Recently, a series of articles on the justification of the uselessness of aircraft-carrying ships in the fleet has been published on Voennoye Obozreniye.
The arguments of the authors usually boil down to three or four theses of the "target-trough" type, "you can't hide from satellites", "we can't master it, there is no money" and the like. At the same time, absolutely any arguments by the authors are usually discarded as such wars do not shine for us, we must abandon interests outside our borders, but in any case, we will find an air base somewhere nearby … In especially pathological cases, it is proposed to start a nuclear war in response to any shot, Moreover, even if the United States does not participate in the conflict, then immediately strike at them, cause a retaliatory nuclear strike on its own, after all, America is definitely for any of our enemies, right? So, we all need nuclear suicide, it's not the same to build a fleet …
We must clearly understand that the issues of creating a military fleet in general and aircraft carrier forces (without which the capabilities of the Navy are very severely slaughtered) in particular, in our country have long been turned into irrational, and in some especially neglected cases, in general, into medical ones.
The reason for this lies in the fact that the consciousness of a significant part of our citizens still bears clear signs of such a pre-industrial era, and such complex issues as the Navy simply do not fit into their heads. Potatoes in the garden - fits, the neighboring city where there is (or not) Ikea, unlike the city of residence - fits, the fleet - does not fit. The land for which you can fight in order to take it, dear land, (or, alternatively, not to give it) - fits, and the significance of open sea communications - does not fit. And really, what kind of fleet is in the taiga? There is no fleet there, which means that it does not exist, and cannot exist at all, and there is nothing to breed verbiage here.
This unpleasant and tough, but truthful conclusion is directly confirmed by the fact that none of the authors has ever illustrated the uselessness of an aircraft carrier with any even primitive tactical task simplified to an unacceptable level in military planning. With distances, combat radii and specific areas of the oceans. This means that behind the propaganda of the uselessness of aircraft-carrying ships among those who disseminate it, there is no understanding of the process. They think in cliches, but they simply cannot imagine the reflection of the American "alpha-strike", as well as a lot of other things.
Most likely, the discussion will have to be returned to a rigid conceptual framework.
Let's ask the opponents of the aircraft carriers a number of questions, an attempt to answer which would make them start thinking not in clichés.
Question 1. How are you going to fight without aviation in principle?
One of the problems that hinder the understanding of aircraft carrier issues is a kind of fetishization of this word, it is perceived by some people in isolation from its content. Meanwhile, it is the content that is important.
The aircraft carrier is not a fetish, not a symbol or an instrument of world imperialism. This means to ensure the basing and combat use of aviation outside the combat radius of the basic (in "everyday" terminology - coastal) aviation, or - with the time of entry into battle, significantly less than that for basic aviation.
That is, denying the aircraft carriers the right to exist, the supporter of this point of view declares de facto the following:
Where our aircraft from the shore cannot be in the minimum necessary time, the interests of the Russian Federation should end, and in this case, it should be abandoned to ensure its military security
Let's look at a specific example.
As you know, the United States has made great efforts to create a terrorist group called the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" - ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation). While the leaders of this group communicated with each other in the American concentration camp at Camp Bucca, generating creative ideas for the future, the American Green Berets trained Sunni militias in central Iraq, which (according to the American command's plan) would then have to fight al-Qaeda. …
Then step by step: the future leaders of ISIS were released. "Berets" handed out to their students all their equipment and weapons (up to American-assembled Toyota Tundra pickups with special forces "gadgets" such as boxes for grenade launchers and machine gun brackets - columns of these white "Toyota" quite often got into the frame in the first year of its existence ISIS) and retreated. And the group, having gathered around the newly-minted leaders, immediately rebelled. Well, everyone who followed this war remembers the invasion of American-trained militants along the Euphrates into Syria from Jordan and Turkey along converging directions - by that time Assad had almost suppressed the Islamist uprising, peace was not far …
The two terrorist armies joined together and announced that they are now also ISIS. Perhaps this is such a coincidence. The United States even slowly bombed its offspring later, denoting an alleged fight against it, but very sluggishly. But the Syrian troops and Iranian troops, who were bleeding to death in the war with this monster, they did not touch.
