Catapult
In early July 1940, a series of operations were carried out by the British Navy, which claimed the lives of over 1,300 French sailors. United by the common name "Catapult", they provided for the capture or destruction of the ships of their yesterday's allies in the British and colonial French ports.
The main events during the implementation of the above operation took place as follows. On July 2, the British captured the battleship Courbet in Portsmouth, the next day in Plymouth, it was the turn of the battleship Paris, the counter-destroyer Le Triomphant, the destroyer Mistral and the world's largest submarine Surcouf. The British plans also included a raid on the port of Pointe-à-Pitre, where the aircraft carrier Béarn, the cruiser Émile Bertin and the light training cruiser Jeanne d'Arc were stationed, but the attack, scheduled for 3 July, was canceled at the last minute due to the personal intervention of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On July 4, in the port of Alexandria, the British threatened the crews of the French battleship Lorraine, the cruisers Duquesne, Tourville, Suffren and Duguay-Trouin, as well as the destroyers Forbin, Fortuné, Basque and submarine "Persée" to give them ship fuel, gun locks and torpedo warheads. Some of the crews of the French ships were interned at the same time. Three days later, Rear Admiral Planson rejected the British ultimatum, and on the morning of 8 July the battleship Richelieu in Dakar was attacked by six British torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier Hermes. One of the torpedoes dropped by them damaged the stern of the ship, a significant amount of outboard water was taken through the resulting hole with an area of almost eighty square meters, and the ship was out of order.
Largest naval battle involving line forces
In one of the cases, it came to an armed clash at Mers el-Kebir, which during the Second World War became the largest naval battle in the European theater of operations with the participation of linear forces.
In the early morning of July 3, Formation H, whose cash forces were represented by the flagship battle cruiser Hood (flag of Vice Admiral D. Sommerville), the battleships Valiant and Resolution, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and the cruisers Arethusa "and" Enterprise "approached Oran.
At 06:31 (hereinafter, the time is indicated in English), a biplane Fairey Swordfish (hereinafter Swordfish) rose from the deck of the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal", heading for reconnaissance and for tracking the unfinished naval base Mers el-Kébir) and the port of Oran. According to the "Anvil" (Anvil) plan, the aircraft of the aircraft carrier were to attack French surface ships and submarines stationed in these two ports with bombs and torpedoes. In addition, the aviation group of the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal" was entrusted with ensuring the adjustment of the fire of heavy ships.
Two hours later, the scout reported that the French battleships and counter-destroyers were pairing up. Forty minutes later, he received a message that the French battleships were folding tents, and four Swordfish biplanes flew to French ports for reconnaissance. At 11:05 am, the commander of Formation H, Rear Admiral D. Somerville (James Fownes Somerville) gives the order to drop six Mark I aircraft magnetic mines (weight 680 kg, explosive weight 340 kg), and at 13:07 to Mers el- Kebiru, accompanied by six Blackburn B-24 Skua (hereinafter Skua) aircraft, flew five Swordfish biplanes, where one mine was dropped in front of an anti-submarine barrier covering the entrance to the harbor, and four more - behind the obstacle. The mines were dropped from a height of 90 meters at an aircraft speed of 175 km / h.
At 13:45, seven Swordfish biplanes were launched from the deck of the Ark Royal, accompanied by three Skua aircraft - four went for reconnaissance, one for reconnaissance, and two for anti-submarine patrols. At 15:25, two Swordfish biplanes (No.4K and No.4M) mined the entrance to Oran harbor. Both mines were dropped from a height of 45 meters at a distance of 60 meters from the entrance to the harbor, as a result, not a single ship with a displacement of over a thousand tons could leave the port without risk of being blown up by a mine. British planes, setting mines, at an altitude of about sixty meters approached the French ships and freely counted them (seventeen destroyers and advice notes, a large number of transports and the hospital ship "Sphinx" with a displacement of 11,375 tons), while the French side showed complete indifference to the actions of yesterday allies.
