"It was a victory of the spirit."
After entering service from the next, in 1898, the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was annually included for three weeks in the Training and Artillery Detachment of the Baltic Fleet to improve the training of artillerymen. Intense practice firing led to the fact that by the end of the 1904 campaign, during which 140 shells were fired from only 10 '' guns of the battleship, the total number of shots fired by the ship from main battery guns reached 472 (), which seriously affected the wear of the guns trunks. The 120 mm rapid-fire cannons were in an even worse position, each of which already fired about 400 rounds.
At a special meeting held a few days before the surrender of Port Arthur, a decision was made, and three days later, on December 14, 1904, the highest order followed to send the first echelon of the 3rd Pacific Squadron as part of the 1st Separate Squadron of ships to the Far East under the flag of Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov, whose departure from Libava was scheduled for January 15, 1905. Preparation of ships for sailing was carried out in the port of Emperor Alexander III, where, to speed up the work, which, at the request of Admiral F. K. Avelan, Emperor Nicholas II allowed the allocation of 2,000,000, 00 rubles, more than 1,500 workers from state and private factories were collected.
"Ushakov" was brought into the dock, where the underwater part was cleaned and painted red, while the sides, pipes and superstructures were covered with black paint. In the course of partial modernization from Mars, which had lost part of the structures, ten 37-mm single-barreled Hotchkiss cannons were dismantled, replacing them with two Maxim machine guns with shields; instead of six 37-mm five-barreled Hotchkiss guns, four 47-mm Hotchkiss guns without shields were installed on the spardeck. Decorations were removed from the bow and stern, the bow and stern torpedo tubes were dismantled, and the propelling torpedo tubes were removed from the steam boats. Thanks to these and a number of other measures, the construction overload of the battleship of 468 tons was reduced by about one hundred tons.
Along with the GUKiS, the Obukhov plant produced six new 120-mm guns, two of which replaced the most worn-out ones on the Admiral Ushakov.
Four rangefinders were delivered to the battleship: two seized from the artillery class of the Baltic Fleet Training and Artillery Unit () and two of the Barr and Stroud company of the latest modification FA 3 (), as well as Belgian hand-held optical rangefinders manufactured by the Fabrique Nationale Herstal Liège factory (). Guns of calibers 120 mm and 10 "received domestic optical sights of the Perepyolkin system (). Also on the" Admiral Ushakov "was installed a radio telegraph of the" Slaby-Arco "system of the" Telefunken "society, developed by Dr. A. Slaby () and his collaborator Count G. von Arko (). At the rate of 80 shells per barrel, 320 10 "shells () were fired for" Admiral Ushakov ", of which only 300 could fit on the ship. with armor-piercing shells, 480 with high-explosive and 160 with segment.
Due to delays caused by workers' strikes, incited by agitators financed from abroad, as well as difficult weather conditions, the Separate Detachment left only on February 3, 1905.
During the artillery training that continued during the campaign, both barrel and caliber firing were carried out. March 28, 1905in the Gulf of Aden, the first training detachment fire was fired, four high-explosive shells were fired from each main-caliber gun at once. Two weeks later, the study was continued, and the 10 '' guns of the battleship fired four more shells, and three days later, during the loading of coal, the ammunition spent on training firing was replenished from the transport ships accompanying the detachment. Thus, as of the beginning of the Tsushima battle, the main guns of the "Admiral Ushakov" fired about 504 rounds. Looking ahead, we note that, as follows from the testimony of the senior navigator officer, Lieutenant E. A. Maksimov on the 4th, on May 14, 1905, the battleship fired about 200 more 10 '' shells, thus bringing their total number fired for operating time, up to 704. From 120-mm guns, according to the same information, about 400 shells were fired during the battle. Consequently, "Admiral Ushakov" entered the battle with two armored cruisers, having an average of 176 rounds per main battery gun. At the same time, according to the MTK norms, the survivability of a 10 '' gun barrel was 200 live shots per barrel (), and 120 mm - 1000. This could not but affect the wear of the barrels, which led to a loss of the projectile characteristics.