Let us ask ourselves the question - what if the Americans, with air strikes, would clear the way for the militants in the same way as their loyal henchmen, the Danes, did it later at Deir es-Zor, opening the way for ISIS fighters to the city? We are not talking about open intervention in the war on the side of terrorists, but about occasional rare strikes, but at critical moments for the Syrian defense? Could this have happened not from 2016 and later, but before our intervention? Quite. And in the United States there would be many supporters of such an intervention.
When our forces began to arrive in Syria, the fighting, as we remember, was already on the streets of Damascus.
But what if the militants, receiving occasional assistance from their creators, were too close to Khmeimim? To other airbases? How would we stop them then?
In reality, nothing. Because our only aircraft carrier and both naval air regiments were not capable of combat at that time.
But if the aircraft carrier were in a combat-ready form and if its aircraft were also combat-ready, then we simply would not have such a sharp dependence on Khmeimim. The first stage of the war, when the number of military sorties of the Aerospace Forces was measured by several dozen per day, we would have fully pulled out the "Kuznetsov" and episodic strikes from Mozdok.
Accordingly, the opponents of aircraft carriers are invited to answer the question - how in the future in a similar situation to do without aircraft? What to do when there are tasks, but there are no air bases?
This is not an idle question - let's look at the scheme of Russia's economic presence in Africa.
We look at the money invested and the turnover. So far, the security of these investments is provided by guys from non-state structures and a very small number of military advisers from the RF Armed Forces. But all these are "peacetime games".
Let us recall the favorite tactic of Westerners: wait until we invest in the country properly, and when it comes to the return on these investments, just arrange a coup there, and that's it.
And what should we do then, how to save our money? The answer at all times lay in phrases such as "marines", "commandos", etc. And we will not be an exception. Should any such event happen in a significant region for us, and have to restore "constitutional order" there. And for this, at the first stage, it will be necessary to provide air cover for their forces. And then after their withdrawal - to bomb all dissenting "according to the Syrian option", supporting local friendly forces, as in Syria.
In extreme cases, it will be necessary not to let anyone interfere with the establishment of order, at least by reliably blocking access to the country of interest: both from the sea and from the air. Moreover, the latter is without airbases, which may not exist at this time.
And how can this be done if there are no safe airfields in the region? What will the opponents of aircraft carriers say?
Or simply imagine the aggravation of the situation in Sudan, fraught with attacks on our PMTO in Port Sudan. What if air support is needed to protect or evacuate PMTO personnel? To Khmeimim, after all, 1800 kilometers along a realistic route. How will we work from there on requests from the "ground"? But an aircraft carrier, at the first signs of a threatened period, moved from Tartus to the Red Sea is quite a solution to the problem. And not only the question of the PMTO.
The scenario, by the way, is quite real - as soon as we were there, the Americans immediately visited Port Sudan. And it's not just that, they will still try to survive us from there.
Well, how to get out without planes, dear opponents of aircraft carriers? After all, all of the above risks have a very specific link to the events taking place right now. And in Syria, the militants almost won. And we are present in Africa. These are all not fantasies, but the reality of today.
Despite the realism of all of the above, one can predict in advance what they will say: this will never happen, these are all inventions of the Moremans, well, they did it in Syria, we have nothing to do outside our borders, we are not Turks in order to have any interests in the world …
But what if you think about it? After all, later, when it turns out that fighters and attack aircraft with red stars are needed, but they are not, it will be too late. You have to be prepared for war in advance.
From the question "how are you going to fight without aviation" a particular case of this question smoothly follows.
Question 2. How are you going to fight without aviation with those who have it?
Relatively recently, relations between Russia and Turkey have seriously deteriorated due to the situation in the Syrian province of Idlib. These events are mentioned in the article "Will the frigates with" Calibers "be able to pacify Turkey?"as well as the related naval problems.