At 16:20, work was in full swing at Ark Royal - it was necessary to ensure the reception of the returning 13 Swordfish biplanes, 9 Skua aircraft and three float Swordfish. On shift, three Swordfish were taken into the air and set off to patrol over Mers el-Kebir.
At 17:15, after an ineffectual conclusion of nine-hour formal negotiations with the French, who rejected the British ultimatum, Somerville, urged by the Admiralty, ordered to open fire on the French formation, which included the battleships Dunkerque, Strasbourg, Bretagne and Provence, seaplane carrier Commandant Teste, counter-destroyers Mogador, Volta, Terrible, Kersaint, Lynx and Tigre. A little later, an exchange of radio messages took place between the commanders of the British and French units. To the British threat to open fire on the French if the ultimatum was not accepted, Vice Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul replied briefly: “Do not create the irreparable”.
At 17:54, Resolution was the first to open fire.
Then "Valiant" and "Hood" entered the battle in succession. A minute and a half later, Provence was the first to return fire from the French side.
Over the next thirteen minutes of fire contact, the British heavy ships, at their maximum visibility range of about 17,500 yards, fired thirty-three volleys. Three more volleys (probably seven 15 "shells) were fired by the British flagship against the coastal battery Fort Canastel. In total, the heavy ships of Formation" H "fired 144 15" shells, including the battle cruiser "Hood" fifty-five (according to other sources, fifty-six). Taking into account the shooting at the coastal battery, it can be assumed that 137 15 "shells were fired directly at the French ships.
Three French ships of the line fired a total of 67 rounds of the main caliber, including Dunkerque - forty 330-mm shells (six volleys, red bursts), Strasbourg - four 330-mm shells (blue bursts), Provence - twenty-three 340-mm projectiles (ten volleys, green bursts). The battleship Bretagne also fired at the enemy (the British observed yellow bursts), but the number of shells it fired is unknown.
The fire of the British, in contrast to the French, who did not achieve a single hit, turned out to be extremely accurate - the French ships were hit by ten 15 "shells (one in the counter-destroyer" Mogador ", four in the" Bretagne ", four in the" Dunkerque "and one in "Provence").
The firing of the "N" compound, which was moving in seventeen knots, was carried out in not the most favorable conditions. The targets were located against the background of the coast, observation of the fall of the shells was at first made difficult by the presence of a fort and a high breakwater, and immediately after the fall of the first shells, the harbor was clouded with smoke mixed with a light fog, which aggravated the situation and made observation of the fall of shells impossible, therefore the British as a reference point a lighthouse served for sighting. Apparently, taking into account the conditions of the upcoming shooting, the British relied on the control of the ships' fire according to the data of the spotter aircraft (G. I. C. - Individual Ship Control). The resulting accuracy of fire (7.3%) looks impressive, especially against the background of the accuracy of the battleships in two other known cases.
During the Battle of Jutland, the British battleships Barham, Valiant, Warspite and Malaya fired 1,099 main caliber rounds (range 17,000-22,000 yards), of which 29 were hit. American battleships "Colorado", "Maryland" and "West Virginia" on shooting practice of 1930-1931, going twelve-knot speed, fired fifty-six 16 "shells (seven volleys). Targets - floating shields - were at a distance of about 12 800 yards, the accuracy achieved by the three ships of the line was 4, 2%, 5, 4% and 3, 7%, respectively.
The coastal artillery of the French, like their ground air defense systems, also demonstrated ineffective firing.
From land, the naval approaches to the French naval base were covered by eight coastal defense batteries, distributed between four sectors.
1) Sector Est d'Oran:
- Cape Laguy: two 95 mm coastal defense guns (canon G de 95 mm Mle 1888).
- Fort Canastel: three (according to Zhensulya two) 240 mm guns from a battleship of the "Danton" class (canon de 240 mm mle 1902).
