If we consider the state of our army, weapons and military equipment in the context of a big war, that is, a war with a numerous, well-armed and experienced enemy, it soon becomes clear that we are not ready for very many sides of this hypothetical war.
I would not say that this is a favorite topic for readers of military analytics. I judge this from the experience of my previous articles, which touched upon a similar problem (for example, do we have enough cartridges for small arms or what is the best way to fight in swamps and impassable mud). Not everyone likes this kind of reasoning. Military issues, however, are far from personal taste. In my opinion, it is better to be an unpleasant author for the readers than to be defeated later. In addition, more has recently begun to be written on this topic.
Here is another moment in which the Russian army is not ready for a big war - battles over rivers. This does not mean small rivers, but large waterways, such as the Dnieper, Don, Volga and so on. Of the most probable theater of operations, of course, the first place is currently occupied by the Dnieper and Don, especially the first. Regarding current events, I want to emphasize that with all possible political twists and turns, we have the right to theoretically consider this theater of operations, study the conditions for conducting hostilities on it, pose questions and seek answers to them.
Well, if it doesn't come in handy. But personally, a long study of the experience of World War II convinced me that the most incredible options should be considered, so that later I would not be completely unprepared for them. For the mistakes of theorists, then, in the event of war, will be generously paid in blood.
So, big rivers. Here are the most common river tasks, judging by the experience of World War II and partly the Vietnam War.
Forcing (in two versions: in the offensive and in retreat), transport and fire support for the units that have crossed, holding and expanding the bridgehead, transferring large formations across the river with the guidance of crossings, fighting in the fairway (mainly a breakthrough along the river with the landing and support of the landing force), the use of the river for bypassing, enveloping and encircling the enemy (mainly to prevent him from retreating across the river).
Now the Russian army is most prepared only for crossings. Yes, there are exercises to guide pontoon crossings. But they are largely arbitrary and are carried out practically without taking into account the enemy's resistance or with an imitation of this resistance.
A review of the available equipment (floating transporters PTS-2, PTS-3 and the latest PTS-4, self-propelled ferries PMM-2, PMM-2M and PDP) quite clearly shows that they are all specialized for the transportation of heavy equipment: tanks, cars, and specialized for the motorization of crossings and the mechanization of building temporary bridges, as well as for the crossing of heavy equipment. For the infantry there are amphibious armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Previously, there was also a very good amphibious tank PT-76, which has fought pretty well and is now still in service with a number of countries.
It seems to be quite enough, if we bear in mind only the task of forcing the river in conditions of rather weak enemy resistance and the fastest transfer of troops with heavy equipment across the river.
In the conditions of a big war with an experienced adversary who perfectly understands the importance of a large river as an important line, it is unlikely that there will be such hothouse conditions for a crossing. If you put yourself in the shoes of the enemy, then what can you oppose to such a mechanized crossing? First, air strikes. Only a few F-35Bs with guided bombs and other precision weapons are quite capable of disrupting such a crossing. In the same role, helicopters and attack drones will do well, especially if the enemy has a high coast with hills. Secondly, it is possible to specify the point at which self-propelled ferries with tanks will approach the shore, wait until they swim 50-100 meters to the shore, and cover this place with a volley from MLRS. Thirdly, even the guerrillas, if they have enough mortars and RPGs, will well be able to repel an attempt to cross ferries with tanks. All this applies not only to ferries, but also to floating armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.
Therefore, most likely, the crossing, which looks very cool on the exercises, in the conditions of a real and big war, simply will not work. The situation with the crossing of a large river will return to a typical situation during the Great Patriotic War. It will first be necessary to cross over with relatively small infantry detachments, as secretly as possible, to seize a bridgehead of sufficient width and depth to secure the crossing point, and only after that start up self-propelled ferries and build a pontoon bridge. Before the crossing is established, there will be stubborn battles on the bridgehead, in which it will be necessary to transfer reinforcements, deliver ammunition and food across the river, and take out the wounded. For this transport work, which is very difficult and dangerous, nothing suitable is available.
BTR and BMP for the transport role and in themselves are not very suitable, moreover, using armored vehicles as an impromptu river vessel is impractical. Each unit of armored vehicles, that is, each cannon and machine gun, on the bridgehead is very valuable, and their withdrawal from the battle will significantly weaken the forces engaged in holding and expanding the bridgehead.
