The battle of the shield and the sword is more relevant than ever in matters of naval construction. Since the strength of the fleets has ceased to be limited to the number of muzzle-loading cannons on board wooden ships, the division of resources allocated to the fleet between defensive and offensive forces and assets has become a serious "headache" for everyone who made fundamental decisions. Build destroyers or battleships? Ocean cruisers or small submarines? Shore-based attack aircraft or carrier-based aircraft carriers?
This is a really difficult choice - it is a choice, because it is impossible to have both defensive and offensive forces at the same time. No economy can handle this. There are many examples. How many anti-submarine corvettes does the US have? Not at all. And the minesweepers? Eleven or so. According to the plans of the US Navy, when mine action modules for LCS ships finally appear, the fleet will buy eight sets each for the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. This is practically zero.
True, now anti-mine equipment is installed on existing ships - for example, on the destroyers "Arleigh Burke". But there are few destroyers modernized in this way, and not everything is going smoothly with the mine countermeasures of crews, in fact, the Berks are fully ready only to perform air defense missions for ship formations, individual ships can still intercept ballistic missiles, there are problems with the rest.
There is an example of a country in history that tried to have everything - both forces for attack and forces for defense. It was the USSR.
The Soviet Navy had huge coastal forces - alternating torpedo and missile boats, small missile and anti-submarine ships, small landing ships, diesel submarines of relatively small displacement, base anti-submarine Mi-14 helicopters, amphibious aircraft. There were coastal troops with a large number of missiles on an automobile chassis. There was also something else - a huge, numbering hundreds of vehicles, naval missile-carrying aviation. All this cost absolutely fantastic money, especially the MPA - hundreds of the world's best bombers, armed with the world's best heavy missiles and piloted by the world's best naval pilots. It was a very expensive pleasure, and in many respects those who believe that the MPA cost roughly corresponded to the aircraft carrier fleet are right. But it was a coastal weapon nevertheless, a force with which the coast could be defended from enemy ships. A defensive tool, not an offensive one.
However, the same Soviet Navy had something else - nuclear missile submarines, large diesel missile submarines capable of operating in the open ocean, artillery cruisers 68 bis, missile cruisers of project 58, BOD projects 61, 1134 (in fact, anti-submarine cruisers, no matter how it sounds strange), 1134B, Project 1123 anti-submarine helicopter carriers and a whole brood of Project 30 destroyers, and later Project 61 BOD.
Some time later, more advanced ships appeared - SKR of project 1135b, aircraft-carrying cruisers 1143, with ship planes, destroyers of project 956, BOD of project 1155 …
The list can be continued for a long time, it will include more and more advanced missile submarines, and the "long arm of the MRA" that appeared "at the end" of the 80s - Tu-95K-22 missile carriers, a fairly large base anti-submarine aircraft and "under the curtain" of existence The USSR is quite full-fledged aircraft carriers, of which, however, only one could be built for themselves. The second, as you know, is now serving in the PLA Navy, and the third is cut at the stage of readiness at 15%.
And the USSR could not stand it. No, he certainly could not stand the five branches of the Armed Forces (SV, Air Force, Navy, Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense), and sixty-four thousand tanks in service, and in general an army numerically sufficient for the simultaneous conquest of NATO and China, and a war against the whole world in Afghanistan, and an ineffectively managed and therefore continuously stagnating economy. But the gigantic expenses for the fleet also made themselves felt.
In part, the USSR's desire to embrace the immensity was understandable. The coastal forces lacking a "long arm" are vulnerable to attack from the sea. For example, we have a naval strike group from MRKs, which, however, do not leave the zone of action of coastal aviation, so as not to be killed by a small number of enemy aircraft. But what prevents the enemy from lifting large aviation forces into the air from aircraft carriers, and at low altitude, with outboard fuel tanks (and refueling on the way back), throw them into the attack against our MRK? Our interceptors? But the duty forces in the air a priori will not be large, and the attacker will have a numerical superiority, which means that both the MRK and the interceptors "protecting" them will be destroyed, and when on alarm the main forces will be raised into the air and fly to the place of the massacre, from the enemy already the trail will cool down. Literally. Powerful forces in the far sea zone, in theory, lend combat stability to coastal forces. However, at present, various types of reconnaissance and basic strike aircraft in general make it possible to prevent the enemy from calmly attacking even from the DMZ.
