VO or fronts: Far Eastern Front - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Zabaikalsky VO, ZapOVO - Western special VO, KOVO - Kiev special VO, LVO - Leningradsky VO, OdVO - Odessa VO, OrVO - Orlovsky VO, PribOVO - Baltic special VO, Siberian Military District - Siberian VO, SKVO - North Caucasian VO.
Small digression
In two parts, the version about the purpose of moving the 16th A will be proposed for consideration and the events that took place at the same time will be considered. It should be noted that no documents were found to reliably confirm the version …
In the thirties, a number of countries pursued policies in the interests of their states at the expense of other peoples. They did not care how many tens of millions of people would die in Europe. The three largest countries were leading the world to a new war. They all played their cards and tried to win. We are talking about the USA, England and Germany. The article "Struggle for World War II" provides a detailed chronology of events on the eve of World War II.
The Soviet Union tried to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe and its growth. Our government understood that in a future war the USSR could find itself alone against an alliance of several states. When it was necessary to negotiate with Hitler, the USSR had to negotiate, since other countries also tried to negotiate with him. The USSR had no allies before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and therefore the emerging threats to the Soviet government had to be neutralized by itself.
The introduction of spacecraft troops into a part of the territory of Poland, defeated by the Nazis. Is this good or bad from a modern point of view? And from the point of view of that time? When Poland was betrayed by its allies, England and France? If the troops of the USSR are not brought in, the Nazis will find themselves on the border of the Minsk region … The introduction of troops into the Baltic countries … Is it good or bad? The USSR government then pushed back the starting line for the German invasion from Pskov to the East Prussian border.
The introduction of troops into Moldova and Bessarabia … Finland's proposal to revise the borders and the ensuing war … Is this good or bad for our country? You can find arguments for and against. Perhaps our government would answer:
The government of the USSR tried as best it could single-handedly to confront Germany, which crushed the whole of Europe. Therefore, all the events of 1941 should be viewed from the point of view of the opposition of the USSR to a group of countries: Germany, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Japan and, oddly enough, England.
By concluding a Non-Aggression Pact with Japan, our government managed to knock Japan out of the ranks of hostile countries. Secure our eastern border and, if necessary, transfer part of the divisions to the European part of the country. The planning of military operations before the outbreak of the war was aimed at the survival of our country at any cost. Don't give advantage to our enemies. Delay the start of the war or avoid it …
Repetition of key points
I will repeat the main points from the previous parts (part 1 and part 2).
1. According to the General Staff, in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany fielded up to 180 … 200 divisions, excluding allied troops. In the RU summary at 20-00 on 22.6.41, the German grouping concentrated on the border was estimated at 167 … 173 divisions. The summary also mentions a possible supply of new divisions to the border from the west. This indirectly indicates that the RU and GSh until June 22 estimated the German grouping on the western border (in the event of a war with our country) in the amount of about 180 divisions.
2. Based on the presence of 180 … 200 divisions of the General Staff at the border, the grouping of spacecraft forces was determined, which should have been in PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, ODVO (hereinafter referred to as the Western VOs), in the LVO and as part of the RGK troops. Taking into account the enemy's grouping of 180 … 200 divisions in the General Staff and in the western military units, since May 1941, "Covering plans …" The exception was a few compounds from the composition of the 19th A (SKVO). It should be noted that the troops of the RGK are not only armies relocated from the inner districts, but also corps that were stationed on the territory of the western military units. For example, the 2nd MK and the 7th SC, which were located on the territory of the OdVO.
3. From May to June 1941, the enlistment personnel are called up for training camps, most of which are sent to replenish the SDs located in the internal districts.
4. In May, the RM received information about the concentration of the German army on the border with Turkey, about the movement of 3-4 (at least) German divisions in Turkish territory. In addition to reports of preparations for a war with the Soviet Union, there are reports that states such as Syria and Iraq are next in line for a German invasion. Iraq shares a border with Iran, where pro-German sentiment flourishes. Iran, which did not supply aviation fuel for the German and Italian aviation, which opposed the British aviation in Iraq …
5. According to intelligence data, from 11.3.41 to 25 April, the rate of concentration of German troops from other theaters of operations to our border averaged 1, 43 divisions / day; from April 25 to May 15 - 0.95 divisions / day. From May 15 to June 19, the rate of concentration decreased significantly and amounted to about 0.3 divisions / day. This could indicate that the Germans chose a different theater of operations as their next operations.
