The role of aircraft carriers and submarines in the war in the Pacific

2024 Author: Matthew Elmers | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 21:49

For a long time, the leading role of aircraft carriers in the history of World War II in the Pacific Ocean seemed self-evident and was not seriously disputed by anyone. However, for some time now, in the disputes that have already become traditional for "VO" "who is stronger, a whale or an elephant … that is, an aircraft carrier or a submarine?" tonnage than carrier-based aircraft.

Indeed, having studied the losses of the Japanese merchant fleet, we will see that the Yankee carrier-based aircraft sank 393 ships with a total tonnage of 1,453,135 tons, while American submariners chalked up 1154.5 ships with a tonnage of 4,870,317 tons (if destroyed ships were attended by dissimilar forces, for example - aviation and submarines, then their joint trophy was divided in half when counting - hence the fraction in the number of ships). At the same time, American submarines inflicted severe damage on the Japanese military fleet, they destroyed 1 high-speed battleship (nee - battle cruiser) "Congo", four large aircraft carriers and five escort, seven seaplane transports, three heavy and ten light cruisers, thirty-six destroyers, fourteen destroyers … and that's not counting the numerous air transports, auxiliary cruisers, frigates, submarines, and in total - about 250 warships. So maybe the laurels of the winner of the Japanese fleet and the main naval force of that war should be given to the submarine? Let's try to figure it out.

First, let's look at the pre-war plans of the parties. The American ones do not interest us too much, because they still did not come true, but the Japanese ones … In essence, the plan of the Yamato sons was as follows - with a series of strikes in the southern seas to occupy many territories that are very distant from each other and create a defensive fortification with a perimeter along the Kuril and the Marshall Islands, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, Burma. All this was necessary for the Japanese in order to provide the metropolis with a sufficient amount of scarce raw materials and, first of all, oil, without which it was simply impossible to fight. The occupation of such a territory inevitably led Japan to war with England, Holland and the United States. Japan was not afraid of the first two - the British got bogged down in a European war with Germany, their fleet was torn between the defense of the mother country, the defense of Atlantic communications and the Mediterranean Sea, and Holland did not have any significant naval forces. But the USA … America - it was serious.

The Japanese had some idea of the American military plans ("Orange", "Rainbow-5"), according to which, in the event of war, the American fleet was to move forward, sequentially occupying the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. After that, the US squadrons were to inflict a final defeat on the imperial fleet in the waters immediately adjacent to the Japanese metropolis. The only question was how fast the US advance would become.

The Japanese believed that they were not able to win in a protracted war with the United States, so if the Americans chose to move forward slowly and cautiously, then their industrial power would certainly ensure victory - and it was this understanding that determined Japan's military plan. In essence, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a choice between two strategies. The first is to gather all forces in a fist, wait for the American fleet in the waters of the mother country, and there, hoping for individual superiority in the quality of ships and the best training of crews, defeat the US Navy in a general engagement. The second is to deliver a preemptive, preemptive strike of such power as to immediately smash the American Pacific Fleet, and if not smash it, then weaken it so much as to exclude its interference at the stage of forming a "defensive perimeter."

Why did the Japanese choose the preemptive strike strategy? The answer is very simple. Japan should have seized territories far apart from each other and done it as quickly as possible - in order to master the resources located there and not give the opposing forces time to prepare to repel the invasion. For this, the capture had to be carried out in the form of a series of operations carried out at the same time. But the Japanese fleet did not have the slightest opportunity to cover operations in Malaya, Java, and the Philippines at the same time. The appearance of American squadrons in any region where the main forces of the Japanese fleet would not be concentrated automatically led to the defeat of the imperial forces operating there, which the Japanese could not afford. Therefore, Japan could not give up the initiative to the enemy and wait for the Americans to deign to move forward, especially since time was working for the United States. The entire Japanese war plan was based on the rapid seizure of resources, for this it was necessary to quickly capture many remote territories, and for this it was necessary to defeat the US Pacific Fleet. This became a key task for the Japanese fleet at the initial stage of the war.

