After the creation of nuclear weapons in the United States, due to the limited number and significant dimensions of nuclear bombs, they were considered as a means of destroying large, especially important targets and an instrument of political pressure and nuclear blackmail of the USSR. However, with the accumulation of stocks and miniaturization, it became possible to deploy nuclear warheads on tactical carriers. Thus, nuclear weapons have already become a weapon of the battlefield. With the help of nuclear charges of relatively low power, it is possible to solve the problems of breaking through a long-term defense, destroying the accumulation of enemy troops, headquarters, communication centers, airfields, naval bases, etc.
At the first stage, tactical bomb carriers were tactical (frontline) and carrier-based aircraft. However, aviation, with many of its merits, could not solve the entire range of tasks. Jet combat aircraft had a number of limitations related to the accuracy and safety of bombing, weather conditions and the time of day. In addition, aviation is vulnerable to air defense weapons, and the use of nuclear weapons from low altitudes is associated with a great risk for the carrier itself.
The use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield required sufficiently accurate, all-weather, invulnerable to air defense systems and, if possible, mobile and compact delivery vehicles. They are tactical and operational-tactical missile systems. Starting from the 50s, TR and OTP with engines operating on both solid and liquid fuels were created in the USA. Missiles "Honest John", "Little John", "Sergeant", "Corporal", "Lacrosse", "Lance" had a sufficiently high mobility, their accuracy made it possible to deliver nuclear strikes against objects located near the line of battle of contact.
Naturally, similar work on the creation of ballistic missiles for the army and frontline level was carried out in the Soviet Union. In 1957, the R-11 operational-tactical missile, created in OKB-1 S. P. Queen. Unlike the rockets created on the basis of the German A-4 (V-2), in which alcohol was used as fuel and liquid oxygen was the oxidizer, the R-11 became the first Soviet rocket of this class using high-boiling propellants.
The transition to fuel - TM-185 based on light petroleum products and an oxidizer - "Melange" based on concentrated nitric acid - made it possible to significantly increase the time spent by the rocket in the fueled form. The displacement method of supplying fuel and oxidizer to the liquid-propellant rocket engine (compressed gas pressure) significantly reduced the mass and size characteristics of the rocket and its cost. Thanks to the introduction of new propellant and oxidizer components, it became possible to transport a combat-ready fueled rocket on a launcher. Also, the procedure for starting the rocket engine was greatly simplified; for this, a starting fuel was used, self-igniting upon contact with an oxidizer - "Samin".
With a launch weight of 5350 kg, the launch range of the OTR R-11 with a warhead weighing 690 kg was 270 km, with a KVO - 3000 meters. Initially, only high-explosive and chemical warheads were used. This was due to the fact that in the 50s the Soviet nuclear industry failed to create sufficiently compact warheads. For the R-11, warheads, fueled with liquid highly radioactive substances, were also worked out, like chemical warheads, they were supposed to create insurmountable foci of infection on the way of the advancing enemy troops and make large transport hubs and airfields unusable.
SPU 2U218 with R-11M / 8K11 missile during the parade on Red Square
At the very beginning of the 60s, the modernized R-11M entered service. The main difference between this missile was the equipment with a nuclear warhead weighing 950 kg, as a result of which the maximum launch range was reduced to 150 km. In September 1961, two R-11M test launches with nuclear warheads were carried out on Novaya Zemlya. Full-scale nuclear tests have demonstrated acceptable accuracy and good destructive effect. The power of nuclear explosions was in the range of 6-12 kt.
In addition to land-based options, there was also a naval missile - R-11FM. She entered service in 1959. The D-1 missile system with the R-11FM missile was part of the armament of the diesel submarines of the project 629.
Soon after the adoption of the PTRK P-11, the question arose about a radical improvement in its characteristics. The military was primarily interested in increasing the missile launch range. An analysis of the R-11M missile scheme showed the futility of attempts to further modernize missiles with a displacement fuel supply system. Therefore, when creating a new rocket, it was decided to use an engine with a turbo-pump fuel supply system. In addition, the turbo pump unit made it possible to achieve better firing accuracy at range.
The 9K72 Elbrus operational-tactical complex with the R-17 missile (GRAU index - 8K14) was developed at SKB-385 (chief designer - V. P. Makeev), during development the missile had the R-300 index. To speed up the creation of a new complex, the mass and size characteristics of the R-17 rocket were chosen close to the R-11M. This made it possible to use part of the units and equipment from the R-11M rocket, which in turn saved time and money.