- Battery Espagnole: two 75mm guns.
- Battery Gambetta: four 120 mm guns.
2) Sector A Oran:
- Battery Saint Grégoire: four 95 mm coastal defense guns (canon G de 95 mm Mle 1888).
3) Sector Ouest d'Oran:
- Fort Santon: four (according to Jensul, two) 194-mm guns (canon de 194 mm mle 1902).
- Cape Falcon: two 95 mm coastal defense guns (canon G de 95 mm Mle 1888).
4) Sector Mers El Kébir:
- Dual 75mm battery (canon de 75mm Mle 1897).
In pursuance of the order received the day before the British attack to disarm, according to the terms of the armistice, all the coastal batteries, with some of the guns, managed to remove the gun locks, which the next day, after the British presented an ultimatum, they had to urgently unpack and bring the guns into combat readiness. The Fort Santon coastal battery of 194 mm guns fired 30 rounds at the English flagship without achieving a single hit. Return fire from cruiser Arethusa, firing four 6 rounds (two volleys), and battlecruiser Hood, which fired three volleys at the battery, was also ineffectual. mm guns from the Danton-class battleship), as well as Espagnole (2 75 mm guns) and Gambetta (2 120 mm guns)., hid behind a smoke screen.
The armament of the Mers el-Kebir fort also included the 159th air defense battery (four 75 mm anti-aircraft guns on the Mle 1915-34 gun carriage).
The air defense of Oran - Mers el-Kebira, in addition, included:
- 157th air defense battery (four 75-mm anti-aircraft guns Mle 32);
- 158th air defense battery (four 75-mm anti-aircraft anti-aircraft guns Mle 1915-34);
- 160th battery (four 75-mm anti-aircraft anti-aircraft guns Mle 1915-34).
These three batteries, as well as the 159th battery, were organizationally part of the 53rd group of the 66th RAA regiment (régiment d'artillerie d'Afrique - African artillery regiment).
The following forces were subordinate to the navy on the coast:
- Mobile naval battery N ° 2 (four 90mm Mle 32 anti-aircraft guns).
- Mobile naval battery No. 8 (four 90 mm Mle 32 anti-aircraft guns).
- A site in Oran covered with 8 mm Hotchkiss mitrailleuses (Hotchkiss modèle 1914).
It should be emphasized that disarmament was not started on any of the air defense batteries after the conclusion of the armistice. Almost all of them opened fire on British aircraft, however, none of them was shot down due to insufficient training of personnel, especially to deal with low-flying targets.
French aviation, despite the quantitative and qualitative superiority, also turned out to be not up to par.
Against the aviation formation of the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal", on July 3, which included 45 aircraft (800 Squadron - 12 Skuas; 803 Squadron - 12 Skuas; 810 Squadron - 12 Swordfish; 818 Squadron - 9 Swordfish), the French could oppose the combined forces of the Air Force and the French Navy from the military airfields of La Sénia and d'Arzew, located at a distance of six and thirty-five kilometers, respectively, from Meers el-Kebir. The first was based on fifty Morane-Saulnier MS.406 and Curtiss Hawk 75A-4 fighters, as well as fifty medium and light bombers Lioré-et-Olivier LeO 45 and Bloch MB.174. The second had 8 Loire 130 seaplanes.
If, according to the commandant of the base Senya, Colonel Rougevin, the crews of the bombers were not prepared to conduct hostilities against naval targets, and the bombers themselves were only partially combat-ready (in pursuance of an order received in June, some of the instruments were removed from them), then the fighters, according to him, were in perfect order, and the pilots were ready to perform combat missions.
In the interval 18: 05-18: 20, with the order to bombard British ships, six seaplanes took off, three of which, pursued by British aviation, managed to reach the target and drop six 75 kg of bombs.
