From about the middle of the 20th century to the present day, submarines with cruise missiles have been an integral part of the Navy of the USSR, and now also of Russia. Taking into account the general lag of our country's fleet in relation to the NATO fleets, especially in terms of aircraft-carrying ships, special attention has always been paid to anti-ship missiles (ASM).
The first cruise missiles intended for deployment on submarines were the P-5 and P-6 missiles, developed in the late fifties and early sixties. The missiles were housed in sealed containers and were intended to be launched from the surface.
In the future, this direction received significant development, as a result of which, by the time of the collapse of the USSR, the submarine fleet possessed such highly effective anti-ship missiles as the P-700 "Granit", to destroy surface ships, and the strategic cruise missiles (CR) S-10 "Granat" with nuclear combat partly for hitting ground targets.
The main carriers of the P-700 "Granit" anti-ship missiles are currently Project 949A nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGN). Each of these submarines carries 24 missiles. Due to the impressive dimensions of the Granit missiles, Project 949A SSGNs have an underwater displacement of 24,000 tons, which is comparable to the displacement of strategic missile carriers with ballistic missiles.
By the time of the collapse of the USSR, work was close to completion on the development of new missiles, such as the supersonic anti-ship missile P-800 "Onyx" (3M55) and the family of missiles of the "Caliber" type, including the 3M-54 anti-ship missiles and the 3M-14 KR to destroy ground targets … Also, the complex "Caliber" includes rocket-torpedoes (RT) 91R1.
A distinctive feature of the new missiles was that they were initially considered for use from different types of carriers. Modifications of the PKR / KR / RT "Caliber" are placed on surface ships, submarines and ground carriers. Rockets P-800 "Onyx" are also adapted for aircraft carriers. The lesser destructive capabilities of these types of missiles, due to the reduction in their dimensions, in comparison with the P-700 missiles, should be compensated for by the possibility of placing a larger number of missiles on carriers.
Also, the press is actively discussing the appearance in the near future of the hypersonic missile 3M22 "Zircon". In the event of its appearance, and the compliance of the actual characteristics with the declared ones, the fleet can receive an effective weapon for the destruction of enemy surface ships.
The termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) may lead to the emergence of other types of missiles. Despite the fact that the INF Treaty did not apply to the fleet, its cancellation could intensify the development of ballistic missiles with a range of several thousand kilometers, and their further "chilling" could lead to the appearance in the Russian Navy of analogues of the Chinese ballistic missile DF-21D, designed to destroy surface ships.
Since the P-700 Granit missiles are no longer produced, their shelf life is coming to an end, and the Project 949A submarines have not yet exhausted their service life, it was decided to re-equip the Project 949A SSGN to accommodate the P-800 Onyx anti-ship missiles and KR family "Caliber". Each upgraded project 949AM submarine will receive 72 launchers to accommodate these types of missiles.
It is not known for certain how many Project 949A SSGNs will be upgraded to Project 949AM, according to some sources it will be four submarines, according to others, all eight units in service with the Russian Navy.
There are polar points of view, according to which modern anti-ship missiles are invulnerable weapons that have turned aircraft carriers into "floating coffins," and vice versa, that anti-ship missiles are unable to penetrate the defense of an aircraft carrier strike group (AUG) - most of the missiles will be destroyed by air defense systems, and the rest will lose their targets due to for the interference.
Most likely the truth lies somewhere in the middle. The question is how many anti-ship missiles will be required to destroy one or another grouping of surface ships. Agree that it is one thing to release 24 "Granites" on the ship connection of Japan or Turkey, and another - on the full-fledged AUG of the US fleet. In addition, it is doubtful that the leadership of the Soviet Navy was so incompetent that it made a serious bet on missile weapons.
Submarines, especially nuclear-powered ones, can be considered one of the most effective carriers of anti-ship missiles. The maximum range of use of modern anti-ship missiles is about five hundred kilometers. To strike an anti-ship missile system, for example, on an aircraft carrier strike group, it was supposed to concentrate significant surface forces or send an air group as part of several Tu-22M3 regiments. Such large groups can be detected by the enemy at a considerable distance, after which the latter will apply active countermeasures - it will raise carrier-based aircraft into the air, turn on air defense radars, and change course.
In turn, anti-submarine defense (ASW) at the turn of the order of five hundred kilometers is significantly less effective. The carrier group is accompanied by one or two multipurpose hunting submarines. With all their might, they will not be able to control an area of over 785,000 square kilometers. If the real range of the P-800 missiles is 600 km, then it is necessary to control an area of over one million square kilometers.