Despite the fact that the R-17 and R-11M missiles were outwardly similar and used the same fuel and oxidizer, structurally they had little in common. The internal layout was completely changed and a more perfect control system was created. The R-17 rocket used a new, much more powerful engine, created in OKB-5 (chief designer - A. M. Isaev).
On December 12, 1959, the first test launch of the R-17 rocket took place at the Kapustin Yar test site. On November 7, 1961, four 2P19 tracked self-propelled launchers with R-17 missiles passed for the first time during a military parade on Red Square.
On March 24, 1962, the 9K72 "Elbrus" operational-tactical missile system with the 8K-14 (R-17) missile was put into service by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In NATO countries, the complex received the designation SS-1c Scud B (English Scud - Shkval). In the Soviet Union, 9K72 complexes were combined into missile brigades of the Ground Forces. Usually a brigade consisted of three fire divisions, three batteries each. Each battery had one SPU and TZM.
Initially, as part of the missile system for transporting and launching a rocket with a starting mass of 5860 kg, a tracked SPU based on the ISU-152 was used, similar to that used for transporting and launching the R-11M. However, the tracked chassis, with good cross-country ability, did not satisfy the military in terms of travel speed, power reserve, and destroyed the road surface. In addition, significant vibration loads when driving on tracks adversely affected the reliability of the missiles. In 1967, the missile brigades began to receive SPU 9P117 on the MAZ-543P four-axle chassis. By the end of the 70s, the wheeled chassis gradually replaced the tracked one, however, in a number of places with difficult road conditions, the tracked vehicles were operated until the end of the 80s.
SPU 9P117 on the MAZ-543P four-axle chassis
From the very beginning, the R-17 was designed as a delivery vehicle for tactical nuclear warheads with a capacity of 5-10 kt with a maximum firing range of 300 km. KVO was within 450-500 meters. In the 70s, new thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 20, 200, 300 and 500 kt were created for the Elbrus missiles. When operating a rocket with a nuclear warhead, a special thermostatic cover was put on the head of the rocket.
And although the presence of chemical weapons in the USSR was officially denied, R-17 missiles, in addition to nuclear ones, could carry chemical warheads. Initially, the combat units were equipped with a mustard-lewisite mixture. At the end of the 60s, cluster warheads with a binary nerve agent R-33 were adopted, which in its properties was in many respects similar to the western OV VX. This nerve poison is the most toxic ever artificially synthesized chemical used in chemical weapons, 300 times more toxic than phosgene used in World War I. Weapons and military equipment exposed to the R-33 substance pose a danger to personnel in the warm season for several weeks. This persistent poisonous substance has the ability to be absorbed into paintwork, which greatly complicates the degassing process. The area contaminated with the P-33 OM is rendered unsuitable for long-term combat operations for several weeks. High-explosive warhead 8F44 weighing 987 kg contained about 700 kg of powerful explosive TGAG-5. High-explosive warheads were mainly equipped with R-17E export missiles. In the USSR, as a rule, they were used for control and training firing.
It would be wrong to assume that the 9K72 Elbrus missile system included only a missile and a launcher. During the maintenance and combat use of the OTRK, about 20 units of various towed and self-propelled vehicles were used. To refuel the missiles, automobile fuel and oxidizer tankers, special compressors and washing and neutralizing machines were used. Special mobile test and metrological machines and mobile workshops were used to check and minor repairs of missiles and launchers. "Special" warheads were transported in closed storage vehicles with controlled temperature conditions. The loading of missiles onto a self-propelled launcher from a transport vehicle was carried out by a truck crane.
Reloading a rocket from a transport vehicle to a SPU using a truck crane
To determine the coordinates of the launcher, topographic markers based on the GAZ-66 were used. Data entry and control of the Elbrus complex was carried out from mobile control points. The logistics platoon included fuel tankers for cars, field kitchens, flatbed trucks, etc.
Over the long years of service, the OTRK has been repeatedly modernized. First of all, this affected the rocket. The upgraded 8K14-1 missile had better performance and could carry heavier warheads. Missiles differ only in the possibility of using warheads. Otherwise, the 8K14-1 rocket is completely interchangeable with the 8K14 and does not differ in its performance characteristics. Rockets of all modifications could be used from any launch unit, they all had interchangeable console equipment. Over the years of production, it was possible to achieve a very high level of technical reliability of missiles and increase the time spent in a fueled state from 1 year to 7 years, the warranty service life increased from 7 to 25 years.