This is how the Japanese decided on a preemptive strike. It was supposed to be applied by aircraft carriers … and, surprisingly, by submarines.

Taking into account what we know today, the participation of submarines in such an operation looks at least strange. But this is today, and then the Japanese admirals expected a lot from the submarines. S. Fukutome, Chief of Staff of the United Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy:

In the period 18-20 November 1941, 27 submarines of the latest types selected from the United Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Shimizu left Kure and Yokosuka. After replenishing supplies of fuel and food in the Marshall Islands, they moved forward as the vanguard of Admiral Nagumo's strike force. The submarines were supposed to sink enemy ships, which would have been able to avoid strikes by our aviation, as well as prevent the delivery of reinforcements and supplies from the United States, and in this way contribute to the completion of operations at the Hawaiian Islands. The headquarters in Tokyo expected that prolonged submarine operations would yield more significant results than a one-time air strike. In reality, the results were completely different. During the entire operation, only one submarine out of 27 managed to launch an attack on an enemy ship. Morison in his work writes on this issue the following: “Active patrolling and depth-bombing conducted by destroyers and other ships brought to naught the attempts of large Japanese boats with a displacement of 1,900 tons to attack our ships. They failed to torpedo any of the many ships and vessels that entered Pearl Harbor and Honolulu and left. Most of the 20 class I submarines that were located south of about. Oahu, headed back to Japan a few days later. About 5 boats were sent to the west coast of the United States. One of them, "I-170", was sunk during the transition by plane from the aircraft carrier "Enterprise", the rest off the coast of California and Oregon managed to sink several of our ships. So, the vanguard expeditionary force suffered a complete failure. He did not manage to sink a single ship, but it itself lost 1 large and 5 midget submarines … Both the imperial headquarters and the headquarters of the United Fleet of Japan were greatly amazed and bitterly disappointed with the insignificant results of submarine operations near the Hawaiian Islands, as a result of which faith into their submarines was shaken."

So, even more hopes were pinned on submarines than on carrier-based aircraft, but they did not come true at all. Moreover, the Japanese submarine fleet nearly derailed the entire operation. The fact is that Japanese submarines deployed near Hawaii were repeatedly spotted from American ships, and moreover, a little over an hour before the start of the air attack, the American destroyer Ward entered into battle with submarines trying to get into Pearl Harbor. If the American commander had taken the report of the destroyer commander more seriously, the US fleet, aviation and anti-aircraft guns of Oahu could have met the planes with red circles on their wings on full alert … who knows how things would turn out then?

However, exactly what happened happened - the Japanese carrier-based aircraft dealt a terrible blow, the American surface fleet suffered heavy losses and ceased to be a force capable of thwarting Japanese plans to seize the southern territories. As for the submarine fleet, the Yankees never considered it capable of solving problems of this scale, and its numbers were not at all amazing. In total, the US submarine fleet consisted of 111 submarines, of which 73 were in the Pacific Ocean. But 21 submarines (of which only 11 were combat-ready) were based in Pearl Harbor - too far to make a significant contribution to the struggle for the southern seas, another 22 submarines were located at all on the Pacific coast of the United States. And only 29 submarines were located on Cavite (Luzon Island, Philippines). Nevertheless, it was logical to assume that the existing forces could at least complicate Japanese naval operations.

Alas, nothing of the kind happened. In the battles for Guam and Wake, American submarines did not take part, probably because these islands were located too far from the submarine's bases, and were captured too quickly (although T. Rosco writes about the submarine patrol at Wake). But even when it came to the Philippines, the US submariners could not oppose anything to the Japanese landings.

The admirals of the United Fleet divided the operation into two stages - first, three detachments of ships landed troops to seize key airfields in order to carry out the main landing under the cover of their aviation. The forces landing at Aparri included an old light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 3 minesweepers, 9 anti-submarine ships and 6 transports. 1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 9 minesweepers, 9 anti-submarine ships and 6 transports went to Wigan. And finally, the third unit, which attacked Legazpi, consisted of 1 light cruiser, 6 destroyers, 2 seaplane transport bases, 2 minesweepers, 2 patrol ships and 7 transports. All three landings were crowned with complete success, and the Japanese began the main thing - the landing in Lingaen Bay. Seventy-three transports, organized in three groups, carried the 48th Infantry Division. Not everything worked out for the Japanese as it should: by dawn on December 22, the day of the landing, the Japanese warships and transports had lost their ranks and were scattered 20 miles (37 km).