Anti-submarine defense helicopters do not work at this range, their line is 20-30 kilometers. PLO deck aircraft carry out anti-submarine defense at a distance of about 200 kilometers. Thus, the detection of a submarine at the line of 500-600 kilometers can only be carried out by PLO aircraft of the P-8A "Poseidon" type, based on ground airfields.
Due to the difficulty of detecting enemy submarines at such a distance, the main means of countering anti-ship missiles by surface ships are air defense (air defense) means, which ensure the physical destruction of incoming missiles, and jamming means designed to deceive missile guidance systems.
It should be noted that at present the capabilities of air defense have increased markedly. This is due to the adoption of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) with an active radar homing head (ARGSN). The presence of such missiles, combined with the ability to issue target designation by airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS) and fighters, allows surface ships to fire at low-flying anti-ship missiles located below the visibility level of shipborne radars. This significantly increases the chances of the AUG to parry the blow. Gas-dynamic control is also being actively introduced, which allows missiles to maneuver with overloads of over 60g, which increases the likelihood of hitting high-speed maneuvering anti-ship missiles.
In turn, anti-ship missiles are used to reduce visibility, reducing the detection range of AWACS aircraft and surface ships' radar. According to unconfirmed reports, the anti-ship missiles can also be equipped with their own jamming devices designed to disrupt the capture of enemy anti-aircraft missiles. Another way to increase the probability of an enemy's air defense breakthrough is to increase the speed of anti-ship missiles. This method, presumably implemented in the Zircon missile, makes it possible to reduce to a minimum the time allotted to the ship to repel an attack. In general, the sword and shield competition continues.
The main problem that complicates the use of long-range anti-ship missiles is the issuance of target designation. For this purpose, the USSR deployed the ICRTs "Legend" system - a system of global satellite maritime space reconnaissance and target designation. The ICRC "Legend" system included passive US-P and active US-A reconnaissance satellites. The US-P passive reconnaissance satellites are intended for electronic reconnaissance, the US-A active reconnaissance satellites included a radar capable of scanning the surface from an orbit of 270 km. At the moment, this system has been taken out of service.
It should be noted that an orbital altitude of 270 km makes the satellites of the ICRC "Legend" system vulnerable to modern anti-satellite weapons of the United States and China.
Instead of the ICRC "Legenda", the space reconnaissance system "Liana", which includes satellites of the "Lotos-S" (14F145) and "Pion-NKS" (14F139) type, is being commissioned. Satellites "Lotos-S" are intended for passive electronic reconnaissance, and "Pion-NKS" for active radar reconnaissance. The Pion-NKS resolution is about three meters, which makes it possible to detect ships made with the use of signature reduction technologies.
The orbit of the satellites of the "Liana" system, according to various sources, is at an altitude of 500 to 1000 km. If so, then they can be destroyed by SM-3 Block IIA missiles with an impact area of up to 1500 km in height. There are significant numbers of SM-3 rockets and launch vehicles in the United States, and the cost of the SM-3 rocket is most likely lower than that of the ICRC Legend satellite and the cost of putting it into orbit. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that only the United States and, to a lesser extent, China have such anti-satellite capabilities. Other countries have no or limited capabilities to destroy objects in space. In addition, it is possible that Russian military satellites can counteract destruction by jamming and / or adjusting the orbit.
In addition to satellite reconnaissance, reconnaissance aircraft Tu-95RTs and Tu-16R were used to detect AUG in the USSR. At the moment, these aircraft have been removed from service. In addition, the huge effective dispersion area (EPR) of these aircraft made them easy for NATO aviation to detect. In the event of a conflict, all crews would most likely become suicide bombers.
What opportunities will Russia have for delivering massive strikes against anti-ship missiles in the future? Unfortunately, the prospects are vague. After the last 949AM SSGNs left the Navy, the maximum number of anti-ship missiles (32 missiles each) will be carried by Project 885 Severodvinsk multipurpose nuclear submarines. It is planned to produce these boats only seven units for two fleets.
There is no reliable data on the Husky project yet. According to one information, this type of submarine will be carried out in different versions - a multi-purpose hunter boat, a cruise missile carrier boat, and even a ballistic missile carrier boat. According to the other, it will be a Yasen-class SSN, but at a new technical level. In any case, so far there is no information that on the basis of "Husky" will be created SSGN for 70-100-150 KR / anti-ship missiles.
