230 years ago, Ushakov defeated the "Crocodile of Naval Battles"

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230 years ago, Ushakov defeated the "Crocodile of Naval Battles"
230 years ago, Ushakov defeated the "Crocodile of Naval Battles"

Video: 230 years ago, Ushakov defeated the "Crocodile of Naval Battles"

Video: 230 years ago, Ushakov defeated the
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230 years ago, on July 3, 1788, the Sevastopol squadron defeated the Turkish fleet in the battle at Fidonisi. This was the first victory of the young Black Sea Fleet over the vastly superior enemy forces.

Background

After the defeat in the war of 1768-1774. and the subsequent loss of Crimea. Porta was preparing for a war with Russia. The Turks dreamed of revenge, wanted to return Crimea and drive Russia out of the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. France and England urged the Ottomans to war. The British and French exerted strong pressure on Istanbul, calling for "not to allow the Russian navy into the Black Sea." In August 1787, an ultimatum was presented to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, in which the Turks demanded the return of Crimea and the revision of the previously concluded treaties between Russia and Turkey. Petersburg rejected these impudent demands. In early September 1787, the Turkish authorities arrested the Russian ambassador Ya. I. Bulgakov without an official declaration of war, and the Turkish fleet under the command of the "Crocodile of naval battles" Hassan Pasha left the Bosphorus in the direction of the Dnieper-Bug estuary. A new Russian-Turkish war began.

Fleet status

On land, the Ottoman Empire had no advantage over the Russian army, but at sea the Turks had an overwhelming superiority. By 1787, the Turkish fleet had 29 ships of the line, 32 frigates, 32 corvettes, 6 bombardment ships and a significant number of auxiliary ships. However, some of the forces were in the Mediterranean Sea, and some of the ships were incapable of combat (poor condition, lack of weapons and trained personnel). 19 battleships, 16 frigates, 5 bombardment ships and a large number of galleys and other rowing ships were allocated for operations in the Black Sea. Before the war, the Turks tried to improve the material condition of the fleet. So, during the period of Hassan Pasha, shipbuilding in Turkey more strictly followed European models - ships and frigates were built according to the best French and Swedish drawings at that time. Ottoman ships of the line were two-decked and, as a rule, relatively larger than the Russians of their respective ranks. They also had a larger crew and often better weapons.

The Turkish command had high hopes for its fleet, planning to use supremacy at sea. The Turkish fleet, having a base in Ochakov, was supposed to blockade the Dnieper-Bug estuary, and then, with the help of landings, seize the Russian fortress Kinburn, strike at the shipyards in Kherson and conduct an operation to seize Crimea (the Turks hoped for the support of the local Crimean Tatars).

Russia, having annexed the Northern Black Sea region and Crimea, begins to actively develop the region, build a fleet, shipyards, ports. In 1783, on the shores of the Akhtiarskaya Bay, the construction of a city and a port began, which became the main base of the Russian fleet on the Black Sea. The new port was named Sevastopol. The basis for the creation of a new fleet was the ships of the Azov flotilla, built on the Don. Soon the fleet began to replenish with ships built at the shipyards of Kherson, a new city founded near the mouth of the Dnieper. Kherson became the main shipbuilding center in the south of the empire. In 1784 the first battleship of the Black Sea Fleet was launched in Kherson. The Black Sea Admiralty was also established here. Petersburg tried to speed up the formation of the Black Sea Fleet at the expense of a part of the Baltic Fleet. However, the Turks refused to let Russian ships pass from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

As a result, by the beginning of the war, naval bases and the shipbuilding industry on the Black Sea were in the process of being created. There was a shortage of the necessary supplies and materials for the construction, armament, equipment and repair of ships. There was a lack of ship masters, naval officers and trained sailors. The Black Sea was still poorly studied. The Russian fleet was much inferior to the Turkish one in the number of ships: by the beginning of hostilities, the Black Sea Fleet had only 4 ships of the line. In terms of the number of corvettes, brigs, transports and auxiliary vessels, the Turks had a superiority of about 3-4 times. Only in frigates, the Russian and Turkish fleets were approximately equal. The Russian battleships on the Black Sea were inferior in quality terms: in speed, artillery armament. In addition, the Russian fleet was divided into two parts. The core of the Black Sea Fleet, mainly large sailing ships, was based in Sevastopol, while rowing ships and a small part of the sailing fleet were in the Dnieper-Bug estuary (Liman flotilla). The main task of the fleet was the task of protecting the Black Sea coast in order to prevent the invasion of an enemy landing.