An important point - this war, in theory, was not needed by anyone: neither Russia nor Turkey. However, in the case of Turkey, Erdogan, apparently, was experiencing the strongest pressure within the country, especially after someone's (it is clear whose) bomb killed several dozen Turkish conscripts at the command post. The escalation could have occurred outside of connection with the decisions of the Turkish political leadership, and our response to it could have made the situation irreversible.
This is a very important point - sometimes wars start when no one wanted them. The First World War, for example, was undesirable for all European participants, except England, and its course turned out to be extremely undesirable for England. In such conditions, a war with Turkey would be quite possible.
The question arises - how would our group in Syria keep up in such conditions? Do not think that she would be dumped. In the Black Sea direction, Russia could create enough problems for Turkey so that it could not throw all its power on Khmeimim and other air bases in Syria. Together with the Syrian troops, our group could hold there for some time. But it would need to be supplied and strengthened.
The supply could well be through the Baltic and Gibraltar and through Iran and the Red Sea. In the latter case, it would be possible to attract Iranian tonnage for transportation.
But how would we protect the convoys from Turkish air strikes? Even if the war lasted for a month or three weeks, this problem would have to be solved. After all, the Turks can operate from Libya. And they will find forces for a long-distance flight from Turkish territory against the convoy.
The answer is that it would be necessary to cover them with our own fighters. But Syria is far away, and the Turks in Libya have both airfields and airplanes. How and with what to deal with them?
Consider escorting a convoy on the “roughly” section of the route from Crete to Cyprus. Khmeimim is a thousand kilometers away. How to provide fighter cover from there? It is much closer to Turkey, even if we detect the take-off of Turkish fighters immediately, then ours do not have time from Khmeimim, and even more so from other bases in Syria. Solution - look at the combat radius of the MiG-29K with air-to-air missiles from an aircraft carrier located south of Crete at the edge of the Territory. waters of Greece.
Greece is a state hostile to Turkey. They, too, were teetering on the brink of war quite recently, Crete is covered by an aircraft carrier from the north, and there are Greek S-300s there. At the same time, the aircraft carrier, as a mobile unit, can at any time make a dash to the southeast, moving towards Syria, but remaining at a distance from Turkey, while keeping the convoy inside the combat radius of the ship's fighters. And closer to Syria, the VKS aircraft from the coast will already cope.
And now a question for the opponents of aircraft carriers - how can all this be ensured without an aircraft carrier? I'd like to hear the answer. Will we hear?
Question 3. How are you going to do without aerial reconnaissance?
Let's remember the Soviet era. The ICRC "Legend" system gave CU in about a third of the cases, the rest of the time this was hindered by various factors. Let us recall Admiral I. M. Kapitanets and the great exercises of the Northern Fleet:
Under the leadership of the commander of the 1st FLPL, Vice-Admiral E. Chernov, in the Barents Sea, an experimental exercise of a tactical group on a detachment of warships was carried out, after which rocket firing at a target field was carried out. Target designation was planned from the Legend space system.
During a four-day exercise in the Barents Sea, it was possible to work out a joint navigation of a tactical group, to acquire skills in the management and organization of a missile strike.
Of course, two SSGNs of pr. 949, having 48 missiles, even in conventional equipment, are capable of independently incapacitating an aircraft carrier. This was a new direction in the fight against aircraft carriers - the use of SSGN pr. 949. In fact, a total of 12 SSGNs of this project were built, of which eight for the Northern Fleet and four for the Pacific Fleet.
The pilot exercise showed a low probability of target designation from the Legend spacecraft, therefore, to ensure the actions of the tactical group, it was necessary to form a reconnaissance and shock curtain as part of three nuclear submarines of the project 705 or 671 RTM. Based on the results of the experimental exercise, it was planned to deploy an anti-aircraft division to the Norwegian Sea during the command and control of the fleet in July.
Now the Northern Fleet has the opportunity to effectively operate submarines, independently or in conjunction with naval missile-carrying aviation, on the US aircraft carrier-strike formation in the North-East Atlantic.
How was the issue of obtaining information about the enemy solved?
