The unique qualities of domestic electronic warfare systems, as well as the combat capabilities of air defense systems, have long been legendary. And these legends are fully justified by the events that occurred during the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Yugoslavia, when dozens of Phantoms, Stratofortresses were shot down, and then even such thoughtful predators as the stealthy F-117A Nighthawk, intercepted over Yugoslavia, and the Tomahawks destroyed by the Wasps and Shilkas over Iraq. As for the electronic warfare itself, the last sensational incident occurred in a Syrian company immediately after the deployment of the Russian Aerospace Forces at the Khmeimim airbase. In early October 2015, the Krasukha-4 mobile electronic warfare system was delivered to its vicinity, which, together with the S-400 Triumph air defense system, literally closed the airspace over the northwestern part of the Syrian Arab Republic for flights of tactical aviation of the Turkish Air Force and NATO Allied Air Forces. "Krasukha-4" supplemented "Triumph" with the ability to completely suppress the proper operation of the airborne radio-technical means of the coalition strike aviation, which could make an attempt to break through in a low-altitude regime.
The incident so puzzled the commander of the US Air Force in Europe, General Frank Gorenk, that he hastened to alert the alliance about the ability of the Russian Armed Forces to implement the most advanced Western strategic concept to restrict and deny access and maneuver "A2 / AD", which NATO has been trying to apply for a long time without success. in relation to the Russian Armed Forces in Eastern Europe. But the width of the air corridors from which a massive strike by NATO sea- and air-based strategic cruise missiles is possible often exceeds the areas of our country's airspace covered by ground-based electronic warfare systems. And as you know, the flight of missiles and enemy aircraft in the air defense breakthrough mode at low altitude practically eliminates the capabilities of any ground-based electronic warfare system at a distance of more than 30-40 km due to the concept of a radio horizon. This is ordinary physics, against which no ground-based electronic countermeasures will trample. And there is also a relief that complicates the situation even more. The presence of electronic warfare aircraft in the breakthrough zone of a certain section of the air direction depends solely on the tactical air situation, i.e. they may not be there at the most crucial moment. The only solution to the question may be as follows.
It is necessary to create a dense network of ground-based electronic countermeasures, both mobile on a wheeled chassis and stationary, located on urban and industrial infrastructure, including chimneys of thermal power plants and various antenna mast structures. Their average height usually fluctuates within 60-150 m, which gives an excellent radio horizon of 50 kilometers or more, and the entire low-altitude section of the airspace is located in the coverage area of electronic warfare devices located on such structures. Also, standard cell towers are perfect for these purposes, which are located even in those places where there is no direct line of sight from urban antenna mast structures.
Such a network of electronic countermeasures has already been developed and can be brought to the level of initial combat readiness within the next months - a couple of years. This is the most promising project of the Scientific and Technical Center for Electronic Warfare JSC - Pole-21. This system is represented by a huge number of spaced-apart transmitting antennas-emitters of radio-electronic interference R-340RP, placed on the above types of structures. They will form the so-called intellectually controlled distributed aperture, where that part of the emitters will work at the maximum radio-electronic interference radiation power, in the zones of which the most numerous breakthrough echelon of enemy air attack will be found. In other words, the Pole-21 electronic warfare system will also implement the principle of energy distribution optimization, which allows the most correct use of energy resources.
The importance of this principle is dictated by such side effects of the R-340RP as the suppression of Russian consumers of the GLONASS and GPS global positioning systems, because the main task of the Field-21 is to disable all elements of high-precision weapons that have satellite correction devices via the GPS channel. Selective use of the maximum radiation power will make it possible to maintain GPS / GLONASS coordination for numerous units and civilian users of these systems, near the main areas of electronic jamming. Jamming can also be carried out in strictly specified sectors of the flight of high-precision weapons through the use of certain emitters and their phased switching. This minimizes the negative impact on friendly consumers. But both for energy distribution and for sector suppression, the Field should rely on information from low-altitude radar detectors and AWACS aircraft, transmitting the exact coordinates of the enemy's escorted aircraft to the ground system. Moreover, Pole-21, with its chaotic distribution of tens to hundreds of jammers, requires an overproductive command and control center, where computerized facilities must obtain the clearest and most updated topographic maps of vast areas of the system's operation for maximum coverage with minimal side effects.
According to information from a source in the Russian Ministry of Defense, now the elements of the Pole-21 system are already being installed on various objects, and the network is becoming denser and more efficient: its coverage is increasing literally every day. R-340RP radio-electronic interference emitters are integrated into antenna-mast devices for GSM cellular communication, while power is supplied from the same sources as GSM antennas, which greatly facilitates the installation of complexes, repair work at facilities, and also leads to a decrease in the total mass of additional equipment and power cables for the "Field". In case of failure of the main radiators, GSM antennas themselves can be used as backup antennas, the aperture of which is excellent for the frequencies used by the R-340RP. These elements carry out jamming at frequencies from 1176 to 1575 MHz (L-band), which, in addition to GPS / GLONASS, also includes the BeiDou and Galileo navigation systems. The latter, as you know, can be a NATO backup radio navigation system.
An interesting quality of the Pole-21 system is the low power of the R-340RP complexes. For a more or less stable suppression of all receivers of the above radio navigation systems within a radius of 80 km, there is enough power equivalent to a car radio station, i.e. only 20 watts. And by increasing the power by another 10-15 W, it is possible to achieve effective disorganization of air attack weapons in the medium-altitude sector (2-5 km) with a range of more than 100 km.
