In this article, we will try to understand the degree of participation of Italian specialists in the creation of cruisers of the 26 and 26-bis project, as well as the position of Soviet cruisers in the international classification of the 30s of the last century.
To begin with, let's refresh our memory on the “major milestones” in the design of cruisers like “Kirov” and “Maxim Gorky”.
April 15, 1932 the first operational-technical assignment (OTZ) of the cruiser was approved.
July-August 1932 - a Soviet commission was sent and worked in Italy, whose task was to get acquainted with the Italian shipbuilding industry, the choice of a prototype for the Soviet cruiser and the purchase of a boiler-turbine power plant with a capacity of 100-120 thousand hp. The choice was made in favor of the cruiser "Montecuccoli", and the commission offered to purchase the theoretical drawing and the power plant of the latter.
March 19, 1933 the revised version of the OTZ "with mechanisms (turbines) of the Italian cruiser" Montecuccoli "was approved. In accordance with the new OTZ, the leadership of the Red Army Naval Forces Directorate instructs the Scientific Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding (NIVK) to develop a draft design of the ship.
April 20, 1933 the preliminary design of the NIVK was approved.
May 8, 1933 the leadership of the UMC RKKA signed an agreement with the Central Design Bureau of Shipbuilding (in other sources - "special shipbuilding") TsKBS-1 for the creation of a general (technical) project of the cruiser.
July 11, 1933 The Labor and Defense Council approves the "Program of Naval Shipbuilding for 1933-1938", which provided for the construction of eight light cruisers for the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets.
May 14, 1934 an agreement was signed between the Italian company Ansaldo and TsKBS-1 under which (among other things) the Italians undertook to supply the power plant for the cruiser Eugenio di Savoia and a complete set of documentation for setting up the production of such plants in the USSR. From that moment on, Italian specialists have been directly involved in the design of the Project 26 cruiser.
By September 1934 NIVK manages to develop a new draft design, according to which it is impossible to "fit" the performance characteristics of the cruiser of Project 26 into the standard displacement of 6,500 tons, and that the cruiser will turn out when the standard displacement is increased to 6,970 tons. technical project
In October 1934 g. head of the development of main caliber turrets A. A. Florensky suggested placing not two, but three guns in the turret of the Project 26 cruiser.
In November 1934 g. TsKBS-1 presented a technical design. However, the results of TsKBS-1 turned out to be even more discouraging - according to the calculations presented, the standard displacement of the cruiser should have reached 7,225 tons, and the speed dropped by half a knot. At the same time, insufficient booking and armament of the ship was noted.
5th November 1934 VM Orlov approves the replacement of two-gun turrets with three-gun turrets. At the same time, the standard displacement of the cruiser of the project 26 is set by him at the level of 7120-7170 tons.
December 29, 1934 The Labor and Defense Council approves the final performance characteristics of the cruiser.
At the end of 1934 (Unfortunately, there is no exact date. - Approx.author) "Ansaldo" transfers to the Soviet side the theoretical drawing of the cruiser, which was tested in the Roman and Hamburg experimental basins.
This is followed by the finalization of the cruiser project by the TsKBS-1 forces and the laying of two ships of the project 26 in October 1935
December 20, 1936 according to project 26, a cruiser for the Baltic is being laid (the future "Maxim Gorky").
January 14, 1937 according to project 26, a cruiser for the Black Sea is being laid (the future "Molotov").
In January 1937 g. the "Kirov" under construction is visited by the commander of the KBF L. M. Haller and proposes to remake the conning tower and wheelhouse, as well as a number of other posts. In the future, ideas arise about improving body armor, etc.
In April 1937 the final decision was made: the first two ships of the series (Kirov and Voroshilov) should be completed according to Project 26, and two recently laid down ships should be completed according to Project 26-bis - with enhanced armor and armament, an increased full fuel supply and a modified bow superstructure.
June-August 1938 - the laying of the last cruisers of the 26-bis type ("Kalinin" and "Kaganovich") for the Pacific Fleet.
What did the Soviet cruisers end up with? Were they a copy of the Italian ones, adjusted for the 180mm main caliber? Let's see the main tactical and technical characteristics of cruisers.
Of course, there is some "kinship" of the projects, but the differences between them are very large, and the matter is in no way limited to the main caliber guns alone. For example, the booking of Soviet and Italian cruisers has fundamental differences. The Italians relied on vertical protection and placed spaced armor on their ships (in addition to waist armor, there was also an armored partition to "catch" fragments from shells that pierced the main armor belt), but their horizontal protection was not good. Soviet cruisers, on the contrary, receive a very powerful armored deck, which at the time of design is superior to that of almost all light cruisers in the world, but they abandon spaced armoring of the side, limiting themselves to an armored belt of moderate thickness. It is interesting that the Italians, providing very good side armor, for some reason ignored the traverses, which they received much weaker protection: for example, the Eugenio di Savoia's side is covered with a 70-mm belt and behind it is also a 30-35-mm bulkhead, while the traverse is only 50 mm thick. Quite a strange decision, given that light cruisers are characterized by both a meeting engagement on converging courses and a combat on a withdrawal, when armoring of the extremities is of the utmost importance. In this respect, Soviet cruisers are more logical - they have the same thickness of side and traverse armor.