Primary detection was carried out in the course of complex operations of all types of reconnaissance - space, aviation, radio reconnaissance, etc.
But it was the data for missile strikes that were mainly obtained using the "Success" system, the main means of which were Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designation aircraft.
How can we ensure the same now?
We must clearly understand that we will not be able to follow the Soviet path - we simply will not have enough money. How much will the same fleet of long-range targeting aircraft as in the USSR cost, that is, 52 new (we do not consider alteration) Tu-95RTs? You can safely imagine that the price will be comparable to the cost of a new bomber. In other words, about 15 billion rubles (like the Tu-160) per unit. That is, we are talking about about 780 billion rubles.
But the trouble is, these are just two brand new aircraft carriers with a displacement of about 40–45 kilotons, with a pair of catapults each, for 24–30 aircraft. Can naval fighters be used as reconnaissance aircraft? They can.
Quote:
As previously reported, the Russian MiG-29K carrier-based fighters have already received new information exchange systems, and in the near future they will also equip heavy carrier-based fighters Su-33, which will undergo modernization. It is also reported that thanks to this, Russian carrier-based aircraft will be able to issue target designations for anti-ship missiles, as well as in advance "notify" the ship's air defense systems about the enemy.
In fact, we are talking about the creation of a unified tactical data exchange system, similar to the well-known American information exchange system "Link-16". Within the framework of this system, each aircraft, a ship, is one of its "subscribers" and the information received by it is instantly transmitted to all other members of the network. As reported in open sources, the new system was named the Unified Management System (ESU) of the Navy.
Ships, aircraft and naval headquarters will be united into a single network
In fact, we are talking about the fact that any fighter can become the "eyes" of a strike group, providing data for firing to all - surface ships, submarines with cruise missiles, if they are in touch, assault or other strike aircraft "on the shore", coastal missile systems " Bastion "and their future versions with a hypersonic missile, even units and formations of the Aerospace Forces.
A simple scheme is carried out - the detection of a contact "somewhere out there", with the help of RTR or satellite reconnaissance, or a submarine's GAK, a search for a reconnaissance or reconnaissance-strike group from an aircraft carrier, a strike following the results of the flight of the RUG. Anywhere in the world. They can also search for the enemy themselves.
The fact that the project is proceeding very slowly and with a creak does not mean that it is unrealistic, the problems there are purely organizational. All that is needed is to bring the system described above to a working state, and equip ship aircraft with more powerful radars.
And, lo and behold - our ultra-long-range anti-ship missiles got a target! It is no longer necessary to push the missile cruiser towards the enemy, it can attack from many hundreds of kilometers, receiving target data from ship planes from an aircraft carrier located somewhere far away. At the same time, obviously, the combat stability of the four modern fighters is incomparably higher than that of the huge "pterodactyl", especially if it is a subsonic aircraft, as was the Tu-95RTs.
And if we go along the Soviet path, then with this money we will build only vulnerable reconnaissance and target designation aircraft, and after all, we also need to create strike forces and pay for them! An aircraft carrier with aircraft is both reconnaissance forces and sometimes strike forces: two in one. Amusingly, an aircraft carrier fleet may turn out to be cheaper than an "asymmetric" one.
And, of course, they are much more versatile than the specialized base scout.
At the same time, unlike the old Tu-95RTs and its hypothetical future analogues, the aircraft carrier is much less limited by geography - if necessary, it will make the transition even to Antarctica, and will work as aviation there, even for reconnaissance purposes, even for the purpose of destroying air, surface or ground targets. It will not work like that with an airplane: the banal refusal of Iran or Afghanistan and Pakistan to let scouts through their airspace - and that's it, in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean we were left without aerial reconnaissance.
The naval aviation is able to almost completely "close" the issues of reconnaissance and target designation in naval warfare. Of course, if it is combat-ready and equipped with the necessary equipment. The satellites give a "picture" with insufficient frequency, moreover, they can evade detection. An example of a real satellite constellation is shown in the article “Naval Warfare for Beginners. We bring the aircraft carrier to strike " … Basic aviation is "tied" to its bases. An aircraft carrier can operate anywhere, and therefore its aircraft too.