THE LIST OF ELEMENTS OF HIGH-PRECISION WEAPONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES THAT ARE LOCATED IN THE NETWORK OF FIELD-21 IS GREAT ENOUGH THAT CAN RADIALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION AT THE TIME AT THE TIME OF AN ATTEMPT OF AN EXPLOSION
The dependence of the armed forces of Western states on global positioning systems is enormous. It is almost impossible to give an example of a large-caliber corrected missile MLRS, high-precision aerial bomb or long-range cruise missile that would not be equipped with a high-precision GPS receiver for the possibility of reserve trajectory correction in the event that the homing head is clogged with radio-electronic or optical-electronic interference, and the optical correlation the sensor is out of order.
The most widespread and numerous high-precision weapon systems using GPS correction include the JDAM aerodynamic control kit with satellite correction. This "smart" equipment transforms standard free-fall bombs such as Mk-82/83/84 into high-precision guided bombs GBU-31/32/34/35/38, capable of striking enemy targets with a CEP accuracy of about 10-15 meters at a distance of up to 30 km, depending on the speed and altitude of the carrier. Getting into the dome of the radio-electronic interference of the Pole-21 system, the free-falling GBU INS ceases to receive corrections from the GPS satellite regarding its flight path, the bomb slowly changes course due to oncoming and lateral wind gusts, and can no longer correct itself. So the whole JDAM is sent to the "furnace": a miss can be no longer 15, but all 350 or 850 meters, which also depends on the height and speed of the discharge, as well as atmospheric conditions. In this case, there can be no question of any destruction of the fortified target.
The second type of high-precision weapon, lost in the veil of electronic countermeasures of the "Field" - various modifications of tactical and strategic cruise missiles. First of all, these include: American tactical long-range missile systems AGM-158A / B "JASSM / JASSM-ER" (range from 360 to 1200 km), TKRVB KEPD-350 "TAURUS", as well as modifications of strategic missile launchers "Tomahawk" and underwater basing - UGM / RGM-109C Block III (range 1850 km), UGM / RGM-109D Block III (range 1250 km) and UGM / RGM-109E Block IV (range 2400 km). On the cruising section of the trajectory, all these missiles largely depend on the correction by the GPS channel. When they get into the coverage area of the Pole-21 network, communication with satellites will be lost, and the slightest error in the onboard optical-electronic correlation system TERCOM can lead to the loss of the missile long before reaching the target.
The third type of high-precision weapons, suppressed by the R-340RP complexes, can be attributed to the modern guided missile M30 GMLRS (and its longer-range version ER MLRS), designed to be launched from combat vehicles PU M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS, as well as the 3 most high-precision versions of the operational - tactical ballistic missiles of the ATACMS family, which are equipped with GPS receivers - MGM-140B, MGM-164A and MGM-164B. At the same time, the capabilities of the Pole-21 to suppress the GPS-control modules for M30 GMLRS missiles are much higher than in the ATACMS OTBR radio navigation receivers. The thing is that M30s fly along a flatter trajectory, at lower altitudes, where the effect of radio-electronic interference from the R-340RP continues to remain high enough, MGM-164A / B ballistic missiles rise to the upper layers of the stratosphere, and on the descending part of the trajectory to speeds over 3M very quickly overcome the "jamming" section. Considering the ATACMS warhead equipment in the form of P31 BAT homing warheads capable of targeting infrared radiation of ground armored vehicles, it becomes clear that surgical accuracy is not needed for these ballistic missiles. As a result, the rocket deflects by about 400-500 m (GPS operation is disrupted only in the short final flight segment) and SPBE, scattered at an altitude of several kilometers, can safely provide homing, despite this non-critical deviation.
The Pole-21 also affects the navigation capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles and combat aircraft. Blinded by interference, the GPS receivers of tactical attack fighters and strategic bombers B-1B, operating in the mode of following the terrain, will not allow the operation to be successful, since onboard radars designed for independent search and destruction of ground targets will also be suppressed by other electronic warfare systems such as Avtobaza "And" Krasuha-4 ". At best, the powerful AN / APQ-164 radar of the B-1B missile carrier will be able to map the earth's surface only at a short distance, allowing you to leave the airspace of our state as soon as possible by flying around dangerous air defense lines detected by the AN / ALQ defense complex radiation warning system. 161. A huge part of the manipulations in the theater of war of the 21st century is carried out with the participation of the GPS system, and the impossibility of its correct operation will lead to a serious change in the predicted combat situation.
The Pole-21 electronic warfare system has a great modernization potential. Several times we returned to the consideration of the possibility of the development and serial production of airships for long-range radar detection and control for the rapid detection of low-flying stealthy SKR and UAVs and target designation of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems. A similar concept can be used with the Pole-21, in addition, the standard radio-electronic interference emitting antennas can be replaced by AFAR emitters, each of which is capable of targeting individual AHV or their groups in a narrow sector of the airspace. Placing it on the airship will increase the radio horizon to several hundred kilometers, making Pole-21 ten times more productive over remote areas where cell phone towers and other communications infrastructure have not yet been erected.
"Pole-21" is strikingly different from other electronic warfare systems and the fact that it is practically impossible to identify it, unlike other mobile electronic warfare systems: compact emitting modules do not stand out in any way against the background of GSM antennas and various AMC, which quantity of several tens of thousands of units. NATO command will be almost unaware of the deployment points of the R-340RP elements, and even the most advanced Western electronic reconnaissance means are unlikely to correct the situation.