One way or another, the Soviet economy could not stand all of this.
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Americans did not even consider building a defensive naval force for themselves. Admiral Zumwalt managed to "break through" the construction of only six missile boats - and this despite the fact that they were supposed to operate near the territorial waters of the Warsaw bloc countries, that is, they were purely nominally defensive means. But it didn't work …
Americans understood that you can't have everything. You have to choose.
Countries with limited budgets need to choose even more. Russia is one of those countries.
I must say that in fact, the economy of the Russian Federation makes it possible to build a fairly strong fleet. But the problem is that, firstly, we also need to finance the army and the air force, and secondly, we have four fleets, and one more flotilla, and in most cases, to ensure that in each direction we cannot be stronger than a potential enemy, and maneuver of forces and assets between theaters of operations is almost completely ruled out, minus naval aviation. This makes the choice between defense and offense even more difficult.
But maybe it's not that bad? Maybe it is still possible to provide full-fledged defensive forces, and some opportunities to perform tasks in the far sea zone (off the coast of Syria, for example, if they try to oppose us there) at the same time?
There are eighteen major large naval bases in Russia. Each of them, in theory, needs a mine action force. This means a brigade of six minesweepers for each naval base. It is necessary, however, to protect the ships leaving the bases from submarine ambushes. And again, it is necessary to have dozens of some kind of anti-sabotage corvettes, functional analogs of small anti-submarine ships of the Soviet era. But the enemy can attack the coast with cruise missiles. This means that we need coastal strike aviation, from a regiment to a division to the fleet. For example, a division for the Northern Fleet, a division for the Pacific and a regiment for the Baltic and the Black Sea. And more submarines.
And this is where the problems begin. Two divisions and two aircraft regiments are the equivalent of naval aviation sufficient to man four large, approximately seventy thousand tons, aircraft carriers. And a couple of hundred small warships of all classes (minesweepers, anti-submarine corvettes, small landing ships) in terms of the number of personnel are comparable to the ocean fleet.
The crew of a modern PLO corvette can be in the range of 60-80 people. At first glance, this is the equivalent of one fourth of a destroyer. But the commander of this ship is quite a full-fledged commander of the ship. This is a piece "product" of which there cannot be a lot a priori. He is "equivalent" to the commander of a destroyer, and, having accumulated a certain amount of experience and undergoing minimal training - and the commander of a cruiser. Anyone cannot be a good commander. And the same applies to the commanders of combat units, even if they are combined on small ships.
Let's say we have eighty PLO corvettes in our four fleets. This means that we keep on them eighty highly professional, experienced and daring (other PLO corvette "will not master", this is not a tanker) ship commanders. That is, almost as much as the Americans have on all cruisers and destroyers combined. And if we still have the same number of minesweepers and three dozen RTOs? This is already a little less than the US Navy in general, if you do not take into account the submarines. But at the same time, we are not getting anywhere near the opportunities for the use of the fleet in foreign policy that the United States has. Will we not send an anti-submarine corvette to its shores to put pressure on someone?
Russia is more than twice as small as the United States in terms of population. It is foolish to think that we will be able to form more crews (albeit small in number) and educate more commanders of ships and combat units than the Americans have. It's impossible.
But can then go the way of the United States? When our submarine tries to penetrate the Gulf of Juan de Fuca, it will have to deal not only with anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy, but also with destroyers. The Americans do not have corvettes, they have withdrawn frigates from service, but no one will forbid them to use destroyers for hunting submarines, together with aircraft. On the other hand, Arlie Burke can be loaded with Tomahawk missiles and sent to strike at Syria. It is universal in this sense.
However, we will not succeed here either. The United States has a huge barrier in the form of two oceans that separate it from any enemy in Eurasia, and any enemy in Eurasia is surrounded by a dense ring of American allies and just friendly countries that help America control its rivals right on their territory.
