We have always been and will be interested in the opinion of our potential partners overseas about us and our capabilities. Fortunately, a number of publications in the United States such as "National Interest", "Goals and Objectives" are ready to share their thoughts with us.
I present to your attention another edition of this kind. Signal Magazine, the official mouthpiece of the AFCEA, a nonprofit association of veterans of the US Signal and Electronic Corps. Published since 1946.
Robert K. Ackerman, author of the article, has been the editor-in-chief of the journal for over ten years. Ackerman served as a war correspondent covering the war in Iraq, being assigned to the US Army's 101st Airborne Division.
A journalist by training, Ackerman was also the dean of the political science department at the university. His journalistic career spans over three decades, starting with filming as a radio reporter covering Republican and Democratic political conventions in the 1976 elections. Following these agreements, he acted as a media consultant or spokesman for candidates for state and presidential campaigns.
Ackerman's articles cover topics such as military information systems, space technology, international security, terrorism, and information operations.
What does Mr. Ackerman think about Russian electronic warfare systems?
Mr. Ackerman believes that Russia was able to implement advanced technologies in the field of electronic warfare and today Russian electronic warfare systems are ahead of Western electronic systems in terms of efficiency and power.
Based on the report of one of the European think tanks, Ackerman is sure that the plan for the modernization of the armed forces of our country for the period until 2025 is not just a basis for further improvement.
The report was published by Roger McDermott of the International Center for Defense and Security Issues in Estonia.
Of course, the main focus of the report is on the threats posed by Russian electronic warfare systems for the Baltic region. But Ackerman believes that the conclusions of the authors of the study can be applied to all Russian forces adjacent to NATO's borders, since Russia's electronic warfare is highly mobile.
According to the report, Russian electronic warfare systems are capable of disrupting and interrupting the operation of NATO communication channels, suppressing drones, radars and other surveillance and communication systems.
NATO's plans to protect the Baltic states and other members of the alliance on its eastern borders may be disrupted by an attack by Russian electronic warfare systems as part of blocking access to the A2 / AD zone, which requires blocking communications and information systems of the alliance.
It is worth noting that the authors are right here. The creation of a real A2 / AD zone on the territory of the Baltic States, and near our eastern borders, is quite real. However, here it is worth talking not only about the means of electronic warfare, but really about the complex of weapons that allows this to be carried out.
And, if we are talking not only about electronic warfare equipment, but about a complex of electronic warfare + S-300 / S-400 + Iskander + Caliber - yes, there is reason for concern.
However, of all the above, only "Caliber" can be called an offensive weapon, and even then, with some stretch. Everything else is really a means of deterrence.
In any case, the creation of a "dead zone" near our borders for NATO is a cause for concern for NATO only in the event that alliance forces begin to move.
If there are no movements directed against the interests of Russia, then there is nothing to worry about. But Ackerman and the authors of the report are concerned not only with this aspect.
Actually, why not? If the alliance does not do the same, then these are exclusively NATO problems. On the other hand, if we do not have as many offensive weapons as, for example, Tomahawk missiles, then what prevents Russia from creating a reliable missile defense shield not only in the form of air defense systems, but also electronic warfare?
Again, if the trend is in the West, why are we worse? If NATO considers psychological and information warfare as a component of the entire military concept, why can't Russia follow the example of potential ones?
Everything is correct here. Indeed, the "Murmansk", which we talked about at one time, is capable of such actions that NATO can only dream of. It should only be noted that the impact range of 5 thousand kilometers is not the limit for "Murmansk". When using the complex as part of a division, that is, two stations, the aggregate power is enough to confidently suppress the VHF band at a distance of 8 thousand kilometers. And during the exercises "in full force" several times the application of a "shot in the ass" was noted, that is, the signal sent by the station went around the globe and was received by the antennas of the complex. Of course, in a weakened form, but nonetheless.
Of course, for such a thing, it is necessary that certain favorable conditions for the passage of the signal develop in the atmosphere, but even without this, the effect is more than sufficient.
I agree with Mr. Ackerman that Murmansk can be viewed not only as a deterrent because of its range of impact. On the other hand, disruption of communications in the VHF range is not as fatal as, say, a missile with a nuclear warhead capable of covering the same 5,000 kilometers.
Not something to be afraid of. "Bylina" is a very promising complex, but first of all, it is a complex for managing existing electronic warfare assets. And here we also have complete order, given the presence of "Moscow".
So "Bylina" is not a miracle weapon that will change the balance of power, it is the next step in the development of Russian electronic warfare systems.
Somewhat incomprehensible. Yes, modern Russian complexes are capable of detecting objects emitting in the radio range, classifying them and displaying them on a map with reference to the terrain. This is not a secret for a long time. And naturally, both artillery and army aviation can work out according to coordinates. This is a completely normal conduct of complex combat operations.
And here psychological operations are not entirely clear. If an enemy subunit that has discovered itself is subjected to shelling or treatment by tactical aviation, then where is the place for psychological warfare?
In general, the conclusions of Mr. Ackerman are quite literate.
It is impossible not to agree. The fact that the United States recognizes our success in the development and implementation of new electronic warfare systems is gratifying. However, the enemy's understanding of his own lag usually calls for the development of certain measures aimed at leveling the problem.
Since the problem is that Russian electronic warfare systems significantly exceed the capabilities of the alliance, and NATO understands this, it means that retaliatory measures should be expected.
And here the question is in what area the NATO leadership will take these measures.
