Some reflections on our Project 885 Yasen and 885M Yasen M nuclear submarines with cruise missiles.
About the tasks of the MAPL
Unlike SSBNs, they are not easy to identify. With the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, everything is simple: its main task in peacetime is nuclear deterrence, and in the military - full-scale nuclear missile retaliation to anyone who encroaches. But with multipurpose nuclear submarines, everything is much more complicated for the simple reason that there is a very wide range of tasks that you want to assign to this class of ships.
Destroy enemy submarines targeting our SSBNs, preparing to strike the SLCM "Tomahawk" or covering the enemy AUG? Without any doubt! Destroy enemy surface warships - both single and operating as part of KUG, AUG or amphibious formations? Absolutely and obligatory! Suppress hostile sea communications, sinking military transports, carrying something booming and booming to our mainland? Of course! To strike at ground targets, enemy infrastructure? How else!
But is it possible to create an MPSL that would be equally effective in solving such different tasks? Technically, yes. But, as practice shows, the cost of such a solution will exceed all conceivable limits and counting on some mass equipment of such ships of the fleet is a perfect utopia.
About nuclear super ships
It is interesting that attempts to create MAPLs with extremely high performance characteristics were made twice, in the USA and the USSR / RF. The Americans built the Seawulf, the most grandiose death machine for its time. But even in the most optimistic plans, they did not envisage a complete transfer of their naval forces to MPSS of this type - the maximum program for the construction of the Sivulfs assumed the commissioning of only 29 submarines. In fact, this turned out to be too much, so in the end the series "dried up" to only 3 units. The choice was made in favor of the less "militant" nuclear submarines of the "Virginia" type, which had more modest performance characteristics, but, at the same time, a significantly lower price.
As for the USSR, work on the creation of a universal MAPL was carried out in it since 1977, and was finally embodied in metal in the 885M or Yasen-M project. The lead ship of this project was Kazan, and I really hope that it will join the Russian Navy in 2020. As for the “original” Ash, unfortunately, Severodvinsk, due to a number of compromises between the wishes of the sailors and the budget of the Navy turned out to be, to a certain extent, an "intermediate" ship, in which it was not possible to implement all the possible and necessary technologies.
But what will the Russian Navy “in the face” of “Kazan” get in the end? In fact, it is the largest multipurpose nuclear submarine in the world, whose surface displacement is likely to exceed 8,000 tons, although it probably does not reach the 8,600 tons of Severodvinsk. A similar figure for Seawulf is 7,460 tons, Virginia - depending on the modification and according to various sources, from 7,080 to 7,925 tons, the British Astute - 6,500 tons. Why is this?
Of course, the performance characteristics of "Ash-M" are secret, but they, apparently, differ from those of "Ash". It is known, for example, that the hull of the project 885M is 9 meters shorter, which gives reason to assume a slightly lower displacement in comparison with the "original" "Ash" of the project 885. In addition, the composition of the armament has probably changed. While Ash carries 10 torpedo tubes and 8 vertical launchers (VPUs) for missiles, Yasen-M, presumably, has 8 torpedo tubes and 10 TLUs. The total ammunition load of "Ash" is 30 torpedoes / rocket-torpedoes or missiles used from torpedo tubes and 32 missiles in the VPU. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the Ash-M ammunition will be 24 torpedoes or the same amount of other ammunition for torpedo tubes and 40 missiles.
So, the first answer to the reasons for the large displacement of the most modern domestic MAPL is the composition of its armament. Seawulf and Astyut do not carry a TLU at all, while Virginia, depending on the modification, has a TLU for 12, and Block V even has 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles. And it is this modification of the Virginia that is approaching in terms of its surface displacement to our Ash-M. But it should be borne in mind that the American VPUs are more compact - simply due to the fact that the American Tomahawks are much lighter than the domestic “Calibers” and, moreover, “Onyxes”.
In addition, one should not forget that British and American nuclear submarines are single-hull, while Yasen-M is a one-and-a-half-hull ship, which obviously makes the hull of our submarine somewhat heavier.