In the early 60s, the design bureau of the Votkinsk machine-building plant made an attempt to radically modernize the R-17 rocket by replacing the engine, fuel type and increasing the volume of fuel tanks. According to calculations, the launch range in this case should have exceeded 500 km. The updated operational-tactical missile system, designated 9K77 "Record", was sent to the Kapustin Yar training ground in 1964. In general, the tests were successful and ended in 1967. But the new OTRK with the R-17M missile was not accepted for service. By that time, the Temp-S mobile missile system had been created, which had higher characteristics.
Another original project was an attempt to create an airmobile launcher 9K73. It was a lightweight four-wheeled platform with a launch pad and a lifting boom. Such a launcher could be quickly transferred by a transport plane or helicopter to a given area and from there launch a rocket. A modification of the Mi-6PRTBV helicopter - a mobile rocket-technical base of the helicopter type was created especially for this.
During the tests, the prototype of the platform demonstrated the fundamental possibility of rapid landing and ballistic missile firing. However, things did not progress beyond the construction of the prototype. To carry out an aimed launch, the calculation needs to know a number of parameters, such as the coordinates of the target and the launcher, the meteorological situation, etc. In the sixties, in order to determine and introduce these parameters into the missile control system, it was impossible to do without the participation of specialized complexes on an automobile chassis. And to deliver the necessary equipment to the launch area, additional transport aircraft and helicopters were required. As a result, the idea of a "stripped-down" light airborne launcher was abandoned.
By the second half of the 70s, the complex began to become obsolete, and its characteristics no longer fully corresponded to modern requirements. Against the background of the emergence of modern solid-propellant rockets, great criticism was caused by the need to refuel and drain fuel and oxidizer. The handling of these components necessary for the operation of a liquid-propellant engine has always been associated with great risk. In addition, to preserve the resource of the missiles after draining the oxidizer, a procedure was required to neutralize acid residues in the tank and pipelines.
Despite the difficulties of operation, the Elbrus OTRK was well mastered by the troops, and due to the relative simplicity and cheapness of the R-17 missiles, they were produced in a large series. The missile's not very high accuracy was partly offset by powerful nuclear warheads, which were quite suitable for destroying a concentration of enemy troops or large area targets.
However, the use of tactical nuclear weapons threatened to escalate into mutual nuclear destruction, and even in a "big war" the use of nuclear weapons is not always advisable. Therefore, in the 80s in the USSR, work was carried out to improve the accuracy of the complex by creating a guided missile warhead as part of the Aerofon R&D project.
A detachable 9N78 warhead weighing 1017 kg in conventional equipment was aimed at the target in the final section of the trajectory according to the commands of the optical seeker. For this, in preparation for launch, the "portrait" of the target was loaded into the memory block of the guidance system. When drawing up a "portrait" of the target, aerial photographs obtained by reconnaissance aircraft were used. The maximum range for the upgraded 8K14-1F missile was 235 km, and the accuracy of the detachable warhead 9N78 was 50-100 m. The modified missile system included a data preparation machine and a data entry machine. The firing accuracy of the modified 9K72-1 complex strongly depended on the quality and scale of aerial photographs and weather conditions in the target area. In 1990, the complex was accepted into experimental military operation, but was not serially built. By that time, the R-17 liquid-propellant missiles were hopelessly morally obsolete, their production in Votkinsk was completed in 1987.
But this is not the end of the history of the Elbrus OTRK in our country. Despite the fact that the missile system largely did not meet modern requirements due to the high prevalence and high cost of re-equipping missile brigades with new equipment, it was in service with the Russian army for about 10 more years. In addition, missiles that had served their warranty periods were actively used as targets during exercises and tests of air defense and missile defense systems. For this, the designers of the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant created a target rocket on the basis of the R-17 rocket. Unlike the base missile, the target did not carry a warhead. In its place, in an armored capsule, missile control equipment and specialized telemetry systems were located, designed to collect and transmit information about flight parameters and the course of interception to the ground. Thus, the target missile could transmit information for some time after being hit until it fell to the ground. This made it possible to fire several anti-missile missiles at one target.
The operational-tactical missile system 9K72 "Elbrus", since 1973, has been widely exported. In addition to the Warsaw Pact countries, OTRKs were in service in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria.