What in all this does not suit the opponents of the aircraft carrier?
Question 4. Why do you not want to use aviation even when it is vital?
Let us analyze a task that was once considered one of the main tasks for the Navy - disrupting an enemy nuclear missile strike from oceanic directions.
Active work by the United States to create high-precision nuclear warheads of reduced power W76-2 for Trident SLBMs, a program to create hypersonic weapons for submarines, a similar program for the army (medium-range missiles with a hypersonic glider) and a program to create hypersonic missiles for aviation (for example, AGM-183 ARRW) say that within 7-8 years the United States will have the potential to deliver such a blow with serious chances of success. That is, the absence of a response from our side or a weak response with acceptable losses.
Politically, it will be very beneficial for the United States to show brutally knocking out the "Russian support" from under China. They do not consider us a significant enemy and are much less afraid than North Korea or Iran. It's hard to say why, but they very often feel contempt for us as an enemy. The combination of these factors is very explosive and potentially fraught with an attempt to remove us from the site in one move.
In such conditions, it will be extremely important to track in advance at least some of their submarines, without which they may not be able to count on the full success of the strike without deploying them near our territory - there simply will not be enough time. And mutual nuclear suicide does not suit them.
These are the zones. Of course, the launch can be made not only from them. But the farther from the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower the chances of doing everything quickly, without running into at least some kind of retaliatory or retaliatory strike.
For the location of SSBNs in the Gulf of Alaska, see article "A blow against reality or about the fleet, Tu-160 and the cost of human error", in the final part there is a diagram of the launch corridor, which does not fall into the review sectors of our early warning radars.
What do we need to prevent the blow from taking place?
Prevent SSBNs from deploying at the points from which a strike is delivered to the European part of Russia, because a strike only against the Siberian formations of the Strategic Missile Forces makes no sense. The disruption of a strike on the European part of Russia is the disruption of a nuclear attack as a whole.
What zones need to be controlled for this?
About these.
The question is - will the ship's search and strike groups, which will have to operate there, need at least some kind of protection from air strikes? Or would it be better without it?
What will the opponents of aircraft carriers say?
Probably they will say that this will never happen, because this will never happen.
But this is not the case.
This may well happen in 2028–2030. This, frankly, will happen with a high degree of probability. And what are we going to do with our "land thinking" then?
And don't think that enemy aircraft from the shore will quickly sink our ships. In 1973, when we nearly collided with the United States in Mediterranean, even the Americans themselves did not expect any NATO to help them. Moreover, even during the general Western pressure on the USSR in the 80s, the United States always had plans in store in case the rest of NATO "dumped" them. There is no guarantee that the Europeans will voluntarily go into nuclear fire for no reason.
The influence of the United States on its vassals is of course. So, for example, Europe rolled the TTIP agreement that was deadly for it, and how the owners demanded to conclude it! Even the Russian threat was whipped down by fomenting the well-known events in Ukraine. But Europe played in Ukraine, as the owners asked, and sank the agreement. So the US allies may well not come to the war, this is a fact. And without them, it is not easy to deal with our ships, even in Mediterranean.
Moreover, at a number of points, geography begins to work against them, just as it works against us when trying to reach a surface target from the shore. And also any failure will lead to the loss of surprise.
Let's take a look at two examples. We are conducting an anti-submarine search operation west of the Strait of Gibraltar to prevent SSBNs from breaking through into the Mediterranean.
In theory, the United States can use its surface forces to secure a breakthrough - but this is a loss of surprise, they need us to think that the boat is not yet in Mediterranean.
The loss of surprise is unacceptable.
One could try to attack from Spanish airspace only with their own aircraft. With a sudden blow, kill all the ships of the KPUGs and go home. As long as the Russians lose the planned communication, until they find out that their ships are not communicating because they are no longer there, the SSBNs will have time to pass.
But the presence of air cover from our side breaks this scheme.