P. A. Sudoplatov wrote about this period:
Although the intelligence received exposed Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union, many reports contradicted each other. In them were absent assessments of the German military potential: tank formations and aviation located on our borders and capable of breaking through the defense line of spacecraft units. No one in the state security service seriously studied the real balance of forces on the Soviet-German border. That is why the force of Hitler's strike was in many ways unexpected for our military leaders, including Marshal Zhukov, then the chief of the General Staff. In his memoirs, he admits that he did not imagine an enemy capable of such large-scale offensive operations, with tank formations operating simultaneously in several directions …
6. Intelligence data, which carried a significant amount of disinformation, were also brought to the conclusion about the next strike by Germany in another theater of operations. So, in the report of RU from 31.5.41 it was noted that 120-122 German divisions were concentrated against the USSR. Almost the same number of divisions was concentrated against England on all fronts: 122-126. A comparable number of divisions are concentrated against the two main opponents … Which enemy will be dealt the next blow? How to determine this?
Probably in the direction in which the unions and connections used in deep breakthroughs are focused. Before the start of the war, reconnaissance near our border did not find mobile shock groups (TGr), which consisted of microns. Our command believed that at the end of 1940 Germany had 10 microns, and not a single corps was near our border. They were not found until the start of the war.
Specific example. One of the strongest shock groups is the 2nd TGr, concentrated near Brest. In the operational reports of the General Staff, this direction, where a large mobile group breaks through, is not considered either in the morning of June 22, or in the evening of June 22, or in the morning of June 23. No one suspects a breakthrough and disaster in this direction. Why? Below is a fragment of the map of the headquarters of the Western Military District with the situation that they knew about on June 21. The map was prepared immediately after the outbreak of the war (apparently) to explain the causes of the disaster. A similar map should have been available at the General Staff.
The map shows that Brest does not have a large mobile German grouping. There are only two headquarters of army corps, three headquarters of infantry divisions (40th, 47th and one with an unknown number, which are estimated at three infantry divisions), two headquarters of the cavalry brigades of the border troops (four cavalry regiments in total), the headquarters of a tank brigade (two tp) and mp. Brest itself does not have a single artillery regiment … All German units are stationed far enough from the border. At the same time, about 50-60% of the troops are deployed in the same places in which our reconnaissance spotted them by May 31.
Against the German grouping there are four spacecraft divisions and one other. In the depths there are more so and md. Based on such information, intelligence in Moscow could have made the right decision to withdraw troops to field positions? Data from the districts about a sharp change in the situation and an increase in the number of German troops directly at the border did not have time to pass through the RU line to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. It turns out that the information received by phone was simply not believed, looking at the map with an older setting …
The question is often asked: There can be only one answer: these were the only reports that were not confirmed for almost a whole month by any intelligence of the USSR and not by a single source.
At a meeting of the highest command personnel in December 1940, it was repeatedly said about the strikes of mobile groups supported by a large number of landings, and when the defensive line was broken through, heavy tanks were ahead …
According to intelligence, as of 25.4.41 Germany had a significant grouping of 8-10 paratrooper divisions, and none of them was near our borders. On May 15, intelligence knew that 1-2 parachute divisions were deployed in Greece, 5-6 - on the northern coast of France and Belgium, 2 - inside the country.
On May 31, near our border, there was one parachute regiment against the ZAPOVO and two parts (either regiments or battalions) against KOVO. One parachute division is stationed in central Romania. Intelligence also brings information that two paratrooper divisions will be used to seize oil fields in the Soviet Caucasus. All information about these divisions is fiction, but it comes from intelligence as reliable … They believe it, and Moscow is trying to calculate their response.