The surface fleet has even fewer possibilities. Despite the fact that almost pleasure boats are equipped with launchers for KR / anti-ship missiles, their total number is small. To organize a massive attack, the anti-ship missiles will have to collect a whole "mosquito flock". The seaworthiness and range of corvettes, missile boats and diesel submarines are limited.
Aviation capabilities are more, but not much. Each sortie of a strategic missile-carrying bomber is monitored by NATO forces, let alone the departure of a dozen missile-carrying bombers at the same time. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, there is a chance that they will be intercepted before reaching the anti-ship missile launch line.
Do Russia need SSGNs? If we consider the need to counter the IBM or AUG of developed countries, then yes. It will be difficult to penetrate the modern echeloned defense of a ship formation with a salvo of thirty, and possibly sixty anti-ship missiles. In addition, given the shortage of multipurpose submarines, all Yasen-class SSNs will most likely be involved in solving problems of covering strategic missile carriers. The prospects for the Husky project are vague, especially given the habit of our industry to shift deadlines.
What can you offer in this situation? Implement a new generation of SSGNs based on Project 955A SSBNs of the Borey type, and possibly also Project 955B. An example of the processing of SSBNs into SSGNs is available - these are American SSBNs / SSGNs of the "Ohio" type, and they were re-equipped from ready-made boats. Despite the fact that the number of carriers of the KR in the US fleet is greater than that of all fleets of other countries combined, they considered such modernization expedient, and are actively operating these boats.
SSGNs are not required to wage submarine warfare against enemy submarines or attack surface ships with torpedoes (although it can do that), so Project 955A / B looks optimal for creating a replacement for Project 949A / AM SSGNs.
In the coming years, the construction of a series of eight Borey-class SSBNs will be completed (with the possibility of increasing the series by two more units). After that, on the vacated stocks, you can lay the SSGN based on the project 955A / B. The technologies worked out during the construction of SSBNs will make it possible to implement the project in the shortest possible time. The cost of SSGNs should not exceed the cost of SSBNs of the "Borey" type, and perhaps it will decrease by increasing the series (most of the equipment will be unified with SSBNs). Even now, Project 955A SSBNs are cheaper than Project 885 SSBNs, so the construction of four SSGN units will not greatly affect the construction program for multipurpose SSBNs (they still need to build a lot more).
The ammunition load of the KR / ASM of one SSGN based on the 955A / B project will presumably be about 100-120 KR / ASM in vertical launch units (OVP), i.e. one and a half times more than in the 949AM project, with the same displacement.
The required number of SSGNs for the Russian Navy can be estimated at four to eight units (two to four for the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet). Thus, there will be a smooth transition from SSGN project 949A / 949AM to SSGN based on project 955A / B. It should also be noted that the 949 / 949A project was an uncompromising fighter with the AUG, while the capabilities of the 949AM SSGN and the SSGN based on the 955A / B project will be much wider.
What tasks can SSGNs solve as part of the Russian fleet?
1. Destruction of enemy warships and vessels operating as part of formations and groups, as well as singly. The first and most obvious purpose is to combat AUG. A volley of 200-240 anti-ship missiles from two SSGNs will "break through" any air defense. To ensure a similar launch density without SSGNs, all seven Ashes from two fleets will be required. The surface fleet, without air cover, is unlikely to be admitted to the launch range of anti-ship missiles to the AUG. If the anti-ship missiles "Zircon" turn out to be as good as they are told about (Mach 8 on the entire flight path), then perhaps one SSGN will be enough to defeat the AUG.
2. Fight against IBM. The fleets of other countries, which have weaker aviation support capabilities compared to the United States, are much more vulnerable to a massive anti-ship missile attack, because will not be able to provide over-the-horizon guidance of missiles to anti-ship missiles. In other words, the fleets of countries such as Japan, Turkey, Norway can shoot anti-ship missiles from a long distance with almost impunity (if target designation is available, which we will return to later).
3. Violation of enemy sea and ocean communications. Destruction of US convoys to Europe. Attacking convoys with torpedoes will always run the risk of losing submarines from enemy anti-aircraft missile forces. At the same time, the air defense of convoys cannot be compared with the air defense of the KUG / AUG, therefore, in the presence of target designation, the SSGN will shoot ships from the convoys like ducks in the shooting range.