Late in the evening, two Skuas returning to the Ark Royal collided with a Breguet 521 Bizerte flying boat. After the second attack of one of the British fighters, the French, having disabled one of the three engines and a broken gas tank, dropped several 400 kg bombs on the British destroyer "Wrestler", which fell forty-five meters from the ship.
At 17:20, Zhensulya received an order to raise fighters into the air, out of the fifty available, forty-two took off. However, as noted by the British observers, the attacks of the French fighters, who had numerical and material superiority, but did not have clear orders, according to the report of Jensul, did not differ in persistence.
For ten minutes, while the "H" unit was firing, the two spotters carried out their task without hindrance until, at 18:04, the command for a ceasefire was received by the British. Later, both biplanes were attacked by French fighters. The first of them, maneuvering at low speed, managed to evade the attacking French fighter, the second was covered by the anti-aircraft artillery of British surface ships.
At 18:30, Skua was spotted by five French Curtiss fighters re-attacking the spotter aircraft from the Ark Royal.
As a result of a short battle, the French managed to shoot down one Skua, both crew members were killed. The French did not build on the success and returned to base, and the remaining Skua escorted the second Swordfish to the aircraft carrier.
At 19:10 at an altitude of 3650 meters, nine Curtiss and Morane fighters attacked a single Swordfish from the rear hemisphere, in the ensuing "dog fight" with two British escort fighters, two French aircraft (Curtiss and Morane) were damaged and dropped out of the battle. Twenty minutes later, two more Curtiss appeared, and a "dog fight" ensued with no visible results on either side.
The losses of Ark Royal aircraft during daytime operations amounted to five units - 2 Swordfish (bomber and reconnaissance aircraft) were shot down by anti-aircraft fire of French ships going to Toulon, one Skua was shot down in an air battle, two more aircraft - spotter aircraft Swordfish and Skua made forced landings on water.
The French side had no losses in aircraft.
conclusions
A combination of objective and subjective reasons prevented the French armed forces, despite the available resources and capabilities, to provide a worthy rebuff to the treacherous attack of yesterday's ally. A considerable share of the blame for the unfolding tragedy, according to the author, lies with the French commander, who at the crucial moment showed himself not as a combat commander of a squadron, but as an official in an admiral's uniform, which, in essence, he was.
Applications
Hits on French ships:
Battleship "Dunkerque".
The first 15 shell hit the turret roof of the II main battery.
There was no explosion, the shell from the impact split into several parts, ricocheting in different directions. A dent formed on the outer side of the armor plate (150 mm thick), on the inner side a piece of armor 100-120 mm thick and weighing more than 200 kg flew off, damaging gun No. 8.
The second 15 shell, also without exploding, went through the aircraft hangar, leaving a through hole in the latter and damaging a section of the deck.
The third 15 round pierced the 225-mm plate of the main armor belt on the starboard side, went through a number of rooms and exploded in a medical equipment warehouse.
The consequences of this hit made themselves felt until nightfall: five or six 130-mm shells exploded, exacerbating the damage caused by the British shell and causing a massive fire, for the liquidation of which it was necessary to flood first the cellar of the medium-caliber tower No. 3, and then the cellar of a similar tower IV.
The blow of the fourth 15 projectile hit the main armor belt almost above the waterline. Breaking through the armor plate (225 mm thick) and the bevel of the armored deck (40 mm thick), the projectile passed through a fuel tank filled almost to the top with fuel oil and exploded in the boiler compartment No. 2.
As a result of the last two hits, two of the three boiler rooms stopped working, the aft compartment was de-energized. The starboard network ceased to function, the fire control posts for 330 mm and 130 mm guns, as well as the turret II of the main caliber guns, stopped working due to a lack of electricity.
Battleship "Provence".
The unexploded 15 projectile that hit the turret of the battleship Dunkerque split into several parts on impact, one of which - almost the entire head of the projectile - hit the Provence foremast. the senior artillery officer of the ship, Lieutenant Cherrière, was seriously wounded, who had lost a leg.
