April 15 - 115 years of Russian electronic warfare troops

April 15 - 115 years of Russian electronic warfare troops
April 15 - 115 years of Russian electronic warfare troops

So, on May 3, 1999, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 183, a holiday called the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist was established, which is celebrated annually on April 15.

On April 15, we celebrate the 155th anniversary of not even the creation of electronic warfare troops, but the first successful use of electronic warfare by Russian specialists. Although then even such a term as electronic warfare did not yet exist.

But there was a Japanese squadron that came to Port Arthur in order to continue the defeat of the Russian troops. And it was on April 15, 1904, two days after the tragic death of Admiral Makarov, that the Japanese fleet began shelling Port Arthur.

But alas, the case was not crowned with success. The Japanese armored cruisers "Kasuga" and "Nishin", having taken a good position in the dead zone of the fortress's guns and Russian ships, began to correct the firing of the main forces of the squadron by radiotelegraph. Japanese ships fired more than two hundred large-caliber shells at the harbor of Port Arthur, but not a single hit was achieved.

The reason for this was the work of the radio operators of the Golden Mountain station and the battleship Pobeda, who, with spark discharges, were able to drown out the transmissions of Japanese cruisers.

Actually, this was the first recorded case of jamming communication systems. This is how the history of the EW troops began.


It is clear that over the past 115 years since that time, a lot of electrons have flown under the bridge. Although, if not very seriously, the principles have remained almost the same.

After all, physics is at the heart of electronic warfare, and it has not changed very much since then. What can not be said, of course, about electronic warfare.


But the principles remained the same. And at the heart of all the work of electronic warfare is the principle of disrupting the operation of the enemy's electronic systems.

In order to destroy something, you need something first, what? That's right, the enemy must be detected and classified.

It is electronic intelligence that is the first component of electronic warfare. It is RTR that studies the area of ​​application by all available means (and there are many of them), identifies objects and systems, assigns importance to them, and then "on a silver platter" transfers it to those who will directly work on them.

Basically, modern electronic warfare stations combine search and suppression capabilities.


In general, there is practically no romance in the suppression of an object today, as some people are suppressing. It's simple: the essence of any suppression is to create a noise signal at the input of the receiver, more than the useful signal.

Moreover, it does not matter at all what kind of receiver it is: an aircraft radar or a cruise missile, a headquarters radio station or a projectile radio fuse. The bottom line will be the same - disruption of the system that receives information over the radio channel.

These are active interference. And there are passive ones, by the way, no less effective. Clouds of foil strips of a certain length and width can permanently paralyze the operation of the radar of the range for which the foil was cut. Considering that the lightest strip of aluminum foil can hang in the air for a very long time, the radar calculations will have to be idle for quite a long time, waiting for the wind.

And corner reflectors shouldn't be discounted. Because just, according to the principle of "cheap and cheerful", corners are able to superbly fool your head, especially if the opponent does not have time to investigate. This applies primarily to aircraft.

Electronic warfare systems today are a fairly wide range of devices that are able to arrange trouble for the enemy, you just need to clearly understand what actions are needed.


"Murmansk" is capable of disrupting radio communications between the ships of the aircraft carrier strike group in the Atlantic, at a distance of 5-6 thousand kilometers from its base. This is the only system in the world capable (with a certain confluence of radio wave transmission factors) "sting" itself in the back. What will happen where the Murmansk antennas send their signals …


The "inhabitant" is much smaller, but not much more harmful. And its range of action is less, but in the zone of action of the "Resident" you can simply forget about cellular communication. The second generation - "Altayets-BM" is even more mobile and no less harmful.


In general, as one EW specialist said, "we crush everything, from geese to satellites."

Satellites, by the way, are also not a question. It is even easier with them, they fly in certain orbits, and today it is quite easy to reach the LEO satellites of our “partners”. There is something.

A separate family of complexes is actually microwave ovens that burn out all the elements of radio-electronic components with radiation.

“Radio” is a rather broad concept, but the second part, “electronic”, includes no fewer components. This, by the way, is the optical range, since laser processing of optical sensors of various guidance systems is the most that neither is the setting of interference with the operation of equipment.