4. Destruction of militarily and economically important enemy targets on the coast and in the depths of its territory. The delivery of massive strikes by the KR against targets on the territory of the enemy or its military bases on the territory of other countries. A salvo of 200-240 KR can cause significant damage to the economy of a developed state. Administrative offices, power plants, bridges can be destroyed, large factories damaged, and so on.
If the CD can be equipped with electromagnetic warheads (and they are real and effective), then their attack on large cities and industrial facilities of the enemy can cause a collapse of the enemy's economy.
For the military, this means the diversion of additional forces to defend the bases, constant stressful impact on the personnel.
Another scenario is that the regime has changed in the former "friendly" state, and it has been decided not to return the loans previously issued to the Russian Federation. By inflicting periodic strikes of the Kyrgyz Republic on the debtor's government facilities, the new government can be faced with a choice - to pay off the loan, or to rule the country from a bunker. Include the cost of the missiles fired. And what? Israel is bombing its neighbors, and nothing, we can also try to do this.
5. Implementation of mine laying. Modern naval mines, designed for the use of 533 mm torpedo tubes, may well be adapted to be placed in the UVP, two pieces in one launcher. Thus, the mine ammunition of one SSGN can be 200-240 minutes. Close straits, block ships in bays, mine ambushes on the way of convoys.
6. Landing of reconnaissance and sabotage groups on the enemy's coast. This task is solved by modernized SSGNs of the "Ohio" type. With the appropriate equipment, it can be solved and SSGN based on the project 955A / B.
7. And finally, in the event of a further aggravation of relations with the United States, and the rupture of treaties on the limitation of nuclear weapons, SSGNs can be armed with long-range CDs with nuclear warheads. Accordingly, Russia's strategic arsenal can be quickly increased by 400-800 (480-960) warheads.
The task of "Ensuring the deployment and combat stability of strategic missile submarines" will also be indirectly resolved. Almost the same appearance and acoustic signatures of SSGNs and SSBNs of the "Borey" type can mislead enemy forces, redirecting them to tracking SSGNs instead of SSBNs.
Returning to the vital issue of target designation.
First, these are certainly satellites. The development of a reconnaissance satellite constellation is important in the interests of all branches of the armed forces.
Protection of a satellite constellation from destruction can be solved in several ways.
1. Equipping satellites with protective systems - traps, jamming devices, advanced means of evasion / orbit correction. Perhaps this has already been implemented.
2. Raising the orbit of satellites in order to minimize the likelihood of their being hit by "cheap" missile defense systems.
3. Development and deployment of low-orbit constellations of compact, cheap, but numerous satellites, following the example of satellite Internet projects. Take them out in bundles of 5-10-20 devices. Each individual satellite will be inferior to its "large" counterparts, but in a group they will solve problems no less efficiently. The goal is to make the destruction of a satellite more expensive than launching a new one. It will also allow the satellite constellation to be more resilient to the failure of one or more satellites.
There should also be a reserve of satellites to ensure the possibility of operational replenishment of the orbital constellation. They can be placed in advance in ballistic missile silos or in SSBN silos in a state of high readiness for launch.
Regardless of the reality of the creation of SSGNs, the development of space reconnaissance is of paramount importance for all the armed forces of Russia
The second effective option for reconnaissance and target designation is the creation of long-range reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by analogy with the MC-4C "Triton" UAV.
UAV MC-4C Triton is designed for information collection, surveillance and reconnaissance. The flight radius is about 3700 km, the flight altitude is over 18 km, the autonomy is 24 hours. During one flight, it is able to control an area of 7 million square kilometers.
Russia has a significant lag in terms of UAVs, however, promising samples are gradually appearing. In particular, the Altair heavy-class UAV, developed by NPO OKB named after M. P. Simonov. The flight range will be 10,000 km, the ceiling is 12,000 m. The flight duration is 48 hours.
Another interesting example is the Orion UAV, developed by the Kronstadt company (AFK Sistema). The flight radius will be 250 km, the ceiling is 7500 m. The flight duration is 24 hours.
It should be noted that an important problem of all Russian UAVs is the lack of high-speed satellite communications, which often limits the flight range and the capabilities of the UAV to transmit intelligence.
Summing up, we can say that the presence in the Russian Navy of four to eight SSGNs with effective missile weapons, in the presence of a developed target designation system, will create a threat to any surface fleet of a potential enemy, any military base around the world. And this threat cannot be ignored, since in this case no actions to inflict non-nuclear strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation, destroy ships flying the Russian flag or block the straits are guaranteed not to go unpunished.
