Comparison of fighters of different generations has long been the most bottomless topic. A huge number of forums and publications tip the scales, both in one and the other direction.
Not having our own serial fifth generation fighter (I emphasize - serial), almost 99% of forum battles and publications of various authors in the Russian Federation boil down to the fact that our machines of the 4+, 4 ++ generation do an excellent job with the long-term serial F-22. Before the T-50 was shown to the general public, it was not even roughly clear what this machine would represent. Most of the publications in the Russian Federation boiled down to the fact that there are no problems anyway. Our "fours" will be put on the Raptor's shoulder blades without any problems, or at least they won't be worse.
In 2011, after showing at MAKS, the situation with the T-50 began to clear up, and they began to compare it with the serial F-22. Now most of the publications and forum disputes tended to the total superiority of the Sukhoi machine. If we did not know any problems with our “fours”, then what to say about the “five”. It's hard to argue with this logic.
However, there is no such consensus in the Western media. If the advantage of the Su-27 over the F-15C was more or less recognized there, then the F-22 is always out of competition. The generation of cars 4+, 4 ++ does not upset Western analysts too much. All agree that they will not be able to fully compete with the F-22.
On the one hand, everyone praises their swamp - this is quite logical, but on the other hand, I want to follow the logic of both. Surely everyone has their own truth, which has a right to exist.
In the 50s, 70s, discussing which generation a particular car belongs to was a very unrewarding occupation. Many old cars were modernized and brought up their potential to more modern ones. However, the fourth generation can already be described quite accurately. Last but not least, his concept was influenced by the Vietnam War (no one argued that the gun was not needed, and no one relied only on long-range combat).
The fourth-generation vehicle must have high maneuverability, a strong radar, the ability to use guided weapons, always with dual-circuit engines.
The first representative of the fourth generation was the deck F-14. The aircraft had a number of clear advantages, but was, perhaps, an outsider among the 4th generation aircraft. Now she is no longer in the ranks. In 1972, the F-15 fighter made its maiden flight. It was precisely the air superiority plane. He coped with his functions excellently, and no one had a car equal to him in those years. In 1975, our fourth generation fighter, the MiG-31, made its maiden flight. However, unlike all the other fours, he could not conduct a full-fledged maneuverable air battle. The design of the aircraft did not imply serious overloads, which are inevitable during active maneuvering. Unlike all "fours", the operational overload of which reached 9G, the MiG-31 withstood only 5G. Entering mass production in 1981, five years after the F-15, it was not a fighter, but an interceptor. Its missiles had a long range, but were not capable of hitting highly maneuverable targets such as the F-15, F-16 (the reason for this will be discussed below). The mission of the MiG-31 was to combat enemy scouts and bombers. Perhaps, in part, thanks to the radar station unique at that time, he could perform the functions of a command post.
In 1974 it makes its first flight, and in 1979 another fighter of the fourth generation, the F-16, entered service. It was the first to use an integral layout, when the fuselage contributes to the creation of lift. However, the F-16 is not positioned as an air superiority aircraft, this fate is completely left to the heavy F-15.
By that time, we had nothing to oppose to the American cars of the new generation. The first flight of the Su-27 and MiG-29 took place in 1977. By that time, the F-15 had already entered serial production. The Su-27 was supposed to resist the Eagle, but things did not go so smoothly with it. Initially, the wing on "Sushka" was created on its own and received the so-called Gothic shape. However, the very first flight showed the erroneous design - the Gothic wing, which led to strong shaking. As a result, the Su-27 had to hastily remake the wing for the wing developed at TsAGI. Which has already been delivered to the MiG-29. Therefore, the Mig entered service a little earlier in 1983, and the Su in 1985.
By the beginning of the serial production of "Sushka", the F-15 had been in full swing on the assembly line for nine long years. But the integrated configuration of the Su-27 applied, from the aerodynamic point of view, was more advanced. Also, the use of static instability to some extent led to an increase in maneuverability. However, contrary to the opinion of many, this parameter does not determine the maneuverable superiority of the vehicle. For example, all modern passenger Airbuses are also statically unstable, and they do not show the miracles of maneuvering. So, this is more a feature of Drying than a clear advantage.
