Laying out the material “The death of the cruiser“Izumrud”, the author naively believed that he was talking about quite obvious cases, and did not at all expect that the article would cause such a lively discussion. However, both in the comments and in a separate material published later by one of the participants in the discussion, so many interesting things were expressed that there is no way to ignore this variety of hypotheses and postulates.
The article presented to your attention is reflections on a number of opinions expressed by certain participants in the discussion, and which seemed to the author the most interesting. So…
Liar, liar
What has always surprised me is the tendency of my fellow citizens to be extremely tough, if not to say cruel assessment of the actions of our own ancestors. Today we have any fault, we study every historical document, like a ruthless prosecutor, whose credo: "The absence of a criminal record is not your merit, but our fault." And if we only discover some inconsistencies - that's it, the guilt of the "defendant" is fully proven, and this or that historical character is declared a deceiver unworthy of trust. Moreover, having proved the "guilt" of a historical person in one thing, we do not believe any of his words, because the one who lied once will lie the second time.
But is it right?
It is well known that the human need for judgment arose thousands of years ago. Since then, the methods for determining the right and the wrong have been continuously improved and changed many times. We can say that the principles of legal proceedings existing today (may the professional lawyers forgive me for the vagueness in terminology) contain the wisdom of the ages - perhaps they are imperfect, but this is the best that mankind has thought of to date. What is the basis of today's justice?
In relation to the accused, 2 most important principles apply, the first of which is the presumption of innocence. The essence of this principle is that the burden of proving criminal guilt lies with the prosecutor, and from this there are two important consequences:
1. The accused is not obliged to prove his innocence.
2. Irremovable doubts about the guilt of the accused shall be interpreted in his favor.
The second principle is that the accused has the right to a defense. This is expressed in the fact that the accused:
1. Must know what he is accused of.
2. Can rebut incriminating evidence and provide evidence to justify it.
3. Has the right to defend his legitimate interests by other means and methods.
So, you need to understand that when we bring the descendants of this or that historical person to the court, we seriously violate the modern procedure of justice, if only by the fact that we can in no way give the “defendant” to exercise his right to defense. The reason is objective: the “defendant” has already died long ago and cannot defend his interests in any way, having given “testimony” in our “court”. Well, nothing can be done about this, but it is all the more important to observe in relation to those whom we judge at least the presumption of innocence.
And in simple terms, it is not worthwhile, having found this or that discrepancy in historical documents, to declare the person who committed it in all mortal sins. Before accusing a person of anything, even having seemingly "irrefutable facts" in your hands, you should think about it - maybe the whole point is that we have not taken into account something?
VN Fersen's report - a deception?
Let's start, probably, on the morning of May 15, when the baron decided not to carry out the order of his immediate commander, Rear Admiral N. I. Nebogatov, and did not surrender his cruiser to the enemy. Emerald went for a breakthrough. Here is how V. N. Ferzen describes it in his report:
“The confusion caused by the surrender of our ships distracted the enemy's attention from me for the first time and allowed me to move forward a little. Lay down on SO, as on a course, equally diverting from the cruisers to the right and left.
The right cruisers, Niitaka, Kasagi and Chitose, however, soon chased after me."
Alas, the composition of the Japanese squad is completely untrue. In fact, the "cruisers on the right" are the 6th combat unit, which included "Suma", "Chiyoda", "Akitsushima" and "Izumi" before the battle of Tsushima. "Kasagi" from the squadron of N. I. Nebogatov was not there at all, and "Chitose", although it really was in the future chasing the "Emerald", but the distance between them was such that it could hardly be identified on the Russian cruiser, but simply seen.
And here is the fact - V. N. Fersen in his report incorrectly indicated the names of the enemy cruisers. Is this a mistake, or is it a deliberate lie? Well, the motive is present: since the Chitose and Kasagi are one of the fastest Japanese cruisers, they, of course, will be able to get to Vladivostok much faster than the Emerald. But if so, it turns out that V. N. Fersen to Vladimir Bay is more than justified. So, there is a motive, and therefore V. N. Fersen lied, twice (once for each cruiser).
But if we do not rush, we will see that this hypothesis is completely refuted by the very same report of V. N. Fersen. First, V. N. Fersen writes that in the course of the chase "I have, although insignificant, but still an advantage in the course." Agree, the authorities will find it difficult to assume that the less fast Japanese cruisers following the Emerald will be able to get to Vladivostok faster than the latter. If we take into account the drop in speed of the Russian cruiser to 13 knots, then, again, there is no need to invent any "Kasagi" - any Japanese cruiser was now noticeably faster than the "Izumrud" and could be the first to reach Vladivostok. Secondly, if we assume malicious intent on the part of V. N. Fersen, one would expect that he would directly write in the report that Kasagi and Chitose would go to guard Vladivostok, but this is not the case.
Without bothering the dear reader by quoting various fragments of the report, I note that V. N. Fersen, at the beginning of his breakthrough, saw the Japanese cruisers both to his right and to his left (which, among other things, was mentioned in the quote above). He identified the "right" cruisers incorrectly, but the "left" ones, it seems, did not make out at all, mentioning only that the Japanese detachment consists of 6 cruisers. It can be assumed that V. N. Fersen saw the 5th combat unit of the Japanese: "Chin-Yen", three "Matsushima" together with the advice note "Yasyama" - not far from them was also the 4th combat unit, so the mistake in one ship is quite understandable.
So V. N. Fersen points out in his report that, in his opinion, it was not the cruisers on his right that pursuing him that went to Vladivostok, but 6 "left" cruisers.
And it turns out that if the commander of the "Izumrud" would like to "rub in the glasses" to his superiors, then he should "find" "Chitose" and "Kasagi" not in the right, pursuing his detachment, but in the left, which seems to have gone to Vladivostok! But he did not, and if so, then there was no motive for deliberately lying that he was pursued by two Japanese "fast ships" at V. N. Fersen is not visible. But what happened then?
Let's take a look at the silhouettes of the cruisers Chitose and Kasagi
And let's compare them with the silhouettes of the cruisers of the 6th Combat Squad.
As you can easily see, all cruisers have two pipes and two masts, located with a slope to the stern. Of course, you can see the differences - for example, the "Akitsushima" mast is located in front of the bow superstructure, and the rest of the ships - behind it. But V. N. After all, Fersen was not looking at the pictures in the album, but the enemy's warships, and at a great distance. As we know, the Emerald did not open fire during its breakthrough, because the distance was too great for its weapons. At the same time, the 120-mm cannons of the Russian cruiser could fire at 9.5 kilometers, that is, the Japanese ships did not approach the Izumrud closer than this distance.
Finally, we should not forget about the color of the ships of the United Fleet, which, as you know, could make identification difficult - especially at long distances.
So, taking into account the similarity of the silhouettes and the range of distances, it is absolutely not surprising that V. N. Fersen mistook the same "Akitsushima" for "Kasagi" or "Chitose" - and should we look for some malicious intent in this?
Not just a liar, but an illiterate liar?
The next mistake of V. N. Fersen, who amused many from the bottom of her heart, is the presence in the diagram he painted of the battleship Yasima, which, as you know, died as a result of a mine explosion near Port Arthur and therefore could not participate in the Tsushima battle.
However, many history buffs know that the Japanese were very successful in hiding the fact of the death of the Yashima, and therefore the Russians were quite expecting to meet him in battle. But the point is that in fact in Tsushima the Japanese had one three-pipe ("Sikishima") and three two-pipe battleships. And on the diagram of V. N. Fersen listed four two-pipe battleships - "Asahi", "Mikasa", "Fuji" and "Yashima"! This was the reason to accuse V. N. Fersen in terrible unprofessionalism - the commander of a cruiser, and does not even know the silhouettes of the ships that make up the backbone of the enemy fleet …
It seems to be so, but … Let's still apply the same presumption of innocence and think about whether it is possible that the error in the identification of Japanese ships is not related to the unprofessionalism of the Emerald commander.
It is quite obvious that by the time the 1st combat detachment appeared, when the Japanese cruisers were already surrounded by the remnants of the Russian squadron from all sides, V. N. Fersen had more than enough cares and concerns. And the exact identification of the Japanese battleships was somewhere at the very bottom of the plentiful list of tasks before it. It can be assumed that he did not do this at all, and only then, after the separation, some signalman reported to him that he had seen four two-pipe Japanese battleships. The mistake, again, is forgivable given the range, the angle of the Japanese ships and their color. Accordingly, by the method of simple exclusion V. N. Fersen determined that in front of him were "Asahi", "Mikasa", "Fuji" and "Yashima" (there is no three-pipe "Sikishima") and indicated this in the report on the diagram.
Is this option possible? Quite. We, of course, cannot establish today in any way how things really were: maybe this way, maybe that way. And this means that from the point of view of justice we are dealing with a classic case of the existence of irrevocable doubts about the guilt of the accused. So why, in accordance with the presumption of innocence, not interpret them in favor of V. N. Fersen?
As we hear, so we write
A few words about the classic mistake of a novice researcher, which is an overly literal perception of what is written in historical documents.
The fact is that the maritime service (like any other) has its own specifics and those who chose it as their path, of course, know this specifics. But those who read historical documents are not always familiar with it and, as a rule, not in full. Hence, annoying misunderstandings arise. When a naval officer draws up a report, he writes it for his immediate superiors, who are fully aware of the specifics of the service and who does not need to explain all the nuances in a wordy "from the beginning". And when a layman undertakes to analyze a report, he does not know these nuances and from this he can easily get into a mess.
Let's re-read the article "Some aspects of rewarding for bravery in case of non-observance of orders." In it, the author decided to check the statement of V. N. Fersen:
"… headed to a point equally distant from Vladivostok and the bay of St. Vladimir, decided to reach 50 miles from the coast and there, depending on the circumstances, go either to Vladivostok or to Vladimir."
And the author seems to have done a brilliant job - he made a map of the movement of the "Izumrud", found the turning point into Vladimir Bay and … saw that it was not at all equidistant from Vladivostok and from Vladimir, because Vladivostok was as much as 30 miles further, or about 55, 5 km.
What will this work tell the reader? There is already one of two things - or V. N. Fersen did not consider the passage to Vladivostok at all and initially walked closer to Vladimir Bay, or V. N. Fersen and with him the rest of the officers of the "Emerald" are so ignorant of naval affairs that they are unable even to determine on the map a point equidistant from two geographical points. And the reader, of course, comes to an "obvious" conclusion - or V. N. Fersen is a liar or a layman.
What is it really? We open the testimony of V. N. Fersen of the Commission of Inquiry, and we read:
Not Vladivostok, but Askold Island.
“But how - Askold? Why - Askold, because it was about Vladivostok ?! " - a dear reader can ask a question. The answer is that in order to get to Vladivostok, oddly enough, Baron V. N. Fersen … did not have to go directly to Vladivostok. It was enough to bring the Emerald to the point where it could, if necessary, anchor and be guaranteed to contact Vladivostok with the help of the ship's radio telegraph in order to get help from the cruisers available there. And this point was exactly Askold Island, located 50 km southeast of Vladivostok. That is about. Askold was about 50 km closer to the turning point of the "Izumrud" than Vladivostok.
This is the answer to “the mysterious 30 miles of V. N. Fersen ". The point to which he spent the "Izumrud" was not equidistant not from Vladivostok and Vladimir Bay, but from about. Askold and Vladimir bays. At the same time V. N. Fersen, obviously, considered it unnecessary to state such nuances in the report, but in the testimony of the Investigative Commission he explained everything exactly.
What can you say about this? First, when working with historical documents, there is no need to waste time cross-checking the information they contain. Especially in those cases when it seems that you have made some kind of historical discovery, so to speak, "tore off the covers from the unsightly inner essence" of this or that historical person. This is exactly the case when you should measure seven times, and then think after that: is it worth cutting?..
And you should always remember that, not knowing the specifics, we, "land rats" (of course, this does not apply to sailors), we may not see a lot of what the naval officer reports in his report. And therefore, the desire to interpret "as it is written" can easily lead us to "As we hear, so we write" - with all the ensuing consequences.
However, all of the above is nothing more than errors of judgment, which, of course, are quite excusable.
Distortion of information
In the article "Some aspects of rewarding for bravery in case of failure to comply with orders" the author quotes the report of V. N. Fersen:
"At this point, it was necessary to decide where to go: to Vladivostok or Vladimir. Vladimir chose, not Olga."
As presented, this quote looks like a classic "Freudian slip": if the commander chose between Vladivostok and Vladimir, then how miraculously did the choice shift to Vladimir and Olga? And the author naturally emphasizes this:
“Wait, wait, Mr. Fersen, what does Olga have to do with it ?! Did he seem to choose between Vladivostok and Vladimir? Where has Vladivostok gone? And in the quote above were Vladivostok and St. Vladimir Bay. That's how easily Fersen cut off everything unnecessary with Occam's razor."
And, of course, everything becomes clear to the reader. In any Vladivostok V. N. Fersen did not intend to, but only fooled his superiors about this intention. But…
Let's read the quoted report excerpt in full.
We see that this fragment is open to ambiguity. It can be interpreted so that V. N. Fersen writes about the need to choose between Vladimir and Vladivostok, and then explains why he chooses between Vladivostok and Vladimir, and, for example, not between Vladivostok and Olga. In other words, there is no "Freudian slip of the tongue", but there is, perhaps, not quite aptly constructed phrase. But it is impossible to understand this from the incomplete, out-of-context quotation given in the article "Some aspects of rewarding courage when not following orders".
V. N. Fersen didn't follow the order?
Here the logic of reasoning is as follows: the commander of the Russian forces, Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky ordered to go to Vladivostok, and the commander of "Izumrud" violated this order, as he went instead of Vladivostok to Vladimir Bay. And therefore it is worthy of blame: “… imagine that in 1941 the commander, having received an order to take up defense at the Dubosekovo junction, decided that it was better to do it in Khamovniki, and eventually dug in a bar on Tverskaya. For this I would have been immediately shot by the verdict of the tribunal in front of the formation."
It seems to be logical, but … Exactly what seems to be. The fact is that the army does not order "Take up defense at the Dubosekovo junction!" In the army they give the order "Take up defense at the Dubosekovo junction by 08.00 16.11.1941", and nothing else. That is, the order stipulates not only the place, but also the time of its execution. If it is not specified, then this means that there is no clear time frame for the execution of the order.
At the same time, the commander who gave the order, generally speaking, does not care at all how the order given to him will be carried out. That is, his subordinate has the right to choose the methods of executing the order, except in cases where those are directly spelled out in the order. Moreover, in the Wehrmacht, for example, giving petty instructions was completely discouraged: it was believed that an officer would have a fairly common task, and his qualifications should be enough to determine the best way to accomplish it on the spot, while at a remote headquarters they might not accept into account of some important nuances. By the way, it is the independence of the commanders that is one of the reasons for the superiority of the German army over the forces of England, France, the United States, and even the Red Army in the initial period of the Second World War.
So, Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not give exact instructions to the commander of the "Izumrud" how and when he should reach Vladivostok. So, it remained at the discretion of V. N. Fersen. And he had every right to go to the bay of Vladimir, Olga or somewhere else, if it served the ultimate goal - to get to Vladivostok. Of course, there was no violation of the order in this and could not be.
Escape from the battlefield?
It must be said that such an interpretation of V. N. Fersen in the morning of May 15 can cause nothing but bewilderment. Personally, I naively believed that the battlefield is the place where opponents fight. But the remnants of the Russian squadron did not fight, they capitulated: how could one escape from something that does not exist?
Why V. N. Fersen didn't go to Vladivostok from the turning point?
It seems that the answer is obvious and is repeatedly indicated in the documents of V. N. Fersen - because he feared the patrol of the Japanese cruisers. But no! We are given the following considerations:
“Moreover, the patrol line is about 150 km, and the Japanese have chances only during the day. It is extremely unlikely to catch a single cruiser at night.”
So it turns out that the Emerald commander had all the chances. Well, let's do some math. Let's say the Japanese really decided to block all roads to Vladivostok at night. Then 6 Japanese cruisers need to patrol the 150-kilometer line. In total, each Japanese cruiser would have only a 25-kilometer stretch. It would take a little over an hour to go through it completely with a 12-knot course, and after the cruiser reaches the "end" of the patrol area allocated to it, the neighboring cruiser exits to the point from where the Japanese ship began its patrol.
The visibility in the deepest night was then 1.5 km or more. It was at such a distance that on the night of May 14, Shinano-Maru discovered the unlit warships of the 1st and 2nd Pacific Squadrons. But, I must say, then the weather was not favorable and it is possible that during the possible breakthrough of the "Izumrud" to Vladivostok, the visibility was much better.
Thus, by simple calculations, we get that 6 Japanese cruisers, even in the deepest night at each moment in time, could see 18 kilometers of the watch line (each cruiser sees 1.5 km in both directions, total - 3 km), while completely The 150 km line was "scanned" in a little over an hour. Skipping such a line is super luck, and by no means an "extremely unlikely chance." But the question is also that the Japanese saw the direction of movement of the Emerald, knew that he was leaning to the east and could organize patrol not along the entire 150-km line, but on the most likely route of the cruiser. In this case, the "Izumrud" could go to Vladivostok only by a miracle. It was this option that V. N. Fersen.
Why V. N. Fersen did not dare to go to Vladivostok, but did Chagin dare?
And really. Where the “Izumrud” commander was cautious, Chagin with his “Almaz” (I mistakenly called an armored cruiser in the last article) simply went to Vladivostok, and that's all. Why?
The answer is very simple. "Almaz" separated from the squadron on the evening of May 14 and, according to the report of its commander:
“Adhering to the Japanese coast, and not meeting a single Japanese vessel, having 16 knots in motion, I walked past Okishima Island at about 9 o'clock. on the morning of May 15th, but it lasted until 2 o'clock. days on the previous course NO 40 ° and then lay down on the N-d holding on Cape Povorotny, which I approached at 9 o'clock in the morning."
Obviously, the "Almaz", which was sailing at 16 knots all night and could maintain such a speed even further, did not need to be afraid of the Japanese patrols at all. Chagin did not know the fate of the remnants of the squadron, and could not assume that N. I. Nebogatov capitulates. Accordingly, he had no reason to believe that the Japanese would free up their forces to organize a patrol near Vladivostok. And even if there were such, then in order to intercept the Almaz, they should have run towards Vladivostok at the end of the battle at almost full speed, which, of course, was extremely unlikely. The fact is that the relatively high-speed "Almaz" was at Cape Povorotny already at 09.00 on May 16, and the "Izumrud", with its 13 nodes, moving from the turning point, could have been there 15-16 hours later.
Yes, and finding enemy cruisers, Chagin at his maximum 19 nodes had a good chance of evading the battle, but the "Emerald" was doomed.
conclusions
Everyone will make them for himself. I ask dear readers only about one thing: let's be more careful in assessing certain actions of our ancestors. After all, they can no longer explain to us the background of these or those of their actions and thus dispel our delusions - in those cases when we allow them.