What did the American submarines succeed in? One destroyer and two small transports were sunk. To be fair, it is worth noting the Seawulf attack on the Japanese seaplane carrier Sanye Maru - one of the four torpedoes fired by the Americans nevertheless hit the target. If this torpedo had exploded, the list of Japanese casualties would probably have been one more seaplane carrier. But the torpedo did not explode.

What conclusions can be drawn from all of the above? The Japanese conducted four landing operations with a relatively small force in the immediate vicinity of the American submarine base and 29 American submarines could not oppose this. The same thing happened in the defense of Java. To defend the Dutch East Indies, the Allies concentrated significant forces, although sources do not agree on their numbers. For example, S. Dall writes about 46 submarines - 16 Dutch, 28 American and 2 British. T. Rosco points out that "the submarine force consisted of twenty-eight American, three British and nine Dutch submarines." Be that as it may, the total number of submarines reached or even exceeded four dozen ships. The Japanese, from January to early March 1942, sequentially captured Bangka Roads (in Celebes), Kemu, Menado, Kendari, Ambon Island, Makassar, Bali Lombok, Dutch and Portuguese Timor, Borneo … and finally Java proper. The Allied submarines were unable to stop, delay, or even seriously scratch the Japanese invasion forces. S. Dall points out the following losses of landing caravans and their protection from American submarines - one destroyer was sunk ("Natsushio"), another one was torpedoed, but did not sink ("Suzukaze"), and another transport ("Tsuruga Maru") was killed Dutch submariners. T. Rosco is more loyal to American submarines, he reports on the sinking of the Meeken Maru, Akito Maru, Harbin Maru, Tamagawa Maru and the former gunboat Kanko Maru, as well as the damage of several warships (which is highly doubtful). But even so, the achieved result is still completely unsatisfactory!

In total, American submariners in January-February 1942 sank 12 merchant ships with a tonnage of 44,326 tons, but the fact is that some of these ships were destroyed in completely different places. The Americans sent their submarines to Japanese communications and even to the shores of Japan (during that period, 3 submarines operated there). But in no case can it be assumed that all the submarines were not ordered to repel the Japanese invasion, and instead were sent to distant regions. The commander of the ABDA fleet, Admiral Hart, considered the use of submarines for anti-amphibious defense a priority and tried to place their patrol routes in "landing-dangerous" directions. Despite this, the Japanese quickly and methodically conquered one island after another.

In a short time, the United Fleet delivered a series of powerful blows and captured many territories. Many stood in their way: the basic aviation in the Philippines, the British battleships off Singapore, the cruisers of the ABDA command off Java, submarines - they all tried, but none succeeded. And only in one case did the Japanese fail to succeed. "Operation MO", during which the Japanese planned to capture Port Moresby, was planned no worse than the previous ones, but this time the Americans opposed the forces of the United Fleet with their aircraft carriers.

The first naval battle in history, in which the opponents did not exchange a single shot - the battle in the Coral Sea, the Americans lost "on points", exchanging their heavy aircraft carrier Lexington for the light Japanese Seho. And the second US aircraft carrier, Yorktown, one might say, miraculously escaped destruction. Nevertheless, the losses of the Japanese aviation were heavy, and one of their heavy aircraft carrier received such damage that did not allow it to take further part in the operation - and the Japanese turned back. The capture of Port Moresby did not take place.