With the advent of the fourth generation machines, all forces were thrown into the fifth. In the early 80s, there was no particular warming in the Cold War, and no one wanted to lose their positions in fighter aircraft. The so-called fighter program of the 90s was being developed. Having received the fourth generation aircraft a little earlier, the Americans had an advantage in it. Already in 1990, even before the full collapse of the Union, the prototype of the fifth generation fighter YF-22 made its first flight. Its serial production was supposed to start in 1994, but history has made its own adjustments. The union collapsed, and the main rival of the United States was gone. The states were well aware that modern Russia in the 90s is not capable of creating a fifth-generation aircraft. Moreover, it is not even capable of large-scale production of 4+ generation aircraft. Yes, and our leadership did not see a great need for this, since the West ceased to be an enemy. Therefore, the pace of bringing the design of the F-22 to the production version was sharply reduced. The volume of purchases fell from 750 cars to 648, and production was pushed back to 1996. In 1997, there was another reduction of the batch to 339 machines, and at the same time serial production started. The plant reached an acceptable capacity of 21 units per year in 2003, but in 2006 the procurement plans were reduced to 183 units. In 2011 the last Raptor was delivered.
The fighter of the nineties in our country came belatedly from the main competitor. The draft design of the MIG MFI was defended only in 1991. The collapse of the Union slowed down the already lagging fifth generation program and the prototype took to the skies only in 2000. However, he did not make a strong impression to the west. To begin with, its prospects were too vague, there were no tests of the corresponding radars and the completion of modern engines. Even visually, the Mig glider could not be attributed to STELS machines: the use of PGO, the extensive use of vertical tail, not shown internal weapon compartments, etc. All this suggested that the MFI was only a prototype, very far from the real fifth generation.
Fortunately, the rise in oil prices in the 2000s made it possible for our state to get into a tight fifth-generation aircraft, with appropriate support. But neither the MIG MFI nor the S-47 "Berkut" became prototypes for the new fifth generation. Of course, the experience of their creation was taken into account, but the plane was built completely from scratch. Partly due to the large number of controversial points in the design of the MFI and the S-47, partly due to the too large take-off weight and the lack of suitable engines. But in the end, we still received a prototype of the T-50, because its serial production has not begun. But we'll talk about it in the next part.
What are the main differences from the fourth generation should the fifth have? Mandatory maneuverability, high thrust-to-weight ratio, more advanced radar, versatility and low visibility. It can take a long time to list the different differences, but in fact, all this is far from important. It is only important that the fifth generation should have decisive advantages over the fourth, and how - this is already a question for a specific aircraft.
It's time to move on to a direct comparison of fourth and fifth generation aircraft. Air collision can be roughly divided into two stages - long-range air combat and close air combat. Let's consider each of the stages separately.
Long-range aerial combat
What is important in a distant collision. First, it is awareness from external sources (AWACS aircraft, ground location stations), which does not depend on the aircraft. Secondly, the power of the radar - who will see it first. Thirdly, the low visibility of the aircraft itself.
The biggest irritant of public opinion in the Russian Federation is low visibility. Only the lazy did not speak out on this matter. As soon as they did not throw stones in the direction of the F-22 about its low visibility. You can give a number of arguments, the standard Russian Patriot:
- it is perfectly visible to our old meter radars, the F-117 was shot down by the Yugoslavs
- it is perfectly seen by our modern radars from the S-400 / S-300
- it is perfectly visible to modern aircraft radars 4 ++
- as soon as he turns on his radar, he will be immediately noticed and shot down
- etc. etc….
The meaning of these arguments is the same: "Raptor" is nothing more than cutting the budget! Silly Americans have invested a lot of money in low-visibility technology that doesn't work at all. But let's try to understand this in more detail. For starters, what I'm most interested in is, what does a standard Russian Patriot care about the US budget? Maybe he really loves this country, and does not see it as an enemy like the rest of the majority?
On this occasion, there is a wonderful phrase of Shakespeare: "You so zealously strive to judge the sins of others, start with your own and you will not get to others."
Why is it said? Let's take a look at what's going on in our aviation industry. The most modern production fighter of the 4 ++ generation, the Su-35s. He, like his progenitor Su-27, did not possess STELS elements. However, it uses a number of technologies to reduce the RCS without significant design changes, i.e. at least slightly, but reduced. It would seem why? And so everyone even sees the F-22.
But the Su-35 is a flower. The fifth-generation fighter T-50 is being prepared for serial production. And what we see - the glider is created using STELS technology! Widespread use of composites, up to 70% of the structure, internal weapon compartments, special air intake design, parallel edges, a pair of sawtooth joints. And all this for the sake of STELS technology. Why does the standard Russian Patriot see no contradictions here? The dog is with him with the Raptor, what are our people doing? Are they stepping on the same rake? They did not take into account such obvious mistakes and are investing a lot of money in NIKOR instead of modernizing fourth-generation aircraft?