This is not the case with us, with us Japanese, Polish, Norwegian and Turkish radars provide the Americans with intelligence information, illuminating for them the situation in our airspace and in our waters, sometimes in bases, and these countries are also ready, if necessary, to provide their territory for anti-Russian operations. We have, next to the United States, only a small and "transparent" Cuba. In such conditions, it is impossible to completely abandon the defensive forces.
Let us recall the US military operation against Iraq in 1991. The Iraqis carried out mining operations in the Persian Gulf and two American ships were blown up by their mines. It is worth considering - what if the Iraqis had the opportunity to mine the water areas around the military bases on the territory of the United States? Would they take this opportunity? Maybe yes. So Russia is in such a vulnerable position. Most of our potential adversaries are close to us. Close enough for our bases to need to be guarded as best they can.
There is also a third problem.
The navy is an incredibly specific branch of the military. Among other things, this is expressed in the fact that even the technical characteristics of ships are closely dependent on what political tasks the state as a whole sets for itself. For example, the Chinese are actively preparing to act in Africa - and amphibious ships, integrated supply vessels, and floating hospitals with hundreds of beds are entering their fleet en masse. It is critical for the Americans to carry out "power projection" from sea to land. And they, in addition to the same as the Chinese, have fantastically developed transport forces, forces to ensure the landing of the second echelon of amphibious assault, and thousands of cruise missiles for strikes along the coast. Not a single type of armed forces depends to such an extent on the strategic interests of society as a whole, and on the boundary conditions in which it is forced to carry out its policy. This also applies to Russia.
Take, for example, the extreme issue of aircraft carriers for many.
If we plan to use them for defense, then the waters in which they will be used in a defensive war will be the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the southern part of the Bering Sea, and, if a number of circumstances coincide, the Sea of Japan.
In these waters (with the exception of the Sea of Japan), the sea is often very hectic, and in order for an aircraft carrier to be effectively used in them, it must be quite large and heavy, otherwise it will very often be impossible to take off from it due to rolling (or even sit down, which is even worse). In fact, "Kuznetsov" is the smallest possible ship for such conditions. But if we are going to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, then the requirements for an aircraft carrier are much simpler, and it can be roughly like the Italian Cavour, 30-35 thousand tons of displacement. Similar dependencies apply to all ships. Is it necessary, for example, to be able to launch the KR "Caliber" from frigates? And how. What if NATO, hostile regimes in Eastern Europe, England and the United States did not exist? Then, in general, it is unlikely that a military fleet would be needed, let alone missile weapons. One could "exhale".
Thus, the political and strategic goals of the state have an impact on naval development. In the case of Russia, they require both defensive forces and the ability to operate in a distant sea zone, for example in the Mediterranean, at least to prevent the Syrian Express from being interrupted. At the same time, Russia does not have the ability to extensively build up both a "mosquito fleet" of small missile ships and corvettes, and an ocean fleet of destroyers and aircraft carriers, due to insufficient economic power, and, let's say it out loud, finally, demography. Plus the fact that we have not one fleet, but four isolated, operating in different conditions.
What to do in such a situation?
To begin with, define the tasks and boundary conditions.
Relatively speaking - we do not need PLO corvettes, but the PLO itself, provided in any way. How? For example, an anti-submarine boat of 350-400 tons, armed with one bomb, a pair of 324 mm torpedo tubes, four inclined PU PLURs, a pair of AK-630M, with a compact towed, lowered and under-keel GAS. Or with one 76 mm gun mount and one Ak-630M (while keeping the rest of the weapon). Sacrificing naval air defense, sacrificing the presence of anti-ship missiles, and reducing the crew, we get a solution that is cheaper than an PLO corvette - albeit less versatile, with less combat resistance. Or, in general, a torpedo boat of 200 tons, with one bomb launcher, 324-mm torpedo tubes, the same set of GAS, one AK-630M, a firing sector close to a circular one, without PLUR, with an even smaller crew. How will it hit submarines? Transmit target designation to the shore, where the coastal-based PLRK will be located. What is the exhaust? The fact that there is one submarine missile system for the entire naval base, and it should be enough to ensure the exit of attack ships and submarines at sea. That is, the boat seems to fire, but not with its own missiles, but with missiles of the PLRK. There are many boats, only one submarine, but it will be enough for one or two enemy submarines.