The next two operations of the Japanese fleet - Midway and the capture of the Attu and Kiska islands - are also very indicative in terms of the capabilities of submarines and aircraft carriers to resist enemy landing operations. American submarines were used both there and there, aircraft carriers - only at Midway. In this battle, the four aircraft carriers Nagumo crushed American aircraft based on land airfields, but were defeated and destroyed by US carrier-based dive bombers. Of course, the "land" aircraft played a huge role, "tore apart" the Japanese fighters, so that by the time the carrier-based aircraft attacked, they simply did not have time to interfere with them, and in general, the US aircraft carriers were very lucky in that battle. But you can't erase words from the song - it was the aircraft carriers that crushed the flower of the Japanese 1st Air Fleet - the 1st and 2nd Aircraft Carrier Divisions, which became a turning point in the war in the Pacific Ocean.

And what about submarines? Twenty-five submarines were ordered to wait for the Japanese squadron at Midway, but in fact only nineteen were deployed, of which twelve were located on the side of the approach of the Japanese aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, in that battle, American submarines did not sink a single enemy ship. True, it is worth mentioning the partial success of the Nautilus submarine - she managed to attack the Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga, and if not for defective torpedoes, it is quite possible that this attack was crowned with the death of the Japanese ship. But, firstly, the attack took place two hours after the "Kaga" was hit by American dive bombers, and if this did not happen, the aircraft carrier would not be at all where it actually was at the time of the "Nautilus" attack, and probably these the ships simply did not meet. Secondly, even if the courses of the "Kaga" and "Nautilus" crossed, it is far from the fact that the American submarine could go on the attack - being in a submerged position it is almost impossible to get close to a warship moving at least a 20-knot course (unless that he will accidentally be put under attack, having passed close to the submarine). Thirdly, hitting an already knocked-out and mortally wounded ship is much easier than an undamaged one (the same speed), so it cannot be argued that the Nautilus torpedo attack on the undamaged Kaga was just as effective (shortly before the attack on Kaga "Nautilus tried to attack a Japanese battleship. Unsuccessfully.) And finally, even if everything went well and" Kaga "was sunk, the death of one of the four aircraft carriers could not save Midway from the invasion.

But it cannot be said that the participation of US submarines in the defense of Midway turned out to be completely meaningless. Four Japanese heavy cruisers sent to Midway to bombard it suddenly found an American submarine and were forced to turn away sharply, causing the trailing Mogami to ram the Mikumu. Both heavily damaged cruisers slowly trudged home, but a day later the Mikumu sank the planes of the Enterprise and Hornet.

The Japanese submariners also did not shine in this battle - the curtain of 13 submarines, which were supposed to detect (and, if lucky, attack) the American aircraft carriers going from Pearl Harbor to Midway, turned around too late - by that time the American aircraft carriers had already settled at Midway. Naturally, the Japanese submarines did not find anyone, which inspired some Japanese commanders with confidence in an easy victory … The only success of the Japanese submariners - the sinking of the Yorktown - can be attributed to the results of the battle for Midway only with very big reservations. In fact, the Japanese lost this battle on June 4, when all four Japanese aircraft carriers were fatally damaged by US carrier-based aircraft. In response, the Japanese carrier-based aircraft severely damaged the Yorktown, but it could still be dragged to the shipyards. The Americans did just that, towing the damaged ship, but on June 6, after the Battle of Midway was over, the Yorktown came under torpedoes from a Japanese submarine. This could no longer affect the outcome of the battle, and indeed the Yorktown came under attack only because it was badly damaged by Japanese dealers, but the fact remains that it was thanks to the submarine that America missed a heavy aircraft carrier at the very moment when its fleet desperately needed ships of this class. Let's remember this.

And one more interesting fact. Both submarines that attacked enemy aircraft carriers (Nautilus and Japanese I-168) were brought to the target by aviation - reconnaissance aircraft discovered the location of the enemy, and then the coordinates / courses / speeds of enemy formations were reported to the submarine commanders.

So, American aircraft carriers won the battle, and again, US submarines did not achieve anything. But the Americans knew about the desire of the Japanese, simultaneously with the attack of Midway, to capture several of the Aleutian Islands. The Yankees could not send aircraft carriers there - they were all needed by Midway, so the defense of the Aleut was entrusted to submarines. 10 old S-class submarines were transferred there (to Dutch Harbor). As a result, the Japanese launched several carrier-based attacks on Dutch Harbor and captured the Attu and Kiska islands without any interference - not to hinder, but even to detect the enemy for ten US submarines turned out to be an overwhelming task.