But also T-50 flowers. We have frigates of project 22350. The vessel is 135 by 16 meters in size. According to the Navy, it was built using STELS technology! A huge vessel with a displacement of 4500 tons. Why does he need low visibility? Or an aircraft carrier like "Gerald R. Ford", so unexpectedly it also uses the technology of low visibility (well, it's clear here, again sawing, probably).
So can a standard Russian Patriot start from his own country, where, it seems, the cut is even worse. Or you can try to understand the topic a little. Maybe our designers are trying to implement STELS elements for a reason, maybe this is not such a useless cut?
First of all, you should ask the constructors themselves for an explanation. In the Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences there was a publication under the authorship of A. N. Lagarkova and M. A. Poghosyan. At the very least, the last name should be known to everyone who reads this article. Let me give you an excerpt from this article:
“Reducing the RCS from 10-15 m2 - typical for a heavy fighter (Su-27, F-15) to 0.3m2, allows us to fundamentally reduce aviation losses. This effect is enhanced by adding electronic countermeasures to the small ESR."
The graphs from this article are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
It looks like the constructors turned out to be a little smarter than the standard Russian Patriot. The problem is that air combat is not a linear characteristic. If by calculation we can get at what range this or that radar will see a target with a certain RCS, then the reality turns out to be a little different. The calculation of the maximum detection range is given in a narrow zone, when the location of the target is known, and all the radar energy is concentrated in one direction. Also, the radar has a directional pattern (BOTTOM) parameter. It is a set of several petals, shown schematically in Figure 3. The optimal direction of definition corresponds to the central axis of the main lobe of the diagram. It is for him that advertising data is relevant. Those. when targets are detected in the lateral sectors, taking into account the sharp decrease in the radiation pattern, the radar resolution drops sharply. Therefore, the optimal field of view for a real radar is very narrow.
Now let's turn to the basic radar equation, Figure 4. Dmax - shows the maximum detection range of the radar object. Sigma is the value of the RCS of an object. Using this equation, we can calculate the detection range for any, arbitrarily small RCS. Those. from a mathematical point of view, everything is pretty simple. For example, let's take the official data on the Su-35S "Irbis" radar. EPR = 3m2 she sees at a distance of 350 km. Let's take the RCS of the F-22 equal to 0.01m2. Then the estimated range of "Raptor" detection for the "Irbis" radar will be 84 km. However, this is all true only for describing the general principles of work, but is not fully applicable in reality. The reason lies in the radar equation itself. Pr.min - minimum required or threshold power of the receiver. The radar receiver is not able to receive an arbitrarily small reflected signal! Otherwise, he would see only noises, instead of real targets. Therefore, the mathematical detection range cannot coincide with the real one, since the threshold power of the receiver is not taken into account.
True, comparing the Raptor with the Su-35s is not entirely fair. Serial production of the Su-35s began in 2011, and in the same year, the production of the F-22 was completed! Before the Su-35s appeared, the Raptor had been on the assembly line for fourteen years. The Su-30MKI is closer to the F-22 in terms of years of serial production. It went into production in 2000, four years after the Raptor. His radar "Bars" was able to determine the RCS of 3m2 at a distance of 120 km (these are optimistic data). Those. He will be able to see the "Predator" at a distance of 29 km, and this, without taking into account the threshold power.
The most enchanting is the argument with the downed F-117 and meter antennas. Here we turn to history. At the time of Desert Storm, the F-117 flew 1,299 combat missions. In Yugoslavia, the F-117 flew 850 sorties. In the end, only one plane was shot down! The reason is that with meter radars, not everything is as easy as it seems to us. We have already talked about the directional pattern. The most accurate definition - can only provide a narrow main lobe of the DND. Fortunately, there is a long-known formula for determining the width of the DND φ = L / D. Where L is the wavelength, D is the size of the antenna. That is why meter radars have wide beam pattern and are not capable of giving precise target coordinates. Therefore, everyone began to refuse to use them. But the meter range has a lower attenuation coefficient in the atmosphere - therefore it is able to view farther than a centimeter range radar comparable in power.
However, there are frequent statements that VHF radars are not sensitive to STELS technologies. But such designs are based on the scattering of the incident signal, and the inclined surfaces reflect any wave, regardless of its length. Problems can arise with radio-absorbing paints. Their layer thickness should be equal to an odd number of quarters of the wavelength. Here, most likely, it will be difficult to choose paint for both meter and centimeter ranges. But the most important parameter for determining the object remains the EPR. The main factors determining the EPR are:
Electrical and magnetic properties of the material, Characteristics of the target surface and the angle of incidence of radio waves, The relative size of the target, determined by the ratio of its length to the wavelength.