In fact, it is not a fact that it is necessary to do exactly this way - this is just an example of how an expensive solution - a PLO corvette - is replaced by a cheap one - a boat. With a minimal (subject to full-fledged air cover) loss of effectiveness when used for its main purpose. But with a significant loss of versatility, it is no longer possible to put this in the guard of an airborne detachment. But instead of eighty people led by a lieutenant commander, we "spend" on such a boat about thirty and a senior lieutenant (for example) as a commander.
What else, besides such simplification, will allow "saving" money and people for forces operating in the distant sea and ocean zones?
Universalization. Let's give such an example, as the defense of a narrowness, for example, the second Kuril passage. We will not consider air defense issues for now - we proceed from the fact that it is provided by aviation. In theory, small missile ships, MRKs would be useful here. But our money is bad, and therefore, instead of RTOs, there are several diesel-electric submarines with guided torpedoes. They, in themselves, are more expensive than RTOs, but we also use them for firing "Caliber", we also use them in the PLO of Naval bases, they also attack enemy surface ships, both with torpedoes and missiles, with them somewhere we land the saboteurs - or we pick them up. They are used to solve very different and many problems. Diesel-electric submarines to us in any case to buy. Of course, RTOs would have coped much better with some of these tasks, but they are unable to complete all tasks. But, after all, we have high-speed surface and underwater targets that diesel-electric submarines simply cannot keep up with, even if we do not try to remain stealthy, right? So, and they are transferred to aviation - which you still need to have. In the red - the loss of the "option" of tracking weapons. But it can be replaced with aerial reconnaissance and airborne forces ready for an air attack on the ground - during the threatened period it is more expensive than sending RTOs, but the rest of the time it is cheaper, because both aviation and aerial reconnaissance need to be available anyway. Thus, in one case we need diesel-electric submarines, and in the other diesel-electric submarines and MRK. The choice is obvious.
What other tricks can there be? Placement of underwater mine-finders, unmanned boats with anti-mine GAS, and destroyers on the main warships DMiOZ. On the same frigates. This increases the cost of the ship somewhat, and inflates the staff of the BC-3. But this rise in price and inflation is incomparable with the need to have a separate minesweeper, even a small one.
By the way, one does not interfere with the other - minesweepers are also needed in this case, they just need less, and significantly. Which is the goal. On the naval base, on which surface ships are based, much less minesweepers will be needed than if the PMO were carried out only by them, it will be necessary to keep large sweeping forces only at submarine bases.
And, of course, providing maneuver with forces and means. For example, as said in the article about the revival of the amphibious forces, small landing ships, around which the amphibious forces of the future must be built, must pass along inland waterways, so that a ship from the Black Sea could get into the Caspian, and the Baltic, and the White seas. Then for three "European" fleets and the Caspian Flotilla it will be necessary to have fewer ships, and the lack of forces in one direction or the other will be compensated by the transfer of reinforcements from the other.
And the combat boats described above must also pass through waterways. And for their escort in winter, engineering (ice reconnaissance of rivers, blasting the ice cover with explosives) and icebreaking support must be worked out.
Another way to reduce the cost of the fleet is to build up reserves in advance. Firstly, from ships that are no longer needed in combat strength, but are still at least of limited combat capability. For example, the light cruiser "Mikhail Kutuzov", although it works as a cell tower and a museum, is in fact listed in the Navy as a reserve ship. Its combat value, of course, is near-zero; this is just an example of the fact that we have some reserves even now. On the way, in the next decade, the retirement of the Smetlivy, possibly some small ships, some of which, after refurbishment, could be mothballed. It also makes sense to consider reviving the practice of mob reserve from civilian courts.