It is also worth noting that the Russian fleet had a weak command. Admirals such as N. S. Mordvinov and M. I. Voinovich, although they had the full support of the court and many necessary connections for career development, were not warriors. These admirals were indecisive, inept and lack of initiative, they were afraid of an open battle. They adhered to linear tactics, they believed that it was impossible to engage in a decisive battle with an adversary with a visible superiority. That is, it was believed that if the enemy has more ships, people and guns, then it is impossible to enter the battle, since defeat is inevitable. The Russian fleet was lucky that at this time among the senior officers of the fleet there was a decisive and outstanding military organizer Fyodor Fyodorovich Ushakov. Ushakov had no connections at court, was not a well-born aristocrat and achieved everything with his talent and hard work, devoting his whole life to the navy. The commander-in-chief of land and naval forces in the south of the empire, Field Marshal Prince G. A. Potyomkin saw Ushakov's talent and supported him. In the Liman flotilla, brave and determined foreigners were appointed senior commanders in time: the French prince K. Nassau-Siegen and the American captain P. Jones.

The Russian fleet, despite its youth and weakness, was able to successfully resist a strong enemy. In 1787-1788. The Liman flotilla successfully repulsed all enemy attacks, the Turkish command lost many ships. The Turks could not use their superiority in large sailing ships with powerful artillery weapons, since a situation arose on the Liman, reminiscent of the situation on the Baltic skerries during the Northern War, when the mobile rowing ships of Tsar Peter successfully fought the Swedish fleet. In the Ochakovsky naval battle (June 7, 17-18, 1788), the Turks suffered a severe defeat. For two days of the battle ("The defeat of the Turkish fleet in the Ochakov battle"), the Turkish fleet lost 10 (out of 16) battleships and frigates brought by the kapudan pasha to Liman. Nassau-Siegen estimated the total enemy losses at 478 guns and 2,000 dead sailors. In addition, 1,673 Turkish officers and sailors were captured.

Thus, the Sultan's fleet lost ten large ships and hundreds of sailors. However, the Ottomans still retained enough strength to fight at sea and an advantage over the Russian sailing fleet.

Battle of the island of Fidonisi

While there were fierce battles in the Dnieper-Bug estuary, the Sevastopol squadron was inactive, being at its base. Rear Admiral Voinovich was afraid of a battle with superior enemy forces. The indecisive admiral constantly found a reason not to take ships out to sea. Late with the withdrawal of the fleet to the sea, in the fall he exposed the ships to a severe storm. The squadron was repaired for more than six months. Only in the spring of 1788 was combat capability restored. Voinovich was again in no hurry to go to sea. Knowing the numerical strength of the Ottoman fleet of Hassan Pasha, he was afraid of meeting the enemy and came up with various excuses to postpone the departure of the squadron to the sea. Only after the decisive demands of Potemkin, Voinovich's squadron went to sea.

On June 18, 1788, the Sevastopol naval squadron consisting of two battleships, two 50-gun and eight 40-gun frigates (552 guns), one 18-gun frigate, twenty small cruising ships and three fire ships went to sea. The fleet commander, Rear Admiral Voinovich (flag on the 66-gun ship Transfiguration of the Lord), in accordance with Potemkin's order, sent the fleet to Ochakov to distract the Turkish fleet from it.

On the same day, the commander of the Turkish fleet, Kapudan Pasha Gassan (Hasan Pasha), after the Ochakov defeat with the ships that had broken through from the Dnieper estuary, anchored near the island of Berezan, where he was repairing ships and soon joined the squadron, which included the largest Turkish ships. The Ottoman fleet now consisted of 17 ships of the line, including five 80-gun (no less than 1120 guns in total), 8 frigates, 3 bombardment ships, 21 small cruising ships (shebeks, kirlangichi, etc.). Thus, only the main forces of the Turkish fleet had a two-fold superiority in the number of guns and an even greater superiority in the weight of the side salvo. Voinovich could oppose seventeen Turkish ships with a line of twelve ships and frigates, of which only four were armed with large-caliber guns, equivalent to those of Turkish ships. These were 66-cannon "Transfiguration of the Lord" and "St. Paul", as well as 50-cannon "Andrew the First-Called" and "St. George the Victorious".