Those. among other things, the EPR of the same object is different at different wavelengths. Consider two options:
1. The wavelength is several meters - therefore, the physical dimensions of the object are less than the wavelength. For the simplest objects that fall under such conditions, there is a calculation formula presented in Figure 5.
It can be seen from the formula that EPR is inversely proportional to the fourth power of the wavelength. That is why large 1-meter radars and over-the-horizon radars are not capable of detecting small aircraft.
2. The wavelength is in the region of a meter, which is less than the physical size of the object. For the simplest objects that fall under such conditions, there is a calculation formula presented in Figure 6.
It can be seen from the formula that EPR is inversely proportional to the square of the wavelength.
Simplifying the above formulas for educational purposes, a simpler dependency is used:
Where SIGMAnat is the EPR that we want to obtain by calculation, SIGMAmod is the EPR obtained experimentally, k is the coefficient equal to:
In which Le is the wavelength for the experimental EPR, L is the wavelength for the calculated EPR.
From the above, it is possible to draw a fairly straightforward conclusion about long-wave radars. But the picture will not be complete if not to mention how the EPR of complex objects is determined in reality. It cannot be obtained by calculation. For this, anechoic chambers or rotary stands are used. On which aircraft are irradiated at different angles. Rice. No. 7. At the output, a backscatter diagram is obtained, according to which one can understand: where the illumination occurs, and what will be the average value of the RCS of the object. Fig. No. 8.
As we have already figured out above, and as can be seen from Figure 8, with an increase in the wavelength, the diagram will receive wider and less pronounced lobes. Which will lead to a decrease in accuracy, but at the same time to a change in the structure of the received signal.
Now let's talk about turning on the F-22 radar. On the net you can often find the opinion that after turning it on, it will become perfectly visible to our "Dryers" and how the kitten will be shot at the same moment. For starters, ranged aerial combat has many different event options and tactics. We will look at the main historical examples later - but often the radiation warning will not even be able to save your car, not that to attack the enemy. A warning may indicate the fact that the enemy already knows the approximate position and turned on the radar for the final aiming of the missiles. But let's get to the specifics on this issue. The Su-35s has an L-150-35 radiation warning station. Fig. No. 9. This station is capable of determining the direction of the emitter and issuing target designation to Kh-31P missiles (this is relevant only for ground-based radars). By direction - we can understand the direction of radiation (in the case of an aircraft, the zone is where the enemy is). But we cannot determine its coordinates, since the power of the radiated radar is not a constant value. To determine you need to use your radar.
It is important to understand one detail here when comparing the 4th generation aircraft with the 5th. For the Su-35S radar, the oncoming radiation will be a hindrance. This is a feature of the AFAR F-22 radar, which can simultaneously operate in different modes. The PFAR Su-35S does not have such an opportunity. In addition to the fact that Sushka receives a counter-active interference, it still needs to be identified and escorted (different things, between which a certain time passes!) "Raptor" with STELS elements.
In addition, the F-22 can operate in the jammer's area. As indicated above in the graphs from the publication of the Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which will lead to an even greater advantage. What is it based on? The determination accuracy is the difference between the accumulation of the signal reflected from the target and the noise. Strong noises can completely clog the antenna receiver, or at least complicate the accumulation of Pr.min (discussed above).
Additionally, the reduction of the RCS makes it possible to expand the tactics of using the aircraft. Consider several options for tactical action in groups known from history.
J. Stewart, in his book - gave a number of examples of North Korea's tactics during the war:
1. Reception "Ticks"
Two groups are on a collision course towards the enemy. After mutual direction finding, both groups turn in the opposite direction (Home). The enemy sets off in pursuit. The third group - wedges between the first and second and attacks the enemy on a collision course, while he is busy chasing. In this case, the small EPR of the third group is very important. Rice. No. 10.
2. Reception "Distraction"
A group of enemy strike aircraft is advancing under the cover of fighters. A group of defenders specifically allows themselves to be detected by the enemy and forces them to concentrate on themselves. On the other hand, a second group of defending fighters attack attack attack aircraft. In this case, the small RCS of the second group is very important! Rice. No. 11. In Korea, this maneuver was corrected from ground-based radars. In modern times, this will be done by an AWACS aircraft.
3. Reception "Strike from below"
In the combat area, one group goes at a standard height, the other (more qualified) at an extremely low one. The enemy discovers a more obvious first group and enters the battle. The second group attacks from below. Rice. No. 12. In this case, the small RCS of the second group is very important!