In the battles for Guadalcanal, both the Americans and the Japanese were faced with the same tasks - to ensure the escort of their own transports carrying reinforcements and supplies to the island, to prevent the enemy from doing the same and, if possible, to defeat the enemy fleet. US aircraft carriers played a role here, repelling an attack by the United Fleet, covering a large convoy (second battle of the Solomon Islands) and repeatedly (albeit unsuccessfully) fought the Japanese in the battle of Santa Cruz. Nevertheless, their efforts did not interrupt Japanese communications - the Americans retained the ability to transfer reinforcements during the day, and the Japanese organized night flights of high-speed ships, which the carrier aircraft could not prevent. The Japanese fleet was finally stopped in the third Battle of the Solomon Islands, when battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the United States defeated Japanese squadrons, and ground and deck aviation (using Henderson airfield as a jump airfield) successfully finished off Japanese ships damaged in night battles and attacked transports. In general, American aircraft carriers played, if not a key, then a very important role - they, together with Henderson Field aviation, ensured air supremacy in the daytime, in which the Japanese fleet, even if excellently trained in night sea battles, still did not was able to win victories. At the same time, if the American aircraft carriers were destroyed, and the Japanese retained a sufficient number of aircraft carriers and trained pilots, the fate of Guadalcanal would have been decided, and not in favor of the United States. By providing air cover for their transports, the Japanese could quickly deploy sufficient reinforcements to the island. American submarines … have traditionally achieved nothing. Even such a singer of American underwater power as T. Rosco states:

However, for a number of reasons, the final successes of the boats were insignificant.

The Japanese submariners succeeded more - they destroyed one of the three remaining American heavy aircraft carriers - "Wasp". In fact, it was the actions of the Japanese submarines that ensured the period of unparalleled weakness of the American carrier-based aviation - when the Japanese pilots turned the Hornet into a blazing ruin, which was later finished off by Japanese destroyers, the US Pacific Fleet was left with only one operating aircraft carrier! If the Japanese submarines had not sunk the Yorktown at Midway and Wasp, then in the battle at Santa Cruz the Americans had as many as four heavy aircraft carriers instead of two, and it is very likely that the Japanese fleet at Santa Cruz would have suffered a serious defeat … In other words, the actions of the Japanese submariners inflicted serious losses and greatly weakened the American fleet, but this did not bring victory to the Japanese - despite the obvious luck, the Japanese submarines could not become a decisive factor in the Battle of Guadalcanal (the Japanese still lost this battle), although they certainly demonstrated their usefulness.

We can say the same about the American submarines in the Battle of the Mariana Islands. After all, what happened there? The Americans decided to land on Saipan, a strategically important island, the capture of which not only cut the Japanese defenses in two, blocked the air bridge at Rabaul, gave the American submariners an excellent base, but also allowed the latest B-29 strategic bombers to attack Japan. The Japanese perfectly understood the importance of the Mariana Islands in general and Saipan in particular, and were ready to engage in a decisive battle for the possession of these islands. Therefore, 500-600 aircraft of basic aviation were deployed on the islands themselves, and at any moment they were ready to support about 450 carrier-based aircraft of the Ozawa Mobile Fleet.

Of course, no submarines in such conditions could have ensured the escort of amphibious convoys and the landing of the marines on Saipan. Aircraft carriers are a different matter. American carrier-based aircraft inflicted powerful strikes on the airfields of Saipan, Tinian and Guam, turning them into ruins and destroying about a third of the Japanese base aircraft. Then two aircraft carrier groups of the Americans went north, striking the airfields of the islands of Iwo Jima and Chichijima, leveling them to the ground and destroying up to a hundred aircraft at the airfields and about 40 fighters in the air. After that, the base aviation of the Mariana Islands was not only defeated, but it also lost hope of receiving reinforcements … except for the carrier-based aircraft of the Mobile Fleet. But the Japanese could not come so quickly, so the American landing on Saipan was supported by the strikes of hundreds of aircraft carrier aircraft, which to a certain extent predetermined its success.