The Voinovich squadron, delayed by the winds, only on June 29, when Potemkin's army was already approaching Ochakov, reached Tendra Island, where it found the enemy fleet holding north-west of Tendra. On the morning of June 30, 1788, Voinovich went to rapprochement with the enemy, who maintained an upwind position. Considering the balance of forces, the Russian admiral, in agreement with his junior flagship, the avant-garde commander, brigadier-rank captain Ushakov (flag on the 66-gun ship "St. Paul"), decided to wait for the attack of the Turks in the leeward position. This made it possible to better hold the dense formation of the battle line and guaranteed the use of artillery from the lower decks and, therefore, partly compensated for the superiority of the enemy in artillery. However, Hassan Pasha refrained from attacking. For three days the fleets maneuvered in full view of each other, gradually shifting to the southwest, towards the mouth of the Danube, and moving away from Ochakov.

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By July 3 (14), both fleets were located opposite the mouth of the Danube, near the island of Fidonisi. Hassan Pasha, deciding to attack, went around the entire fleet on his flagship and gave instructions to the junior flagships and ship commanders. After 13 hours, the Ottoman fleet in two dense columns began to descend to attack the Russian fleet. The first column was made up of the vanguard under the personal command of the Kapudan Pasha (6 ships), the second - the corps de battalion (6 ships) and the rearguard (5 ships), respectively, under the command of the vice admiral and rear admiral. The commander of the Russian avant-garde Ushakov, believing that the enemy was trying to attack and cut off the rearguard of the Sevastopol squadron, ordered the forward frigates Berislav and Strela to add sails and keep in a steep sidewind, so that, “having won the wind, make the frontline through a counter-march turn and with it beat the enemy with the wind."

Assessing this threat, the Turkish admiral with the vanguard turned to the left, and soon the entire Turkish fleet began to line up opposite the Russian. At the same time, Ushakov's vanguard was closer to the enemy. At about 2 pm the Turks opened fire and attacked two comparatively weak Russian forward frigates. Turkish bombardment ships, one by one behind the lines of their vanguard, cordebatalia (middle column) and rearguard. Maintaining the fire of the battleships, they continuously fired from heavy mortars, but without much success.

Noticing the enemy's maneuver, Ushakov on "Pavla", attacked by one 80-gun and two 60-gun ships of the Turkish vanguard, ordered all the sails to be set and, together with the leading frigates, led to the wind even steeper, approaching the Turkish vanguard. At the same time, Russian frigates, going out into the wind and engaging in heavy combat at close range, began to cut off two advanced Turkish ships. One of them immediately turned the overstag and got out of the battle, and the other soon also repeated his maneuver, receiving several brandskugels and cannonballs from Russian frigates. In an effort to return his ships to service, Gassan Pasha ordered to open fire on them, but he was left alone, being attacked by two Russian frigates and the 66-gun "St. Paul" Ushakov who came to their aid, repelling the attacks of their opponents. Despite the superiority in the weight of the side salvo, the flagship of Gassan Pasha was unable to disable the relatively weak Russian frigates. The Turks traditionally hit the spars and rigging in order to incapacitate as many people as possible (the Russian gunners preferred to hit the hull), and the Ottoman gunners' fire itself was not sufficiently marked. Only "Berislav" got a big hole at the stem from a 40-kg stone core.

The flagship of the Turkish fleet itself was heavily damaged by the fire of Russian ships firing from a grapeshot range. Meanwhile, Voinovich remained a passive observer of the heated battle of the vanguards, not supporting his junior flagship, although he changed course, following the movements of the latter. Eight ships of the Russian center and rearguard fought with the enemy at a distance of 3-4 cables. The passivity of the main forces of the Russian squadron allowed the ships of the Turkish vice admiral and rear admiral to break down and rush to support their kapudan pasha. At the same time, the Turkish vice-admiral ship twice caught fire from brandskugels from the frigate Kinburn, and then came under attack from St. Paul. The enemy's rear admiral ship was also unable to effectively support Hassan Pasha. Finally, at about 16 hours 55 minutes, the Turkish admiral, unable to withstand the concentrated fire of the Russian avant-garde, turned the overstag and hurried out of the battle. The rest of the Turkish ships hurriedly followed him, and the battle ended.

