Recently, the last part on the deployment of the Southern Front's field command was published.
Pointing to problems with the signal troops, the author named the General Staff as one of the culprits:
Before the mobilization of communications units of the RGK, communications in the front-army command link in the initial period of the war were supposed to be organized at the expense of the network of the People's Commissariat of Communications (NCC). This approach, adopted by the General Staff, was one of the reasons for the defeat of the ZAPOVO and PribOVO troops in border battles due to the loss of command and control … When planning the conduct of hostilities in the initial period of the war, the General Staff did not attach importance to possible communication problems in the border districts during this period.
A similar opinion was expressed by the Marshal of Communications I. T. Peresypkin and other senior officials of the signal troops. However, these words caused a number of condemning messages in the comments to the 4th part of the article and in personal mail. Let's look at one of these messages:
Another distortion of the author of the article, which deliberately misleads readers, because “ this approach" was adopted not by the General Staff, but by the governmentwhich did not allocate funds to organize their own communication system for NPOs due to the fact that the country simply did not have enough funds to create such a system. Already at the end of the war, at a later time, the Ministry of Defense managed to create a completely autonomous communication system, so blaming the General Staff for the lack of finances [should not] …
An illiterate statement, because the communications department of the spacecraft was responsible for communications in the non-profit organization … You cannot blame the General Staff for all the blunders of the pre-war construction, if only due to the fact that there were twenty departments in the non-profit organization, and everyone should do their own thing.
The author suspects that many other readers hold the same opinion, who did not express their point of view. Therefore, he decided to consider this issue in more detail, since this reason made a significant contribution to the defeat of the border grouping of our troops. According to the author, the General Staff (chiefs of the General Staff and employees of the Operations Directorate) devoted too much time to the issues of repelling an attack and subsequent offensive on enemy territory. They carefully calculated the required number of divisions, artillery, aviation, tanks, resources to replace losses and did not understand at all how communication should be organized. For them it was a secondary problem …
Having a lot of mechanized corps with a huge amount of equipment and assessing how much they will grind enemy troops - it was interesting and necessary for them. It was also interesting to estimate how much fuel and supplies the mechanized corps would take with them, how the tanks would advance in 3 echelons. But how exactly to correctly use these corps, the leadership of the spacecraft and the districts had little idea.
A similar situation was with the anti-aircraft artillery units and fighter units that were attached to the air defense command. Everyone understood how to do this, but before the start of the war they did not bother to deploy a system of aerial observation posts of VNOS units. On the territory of all border armies there were only four company observation posts and one battalion post. Such a number of them did not allow timely informing air defense units and fighters at airfields about the routes of passage of German aircraft. Not infrequently, German planes were spotted only when approaching to attack airfields. Already by noon, problems with wire communication began and the effectiveness of the VNOS posts, even after deployment (18 posts for each VNOS company), dropped sharply. On the eve of the war, only the posts of separate battalions of the VNOS of the 29th (KOVO) and 44th (PribOVO) were deployed (for more details, see part 18 and part 19).
The leaders of the Red Army about communication problems
Chief of Communications PribOVO General P. M. Kurochkin, describing the pre-war methodology of combat training of the headquarters and command personnel of the signal troops of the army and district command levels, he pointed out one of the reasons that led to the loss of command and control in the first days of the war: Communication in the area of exercises and maneuvers always prepared in advance, in 2-3 weeks. To provide communications for maneuvers conducted in any one military district, many communications units from other districts were assembled. State communication was widely used. All prepared communications were used only for operational command and control of troops.
As for the communications necessary to control the air defense, air force, rear, it or not taken into account at all, or its organization was studied in special sessions in which the issues of communication for operational management did not understand, i.e. favorable conditions were again created.
Under such conditions commanders and staffs got used to the fact that the organization of communications does not present any difficulties, they will always have communications at their disposal, and not just any, but wired … Was it not this semblance of well-being in the provision of communications, created in peacetime, that led the combined-arms commanders and staffs to neglect the difficulties in organizing communications that had been encountered at every step from the very beginning of the war? Was not this is one of the reasons that led to great difficulties in the leadership of troops, and often to a complete loss of control …
Not only did the commanders and staffs of the front-army-corps command echelons not understand the difficulties of organizing communications in the initial period of the war, but also to a lesser extent, the General Staff did not understand this either. Perhaps they could not get used to the idea that the war could create problems with communication and everything would go completely different from what they had planned … I remind you that since March 1941, among other directorates, the Communications Directorate of the Spacecraft was also subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff. he was the direct superior for the chief of communications of the KA! G. K. Zhukov: Chief of communications troops of the spacecraft, Major-General N. I. Galich reported to us about the lack of modern means of communication and about the lack of sufficient mobilization and inviolable supplies of communications equipment … The Western Border Military District had radio stations only 27%, KOVO - 30%, PribOVO - 52%. The situation was approximately the same with other means of radio and wire communication.