The operational wear was superimposed on the design and manufacturing defects of the implements. Back in 1900, the Admiral Ushakov experienced failures in the hydraulic drives of tower installations. In the campaign of 1901, the wear of the hydraulic drives of the 10 "units of the" Admiral Ushakov "became obvious, in the absence of servomotors of the lifting mechanisms, this made it impossible to accurately target the guns. Unfortunately, the overly "lightweight" guns and their machines had insufficient strength, which forced the powder charge to be reduced from 65.5 to 56 kg of smokeless powder, as a result of which the muzzle velocity of the 225-kg projectile decreased from 778-792 to 695 m / s. In addition, the allowed elevation angle was limited, which, coupled with a reduced powder charge, led to a decrease in the actual firing range.
On April 26, 1905, Nebogatov's ships joined Rozhdestvensky's squadron, having covered about 12,000 miles in 83 days. In the daytime battle on May 14, 1905, "Admiral Ushakov" was the end in the wake column of battleships, closing the 3rd armored detachment ().
During the Tsushima battle, the battleship, bypassing the damaged "Emperor Alexander III", was hit on the starboard side by an 8 "shell in the area of the 15th frame near the waterline, as a result of which the entire bow compartment of the living deck was filled with water. The next round, 6 '' caliber, hit the side at the waterline, opposite the bow tower. As a result, three people were killed, one was mortally wounded, and four were seriously injured. If the first hole was repaired with wood and sailor bunks, then the second, with a diameter of about 90 cm, caused the flooding of the entire bow compartment up to 10 frames. It was not possible to close it up without stopping the vehicles and without stopping fire from the tower. The third projectile (of unknown caliber), hitting the aft turret, shook it quite hard, leaving a deep dent in the vertical armor and sprinkling shrapnel on the deck and wall of the spardeck. Shrapnel from one of the shells that exploded near the ship disabled the wireless telegraph and shot down the gaff; the loss of the crew during the day amounted to four dead and the same number of wounded.
With the entire bow compartment flooded, the battleship was heavily buried by its nose, therefore, on the sea swell at maximum speed, the Ushakov could give no more than 10 knots, as a result of which it lagged behind the other ships led by the Emperor Nicholas I, and developed a speed of 12-12, 5 knots. At a meeting in the wardroom, it was unanimously decided to continue the journey to Vladivostok, trying to catch up with the compound that had gone ahead.
On the morning of May 15, 1905detachments of the United Fleet, while drifting 26 miles south of Takeshima Island, performed prize missions and monitored the surrendered ships of the Nebogatov detachment. At 14:00, smoke was observed from the observation post on the Iwate mast on the south side. An hour later, by clearly distinguishable pipes, the ship was identified as a coastal defense battleship of the "Admiral Senyavin" class. At 15:24 an order was received from the flagship of the 2nd Combat Detachment of the cruiser Idzumo to the cruisers Iwate () and Yakumo to pursue the Russian battleship. Even before they rushed after him, "Admiral Ushakov" turned on the opposite course and began to go south.
The Japanese cruisers developed a course of eighteen knots and after a while, 60 miles west of Oki Island, they again found the battleship. When the distance was reduced to eight miles, the Japanese, following a telegraph order from "Mikasa", tried to persuade the enemy ship to surrender by raising at 17:10 () the signal in English "Your admiral surrended, I would advise you to surrender", which can be translated something like "Your admiral has surrendered, I advise you to surrender as well." At 17:30, when the distance between the opponents was about five miles, the Japanese, convinced that the Russian battleship was not going to surrender, opened fire on it. The Admiral Ushakov also fired back.
After the first four shots, the hydraulic horizontal guidance of the bow turret failed, they tried to rotate it manually, but since the turret rotated 180 ° in 20 minutes, shooting from it became very rare. At the same time, the aft tower continued to fire. The battery fire periodically had to be stopped, since the combat distance exceeded the firing range of 120-mm guns. Ten minutes after the start of the battle, an 8 '' projectile hit the side against the bow turret and made a large hole at the waterline, as a result of which the existing stable roll to the starboard side began to increase, which negatively affected the maximum elevation angle of the main caliber guns. The fatal role here was played by the fact that the battle "Ushakov" had to be fought on the right side, damaged in the battle of Tsushima.