Outcomes

Thus, in successfully repelling the attack of the superior forces of the Ottoman fleet, the decisive actions of Ushakov played a decisive role, who managed not only to upset the plan of Hassan Pasha with maneuvers, but also to focus the fire of three ships of his vanguard against the enemy flagship. Fighting at grapeshot ranges, Ushakov did not allow the enemy to use the advantage in the number of guns, and decisively defeated the enemy vanguard. The retreat of the Turkish flagship led to the withdrawal of the entire enemy fleet. The losses of the Turkish fleet in people are not exactly known, but all the flagships and several ships of the enemy's vanguard received serious damage to the hull, spars, rigging and sails. The Russian fleet lost only seven sailors and soldiers killed and wounded, six of them were in the three ships of the Ushakovsky avant-garde - "St. Paul", "Berislav" and "Kinburn". There were no casualties on Strela. "Pavel", "Berislav" and "Strela" received some damage to the mast, rigging and sails. Of the other ships in the fleet, only the 40-gun frigate Fanagoria, like the Berislav, was pierced in the underwater part by a cannonball, which caused a strong leak.

After the battle, Voinovich, fearing to pursue the enemy, continued to go to the shores of the Crimea. He wrote to Ushakov: “I congratulate you, Bachushka Fedor Fedorovich. That date you acted very bravely: you gave the captain-pasha a decent supper. I could see everything. What does God give us in the evening?.. I will tell you later, but our fleet deserved honor and resisted such a force. In the next three days, the Ottoman fleet followed the Russian, but did not dare to join the battle anymore. Voinovich was still expecting an attack in a closed line and in a leeward position, relying on his junior flagship. On July 5, he wrote to Ushakov: “If the Pasha-captain comes up to you, burn the damned man… If it’s quiet, send me often your opinions about what you foresee… My hope is in you, there is no shortage of courage”. By the evening of July 6, 1788, the Turkish fleet turned to sea, and on the morning of July 7, it disappeared from sight towards the shores of Rumelia (the European part of Turkey).

Voinovich did not develop success and, having arrived in Sevastopol, was in no hurry to go out to sea again in order to engage the enemy, making the excuse to eliminate essentially minor damage. At the same time, Gassan Pasha, having corrected the damage, on July 29 again approached Ochakov, from where he retired to the Bosphorus only on November 4, 1788, having learned about the belated exit to the sea (November 2) of the Sevastopol fleet. This slowed down the siege of Ochakov, which was taken only on December 6.

As a result, despite the fact that the battle at Fidonisi did not have a significant impact on the course of the campaign, it was the first victory of the ship's Black Sea Fleet over the significantly superior enemy forces. The complete domination of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea is a thing of the past. On July 28, the Empress wrote to Potemkin with enthusiasm: “The action of the Sevastopol fleet made me happy: it is almost unbelievable, with what little power God helps to beat the strong Turkish weapons! Tell me, how can I please Voinovich? Crosses of the third class have already been sent to you, will you give him one, or a sword? Count Voinovich received the Order of St. George, III degree.

Potemkin, in the course of the ensuing conflict between Voinovich and Ushakov, quickly figured out the essence of the matter and found a way to side with the younger flagship. Having removed Rear Admiral Mordvinov from the post of a senior member of the Black Sea Admiralty Board (soon dismissed from service) in December 1788, Potemkin appointed Voinovich in his place in January 1789, who soon left for Kherson. Ushakov began to act as commander of the Sevastopol ship fleet. On April 27, 1789, he was promoted to rear admiral, and a year later, on March 14, 1790, he was appointed commander of the fleet. Under the command of Ushakov, the Russian fleet decisively beat the enemy and seized the strategic initiative at sea.

230 years ago, Ushakov smashed
230 years ago, Ushakov smashed

Russian naval commander Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov

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