The battle between the fleets was approaching, and the American submarines showed their best side. It was they who discovered the exit of Ozawa's ships to the Mariana Islands and thereby warned the American commander that a battle with the Japanese fleet was inevitable. It was the submarines that discovered the exact location of the Japanese fleet, which had deployed its lines for attack (the Spruence's aircraft were able to do this much later) and were the first to attack enemy aircraft carriers, sinking the Sekaku and Taiho.

But this did not decide the outcome of the battle. On June 19, the Japanese lifted 4 shock waves into the air, a total of 308 aircraft - and the vast majority of them were destroyed. Of the 69 aircraft of the first wave, 27 survived, of the 110 aircraft of the second - 31, but the surviving aircraft that tried to land on Guam were subsequently destroyed by American aircraft. The American submarines sank the Taiho 10 minutes after the rise of the second wave, and the Sekaku died after the rise of the fourth, so their death had little effect on the force of Ozawa's strikes - these ships are unlikely to have carried more than 40-50 aircraft to the bottom. … At the same time, even after the death of "Sekaku" Ozawa still did not consider the battle lost, although he had only 102 aircraft (according to other sources - 150). He was preparing to resume the battle the next day, but on June 20, the Americans found the Japanese earlier - and struck their first (and last) attack on the Japanese ships. The 80 Japanese planes that were lifted into the air could not do anything, and after the American strike (during which the aircraft carrier Hie was sunk), only 47 aircraft remained at Ozawa's disposal.

The Battle of the Mariana Islands was lost by the Japanese for two reasons - they could not resist the US landing on Saipan, and in the general battle of the fleets, Japanese carrier-based aircraft were finally destroyed. Both are the achievements of the US carrier-based aviation. As a result, the Japanese fleet for the battle in Leyte Gulf formally had an impressive force of five heavy and four light aircraft carriers (excluding escort ones), but only one heavy and three light aircraft went into battle - because all the numerous Japanese aircraft carriers had only a hundred something -as trained pilots. What could have determined the presence of Taiho and Sekaku here if the American submarines had not sent them to the bottom of the Mariana Islands? Nothing.

In the war in the Pacific Ocean, submarines showed their complete inability to achieve supremacy at sea, as well as to independently solve offensive or defensive tasks - in no case did attempts to use them independently against enemy warships lead to the success of the operation as a whole. However, submarines proved to be an important component of a balanced fleet - their competent use in conjunction with aircraft carriers and other surface ships made it possible to inflict sensitive (though not decisive) losses on the enemy. In addition, submarines have shown themselves to be an absolutely irreplaceable means of fighting on enemy communications - their greatest successes were achieved in the fight against enemy cargo transportation, while the use of submarines on communications forced the enemy either to spend significant resources to protect their own merchant ships, detaching them from combat operations. or put up with the hardest, irreplaceable losses in tonnage (in fact, the Japanese had to do both). And it must be admitted that not a single branch of the armed forces has coped with the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage as well as the submarines did.

At the same time, aircraft carriers became the main means of conquering supremacy at sea and supporting both amphibious and anti-amphibious operations. It was the aircraft carriers that played the main role in the defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy and in the collapse of the defensive perimeter it created. However, aircraft carriers were not at all universal ships capable of solving absolutely all tasks of a war at sea. Torpedo-artillery surface ships (night battles at Guadalcanal, and at Leyte too) and submarines (fighting on communications) also demonstrated their usefulness and ability to do work inaccessible to carrier-based aircraft.

In general, it can be stated that victory in the war is achieved not by a separate class of ships, but by a balanced fleet, which, in essence, was demonstrated by the Americans, who fused battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines into an invincible combat vehicle. However, if you still look for "the first among equals", then "The destroyer of the naval power of Japan" should be titled "His Majesty the aircraft carrier."