Be that as it may, in the person of "Kazan" our Navy will receive a very formidable submarine cruiser-station wagon, quite capable of effectively solving the tasks listed above. In theory, "Ash-M" should get all the best that we could come up with for our divers. It is possible, of course, that this is not so, and that our science and industry was able to provide even better torpedoes, GAK and other units and equipment (yes, here are the same water cannons, for example) than what is actually installed on the Ash M ". But such things should be attributed already to our internal oversights and undercover games, and not to "punctures" in the concept of the ship. For example, nothing prevents the Yasen-M from equipping with high-quality counter-torpedoes and submarine imitator traps - there would be these same torpedoes / traps and desire.
In other words, in the person of Yasen-M, we can really get (and, I want to believe, we will get) a universal multipurpose nuclear submarine of extreme characteristics … but its cost, according to various estimates, is 1.5-2 times higher than that of Project 955 SSBNs " Northwind. " Which, by the way, is in good agreement with the results obtained in the USA. Their serial "Ohio", which entered service in the 90s, cost 1, 3-1, 5 billion dollars, while the cost of a serial nuclear submarine of the type "Seawolf" - "Connecticut" - was estimated at 2.4 billion. dollars, but in fact most likely came out even more expensive.
But the cost of building serial "Virginias" at some point fell to as much as $ 1.8 billion, despite the fact that they were built much later, already in the 21st century, and the dollar has noticeably "relieved" since then - by the amount of inflation … Then, of course, inflation took its toll, the cost of the same Illinois transferred to the fleet in 2016 reached $ 2.7 billion. But let's not forget that Connecticut entered service in December 1998, and Illinois - in October 2016, the dollar inflation during this time was 47.4%, that is, in 1998 prices, "Illinois" would cost only 1.83 billion dollars, that is, at least 1.3 times cheaper than the serial ship of the "Seawulf" class.
In other words, the United States, having won the Cold War and being at the peak of its economic power, nevertheless curtailed the construction of super-Seawulfs in favor of mass production of cheaper MAPLs. But the Russian Federation, having completely incomparable economic opportunities with the United States, began the serial construction of Yasenei-M with extreme performance characteristics.
Another planning mistake?
Having read these lines, the dear reader is probably quite sure that the author will now once again attack the RF Ministry of Defense with criticism. But … not in this case.
First, we apparently had no choice at all. As mentioned earlier, the universal MAPL began to be developed back in the USSR, and by the time of its collapse it was the most modern project available. The creation of a new project in the 2000s promised to drag on, if not indefinitely, then for a very long time, while the "wild 90s" and the financing of the fleet "a teaspoon per year" in the period 2000-2010. led to a landslide reduction of MAPLs in the Russian Navy. It was simply impossible to wait, do nothing until the development of an optimal project for the Navy, and bordered on a crime. We have already “reformed” to the point where at some point there is only 1 (ONE) multipurpose nuclear submarine of the “Shchuka-B” type left for the entire Pacific Fleet.
Secondly, many of the novelties that Yasen-M received should have been tested in metal before taking on the creation of more advanced analogs for the newest MAPL.
Third, in 2011-2020. The Russian Federation had to revive the production facilities for the construction of the submarine fleet. If at all we wanted (and we wanted) to preserve this industry, it was necessary to order multipurpose nuclear submarines, and - urgently. And the only project that could be quickly "brought to mind" and to the bookmark was just "Ash-M".
Fourth, the emergence of "white elephants" - that is, the construction of a limited series of nuclear-powered submarine "supercruisers" of extreme characteristics, at least in theory, fits well into the concept of the Russian Navy.
On the usefulness of MAPL of limiting characteristics
In a full-scale conflict with the United States, even a relatively small number of such submarines can have a deterrent effect on the operations of the American surface forces. Not a single American admiral will want to become a target for a missile salvo of 40 Zircons, so the enemy AUG and KUG will have to act much more carefully than they could. But it should be understood that in the foreseeable future the Russian Federation may be threatened not only by a total nuclear missile Armageddon, but also by conflicts of a lower rank, with the use of only conventional weapons.
You can say as much as you like that "we are a nuclear power" and "if anything, the whole world is in dust!", But the fact is that China, having attacked Damansky, for some reason ignored all our Soviet "nuclearity" The USSR, on the other hand, solved the Chinese question, albeit radically, but quite conventionally. And in recent history even the former Georgia, the present Georgia, which cannot be found on the world map without a magnifying glass, has managed to attack Tskhinvali, killing our peacekeepers. And again, the question was solved by us by strictly conventional means. We can also recall the foreign experience - England in 1982 was also in no hurry to grab the "nuclear club", preferring to decide on the ownership of the Falkland Islands "on fists." Moreover, taking into account the noticeable number of British Marines killed and wounded in bayonet battles with the Argentine infantry, “on the fists” it was possible to write without quotation marks.
In general, peace in the whole world is still very, very far away. There are plenty of territorial claims to our country - take at least the Kuril Islands. Moreover, the United States with its "Arab springs" and "revolutions of orange dignity" is striving to create military and political chaos on our borders. To effectively resist all this, the Russian Federation absolutely needs to have powerful general-purpose armed forces - ground, space, air, and, no doubt, naval. It is only due to the geographical factor that we are forced to split our ships between 5 theaters: the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas, the North and the Far East.
It turns out interesting. If we sum up the number of all our fleets, then the Russian Navy has every right to claim the third place in the world after the US and Chinese navies. In terms of combat potential, taking into account the quality of our submarines, we can, perhaps, speak of parity with China - they, of course, set up destroyers and corvettes, as we never dreamed of, but in the part of the submarine at the "Yellow Dragon" everything is not so simple … Thus, the Russian Navy, even in spite of the landslide reduction in its composition, is still a significant force, providing the Russian Federation with a worthy place among the great maritime powers. But this is if you count the total size of the fleet.
But if you look at each maritime theater separately, then the picture is not at all rosy. Today, we are simply unable to saturate our fleet with such a number of ships, in which each individual fleet outnumbered, or at least stood on a par with the strongest navies of the powers present there. The Pacific Fleet is inferior to the Japanese Navy in the Far East, the Northern is hardly on par with His Majesty's fleet, the Baltic is weaker than the German Navy, and the Black Sea has a much smaller ship composition than the Turkish Navy.
Accordingly, in order to effectively prevent possible non-nuclear conflicts with serious maritime powers, or, if it was not possible to prevent, then to win them, an inter-theater maneuver of our Navy forces is necessary. Yes, it will take some time, but in the modern world such conflicts usually do not arise from scratch - they are preceded by a certain period of political tension, during which it is quite possible to have time to make the necessary “castling”. And our "Yaseni-M", being extremely powerful and versatile warships, are the best suited for the role of the very "cavalry" capable of quickly strengthening our naval presence at the right time in the right theater.
It is clear that MPSS will not go to the Baltic or Black Seas, but other means of reinforcement are possible there. But the entire world ocean, including our northern and Far Eastern borders, as well as the Mediterranean Sea, is quite accessible to the ships of the 885M project.
Initially, GPV 2011-2020. included too few "Ash" - only 7 units, of which there were only six truly modern "Ash". This was absolutely not enough for the Russian Navy, and the author was heartily happy about the news of the laying of two more ships of the project 885M, which should have brought the total number of Yasenei-M to 8. Ideally, at least 3 more Yasenya-M should have been built. "To form a division of 6 ships (including" Severodvinsk ") in the Northern and Pacific fleets.
What's next?
Despite the high cost of Yasenei-M, the budget of the Russian Federation is quite capable of withstanding the construction of 3 more ships of this type. Of course, not right away, but as the Boreev-A and Yasenei-M, which are now under construction, are gradually handed over to the fleet, slipways and production capacities will be freed up, so why not? But even in this case, the total number of MAPLs of projects 885 and 885M will be only 12 units, which the fleet will receive in no way earlier than by 2030. And this, of course, is not at all on a par with the threats we face.
We will try to make an optimistic forecast of what general submarine forces the Northern Fleet will have in 2030, provided that the 3 Yasen-M is laid in addition to those already ordered. In this case, the Northern Fleet will receive, in addition to Severodvinsk, another 5 Yasenei-M, and in addition, most likely, the fleet will have 2 or even 3 more modernized Antey (Voronezh, Smolensk and Eagle ), which will make it possible to form a full-fledged anti-aircraft division on the Soviet model of 8-9 ships.
In addition, at present, the Northern Fleet includes 6 MAPLs of project 971 of various modifications. It is hoped that 5 of them will still remain in service by 2030. But here's the "Panther", delivered to the fleet in 1990, exactly "knock" for 40 years, despite the fact that the last repair, to date, she completed in 2008. Chances that in the period 2020-2030. it will receive serious modernization with an extension of its service life is relatively small, so, most likely, if by 2030 it will still be in the fleet, then it will already be in full readiness to "retire." As for the MAPLs of earlier projects, even if by some miracle they remain in the Northern Fleet, they will already have a minimum combat value.
With diesel-electric submarines, the situation is as follows: all 7 "Halibuts" of Project 877 will obviously go on a well-deserved rest, since their service life will reach or exceed 40 years. In addition to them, there is also the lead ship of the project 677 "St. Petersburg". It is also assumed that out of 4 diesel-electric submarines of the "Lada" type, which are currently under construction, or ordered for such, one ("Velikie Luki") will also go to the Northern Fleet. In general, in the optimistic scenario, in which we will succeed with Project 667, and we will have time to deploy their serial construction in the current decade, the Northern Fleet by 2030 will be able to include up to 8 diesel-electric submarines of Project 677.
And in total, 22 submarines are obtained at the Northern Fleet, including: 14 submarines, of which six are of the 4th generation, eight are of the 3rd generation and 8 diesel-electric submarines. I repeat, in an optimistic scenario. Now let's see what our "sworn friends" have.
The US Navy currently has at least 28 Los Angeles-class submarines (the status of Olympia and Louisville is not clear - perhaps they are preparing for scrapping, if not, then 30), 3 Seawulf-class ships and 19 -type "Virginia". That is, at least 50 submarines, not counting the four converted into carriers of cruise missiles Ohio-class SSBNs. It is possible, of course, that this number may decrease further, since the Americans are very energetically writing off their Los Angeles, and a situation may arise when the arrival of the newest Virginia will not compensate for the incapacitation of the ships of the previous generation. But the US has 9 Virginias under construction, and there is an order for 10 more ships. Thus, even if new orders do not follow, which is extremely doubtful, the total number of Virginia in the US Navy will reach 38 units, and the total number of 4th generation MAPLs will reach 41 units. (plus 3 "Seawulf"). Taking into account the fact that the Americans are striving today to lay down 2 MPSs a year, the completion of the construction of the 38th Virginia will take place no later than 2031. This is the minimum below which the American fleet will not fall, while it can be assumed that the Americans are will strive to maintain their submarine fleet of MAPLs at a level of no less than 50 units. But, since we have an optimistic scenario for Russia here, let's assume that by 2030 the US Navy will have 40 MAPLs. Of which, no doubt, they will be able to allocate 15-18 ships for operations in the northern seas. They will be supported by 8 Astyut-class submarines of the British Navy (today - 3 in service, 4 in construction, a contract has been signed for 1) and 6 French Barracuda-class submarines.
And, of course, 6 diesel-electric submarines of Norway, although it will not be possible to predict now what kind of boats it will be. The Norwegians were going to build new ships to replace their 6 diesel-electric submarines "Ula", but they delayed the contract, and it is possible that by 2030 it is the "Uly" (peers of our "Halibuts") that will still form the basis of the submarine forces of the fleet of this northern country …
And all in all, NATO in the northern theater by 2030 turns out - 35-38 submarines, including 29-32 submarines of the 4th generation and 6 diesel-electric submarines.
Thus, we get more than double the superiority of NATO in the MPS, while we will have only 5 full-fledged 4th generation ships (Severodvinsk is still intermediate) against 29-32 American and European ones. That is, for equivalent ships, the ratio will be approximately 1: 6 not in our favor. And 8 of our MAPLs of projects 945A, 971 and 971M, even if modernized, will still be inferior to their foreign counterparts in a number of parameters. In other words, even in the optimistic scenario, in terms of MPSS, by 2030 there is an overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of NATO countries, while a small advantage in diesel-electric submarines, of course, cannot compensate for it.
Having received such an alignment in an optimistic scenario, I no longer want to talk about a pessimistic one.
conclusions
According to the author, which he, however, does not impose on anyone, the construction of 9 multipurpose nuclear submarines of projects 885 and 885M is fully justified, and meets the urgent needs of the Navy. Only the small size of the series can be criticized here: I would very much like to increase the number of "Ash" and "Ash-M" in our fleet to 12 units in order to form 2 divisions of such ships - one each for the Northern and Pacific fleets.
However, the further construction of highly efficient, versatile (and therefore extremely expensive) submarines with the maximum characteristics, will not allow us to create a submarine fleet of the size we need. In the future, we will need other submarines.