Later, two more rangefinders were damaged by unidentified objects, possibly by shrapnel, including the one mounted on the main caliber II turret, and the muzzle of the right 340 mm turret III gun was deformed.
The hit at 17:03 of the only 15 shell hitting the battleship fell on the stern (the photo shows the entrance hole, from the opposite side, the escaping clouds of steam draw attention to themselves).
Having passed through the officer's cabin and piercing the armored deck, the projectile damaged the pipe of the steam distribution manifold, after which it exploded in a storage room located on the inner side of the port side. One of the armor plates (160 mm thick) was torn off the mountings by the force of the explosion, and a hole formed in the ship's hull. Since the fire in the officer's cabin and the steam escaping from the chimney quickly raised the temperature in a number of rooms, heating the bulkheads of the artillery cellars of the aft towers of the main caliber, it was decided to flood the cellars first of tower V, and then tower IV.
As the stern was immersed in the water, the resulting hole began to enter the water, which increased the volume of water entering the vessel. Rear-Admiral Buxen (Jacques Félix Emmanuel Bouxin), fearing for the fate of the battleship, ordered the ship's commander to run Provence aground, where a joint struggle between emergency teams and two approached tugs continued for another two hours with a fire raging at the stern of the ship.
Counter-destroyer "Mogador".
As flagship (flag of Rear Admiral Lacroix (Émile-Marie Lacroix)), the ship led a group of six destroyers that left the dock and headed for the port exit.
As a result of a direct hit from a 15 shell at the stern, 16 depth charges (weight 250 kg, according to other sources 200 kg) were detonated.
Interestingly, the aft artillery cellar of the main caliber guns, directly adjacent to the explosion site and protected by an armored bulkhead, survived. The vehicles of the ship were not damaged either.
The messenger ship (advice note) "Rigault de Genouilly".
On July 3, 1940, the advice note was in Oran. Having received news of the British attack on the French squadron, the ship quickly leaves the port to try to join the escort of the battleship "Strasbourg", but the low speed did not allow him to carry out his plan. After an unsuccessful maneuver, the ship finds itself in front of the British squadron, and as a result of a brief firefight with the cruiser "Enterprise" is damaged. The number of hits is not known. The next day the Rigault de Genouilly was torpedoed by the British submarine Pandora. After holding out on the water for about an hour, the ship broke in half and sank.
Used sources and literature
1. John Campbell. Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting.
2. Warren Tute. The Deadly Stroke.
3. Williams J. Jurens. Evolution Of Battleship Gunnery In The US Navy 1920-1945.
4. Bruce Taylor. The End of Glory: War & Peace in HMS Hood 1916-1941.
5. David Brown The Road to Oran: Anglo-French Naval Relations, September 1939-July 1940.
6. Charles D. Pettibone. The Organization and Order of Battle of Militaries in World War II: Volume VI Italy and France.
7. Report of Proceedings H. M. S. Warspite at the Battle of Jutland.
8. Report of Proceedings H. M. S. Valiant at the Battle of Jutland.
9. The official Admiralty war diary of Force H during Hood's time of involvement.
10. An official Admiralty account of the action at Mers El-Kebir.
11. A firsthand account of the action written by Royal Marine Band Corporal Walter Rees, of H. M. S. Hood.
12. A firsthand account of the action written by Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant Ronald G. Phillips, of H. M. S. Hood.
13. Robert Dumas. Les cuirassés Dunkerque et Strasbourg.
14. Jean Moulin. Les cuirassés français de 23500 tonnes.
15. Le premier rapport de l'amiral Gensoul.
16. Le deuxième rapport de l'amiral Gensoul.
17.air-defense.net.
18.laroyale-modelisme.net.
19. sudwall.superforum.fr.
20.merselkebir.unblog.fr.
21.dynamic-mess.com.
22. 3dhistory.de.