Before the war, it was believed that in the event of war, the NKS and VCh of the NKVD would be used primarily to command the fronts, internal districts and reserve troops of the High Command. The communication centers of the High Command, the General Staff and the fronts will receive everything they need from the local bodies of the NKS. But they, as it turned out later, were not prepared to work in war conditions …
In the flashbacks, the specific culprits of this problem are named: Stalin insufficiently appreciated the role of radio equipment in modern mobile warfare, and leading military personnel failed to prove to him in a timely manner the need to organize mass production of army radio equipment …
Conversations on these issues with the NCC did not lead to anything … Having listened to our messages, S. K. Tymoshenko said: “I agree with your assessment of the situation. But I think that it is hardly possible to do anything serious to eliminate all these shortcomings at once. Yesterday I was at Comrade Stalin's. He received Pavlov's telegram and ordered to convey to him that, with all the validity of his demands, we have no opportunity today to satisfy his “fantastic” proposals …
General Galich on the connection
An interesting article "Production of domestic military communications equipment" was published on the site. General N. I. At the end of 1940, Gapich prepared a Report, which he presented to the People's Commissar of Defense. The report said: Despite the annual increase in the number of communications equipment entering the troops, the percentage of provision of communications equipment not only does not increase, but, on the contrary, decreases due to the fact that the increase in the receipt of products is not proportional to the increase in the size of the army.
The large shortage of communications equipment for the deployment of new military units does not allow creating the necessary mobilization reserves for the first period of the war … All property coming from industry is immediately sent to the troops "from the wheels". If the supply of communications by the industry remains at the same level and there will be no loss in communications property, then it will take more than 5 years for a number of nomenclatures to meet the full needs of NPOs without creating mobilization reserves.
The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff are engaged in the deployment of more and more formations and formations, and they are not at all interested in the fact that these troops cannot be adequately equipped with communications equipment! Was it possible to correct this situation? Yes, such measures were also mentioned in the Report: - to speed up the construction and commissioning of factories: telephone equipment in the city of Molotov - Ural; tank radio stations in Ryazan; … Typical radio components in Ryazan;
- to oblige: NKEP in 1941 to produce telephone equipment at the Krasnodar plant "ZIP"; NK Chermet of the USSR to increase in 1941 at least twice the production of tin-plated steel wire for the production of field cables and to master the production of thin steel wire with a diameter of 0.15-0.2 mm; NKEP of the USSR to organize a workshop for manual dynamo drives at plant No. 266 in order to increase the production of these machines in 1941 to 10,000-15,000 units;
- resolve immediately to use for the production of field telephone equipment the plant in Tartu (Estonia), which until now produced telephone equipment for the Baltic armies; and the VEF plant (Riga), which possesses highly valuable equipment and qualified personnel;
- for the needs of operational communications, oblige the NKEP of the USSR to master and supply for NCOs as an experimental batch in 1941, 500 km of a 4-core pupinized cable with devices for unwinding and winding a cable according to a sample purchased in Germany and used in the German army;
- to transfer the following enterprises to the NKEP of the USSR for the production of field radio stations: Minsk radio plant NKMP4 of the BSSR, the plant "XX Let Oktyabrya" NKMP RSFSR; Odessa Radio Plant of the NKMP of the Ukrainian SSR; Krasnogvardeisky gramophone factory - VSPK; buildings of the Rosinstrument plant (Pavlovsky Posad) of the NKMP of the RSFSR with the equipment of their NKEP by the 2nd quarter of 1941; the building of the former Vilensky radio plant in Vilnius, using it for the production of radio equipment from the 3rd quarter of 1941;
– vacate factories NKEP USSR "Electrosignal" Voronezh and No. 3 Aleksandrov from the production of a part of consumer goods, loading factories with a military order …
The communications chief of the spacecraft proposed concrete measures to significantly increase the release of communications equipment. Below we will see that if the Government of the USSR was competently justified the need to transfer enterprises to the production of products necessary for NPOs, then the government supported such decisions. Financial and material resources were allocated, it was allowed to look for enterprises for the production of these products, funds were allocated for overtime work. It was only required to understand the problem for the leadership of the spacecraft and justify it before the Government of the USSR! The leadership of the KA either could not convince Stalin of the need to increase the output of communications equipment, or they themselves did not understand the seriousness of this problem. The author is leaning towards the second …
District Communications Leaders About Communications Issues
In 1941, this problem was once again brought to the attention of G. K. Zhukov. P. M. Kurochkin:
Analyzing the survivability of communications in the Baltic States, we noted that all the main lines pass near railways and highways, and, therefore, can be destroyed by aerial bombardment. Were very vulnerable from the air and the main nodeslocated in large settlements or in areas of railway intersections, while backup did not exist … About all this, the chief of staff of the district, General P. S. Klenov reported to the General Staff …
It turns out that the chief of staff of the PribOVO in matters of communication understood better than the chief of the General Staff. Immediately after the start of the war (at 4-00 on June 22) P. S. Klenov sends a cipher telegram to the Chief of the General Staff: capable of causing a crisisare:
1. The weakness of the front-line and army communications units in terms of size and power in relation to their tasks.
2. Unequipped communication centers of the army and the front.
3. Insufficient development of wires from Panevezys and Dvinsky communication centers.
4. Lack of communication facilities to provide logistic communications.
5. Poor security of the communications of the district, army communications units and the air force.
I ask: 1. Allow partial mobilization front and army communications units, mobilizing communications regiments, line battalions, operational companies and communications squadrons …
June 30 P. S. Klenov will be removed from the leadership and soon arrested. Among others, he will be blamed for the dismissal from command and control of troops … In the previous part, the same situation with the Chief of Staff of the Law Firm, General Shishenin, was considered, who was also removed from office on June 30. The headquarters of the Law Firm at that time was also practically without communication: the front-line communications regiment began to arrive at the place of deployment of the front-line command only from July 1 …
In the PribOVO (from June 22 - the North-Western Front) by the evening of June 22, the front-line command lost contact with the troops. T. P. Kargapolov (from 3.8.41 - the chief of communications of the North-Western direction): On the eve of the war, the chiefs of communications of the Leningrad Military District and the PribOVO had at their disposal a very a small number of units and signal troops … These units could not provide control of the troops in the border battles that began on 22.6.41. These units could not meet the demand for military communications specialists for the army and front-line units formed with the announcement of mobilization …
The 8th, 11th, 14th and 23rd armies, which began fighting on June 22-26, 1941, had at their disposal only one army communications battalion, with communications equipment for one position, to control subordinate formations in a combat situation. Provide smooth control when maneuvering communications battalions of these armies due to their small size and lack of the necessary wire means could not … They had a decent composition of radio equipment, but headquarters and commanders could not use radio communications to control troops in battle. The headquarters of the districts and armies demanded to control the troops leading the battle, wire connection (telephone, telegraph) …
The enemy was destroying permanent communication lines with aviation and saboteurs, and to restore them, an organized force was required in the form of linear communication units - and at that time it was not yet at the disposal of the commanders of communications of districts and armies … The PribOVO headquarters lost wire communication with its formations by the end of 22.6. 41 g … and after that first restored wire communication with their subordinate units only on July 7-8 …
The same situation was with the ZAPOVO. The executed chiefs of staff and communications did not leave their memoirs. It is possible that they had a lot of reproaches in relation to the General Staff … The article said: In the middle of the day on June 22, the commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov, reported to the General Staff that of the three radio stations he had, two were completely broken, and the third was damaged and did not work. With the constant breaks of wire communication lines, the absence of data on the location of their units and enemy units, this was a complete loss of communication with the subordinate troops. The General Staff was obliged to urgently correct this situation. General Pavlov was promised to send three new radio stations, but they were not sent …
D. M. Dobykin (head of communications KOVO):
Due to the fact that the war began suddenly, therefore, the formation and combat training of signal units during the period of their mobilization was actually not carried out … In peacetime, the district headquarters did not pay due attention to the preparation of the command post in engineering terms in the Tarnopol region. The headquarters was located in the city and on the first day of the war was forced to go to an unprepared command post … enemy aircraft, especially in the early days of the war, sought to destroy the main highways and communication centers, in such cases, communication was provided in bypass directions or switched to radio communication, and also used mobile communications …
The events in KOVO were not as critical as in PribOVO or ZAPOVO due to the large territory, a larger number of spacecraft troops and a smaller number of enemy troops …
Proposals of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to the Government of the USSR
So who is to blame for the loss of command and control of the troops due to problems with communications in the border districts: the head of the communications department of the spacecraft, the General Staff, or Stalin? General Galich was removed from the post of head of the Communications Department on June 22, and on August 6 he was arrested. General Galich is definitely not to blame for this, since his report, long before the war, outlined the problems of the communications crisis in the initial period of the war and measures to remedy the situation. Is it Stalin's fault or Zhukov's? Was it possible to improve the situation to increase the output of communications equipment and increase the number of trained personnel?