I have not encountered, but heard of systems capable of stunning submarines by suppressing their sonar. In principle, nothing fancy, the same physics, just a different environment. Since a sonar (especially an active one) works in the same way as its surface counterpart, accordingly, you can send something to the antenna.

Actually, there would be an antenna to which you can send a hindrance, and after the hindrance, the matter will definitely not rise.


And the third component. Find, suppress and … protect!

Everything is logical, since the enemy also has its own electronic warfare equipment. For about the same as ours. So there is something to work against.

In general, of course, the jamming station is a very vulnerable piece in the operating cycle. For a long time already in all armies of the world (normal) there is something to send, focusing on the signal.

But we are now talking about protecting our control systems from suppression by the enemy. Therefore, a significant part of the efforts of developers of electronic warfare systems is aimed at protecting their own. And this is not so much the development of countermeasures, as whole complexes of technical measures to counter foreign technical intelligence and electronic warfare systems.

Everything is here: signal coding, the use of burst transmissions, the ability to work at minimum power in the radio masking mode (this is more of an organizational method), various shielding methods, the installation of arresters, locking systems (useful if the device is under the influence of enemy interference), and so on.

One should not think that electronic warfare is jamming everything. It is clear that this is both inefficient (in terms of energy consumption) and cumbersome, since it would require quite decent means of generating both electricity and a signal.

If we talk about modern methods of data transmission, the development of which also does not stand still, then the picture is as follows. If we talk about modern communication systems, then the advanced armies of the world have long been in service with stations using the frequency hopping method (pseudo-random frequency tuning). This is a new religion of communication, which is also practiced by Bluetooth in your phone, for example.

Its essence is that the carrier frequency of the signal transmission changes abruptly in a pseudo-random order. To put it simply, the signal does not "lie" on one specific carrier frequency, but simply jumps from channel to channel from several times to thousands of times per second. Naturally, within the specified frequency range.

And since the sequence of these hops is known only to the receiver and transmitter, it is difficult to detect such a signal. To someone who will listen / search on a specific channel, this transmission will look like a momentary increase in noise. Recognizing whether it is random noise or a transmission tail is a challenge.

Intercepting such a signal is also difficult. To do this, you need to know at least the sequence of transitions between channels. And although she is "pseudo", but random. And "crushing" such a signal is also an ambush, since you need to know the set of channels. We add that the signal jumps between the channels several hundred times per second …

I hope I haven't bored anyone with physics. All this is solely in order to explain on the fingers that today electronic warfare is not a beating on the head with a club, but rather, a precisely calculated thrust with a sword. The work is specifically for specialists, moreover, specialists of a very high category.


And if we start talking about network-centric wars of the future …

In general, this model of war has become possible precisely because the development of information technology allows it. Including information exchange of all combatants, aircraft, helicopters, reconnaissance and attack UAVs, satellites in orbit, guidance points and soldiers in the trenches.

The United States is very actively testing some components of the network-centric war, and there are certain achievements, yes. It would be nice to introduce into the material an explanation of what Boyd's Loop is, but I think it will be quite cumbersome. Let's dwell on the fact that the whole idea of ​​network-centric war is tied to the exchange of information.

That is, communication systems are among the first (and maybe the first). Without a reliable and well-protected communication system, there will be no "war of tomorrow".


Disruption / suppression of communication systems will lead to paralysis. There is no navigation, no friend or foe identification, no marks on the location of troops, interactive maps do not work, guidance systems do not work …

In general, not the war of the 21st century, but rather the mid-20th century.

The emblem of the electronic warfare troops depicts a hand in a plate (in fact, a chain mail, shielded according to Tesla's method would look more correct) mitten, squeezing a beam of lightning.

April 15 - 115 years of Russian electronic warfare troops

Well, in general, the correct approach, beautifully thought out. Control over one of the main factors of war today. Control over the ether. And the possibility of strangling it if necessary.


Happy holiday, comrades, experts in electronic warfare!

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