Libyan SPU 9P117 on the MAZ-543 chassis captured by the rebels
Apparently, the Egyptians were the first to use the complex in a combat situation during the "Yom Kippur War" in 1973. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on the details of the combat use. Apparently, the Egyptian missilemen did not manage to achieve much success. Soon after Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt, military-technical cooperation between our countries ceased. Moreover, the Egyptian leadership, for an appropriate remuneration, began to actively acquaint everyone with the latest examples of Soviet technology. So in the late 70s, MiG-23 fighters and air defense systems were sent to the United States and China.
In 1979, three Egyptian OTRKs were sold to the DPRK, and Egyptian instructors helped prepare the North Korean calculations. Prior to that, despite the insistent requests of Kim Il Sung, the Soviet leadership, out of fear that these complexes could get to China, refrained from supplying these weapons to the DPRK.
The R-17 missiles had a simple and understandable design for North Korean specialists, which, however, is not surprising - thousands of Koreans studied at Soviet technical universities and took internships in research institutions and design bureaus. In the DPRK, they were already in service with air defense missile systems and anti-ship missiles, whose missiles worked on similar propellant and oxidizer components.
The metallurgical, chemical and instrument-making enterprises in the DPRK, necessary for the development of their own version of the R-17, were built with the help of the USSR in the 50s and 70s, and the copying of missiles did not cause any particular difficulties. Certain problems have arisen with the creation of instruments for an autonomous inertial control system. Insufficient stability of the operation of the magnetic-semiconductor calculating device of the automatic stabilization machine did not allow achieving satisfactory shooting accuracy.
But the North Korean designers managed to solve all the problems with honor, and in the mid-80s the North Korean version of the operational-tactical missile under the code name "Hwaseong-5" entered service. At the same time, the DPRK was building a rocket-building infrastructure. Its main elements were the Rocket Research Institute in Sanumdon, the 125th factory in Pyongyang and the Musudanni rocket range. Since 1987, the production rate of Hwaseong-5 missiles has been 8-10 units per month.
In the late 1980s, the Korean version of the P-17 was seriously upgraded, the missile known as the Hwaseong-6 could deliver 700 kg warhead to a range of 500 km. In total, about 700 Hwaseong-5 and Hwaseong-6 missiles have been built in the DPRK. In addition to the North Korean army, they were supplied to the UAE, Vietnam, Congo, Libya, Syria and Yemen. In 1987, Iran became the first buyer of a batch of Hwaseong-5 missiles; this country received several hundred North Korean ballistic missiles.
Shehab missile launch
Later in Iran, with the help of North Korean specialists, the production of its own surface-to-surface missiles of the Shehab family was launched. Thanks to the increased capacity of the fuel and oxidizer tanks and the new North Korean engine, the Shehab-3 missile, which has been in service since 2003, reached a flight range of 1100-1300 km with a warhead weighing 750-1000 kg.
"Scuds" were used in a combat situation during the Iran-Iraq war. During the so-called "war of cities", 189 missiles were fired at six Iranian cities located in the launch zone, 135 of them at the capital, Tehran. To launch the R-17E missiles, in addition to the standard SPU 9P117, stationary concreted launchers were used. Iran responded to Iraqi missile strikes with similar missiles produced by the DPRK.
In 1986, Iraq began assembling its own versions of the P-17 - Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas. In order to increase the firing range, the weight of the warhead of the Iraqi missiles has been seriously reduced. Due to this, the capacity of the fuel tanks and the length of the missiles increased. Iraqi ballistic missiles "Al Hussein" and "Al Abbas" have lightweight warheads with a weight reduced by 250-500 kg. With the launch range of "Al Hussein" - 600 km and "Al-Abbas" - 850 km, the KVO was 1000-3000 meters. With such accuracy, it was only possible to effectively deliver strikes against large area targets.
In 1991, during the Gulf War, Iraq launched 133 rockets into Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. To launch the missiles, mainly standard mobile launchers were used, since 12 stationary launch sites were destroyed in the early days, and 13 were seriously damaged as a result of airstrikes. A total of 80 missiles fell in the target area, another 7 derailed, and 46 were shot down.