Currently, thanks to the program of the Ministry of Industry and Trade "keel in exchange for quotas", there is a certain renaissance in the construction of fishing vessels. It is quite possible, in exchange for additional subsidies, to provide for them with additional means of communication and nodes for attaching removable, modular weapons, obliging shipowners to keep everything in good condition (which will be quite profitable for them financially). And in advance, keep in mind that in the event of a big war, these mobilized ships will solve auxiliary tasks, and not build them specially for the fleet, spending money and forming crews.
But the main thing is to transfer some of the functions to aviation. Unfortunately, planes cannot replace ships. The ship has the opportunity to be present in the desired area for weeks; for aviation, such a presence is inconceivably expensive. But some of the tasks should still be delegated to it, if only because it can be transferred from theater to theater in a day, which is absolutely impossible for ships. This means that instead of creating numerous naval forces in each of the fleets, you can take turns attacking the enemy in different theaters with the same aircraft, but with a slight "shift" in time.
The less money, and, most importantly, people, went to the mosquito fleet, the more remains for the ocean.
And last - and most important. Part of the tasks in BMZ may well be performed by the DMiOZ ship. So, if it presses very hard, then the frigate, and not the MRK, can also track the enemy with the weapon. It looks irrational, but in this case we only need a frigate, and in another, a frigate and MRK, with the appropriate involvement of personnel and costs. Similarly, frigates can also ensure the deployment of SSBNs and protect them from enemy nuclear submarines, it is not necessary to build corvettes for this. Not always, but often that's the case.
Once again, all of the above examples are just a demonstration of the approach.
Let's list the main tasks of the Navy in the coastal zone:
- Mine support.
- Anti-submarine defense.
- Strikes against surface ships, including from the tracking position.
- Air defense of bases, areas of deployment of submarines and ship groups.
- Antiamphibious defense.
- Fire support for the landing.
- Protection of shipping, protection of convoys and amphibious troops on the transition.
- Strikes on the coast with guided missile weapons and artillery.
- Placing mine and network barriers.
In principle, this list can be continued for a long time, the principle is important.
First, we determine which tasks from the list (no matter how long this list may be) aviation can solve, and without compromising the quality of their implementation. These tasks are transferred to aviation. After all, you still need to have it.
Then we determine which of the remaining tasks can be solved by the ships of the far sea zone, which will temporarily operate in the near one (for example, a frigate covering the transition of the submarine from the base in Vilyuchinsk to the Sea of Okhotsk, after the completion of the operation can be used for completely different purposes, including and in the DMZ), and how many such ships are needed. Then we already determine how many real ships of the near sea zone remain for us, and how many of them can be simplified - boats replacing corvettes, or even mobilized civilian ships.
Thus, the minimum number of BMZ ships of different types that the Russian Navy must have, the minimum number of combat boats, aircraft operating "from the shore", modular weapons for mobilized ships, reserve ships and people will be determined. And it is precisely these minimal forces that must be created.
And all other tasks, even in BMZ, should be performed by ships "from the frigate and above", ships of the far sea and ocean zones, nuclear submarines and long-range anti-submarine aircraft. And it is on them that the main money should be spent. Because a frigate or destroyer can fight submarines at its base, but to fight a few thousand miles from home shores for a corvette of 1,500 tons is a difficult task, if at all solvable.
Of course, when building new ships, it will be necessary to show economically rational approaches, and somewhere to combine tasks, for example, so that the landing ship is both a transport at the same time and replaces two ships.
But this does not change the main thing.
Forces capable of operating only in BMZ in our fleet, of course, should be. But to rely only on them, or to develop them extensively, as the USSR did, would be a fatal mistake. Because in this case all available resources will be spent on them, and to fight the enemy in the far sea zone, where he actually will be, and from where he will deliver his strikes, nothing will remain, nothing will be left for tasks peacetime, on operations like the Syrian, on "projection of status", as the Americans say, or "display of the flag," as it is still customary to say in our country. To achieve the strategic goals of Russia in the world.
And this is unacceptable.
And although it is difficult both technically and organizationally to combine the presence of forces for the far sea and oceanic zones with defensive forces for the near sea zone, it is feasible. You just need to correctly prioritize and show non-standard approaches.
In the end, you can defend yourself along the line of the enemy bases. Wherever they are.