Now they will not be able to destroy our forces "in one move" and buy a little time to break through the SSBNs - the fighter cover will bind them seriously enough for someone to have time to inform Moscow about the start of hostilities. And without fighter cover, until ours establish that there is no connection with the ships, because they are not themselves, the enemy will act freely.
Let's take an example to the north, in the Norwegian Sea. Even professionals have the opinion that our aircraft carrier performing combat missions (for example, in the air defense of KPUGs searching for submarines) will be quickly destroyed by aircraft from Norway. But let's look at the distances. Obviously, the distance from bases in Norway to the patrol area of an aircraft carrier near the edge of the pack ice is more than 1000 kilometers. A strike at such a distance simply cannot be sudden, and its failure is technically quite possible, and by a variety of different methods.
And, for example, from Keflavik, the Americans fly about 1400 kilometers, and a strike at such a range in a real war on a mobile target is really difficult. Especially if you capture Svalbard and deploy an anti-aircraft missile regiment on it. Then, in general, beauty, the attacking side first falls under the attack of fighters, then under the fire of the air defense missile system, and the aircraft carrier … God knows where he is, you have to wait for the satellite flyby again or again drive the E-3 Sentry from England.
As a result, our anti-submarine forces will be able to operate quite confidently in a given area.
Of course, nothing can be guaranteed in war, but we admit that it is much easier for our aircraft carrier to evade a strike than to inflict one on the enemy. Factor of. You just need to be able to do it, train properly.
And if you ensure the disruption of the deployment of SSBNs for a strike, then the enemy's nuclear weapons will not be used - unlike the domestic charms who are ready to turn into dust not only the whole world, but also themselves and their families (we will immediately "glass"!), Americans are rational people and will not commit mass suicide.
But we will have the opportunity decidewhen it should appear "on stage".
By the way, with air refueling, MiGs from an aircraft carrier east of Svalbard can quite reach the Thule airbase in Greenland.
It is quite possible to deliver a neat non-nuclear strike against it, which will then allow you to capture it and use it for your own purposes (therefore, non-nuclear) from an aircraft carrier.
And here we ask the opponents of aircraft carriers one more question.
Question 5. Why do you not want to use aircraft for strike missions, even when this is the best option?
Today, the main instrument of the Navy for delivering non-nuclear strikes on the coast is the Kalibr cruise missiles. This is an expensive weapon with an eight-figure unit price tag. In this case, a ship that has used up its stock of cruise missiles must go to the base to reload the launchers.
At the same time, in terms of its destructive effect on the enemy, the 3M14 Caliber SLCM approximately corresponds to the KAB-500 bomb.
Let's compare the strike capabilities of "Kuznetsov", and, for example, the ship's strike group.
The group consists of:
Fr. Project 22350 - 4 units. Number of missiles: 16 + 16 + 24 + 24 = 80 CR
Frigate (former BOD) pr. 1155 with 2xUVP 3C-14 - 1 unit. Number of missiles: 16 CR.
In total, there are 96 cruise missiles in the KUG. Please pay attention to the fact that in reality it is impossible to occupy all the launchers only with missiles for strikes on the coast, it is necessary to place both anti-ship missiles and PLUR there, and in reality there will be fewer missiles. But let's give the non-aircraft carriers a head start.
For comparison, we take Kuznetsov with an air group of 22 MiG-29Ks, of which there are 8 attack vehicles, and the rest are fighters (reconnaissance aircraft and, when necessary, also refuellers with an UPAZ). Their weapon will be a hypothetical modification of the Kh-35 guided missile designed for strikes against ground targets. The MiG-29K can easily carry two such missiles.
We will not come up with what kind of war we have, we will limit ourselves to the following. The strike is delivered from a line 1000 kilometers from the nearest base, where ships can replenish ammunition. The blow is delivered at a distance of 1000 km - this is how much we have from the line to the target. We believe that reloading all launchers on all ships takes two days (actually - more for such a group, but oh well).