A note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - I. V. Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - V. M. Molotov on the organizational measures for the military districts 1940-04-07: The total number of divisions currently available is insufficient. We will have 148 pure rifle divisions, excluding tank and motorized ones, intended mainly for offensive actions, maneuvering and repelling counterattacks … which is absolutely not enough …
I consider it extremely necessary now, in addition to the existing … divisions … to create 23 more divisions of 3,000 men each, as divisions of the 2nd echelon with a monthly mobilization readiness period, and thus bring the total number of divisions to 200 …
It is advisable to reduce the number of signal troops and road units - 20,800 people, tk. the need for field communications and road maintenance has been reduced …
When carrying out these measures, savings are obtained … which ensures the implementation of organizational measures for the formation of 23 rifle divisions and the transfer of 3 divisions from 9000 people to 12000 people …
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Marshal of the Soviet Union B. Shaposhnikov.
In July 1940, a decision was made to reduce the signal troops and bring them to peacetime states. The document was signed by Chief of General Staff Shaposhnikov and People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko. For them, the connection was not so important. Knowing the consequences of such a decision, we would not reduce the signal troops. The General Staff decided that increasing the number of rifle divisions was more important than having several deployed communications units in the border districts. After all, the leadership of the non-profit organization could justify not a reduction in the signal troops, but an increase in the total number of spacecraft. The main thing was to justify the need for full-fledged communication units at the border in front of the Government …
In another situation, the NKO and the Air Force were able to justify the increase in the number and the corresponding Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 07.25.1940 was issued: The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: … 10. To carry out the above measures, allow NGOs to increase the staffing of the spacecraft Air Force by 60248 people … Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov
By October 1940, the General Staff did not have enough tanks to support the infantry and in the corresponding Note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft [not earlier than 1940-05-10] it is said about the formation of new units: Due to the existing staffing of the spacecraft - 18 tank brigades, 20 machine-gun and artillery brigades … and one mechanized corps …
The note was signed by the new chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Meretskov. He, too, was satisfied with everything with communication. After analyzing the situation, the NPO appeals to the Government of the country with a request for another increase in the number of spacecraft, and again this does not apply to communications.
A note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - I. V. Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - V. M. Molotov on increasing the number of tank units and formations [no later than 11.10.1940]:
I ask: 1. Permit to start forming 25 separate tank brigades with a deadline of 1.6.41.
2. To approve the increase in the staffing of the spacecraft for the above event for 49850 people …
APPENDIX: Draft resolution of the KO at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
A draft resolution of the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is even attached to the note, and the reader told us that this could not be … It turns out that maybe if you understand the problem and explain it to the government. The leadership of the spacecraft can apply to the government with a request to increase the number of spacecraft. It only needs to be justified! And not just propose, but even propose a draft resolution on this issue.
On November 5, NGOs and the Air Force again appeal to the government with a request to increase the number and even to issue additional auto-tractor equipment beyond the plan. This technique is much more expensive than telephone or telegraph devices and cables for them.
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR DECIDES: … 1. Increase the number of spacecraft air forces by 173484 human …
9. To ensure the training of flight technical personnel in new and expanding military schools and schools, to release the NCO over the scheduled vacation in 1941:
… D) transport vehicles - 1493 units;
e) special machines - 1484 pieces;
f) tractors - 362 units …
On 14 January 1941, the post of Chief of the General Staff is occupied by G. K. Zhukov, and by mid-February the government received a new document with another increase in spacecraft troops. it A note NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - I. V. Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - V. M. Molotov outlining the mobilization deployment scheme for the spacecraft [no later than 1941-12-02]. Considered a significant increase in mechanized corps (up to 30), tank (up to 60) and motorized (up to 30) divisions. Why so many troops? Again, Stalin insisted? No, G. K. Zhukov doesn't blame him:
In February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the creation of armored formations than was envisaged by the decisions of the government in 1940 … I. V. Stalin, apparently, at that time did not yet have a definite opinion on this issue and hesitated. Time passed, and only in March 1941 it was decided to form the requested 20 mechanized corps [new mechanized corps to the existing ones].