In the RM there is information that Germany has 15-18 SS divisions. These are elite connections. But reconnaissance did not find any of these divisions near our border at that time and will not find them before the start of the war …
Heavy TD, in contrast to which our KV-3 tanks are being created and anti-tank brigades with 107-mm corps cannons and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns are being formed (the brigades also have guns of smaller calibers), but none of the heavy TDs will be found near our borders before the start of the war. This is also misinformation …
To anyone in the leadership of the spacecraft at this time can't even come to mindthat available at the border about 125 German divisions (and not 180) without airborne divisions, without heavy etc., without the creation of shock mobile groupings are capable of in a short time break up frontier armada of spacecraft …
Change in the size of the group on the eastern borders
From the fall of 1940 to June 1941, in the documents of the General Staff on the planning of spacecraft groupings in the West and in the East, there was a change in the number of troops of the Far Eastern Fleet and the ZabVO. Various options are being considered for sending troops from this theater of operations to the European part of the country.
On 18.9.40 in the project "Notes on the basics of deployment …" in the structure of the Far Eastern Fleet and the ZabVO troops in the event of a war in the west, there should be up to 39.5 divisions.
11.3.41 in the "General Staff's Strategic Deployment Plan …" provides for the presence of up to 38, 5 divisions, taking into account the redeployment of three divisions from the Siberian Military District.
After the conclusion of the treaty with Japan and its ratification on April 26, instructions from the General Staff on preparations for redeployment were sent to the Far Eastern Fleet and the ZabVO:
- from the Far Eastern Fleet - directorates of the 31st airborne brigade, 211st and 212th airborne brigades, 21st and 66th rifle divisions;
- from ZabVO - 16th A as part of the 32nd RC (46th and 152nd Rifle Division) and 5th MK (13th and 17th TD, 109 MD).
Management of the 31st airborne brigade, 211st and 212th airborne brigades departed westward in the month of May.
On May 13, a Directive was sent to KOVO on the redeployment to the territory of the control district of the sk with corps units, state police and four rifle divisions with a strength of 12,000 people each. The arrival of the first control echelons of the corps, the 28th Guards Rifle Division and the 38th Rifle Division - from May 20. Arrival of the first echelons of the 158th, 171st and 129th SDs - from June 2-3.
Perhaps this was due to the redeployment of German divisions to the border. Until May 15, the rate of troop delivery was about 0.95 divisions / day. No one could predict how the speed of the delivery of German troops would change by the end of May or at the beginning of June. Therefore, there is a small build-up of the RGK grouping in KOVO (5 divisions in 15-20 days).
On the same day, clarifying directives are sent on preparations for the transport of troops to the headquarters of the DF and ZabVO. According to these Directives, it was required to prepare, in addition to sending, the 82nd MD (ZabVO), the 59th TD and the 69th MD from the Far Eastern Fleet.
After May 17, the General Staff is preparing a draft document, according to which 27 divisions remain in the Far Eastern Fleet and in the ZabVO (brigades, of which there were five, were not taken into account in the troop count).
At this time, the FVF has 17 RD, 3 TD, 2 MD, 1 CD, and in the ZabVO - 6 RD, 4 MD, 5 TD. In accordance with the "Considerations …" ten divisions should be sent from the indicated regions on command from Moscow to the west: one rifle division, four TD and five MD.
At the end of May, six divisions are being prepared for dispatch from the ZabVO: the 13th, 17th and 57th divisions, the 109th MD, the 46th and 152nd divisions. Therefore, we can say that when making the Decision to send troops from the ZabVO, they were not guided by the project "Considerations …"
In the Certificate "On the deployment of the Armed Forces in case of war in the West" dated June 13, 31 divisions (21 divisions, 4 TD, 5 MD and 1 CD) remain as part of the Far Eastern Fleet and the ZabVO. all the divisions that remained after the dispatch of the 5th mk, 32nd sc and 57th etc. This again confirms the assumption that the "Considerations …" project was not considered in the planning of the spacecraft constellations.
The beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army
Somewhere after April 23, some RMs arrive, which cause shock in Moscow. Something is being discussed in the People's Commissariat of Defense and in the General Staff. With some kind of proposal, the leaders of the KA apply to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the government. As a result of the discussion, an urgent directive appears, sent to the headquarters of the ZabVO on April 25.
On the morning of April 26, the commander of the troops and a member of the Military Council of the ZabVO together with the command of the 16th A are sent to the troops. Unexpectedly for everyone, the chief of staff calls the district commander and reports on the receipt of an urgent directive. The command of the district and the 16th A fly by plane to Chita and learn about the order to send the army. Only the direction is voiced - somewhere to the west. Loading should be done at night, and the district chief of staff has a schedule for the dispatch of echelons.