4. Reception "ladder"
Consists of pairs of aircraft, each of which goes below and behind the leading one by 600 m. The upper pair serves as the bait, when the enemy approaches it, the wingmen gain height and carry out an attack. Rice. No. 13. The EPR of the slaves is very important in this case! In modern conditions, the "staircase" should be a little more spacious, well, the essence remains.
Consider the option when the missile on the F-22 has already been fired. Fortunately, our designers were able to provide us with a large range of missiles. First of all, let's dwell on the farthest arm of the MiG-31 - the R-33 rocket. She had excellent range for that time, but was not capable of fighting modern fighters. As mentioned above, the Mig was created as an interceptor for reconnaissance and bombers, not capable of active maneuvering. Therefore, the maximum overload of the targets hit by the R-33 missile is 4g. The modern long arm is the KS-172 rocket. However, it has been shown for a very long time in the form of a mock-up and it may not even come to being adopted. A more realistic "long arm" is the RVV-BD missile, based on the Soviet development of the R-37 missile. The range indicated by the manufacturer is 200 km. In some dubious sources, you can find a range of 300 km. Most likely, this is based on the test launches of the R-37, but there is a difference between the R-37 and the RVV-BD. The R-37 was supposed to hit targets maneuvering with an overload of 4g, and the RVV-BD was already capable of withstanding targets with an overload of 8g, i.e. the structure should be more durable and heavy.
In the confrontation with the F-22, all this is of little relevance. Since it is not possible to detect at such a distance with its forces the on-board radar, and the real range of the missiles and the advertising are very different. This is based on the design of the missile itself and tests for maximum range. The rockets are based on a solid propellant engine (powder charge), the operating time of which is a couple of seconds. He, in a matter of moments, accelerates the rocket to maximum speed, and then it goes by inertia. The advertising maximum range is based on the launch of missiles at a target whose horizon is below the attacker. (That is, it is not required to overcome the gravitational force of the earth). The movement follows a rectilinear trajectory until the speed at which the rocket becomes uncontrollable. With active maneuvering, the inertia of the rocket will rapidly fall, and the range will be reduced significantly.
The main missile for long-range aerial combat with the Raptor will be the RVV-SD. Its advertising range is slightly more modest at 110 km. Aircraft of the fifth or fourth generation, after being captured by a missile, should try to disrupt the guidance. In view of the need for the rocket after a breakdown, to actively maneuver, the energy will be spent, and there will be little chances to re-visit. The experience of the war in Vietnam is curious, where the effectiveness of destruction by medium-range missiles was 9%. During the war in the Gulf, the effectiveness of missiles increased slightly, there were three missiles per shot down. Modern missiles, of course, increase the likelihood of destruction, but aircraft of generations 4 ++ and 5 also have quite a few counterarguments. The data on how likely an air-to-air missile will hit a target is given by the manufacturers themselves. These data were obtained during exercises and without active maneuvering, naturally, they have little to do with reality. Nevertheless, the probability of defeat for RVV-SD is 0.8, and for AIM-120C-7 0. 9. What will the reality be made of? From the capabilities of the aircraft to thwart the attack. This can be done in several ways - active maneuvering and the use of electronic warfare means, low visibility technology. We will talk about maneuvering in the second part, where we will consider close air combat.
Let's go back to the low-signature technology, and what advantage will the fifth generation aircraft get over the fourth in a missile attack. A number of seeker heads have been developed for the RVV-SD. At the moment, 9B-1103M is used, which is capable of determining the RCS of 5m2 at a distance of 20 km. There are also options for its modernization 9B-1103M-200, which is capable of determining the RCS of 3m2 at a distance of 20 km, but most likely they will be installed on the ed. 180 for T-50. Earlier we took the EPR of the Raptor equal to 0.01m2 (the opinion that this is in the front hemisphere seems to be erroneous, in anechoic chambers, as a rule, they give an average value), with such values, the detection range of the Raptor will be 4, 2 and 4, 8 kilometers respectively. This advantage will clearly simplify the task of disrupting the capture of the seeker.
In the English-language press, data on the attack of targets by the AIM-120C7 missile in conditions of electronic warfare countermeasures were cited, they were about 50%. We can draw an analogy for the RVV-SD, however, in addition to possible electronic countermeasures, it will also have to struggle with the technology of low visibility (again referring to the graphs from the Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Those. the likelihood of defeat becomes even less. On the last missile AIM-120C8, or as it is also called AIM-120D, a more advanced seeker is used, with different algorithms. According to the manufacturer's assurances with electronic warfare counteraction, the probability of defeat should reach 0, 8. We will hope that our promising seeker for “ed. 180 will give a similar probability.
In the next part, we will consider the development of events in close air combat.