So, our strike group fires at targets 96 missiles and goes to the base for new ones at a speed of 20 knots. At that moment, when the missile ships fired off, the aircraft carrier begins to move to the line of the rise of aviation and appears on it after 10 hours. Over the next 10 hours, MiGs with missiles (two for a departure) strike their blows - 8 cars, 2 CR each. Total - 16. Then after 5 hours - they are the same.
In total, in 20 hours our URO ships are on the march 260 km from the base, they fired 96 missiles, the aircraft carrier fired 32 missiles in the area of combat use.
Another 5 hours have passed since the start of the operation - 25. The aircraft carrier delivered another blow with eight MiGs, bringing the number of missiles used to 48 units. The URO ships are almost at the base. To facilitate the calculations, we will assume that they, having added speed, entered it at that moment.
Now the ships will have 48 hours to reload the launchers (actually more), the aircraft carrier during this time will raise eight MiGs to strike 9 times and use up another 144 missiles, bringing their total consumption to 192. But the URO ships leave the base. 1000 km at 20 knots will take them 27 hours, we again give them a head start and assume that 24.
By the time they reach the launch line and complete this launch, the number of missiles used by MiGs from an aircraft carrier will increase by 64, reaching only 256 missiles. Moreover, the planes will be ready for the next flight, and, in truth, if we had not given a head start to the missile ships, this flight would have already taken place.
We count.
Aircraft - 256 missiles + 16 "in progress", 272 in total.
URO ships - 96 missiles in a salvo * 2 salvo = 192 missiles.
The difference in favor of aircraft is 80 missiles.
And we gave the URO ships a head start with the number of missiles in the cells, overestimating them from the really possible and setting them a speed at the transition of 20 knots, although in reality it will be lower. We also have only 8 attack aircraft, not 16, for example. But it could have been 22! And the reload time of ships in the base is understated to the point of impossibility!
Moreover, such hypothetical missiles have less warhead mass, which is a minus. But this is not important for all types of goals. In most cases, up to 200 kg is quite enough, and they can really be placed in the X-35, if you remove the complex anti-ship seeker and replace it with a simpler system for flying over the ground.
Actually, this example shows that cruise missiles are just niche weapons for special tasks. You can read about the use of long-range cruise missiles in the interests of fleet operations in the article “Sea power and cruise missiles. How to use the Gauges for the Navy.
If, returning to our strike operations along the coast, the risk to the aircraft is reduced, then they will be able to work at targets with bombs, which is hundreds of times cheaper than strikes with cruise missiles. If necessary, the aircraft will be able to use weapons to destroy dispersed targets - cluster bombs, incendiary tanks, unguided rockets. The cruise missile is highly specialized.
And even the range does not give any particular advantages - in a day the ship will easily run 1000 km, and the combat radius of the carrier-based fighter plus the flight range of the guided missile with such an approach to the target will just allow hitting the same target that the CD would have "got" from 1700-1800 kilometers.
At the same time, if takeoff with a pair of rockets for an airplane requires too much fuel, then you can use the old western focus and, taking off with a small supply of fuel, and, therefore, a small takeoff weight, refuel in the air “under the throat”.
So what counter-argument will the opponents of the aircraft carriers have on all this?
At the request of the audience
I would also like to give an answer to a number of questions posed by A. Voznesensky in the article "Inconvenient Questions for Supporters of the Aircraft Carrier Lobby" … Alas, the article contains a lot of factual inaccuracies and errors. Nevertheless, in the "anti-aircraft" materials, which have recently become frequent on the "Military Review", this one, at least, contains logically coherent argumentation and does not contain deranged ideas. And therefore the author considers it necessary to give an answer to the "inconvenient" questions.
In order.
Where to build?
The answer is on the A berth of the Baltic Shipyard after the completion of the construction of icebreakers. From a technical point of view, the issue of building aircraft carriers at Balt. the plant was discussed in the article "Our aircraft carrier is real" in "VPK-Courier", up to the actual drawings of the ship's hull on the slipway "A" which were actually carried out earlier by specialists. Take 10 minutes.