but we didn't calculate objective capabilities of our tank industry. To fully equip the new mechanized corps, 16, 6 thousand tanks of only new types were required, and only about 32 thousand tanks. There was practically no place to get such a number of cars within one year., lacked and technical, command personnel …
Of course, tanks and many other equipment are better than dealing with a secondary problem with communication, which may not exist … Only, as subsequent events showed, without communication, these huge mechanized corps are just a heap of scrap metal that was left in the border districts … The rapid deployment of new parts (I I would say thoughtless) led to the choice of the entire mob-reserve and anti-tank 45-mm guns, which were not planned for production in 1941. Until February, there was enough mobilization for anti-tank guns.
On February 22, a document was prepared for the Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, which spoke about the prospects of mechanized corps. Nineteen corps were considered combat 1st stage: from 1 to 12, from 14 to 16, 22, and from 28 to 30. Seven corps were considered combat reduced 1st stage: 13 (on June 22, 282 tanks and 17,809 personnel), 17 (63 tanks and 16,578 people), 18 (282 tanks and 26,879 people), 19 (453 tanks and 21,651 people), 20 (94 tanks and 20,391 people), 21 (128 tanks (excluding two battalions received after June 22) There were so many personnel in the 21 mk without equipment that 17,000 people were left at the points of deployment in the camps) and 24 (222 tanks and 21,556 people).
The mechanized corps of the second stage included: 23 (413 tanks), 25 (300 tanks), 26 (184 tanks) and 27 (356 tanks). They were supposed to be considered corps by 1.1.42. Maybe it was more effective to transfer tanks and equipment to other corps and include some of the personnel in other formations and units? For example, there were many technical specialists in these formations and could they be retrained as signalmen? Or send valuable technical specialists to the reserve, and call infantrymen, machine gunners, mortarmen, artillerymen and others into the rifle divisions? And also to deploy parts of communication of border districts? Unfortunately, the General Staff was thinking about another start of hostilities … G. K. Zhukov: [Leading workers of the NPO and the General Staff] were preparing to wage the war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that a large the war will start, as before, from border battles, and then the main forces of the enemy will only enter into action. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the ground and air forces of Nazi Germany …
A sudden transition to the offensive with all available forces, moreover, previously deployed in all strategic directions, was not envisaged
V Note according to the mobilization deployment scheme of the spacecraft it was also said:
To increase the mobilization readiness and provision of the army with the most inadequate types of weapons, it is necessary to resolve the issue of their additional deployment in industry … The mobilization plan of 1941 provides for mobilization in two ways:
a) the first option provides for the mobilization of individual military districts, individual units and formations established by a special decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - in a hidden order, in the order of the so-called "Large training camps (BUS)". In this case, the conscription of the reserve liable for military service, as well as the delivery of the vehicles and horse personnel assigned to the units, are made by personal summons, without announcing the orders of the NCO.
b) the second option provides for the general mobilization of all the Armed Forces of the USSR or individual military districts in an open manner, i.e. when mobilization is announced by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR …
In other words, according to the first option, if this is justified before the Government of the USSR, then it is possible to mobilize individual units. For example, communications units of border districts even before the start of the war. Only the need for their deployment should be understood by the leadership of the spacecraft and it is required to justify this before Stalin. But no one did it … Huge mechanized corps look more respectable, right? … In February it comes out Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the plan of military orders for 1941 for ammunition" 1941-14-02:
Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) DECIDE:
1. To approve the plan of military orders of the NKO, NKVMF and NKVD for 1941 for a complete shot at shells, land mines, grenades, aerial bombs and mine-torpedo weapons …
4. To increase the capacity for the production of shot elements hand over in the system of Narkomboepripas as of 1.2.41 the following enterprises: Pervomaisky plant …, Stroymekhanizm plant and Pavshinsky plant of concrete products (for organizing the production of reinforced concrete bombs). Oblige Narkomsredmash, Narkomstroy and Narkomstroimaterialov of the USSR place at their enterprises civilian products filmed from the factories transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense …
5. To approve the construction of a new projectile and equipment plant in the city of Kirov for the production of large-caliber shells and their equipment …
To instruct the People's Commissariat of Defense together with the State Planning Committee within a month find a plant for transferring to the Narkomboepripas system for the production of 37 mm anti-aircraft shells of shells.