Against the Iraqi Scuds, the Americans used Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems, but the effectiveness of their use was not very high. As a rule, 3-4 missiles were launched against one Iraqi "Scud". Often, the MIM-104 missile fragmentation warhead was able to break a ballistic missile into several fragments, but the warhead was not destroyed. As a result, the warhead fell and exploded not in the target area, but due to the unpredictability of the flight path, the damaged missile was no less dangerous.
It is fair to say that the firing accuracy of the Iraqi missile launchers was extremely low. Often, the calculations tried to launch their missiles as quickly as possible in the direction of the enemy and leave the starting positions. This was due to the fact that the most effective American missile defense was not the Patriot air defense system, but strike aircraft, which hunted Iraqi launchers day and night. Therefore, OTR launches were carried out, as a rule, at night in great haste. During the day, Iraqi missile systems were hiding in various shelters, under bridges and overpasses. The only major success of the Iraqis can be considered a missile hitting American barracks in the Saudi city of Dharam, as a result of which 28 American soldiers were killed and about two hundred were injured.
The 9K72 "Elbrus" complex has been in service in our country for over 30 years, and for more than 15 years it has been the basis for arming missile units of the Ground Forces. But by the second half of the 80s, it had already become obsolete. By that time, the troops began to receive OTRK with solid-fuel missiles, which were more compact and had better service and operational characteristics.
The Afghan war has become a good reason for the combat "disposal" of aging liquid-propellant missiles. Moreover, over the years of production in the USSR, a lot of them have accumulated, and a significant part of the missiles were nearing the end of their storage periods. However, unforeseen difficulties arose here: the bulk of the R-17 missiles operated in the missile brigades of the Ground Forces were "sharpened" for "special" combat units, the use of which in Afghanistan was excluded. For the missiles available at the storage bases, it was necessary to order high-explosive warheads at the plant in Votkinsk.
According to unconfirmed reports, about 1000 missiles were launched in Afghanistan against the positions of the Mujahideen. The objects of missile strikes were the places of accumulation of rebels, bases and fortified areas. Their coordinates were obtained using aerial reconnaissance. Due to the fact that the shooting was often carried out at a minimum range, a large amount of fuel and oxidizer remained in the missile tanks, which, when the warhead exploded, gave a good incendiary effect.
After the withdrawal of the "limited contingent", the "Elbrus" remained at the disposal of the Afghan government forces. The Afghan army was not too scrupulous in choosing targets for missile strikes, often striking them at large populated areas under the control of the opposition. In April 1991, three rockets were launched at the city of Assadabad in eastern Afghanistan. One of the rockets fell in the city market, killing and injuring about 1,000 people.
The last time Russian R-17 missiles were used in combat conditions was during the Second Chechen War. By that time, the Russian army had almost no missile brigades armed with the 9K72 Elbrus complex, but a large number of expired missiles had accumulated in warehouses. The 630th separate missile division was formed to strike at militant targets on the territory of the Chechen Republic. This military unit was based on the border with Chechnya, not far from the village of Russkaya. From there, in the period from October 1, 1999 to April 15, 2001, about 250 launches of 8K14-1 missiles were made. During the course of hostilities, missiles with expired storage periods were fired, but not a single refusal was recorded. After Russian troops took control of most of the territory of Chechnya, and there were no more worthy targets left, the 630th Order passed the equipment to the storage base and relocated to the Kapustin Yar training ground. In 2005, this military unit was the first in the Russian army to receive the 9K720 Iskander complex. OTRK 9K72 "Elbrus" was in service in our country until 2000, when the missile brigades stationed in the Far East replaced it with 9K79-1 "Tochka-U".
Despite its considerable age, OTRK continues to operate in different parts of the world. There is no doubt that we will hear more than once about the combat use of Scuds in hot spots. Operational-tactical missiles produced in the DPRK have become a very popular commodity in the third world countries.
It is with these missiles that the Houthis in Yemen are firing at the positions of the Saudi coalition. As of 2010, Yemen had 6 SPUs and 33 missiles. In 2015, about 20 missiles were launched across Saudi Arabia. Riyadh officials said they were all either shot down by Patriot missiles or fell in a deserted desert. But according to Iranian and French sources, only three missiles were actually shot down. Approximately ten missiles hit the intended targets, with the alleged death of the chief of the main staff of the Saudi Arabian Air Force. How much all this corresponds to reality is difficult to say, as it is known in the war, each side in every possible way overestimates its own successes and hides losses, but one thing is certain - it is too early to write off the Soviet missile system, created 54 years ago.