Further A. Voznesensky writes:
Here I would like to draw your attention to the fact that at the time of those works, a significant part of Soviet specialists were still "in the ranks" - it was banal for them not so many years, and the United Shipbuilding Corporation had experienced and efficient personnel at the disposal of the United Shipbuilding Corporation. Now another decade has passed - and it is reasonable to ask, how many of those who participated in the work on Vikramaditya are still “in the saddle”?
Those who came to this job young are quite in the saddle. The aircraft carrier left for India 8, 5 years ago, and someone probably survived over the years. Moreover, if we ignore Sevmash, we can see that the Nevskoe Design Bureau took an active part in the development of the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant and in the maintenance of a number of systems of this ship. Well, or more simply, Russia even now participates in the creation of aircraft carriers, but not its own. And although we have not built such ships for a long time, and in the USSR there were personnel in Nikolaev, it is a gross mistake to think that we have no specialists for these ships at all. "Vikramaditya" was passed not so long ago, if anything.
Further, we will again quote A. Voznesensky.
There is another point that is rarely mentioned in discussions: before there is even a grain of steel on the stocks, it will be necessary to carry out hundreds of R&D, which will cost billions of rubles.
For example? Catapult? But the steam room was built even in the USSR, the reference catapults are on the "Threads" in the Crimea and Yeisk, the electromagnetic ones have already passed the stage of research and development. There is also a big backlog. GEM? Also no, nuclear power plants are mass-produced for icebreakers, gas turbine ones are not, but all we need for a 40,000-tonnage unit is a cruise turbine based on M-90 (serial), a waste heat recovery boiler, an afterburner steam turbine powered by a waste-heat boiler, and a reducer-combiner for two gas and one steam turbines. We need large screws with a reversible pitch, but there is a reserve for them, now we need to scale it. In fact, you will have to strain only to create an aviation control complex, but even here we, at least, have the documentation for the old complexes.
But with the infrastructure, something really needs to be done, but, in truth, the issue of complexity is not very different from the new Novorossiysk naval base, you can build it. It would be under that.
The author's conclusion about the unsuitability of the MiG-29K for military operations is unfounded - this aircraft only needs a new radar and weapons. After that, only a high landing speed and time-consuming inter-flight maintenance will remain a problem, but these problems can be partially solved on the next modifications of this aircraft.
Of course, this is not an F / A-18, but it is deeply wrong to consider this aircraft infinitely obsolete, the potential of this platform is far from being exhausted. Although the development of a new aircraft in the future should not be ruled out. But the fact is that for the time being we will get by with MiGs, only slightly modernized.
I would like to remind you that we already have two naval air regiments. And you just need to raise their combat readiness to the required level, nothing needs to be created, there are planes, pilots, and training infrastructure.
Why are there regiments - we also have an aircraft carrier! You just need to repair it in some way, but there's nothing to be done about it - there are still organizers at USC …
And anti-submarine helicopters will have to be done anyway. Out of touch with an aircraft carrier.
Further, A. Voznesensky gives such an argument that we cannot assemble an aircraft carrier strike group in the image and likeness of the US Navy, but let's honestly say that the US Navy became what it became, because it was preparing to repel the strikes of missile carriers. divisions Soviet naval aviation!
And whose divisions will attack us? Since A. Voskresensky recalled the Falklands in his text, it would be nice to study how the Britons provided protection for their aircraft carriers in that very real war. Very interesting, by the way. And this experience is much more useful for us than dwelling on the American scheme.
This is, if someone does not understand, to the question of the "retinue", escort ships, etc.
To the barrier
Actually, that's all.
The author will be very happy if the opponents of the aircraft carriers answer the above five questions in the comments.… Naturally, with examples, pictures and diagrams. And even better with radio horizons, the flight time of aircraft from the shore, comparing it with the flight time of ship aircraft, etc. Not unfounded, in short.
It's so easy to come up with such an environment in the sea, so that the destruction of a target or protection of one's forces at a considerable distance from one's territory would be clearly and visibly better obtained without aircraftthan with planes.
You guys can do it. Show the class.