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.
It turns out that for the production of shells, several enterprises could be redesigned and loaded with the release of shells. It was even possible to find a plant for the production of 37-mm rounds. No one disputes that the production of projectiles is important, but communications, as we have seen, were also necessary. And according to the proposals of General Galich - nothing has been done. Even for a consumer goods company! Can anyone say that the communication problem was clear and the General Staff was very worried about its solution? In March 1941, problems with explosives appeared and this issue was quickly resolved.
From the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 1941-27-03:
To approve the draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the production of toluene" … To instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade to take measures for the acquisition in 1941 in Germany of one unit for the production of trinitrobenzene.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.
In April, new troops are formed again, and in order to maintain the indicated number of spacecraft, the number of other formations is reduced or they are disbanded. Of course, anti-tank brigades are needed, as are the airborne troops! The question arises: are they needed in such an amount, as stated by the NGO, and will there be enough for all these pieces of equipment? The government does not ask such a question: after all, the military should know what they are asking for. Again, the military does not think about communication … But four months have passed since Galich's report and Zhukov has already received a document from the chief of staff of the PribOVO, but for the General Staff this problem probably does not exist …
Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 23.04.1941:
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR DECIDE:
1. To approve the proposed NPO formation:
a) 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK, each consisting of …
b) 5 airborne corps, each consisting of …
2. The formations specified in clause 1 shall be carried out at the expense of the existing number of spacecraft, for which:
a) to disband 11 six thousandth rifle divisions … with a total strength of 64,251 people.
b) to disband the management of 29 MK and 46 military units with corps units, totaling 2,639 people;
c) to reorganize the 10th Rifle Division into mountain rifle divisions … thus reducing each rifle division by 1,473 men;
d) transfer corps artillery regiments and regiments of the RGK of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the Far Eastern Front to new (common for the entire spacecraft) staffs, reducing them in this regard by 30 people …
3. Specified in paragraphs. 1 and 2 events should be carried out by 1.6.41 …
5. The State Planning Committee of the USSR to provide for the allocation of non-profit organizations during 1941, in excess of the plan, to ensure the measures specified by this Resolution - 8225 trucks (of which 5000 ZIS-5 vehicles), 960 STZ-5 tractors and 420 Stalinets tractors …
After May 15, 1941, the NGO prepared Draft Notes People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin with considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies:
… I ask: 1. To approve the submitted plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the plan of the planned military operations in case of war with Germany;
2. Timely permit the sequential implementation of covert mobilization and covert concentration, first of all, of all armies of the RGK and aviation …
First of all, it is required to mobilize all the armies of the RGK and aviation, but again there is not a word about the signal troops of the border districts and units of the RGK … they also need communications! And underground communication lines! The military justifies the need to increase the number of spacecraft and Stalin agrees again! We see again that he can be convinced.
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 4.06.1941:
SNK of the USSR DECIDES:
1. To approve the formation of units proposed by the NKO of the USSR for the newly built fortified areas …
2. Finish the formation of units by 1.10.41, having carried out it in two stages:
1st stage - for 45,000 people by 1.7.41.
2nd stage - for 75,000 people by 1.10.41 …
After 10 days, a new decree on the URs. It turns out that if justified, then you can get new funds and allow overtime. Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 16.06.1941:
In order to accelerate the bringing into combat readiness of the fortified areas, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) DECIDE:
a) authorize the People's Commissariat of Armaments to use two-hour overtime at factories No. 369, 69, 66 and 2;
b) The People's Commissariat of Armaments to allocate at the expense of its funds the necessary equipment for factories No. 69 and No. 4 and materials for the production of an additional program for sights and periscopes at factories No. 69 and No. 349 …
On the same day, the Chief of the General Staff writes Note about the need to build gliders. It turns out that this is an important problem, but communication is not …
… To support the airborne units of the NKO, the following number of gliders is needed in 41-42 years … In total, for 1941 - 2000 pieces …
So how can the government of the USSR be blamed for problems with communication (in particular with wire communication lines)? After all, orders of magnitude large financial and material resources were given by the government of the USSR and our entire country to NGOs, and the leadership of the army, poorly understanding the problems, wasted these resources ineptly! These resources could have been used more optimally, but it worked out as always … But it turns out that Stalin is to blame for everything! He did not count the footcloths, guns and telephones well, did not think about how to use the mechanized corps … So who is to blame: Stalin or the General Staff?