If the echelons began to load on the night of April 26-27, then by the morning of the 27th the first echelon set off. According to the recollections of a member of the Military Council of the 16th A. A. Lobachev, the tankers were the first to leave, and by the morning of June 3 (7 days) all formations and units of the army left. It turns out that this is not entirely true …
There is a recollection that the artillery regiment of the 109th MD arrived in Chita on 5 June. The 46th rifle division (from the 32nd brigade) began redeploying to the west only at the end of June. In the report on the hostilities of the 13th TD, the later dates for the dispatch of army units are indicated:
The beginning of the war on the 13th TD found railroad transportation in the OVO on the way. The entire division was loaded and sent from Transbaikalia 4-14.6.41 on 43rd railway echelons. The composition of the echelons was made with the aim of concentrating in an unfit camp. Not a single echelon is almost a combat unit. With the declaration of war, all echelons changed direction. The first five echelons were delivered to KOVO, Berdichev, 24.6.41, where they were unloaded and received a combat mission. These echelons consisted of one rifle battalion, two sapper companies, a reconnaissance battalion, a battery of an anti-aircraft battalion, a communications battalion and a division command …
Similar events occur when the 57th TD is sent from the Mongolian People's Republic. The division commander in his memoirs does not name the start date for the dispatch, but, obviously, the first echelon also departed by the morning of June 27, tk. he arrived a little later than the first echelon of the 16th A, sent from Transbaikalia. The last train was probably also sent around June 3rd. The redeployment order was unexpected, because lumber had not been brought to the place of deployment of the division on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in advance to camouflage tanks and guns.
V. A. Mishulin (commander of the 57th TD):
At the end of May … Comrade Povelkin MI informed me of the order of the General Staff: the division would be redeployed to the Soviet Union … With the permission of the district headquarters, I set off with the last echelon. This decision was made on the basis of obtaining additional repair funds and tires planned by the ZabVO headquarters and receiving this property in the 17th Army … In early June, the last echelon was sent …
When transporting tanks, they disguised themselves as wooden boxes. Or a frame covered with a tarpaulin was built around the tanks. The sentries were also hidden from the equipment. When transporting the first echelons of the army, the personnel were in closed wagons, in which it was forbidden to open doors and hatches on the tracks and at large stations. Echelons did not stop at large stations, and personnel were fed at small stations.
Army transportation route
A. A. Lobachev in his memoirs indicates the route of movement of the echelons of the 16th Army. This route is confirmed by the memories of other veterans. The echelons will continue to move along the same route after the start of the war. There are no recollections or documents confirming the fact that army trains were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway before the start of the war. For a long time, the memoirs of A. A. Lobachev were the only ones that the 16th A was intended (or, it seems, was intended) for relocation to the Transcaucasus.
The very fact of transportation on the railways of Central Asia is completely incomprehensible. The railways in Central Asia are single-track, in contrast to the double-track Trans-Siberian Railway. The transportation of many military echelons along these roads was supposed to significantly reduce the volume of transportation of products of the national economy and raw materials for several republics. This is due to the fact that the speed of transport of trains on a single-track road is almost two times lower than on a double-track. On some sections of the two-track road, there were means to accelerate the movement of echelons. Therefore, the choice of the route is one of the mysteries of the movement of the 16th A. Both existing directions of the railways from Central Asia were overloaded to connect with the rest of the territory of the USSR both to the northeast and to the northwest.
E. Drieg. "Mechanized corps of the Red Army in battle":
A rumor was spread among the personnel that the troops were going "to the war with Turkey." The final destination was not reported. Among the senior command staff there were reports of alleged plans to concentrate the corps in the ZakVO … One of the tank battalions of the 17th TD met on June 22 at the Arys station near Tashkent …
End point of the 16th Army route
The book "Commander Lukin" offers a version of the final point of the 16th Army's route at the beginning of June 1941. In the next part, we will try to check this version using indirect facts and memories of war veterans.
In preparation for the transportation of troops of the 16th Army and when moving in echelons, war veterans voiced three proposed goals for the redeployment of the army. The first is the movement to the west, i.e. to the European part of the USSR. The second is for the war with Turkey. The third is the border with Afghanistan. Servicemen who are not in the command of the army did not name a country like Iran in their memoirs.