At 17:45, the Japanese cruisers, which increased their speed, having completed the “all of a sudden” turn by two points to the left, reduced the distance to the “Ushakov” in the bearing line. The hit of a 6 '' projectile in the battery disabled the ship's right bow 120-mm cannon. At 17:59, the towers were jammed due to the incessant heel, the battleship's guns fell silent, and a minute later the Japanese, who were at that moment at a distance of about four miles from the Russians, again made a turn “all of a sudden” two points to the right, lined up in a wake column and, Having moved in an arc, at a speed of 14-15 knots, we went to approach the enemy, continuing to fire at him. One or two more 6 '' shells that hit the battleship caused the fire and explosion of three arbors with 120-mm cartridges. A fire broke out in the battery, the side paneling and lockers in the living deck caught fire. The last one hit the ship by an 8 '' shell, which turned the wardroom. Having exhausted all the possibilities for resistance, at the beginning of the seventh the kingstones were opened on the battleship, the team received the order to "escape". According to the observations of the Japanese, at 18:07 the ship leaving astern under the water was covered with smoke from the explosions, and at 18:10 it turned over to the starboard side and disappeared under the water.
The Japanese who approached the place of death in half an hour began rescue operations. For two days of fighting, the irrecoverable losses of the battleship amounted to six officers, three conductors and 74 lower ranks.
According to the fragmentary testimony of the crew members, on May 15, 1905, two 8 "shells and two or three 6" shells hit the "Admiral Ushakov". According to the data of the Japanese observer, reflected in the diagram from “The Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38. Meiji ", the body of the battleship was hit by three 8" and three 6 "shells, in addition, both pipes received five or six hits from shells of unknown caliber.
Distribution of hits received on May 15, 1905 ()
According to the available information, there is reason to believe that in total, in two days of fighting, 3-4 8 ", 4 6" and six to seven shells of 6 "- 8" () were hit by "Admiral Ushakov".
The battleship, as follows from the testimony of Lieutenant E. A. Maksimov 4th, managed to fire at the enemy about 30 10 "and 60 120-mm shells against the total 89 8" and 278 6 "shells from the Japanese ().
It is unlikely that the higher naval authorities, proceeding from the pre-war ideas about the distances at which the battle was to be fought and driven into a corner by the current situation inside the country and on the fronts of the war with Japan, realized that the 10 '' guns, which were on the verge of wear, would bring little benefits in battle with the Japanese.
Obviously, the dispatch of three battleships of the "Admiral Senyavin" class to the theater of operations was a measure designed to calm public opinion, excited by the widely circulated articles of Captain 2nd Rank N. L. frankly demagogic in nature, and to a certain extent strengthen the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which has lost the opportunity to receive reinforcements at the expense of Port Arthur ships.
Despite the presence on the coastal defense battleships of improved optical sights and a significant, even by British standards, number of modern means of determining distances (), mainly due to the deterioration of the barrels of the main caliber guns, the latter could not properly prove themselves in battle, and in fact, in terms of the number and the quality of the explosive, the steel 10 '' high-explosive projectile, containing 7, 434 kg of pyroxylin, was the most powerful in the domestic naval artillery (). The accuracy of fire of eleven 10 "guns, which fired a total of about five hundred shells (), including" General-Admiral Apraksin "- 130," Admiral Senyavin "- 170 and" Admiral Ushakov "- 200, can be judged by the lack of the main Japanese sources of explicit mentions of Japanese ships being hit by 10 "shells. For comparison, during the battle on July 28, 1904, the battleships" Pobeda "and" Peresvet "from eight 10" guns fired 224 shells (), of which () hit at least four.
The place of death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov" () on the map of sentinel sites mentioned by Novikov-Priboi in the novel "Tsushima":
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By the way, judging by the place of death, "Ushakov" managed to pass unnoticed by the Japanese sentinel ships.
Used sources and literature
1. A number of memoirs of the crew members of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov".
2. V. Yu. Gribovsky, I. I. Chernikov. Battleship "Admiral Ushakov".
3. Top secret history of the Russian-Japanese war at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji.
4. M. Moss and I. Russell. Range and vision. The first hundred years of Barr & Stroud.