Even when self-propelled ferries are operating and a pontoon bridge is built, there is still a great need for auxiliary vehicles, since the capacity of any temporary crossing is very limited and cannot accommodate the entire freight traffic. But the more forces and equipment are concentrated on the bridgehead, the more cargo they need to deliver and as quickly as possible. Finally, a battle is also being fought for the crossing, the enemy will undoubtedly try to destroy the pontoon bridge with artillery fire or air raids. If he succeeded, then here, without auxiliary vehicles, the troops on the bridgehead may be defeated.
We need a full-fledged river ship, fast enough, sufficiently seaworthy (capable of sailing in high waves and going out to river estuaries, estuaries and operating along the sea coast), sufficiently well armed and at the same time suitable for transport operations.
Among the prototypes of a possible solution, I would put in the first place one very ingenious Nazi idea - a Siebel-class barge (Siebelfähre). It was designed by aeronautical engineer Fritz Siebel for the landing campaign in Britain. This vessel was constructed from two bridge pontoons connected by steel girders to form a catamaran. On top of the beams, a platform was built to accommodate weapons or cargo, as well as a superstructure for a bridge. The barge was equipped with four engines. Despite its unpretentiousness, the barge had good characteristics: a displacement of up to 170 tons, a carrying capacity of up to 100 tons, a speed of 11 knots (20 km / h) and a cruising range of up to 300 nautical miles. Four Flak 8.8 cm could be installed on it, which turned it into a powerful floating battery, comparable in firepower to a destroyer. The Siebel-class barge was disassembled into parts and could be transported by trucks or by rail, and then assembled and launched.
The second very good idea is already domestic: the Ladoga tender. Such tenders were built for shipping along Ladoga during the blockade of Leningrad. It was the simplest self-propelled barge 10.5 meters long and 3.6 meters wide, equipped with a ZIS-5 engine. Her speed was 5 knots (9 km / h), but after a slight upgrade, the speed increased to 12 knots (22, 2 km / h). The steering was tiller, sometimes the steering wheel was installed. Navigation equipment was limited to a lifeboat compass. The tenders were sometimes armed with a light or heavy machine gun, but its main advantage was a spacious hold of about 30 cubic meters. meters, accommodating 12-15 tons of cargo and up to 75 people. It was very simple in design, assembled from sections, and there was a case when such a tender was built in just three days. It was something like an iron boat, which nevertheless had phenomenal seaworthiness and successfully sailed in the most stormy and dangerous part of Ladoga, including in difficult ice conditions. Such ships took part in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the offensive to the Crimea.
In a country with a huge number of rivers, the weakness of the river forces and the almost complete absence of river warships are simply amazingly amazing. But you have to do something about it. In view of our general weakness in producing something, I would suggest starting with the simplest and most useful - with a tender.
Firstly, not only any shipbuilding or ship repair plant will cope with the construction of such an iron boat, but in general any workshop in which it is possible to cut metal and weld the hull of this self-propelled barge. Including an impromptu workshop. 118 Ladoga tenders were built this way, in a hastily created workshop on the unequipped shore of Lake Ladoga.
Secondly, for equipping the tender, you can take a more powerful engine. If the original model had a 73 hp engine, then the now widespread diesel engine KamAZ-740.63-400 has a power of 400 hp.
Thirdly, for loading and unloading goods, it is advisable to install a hydraulic manipulator of the same types that are now widely used to equip trucks.
Fourth, tender armament. It is best to take the "Cliff" or "Kord" heavy machine guns. Although the tender is generally intended for the transport of goods, it can be used for amphibious operations in which it may be necessary to fire at targets ashore.
In general, a relatively small river ship is obtained, which can be used on almost any river and on almost any lake (except for the smallest and with swampy shores), where there is sufficient depth for it and there is room for a truck transporting an iron boat overland. The sides of the tender are high enough, which provides it with good seaworthiness and allows it to be used in the coastal waters of the Azov, Black and Baltic Seas. In general, the Black and Baltic Seas are the most optimal sea areas for ships of this type. An important advantage of the tender over special river ships of larger displacement is that the tender does not need equipped bases and backwaters for wintering. It is enough to pull it ashore with a winch and hide it in a hangar or just under a canvas canopy.
Finally, the tender can (and, in my opinion, should) also have civilian use - as a small but ubiquitous vessel suitable for cargo transportation along rivers, lakes, for road operations. Tenders can be produced in large batches (immediately with a turret for a machine gun) and have them on all rivers so that in case of war they can be mobilized into the army.