The commander of the Western Front mentions the redeployment of the army to the border with Iran (from 30.6 to 2.7) A. I. Eremenko: Perhaps Marshal Eremenko heard about this from other war veterans …
There is the only evidence that the 16th Army was not sent to the Transcaucasus. The People's Commissar of Railways spoke about this I. V. Kovalev:
The fascist command was already finishing the concentration of its three main military groupings on the Soviet border, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a note to our leadership and asked for an explanation: why the Soviet 16th Army from Transbaikalia is being transferred by rail to the west?
Stalin ordered Marshal Timoshenko to temporarily turn the echelons of the 16th Army south and inform Berlin that the army was heading to the Persian border in case the British tried to strike from India through Persia. It is unlikely that they believed in Berlin, but they achieved their goal - one of our armies was detained on the way. I learned about this case from Mehlis …
16th Army ready for war
In different parts of the 16th A, from the beginning of May, the personnel learn about the upcoming redeployment to the west. To the west is not necessarily to the western VOs. It could also be an inner district bordering on the western VO. Of course, there could be no question of any secrecy of transportation in such an environment. Both the servicemen and the members of the command staff's families learned about the upcoming transportation. The plans were discussed, some of the relatives left for their relatives in order to later come to their husbands at a new place of residence. Rumors spread on trains and in other regions.
Boxes were being prepared for the transportation of things. If you look at the 333rd artillery regiment of the 152nd RD, then the transportation of things required up to two cars in the echelon. Conversations were not particularly suppressed, because the troops were transported from one inner district to another. The order to ban the transportation of things was not given, on the contrary, separate wagons were provided for these purposes. Those. in early - mid-May, the army was not preparing to go to war, but it simply redeployed to more civilized places. Only these places were not so far from the western VO.
ZhBD 16th A
All … connections (32 sk, 5 microns) began to be transferred from the ZabVO in the last days of May and early June. 57 TD was transferred from the Mongolian People's Republic. It took more than a month to fully concentrate the army.
It is characteristic that all the units began loading with the idea that they would be transferred from the wild steppes of Transbaikalia to the European part of the USSR, they were going to the camps, were in a peaceful mood, so they tried to take more property for life, everyday life and study.
About everything that is needed for war and battle, they took only by order, all the property of the majority of the beginning. composition was directed to their family affairs. The formation of the echelons was also an unforgivable mistake. Echelons rode without ammunition and weapons. After unloading, they were incapable of combat …
This attitude towards the place of future deployment, willingly or unwillingly, should have influenced the performance of official duties. If the commander of the 57th TD before redeployment managed to knock out spare parts and rubber for cars, then in the 109th MD they did not or could not do this. Perhaps because people did not go to fight, but to the camps. There, in the camps, they will give everyone a lift, and we will have time to do everything in time … Only they had to fight from the wheels …
There were also problems with the combat training of the 5th MK. The problems were the same as in other spacecraft associations, which had not been revealed before the start of the war …
ZhBD 5th MK
Disadvantages:
a) the corps was poorly put together and had no combat experience. There was not a single exit to the exercises with a full material part. The elementary rules of movement during the march were not observed, especially the regulation of routes, the headquarters were not taught to control their units in a difficult operational situation, in which the corps was located;
b) insufficiently decisive and truthful intelligence. Intelligence agencies often increase data on the enemy. Combat reconnaissance was conducted very poorly or not at all. As a result, during the attack [of the enemy] on 8.7.41, most of the 34 tp tanks got stuck in a swamp in front of the [enemy's] defenses and died from artillery fire;
f) the issues of interaction of artillery with tanks and infantry have not been sufficiently worked out …
It turns out that the equipment in the corps was not so reliable, and the corps was not so efficient … For example, part of the 109th MD was forced to unload and fight separately from the division:
Units 109 md … 29.6.41 unloaded on the Smolensk - Orsha railway. By the end of the day 4.7 … combat vehicles: 100 BT-5s, of which 39 were faulty; 13 BT-7, of which 6 faulty; 11 BA-20, of which 8 faulty … There were absolutely no spare parts for combat and transport vehicles. Wheeled vehicles, including combat vehicles, have 75% rubber wear …
In the book E. Temezhnikova "And our tanks are fast" is an excerpt from the railway 16th tp 109th MD:
