Perhaps the most interesting recent event in the world of small arms may be the American NGSW program to create a new generation of automatic rifle and light machine gun. In remarks and comments to articles in the media on the topic of this program and similar previous programs for the creation of promising small arms, one can often see a negative attitude towards the waste of funds in this area. The main message is that small arms are not so important as to get hung up on them, and it is much more important to invest in high-tech models of military equipment: tanks, missiles, aircraft.
At the same time, as can be seen from the data given in the article “Combat suit. Statistics of injuries, bullets and shrapnel”, small arms account for 30 to 60 and more percent of the destroyed enemy manpower. Moreover, apparently, since the Second World War, this figure has only increased. While combat vehicles are busy destroying their own kind, the infantry still wins wars.
It can be assumed that an increase in the share of high-tech weapons should contribute to the fact that more and more enemy soldiers will be destroyed by high-tech combat vehicles, but practice casts doubt on this assumption. In fact, if opponents of comparable strength are at war, combat vehicles are primarily engaged in the destruction of similar combat vehicles available to the enemy. If one enemy is obviously stronger than the other, then the hostilities pass into the irregular phase - guerrilla warfare, in which the role of heavy equipment is obviously lower than in classic full-scale wars, which is confirmed by the statistics of local conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
No, of course, the aviation and navy are quite capable of driving a medium-sized country into the Stone Age even without the use of nuclear weapons, but only infantry, whose main armament is small arms, can fully capture and ensure the retention of enemy territory.
Another message is that small arms have practically reached the peak of their development, no breakthroughs in this regard are foreseen in the foreseeable future until the appearance of "blasters" and "disintegrators". At best, it speaks of the need to improve sighting devices, which, of course, is extremely important in itself.
At the same time, the technologies discussed in the article "Armor of God: Technologies for Promising Personal Body Armor", which will be used to create promising personal body armor (NIB), can make most of the existing small arms ineffective.
It turns out that, in fact, there is a need to develop a new generation of small arms, and the importance of small arms on the battlefield is high enough? Let's try to consider how expensive programs for the creation and procurement of small arms are compared to other types of weapons
Since information about the cost of developing domestic weapons is most often classified, we will focus on American programs and purchases, most likely, they somehow correlate with similar Russian ones.
Rifle M14
The M14 rifle, the predecessor to the famous M16 rifle, was developed to replace the M1 Garand rifle. Preliminary work on the creation of a new rifle began in 1944, and in 1957 the prototype of the M14 rifle was adopted by the US Armed Forces.
Four American companies were involved in the production of the M14 rifle. Springfield Armory Inc produced 167,173 M14 rifles between July 1959 and October 1963. From 1959 to 1963, 537,512 M14 rifles were produced by Harrington & Richardson Arms Co. The third company to receive a contract for the production of M14 rifles was Winchester, which produced 356,510 units between 1959 and 1963. The last manufacturer of the M14 rifle was Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge Inc, which produced 319,163 rifles between 1961 and 1963.
Thus, the total number of M14 rifles produced was 1,380,358 units (according to other sources, 1,376,031 M14 rifles were produced). The cost of one rifle was initially $ 68.75, but then increased to $ 95.
Accordingly, the cost of purchasing all M14 rifles was about $ 131 million in prices of the early 60s of the XX century, or approximately 1 billion 133 million in current prices. The cost of one M14 rifle at current prices (under an army contract) should be approximately $ 822
SPIV program
The SPIV program (Special Purpose Individual Weapon, individual special-purpose weapon) by the US armed forces was supposed to be implemented in the period from 1959 to 1965 (in fact, the program stretched until the mid-70s). Initially, the SPIV program grew out of the SALVO research program, which was conducted approximately from 1951-1952. According to the results of the SALVO program, the opinion was formed that small arms with a high rate of fire would be significantly more lethal than a slower-firing weapon, albeit with a significantly more powerful ammunition.
Based on the results of the SALVO program, the SPIV program considered the creation of weapons with an increased probability of hitting targets. An increase in the likelihood of destruction was to be ensured by firing small-caliber cartridges at a high rate - 2000-2500 rounds per minute. As ammunition, both classic small-caliber cartridges of 5, 6 mm and cartridges with sub-caliber feathered ammunition were considered. Weapon requirements also included increased-capacity magazines for 60 rounds and a three-shot grenade launcher, with a weapon weighing less than five kilograms.
In October 1962, 42 companies were introduced to the SPIW project. By December, ten companies had submitted formal proposals. After a two-month survey, four companies were selected: AAI, Springfield Armory, Winchester Arms, and Harrington & Richardson.
The SPIV program was estimated to cost $ 21 million in 1960s prices, or $ 180 million in current prices. In fact, the costs were exceeded several times, that is, they could well have amounted to about $ 300-350 million at current prices
It should be borne in mind that the SPIV program was very advanced for its time, and its successful implementation could give the US Army a significant advantage over the enemy. Unfortunately (and fortunately for us), the technological level of that time did not allow the successful completion of the SPIV program.
Rifle M16
Due to delays and technical difficulties in the implementation of the SPIW program in 1957, the US Army decided to develop a temporary solution - an automatic rifle chambered for 5, 56 mm. Already in 1962, the first Armalite rifles, designated AR-15, were handed over for testing to the US armed forces, and in 1963 Colt received a contract for the production of 104,000 M16 rifles. It was believed that the purchase of rifles would be a one-time and is a temporary measure before the adoption of a rifle developed under the SPIW program.
But already in 1966, Colt received a government contract for the supply of 840,000 rifles for a total of almost $ 92 million, which at current prices is about $ 746 million. Taking into account the previously purchased 104,000 M16 rifles, this would amount to approximately $ 838 million at current prices
ACR program
To replace the "temporary" M16 rifle by the US Army, the ACR (Advanced Combat Rifle) program was launched in 1986. As a result of the ACR program, a weapon was to be developed that provides twice the probability of hitting targets compared to the M16 rifle.
Development contracts were awarded in 1986 with six companies: AAI Corporation, Ares Incorporated, Colt Manufacturing Company, Heckler & Koch, McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems, and Steyr Mannlicher. Already in 1989, AAI, Colt, H&K and Steyr presented their prototypes.
All the projects presented were workable, but not one showed the double superiority required by the ACR program over the M16 rifle, which led to the closure of the program in April 1990.
The Advanced Combat Rifle program cost $ 300 million, or roughly $ 613 million at current prices
OICW program
In 1986/1987, the US Army Infantry School published a report SAS-2000 (Small Arms System-2000, "Small Arms System 2000"), which argued that the rifle as a weapon had already reached its peak, and the only way to create more effective infantry weapons - to use explosive ammunition. This was the starting point for the emergence of a new program - OICW (Objective Individual Combat Weapon).
As part of the OICW program, it was planned to create a weapon in which the main destructive weapon would be a compact multi-charge grenade launcher with remote detonation of grenades in the air. As an auxiliary melee weapon, it was supposed to use a compact machine gun of standard caliber 5, 56x45 mm integrated with a grenade launcher.
Three industry groups were initially recruited for the OICW program: AAI Corporation, Alliant Techsystems and Heckler & Koch, Olin Ordnance and FN Herstal. AAI Corporation and Alliant Techsystems reached the final of the competition. Ultimately, in 2000, it was decided that further development under the OICW program would be continued by Alliant Techsystems Inc in cooperation with Heckler & Koch and Brashear.
In the process of development, prototypes of weapons under the OICW program underwent many changes and in the final turned into a complex, which received the name XM29, including a semi-automatic grenade launcher of 20 mm caliber, a short-barreled machine gun of 5, 56x45 mm caliber and a computerized sight with a laser rangefinder, which provides target range measurement and programming grenades before flying out of the barrel, in order to ensure its detonation near the target. Thus, it was planned not only to increase the likelihood of hitting a target, but also to ensure the defeat of targets beyond the obstacle.
It was assumed that the effectiveness of weapons developed under the OICW program would be five times higher than the standard American M16A2 rifle with an M203 underbarrel grenade launcher.
In 2004, the program was closed, according to official figures, due to the high cost and weight of the weapons developed. According to the author, rather, due to the fact that the XM29 complex required too much time to aim when firing a grenade and did not ensure its guaranteed detonation at a given point.
The OICW development contract with Alliant Techsystems Inc was $ 95.5 million, or $ 134 million at current prices. The cost of the XM29 serial complex was supposed to be about $ 10,000, but in fact, the real cost of the complex in 2010 prices was estimated at $ 40,000, of which most of it was for the sighting complex, which is $ 48,000 in current prices (in fact, electronics have property to become significantly cheaper over time, so these forecasts can be called into question)
After the closure of the OICW program, two separate programs were launched: the creation of a new 5, 56-mm XM8 assault rifle and a 25-mm XM25 multi-charge semi-automatic hand grenade launcher, both programs were officially closed in 2006 and 2018, respectively.
NGSW program
At the moment, the most expensive development and purchase of small arms is the American NGSW (Next Generation Squad Weapons) program, within which it is planned to purchase about 250 thousand weapons (NGSW-R rifle and NGSW-AR machine gun), 150 million cartridges, which enough to equip the warring units with it.
The exact cost of future weapons is unknown, but it says about the cost of rearmament in the amount of $ 150 million per year. Drawing an analogy with the supply of the US Army new M17 / M18 army pistols by SIG Sauer in the amount of about 100 thousand sets per year, it can be assumed that the supply of rifles will be carried out at a comparable or slightly less high rate. If we assume that 250 thousand sets of small arms under the NGSW program will be delivered in 3-6 years, then the cost of their acquisition will amount to about 450-900 million dollars.
conclusions
The development and production of small arms, at first glance, is not cheap.
On the other hand, re-equipping the US Army from the M1 Garand rifle to the M14 rifle and from the M14 rifle to the M16 rifle cost only $ 2 billion at current prices. In total, for all small arms programs (assault / automatic rifles are meant), the costs are unlikely to exceed $ 5 billion in current prices, and this is in the period from the middle of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century.
Ammo? The commercial value of quality cartridges (not sniper) is $ 0.5-1 per piece. Under army contracts, it will be even lower. Well, let's say $ 1, respectively, one billion cartridges - one billion dollars, then it's easy to scale.
The estimated cost of purchasing 250,000 weapons under the NGSW program is equivalent to the cost of approximately 75-150 Abrams tanks ($ 6.1 million per unit) or 10-15 Apache helicopters ($ 60 million per unit), or the cost of 1-2 ships of the coastal zone LCS (460 million dollars per unit), or 0, 15-0, 3 the cost of one multipurpose submarine of the "Virginia" type (2, 7 billion dollars per unit). In total, the American army operates about 1 million units of small arms, thus, to re-equip all the armed forces with completely new small arms, it is necessary (presumably) about 1, 8-3, 6 billion dollars (not counting cartridges for it).
It is enough to compare the volumes of comparative weapons purchased by the US armed forces to understand how small a share of the cost is small arms. Over 6,000 Abrams tanks have been purchased, about 600 Apache helicopters, about 20-40 LCS coastal zone ships are planned to be purchased, Virginia submarines are planned to be purchased 30 pcs.
At the same time, from one third to one half and more of all killed and wounded in military conflicts are small arms.
The cost of small arms and ammunition for them, according to the criterion "cost-effectiveness" or the specific cost of destroying enemy manpower, is significantly ahead of all other types of weapons. Of course, this does not mean that it is necessary to abandon aircraft, tanks and ships, and with this money to buy only megablasters for the infantry, but this shows the value of small arms quite clearly.