There are other differences as well: Soviet cruisers have a smaller displacement, but they have more total fuel capacity (if we compare Kirov and Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia with Maxim Gorky). The design of the hulls differs, and even the geometric dimensions of the ships do not coincide. And all right, the dimensions of the Soviet cruisers were proportionally smaller than the Italian ones, which would be fully explained by the smaller displacement of the domestic ships. But no: the Soviet cruisers are longer and wider than the Italian ones, but the draft "Montecuccoli" and "Eugenio di Savoia" are larger. Someone might say that a few meters of length and a few tens of centimeters of draft do not play a role, but this is not so - such changes significantly change the theoretical drawing of the ship.
We will consider in more detail the differences between Italian and Soviet cruisers in the description of the design of the cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis, but for now we just note that neither Kirov nor Maxim Gorky are tracing copies of foreign ships. We add that visually the Italian and Soviet cruisers also had significant differences:
Graphics by S. Balakin and Elio Ando brought to a single scale
But if "Kirov" is not a "180-mm copy" of "Montecuccoli" or "Eugenio di Savoia", then what is the role of the Italians in the creation of the Soviet cruiser? Here, unfortunately, there are many questions that await their thoughtful researcher. The history of the design of the cruisers of the project 26 is described many times, but very clearly, while various sources largely contradict each other. Here is a seemingly simple enough question: it is well known (and confirmed by all sources) that the power plant (EU) for our cruisers was purchased in Italy. But from which cruiser? After all, EI "Montecuccoli" and "Eugenio di Savoia" differed from each other. A. Chernyshev and K. Kulagin in their book "Soviet cruisers of the Great Patriotic War" claim that the USSR bought the installation of the cruiser "Eugenio di Savoia". But if we open the “Encyclopedia of WWII Cruisers. Hunters and defenders "and look at the section of Soviet cruisers (author - SV Patyanin), then we will be surprised to find that the control unit of the cruiser" Montecuccoli "was purchased. And, for example, A. V. Platonov in his works completely bypasses this issue in silence, limiting himself to the phrase "the main power plant was purchased in Italy" without further specification.
The originals of the documents could have given the answers, but unfortunately, it is not so easy to find them: the author of this article could not find the text of the agreement with Ansaldo dated May 11, 1934. However, we have at our disposal a "Certificate of Cooperation from the Naval Forces Directorate of the Red Army. with the Italian firm "Ansaldo" in the field of shipbuilding "dated May 11, 1934 (ie, drawn up three days before the signing of the contract - approx. ed.) signed by the Head of the Department of shipbuilding UVMS RKKA Sivkov (hereinafter -" Help "). It says:
“I. As a result of receiving mechanisms and technical assistance for shipbuilding from the Italian company Ansaldo, a cruiser with the following main elements should be built: armament: 6 - 180 mm guns in 3 twin towers; 6 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns; 6 - 45 mm semiautomatic devices; 6 - 5 inch machine guns (an obvious misprint, probably 0.5-inch machine guns, i.e. machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber - author's note); 2 - 3 21 inch torpedo tubes; 2 - aircraft on a catapult; PUAO system of the Italian "Central"; barrage mines and depth charges in overload. Reservation: board - 50 mm; deck - 50 mm. Travel speed - 37 knots. The power of the main mechanisms is 126,500 hp. with. (meaning power during forcing - author's note) Navigation area - 12 hours. at full speed (450 miles). Econ. move from the norms. app. - 1400 miles. Displacement - standard, 7 thousand tons.
II. In the development of the contract, the company will supply:
a) A complete set of main and auxiliary mechanisms - boilers, turbo- and diesel-dynamos, mine compressors, air-refrigerating machines, steering gear and other small mechanisms of the machine-boiler plant, completely identical to those of the Italian cruiser E. di Savoia , with all working drawings, calculations and specifications for the electromechanical part. The mechanisms of this ship are the most modern in the Italian fleet and are currently being manufactured by the company for the 36.5-nodal cruiser under construction with a displacement of 6950 tons.
b) Technological assistance in setting up the production of the above mechanisms at the factories of the USSR, both in terms of metallurgy and in terms of mechanical processing and installation. Technological assistance will consist in the transfer of all data of the technical process to the factories of the USSR, the supply of calibers, templates, devices and devices necessary for the manufacture of these mechanisms, the dispatch of highly qualified engineers (18-24) and technicians to the USSR to train and manage the work of our factories, and, finally, training our engineers (12) and workers (10) in their factories.
c) A set of drawings, calculations and specifications for the hull of the cruiser "Montecuccoli", one of the newest cruisers of the Italian fleet, which entered service in 1935, as well as theoretical drawings and drawings of propellers for the cruiser and destroyer we designed."
Thus, it can be argued that the USSR acquired a complete set of power plant with all auxiliary mechanisms from Eugenio di Savoia (which is also confirmed by the similar power plant power on this Italian and Soviet cruisers), while the Italians undertook to organize the production of similar plants in the Soviet Union …But then everything is not clear again: the document clearly says about the acquisition of "drawings, calculations and specifications" of the "Montecuccoli" hull, why then many authors (A. Chernyshev, K. Kulagin and others) indicate that the theoretical drawing of the cruiser "Kirov" was a revised version of Eugenio di Savoia? How can this be explained?
It is possible that at the last moment, or even after the conclusion of the contract, it was decided to replace the drawings of "Montecuccoli" with those of "Eugenio di Savoia". But some phrases of the above "Help" hint that the sale of the theoretical drawing of the Italian cruiser is only part of the deal, and besides that, the Italians undertook to create a new theoretical drawing for a specific project of the Soviet ship. Let's pay attention to: "… as well as theoretical drawings and drawings of propellers for the cruiser we designed …" In addition, the fourth section of the "Help" reads:
“The firm guarantees the power and fuel consumption of the main mechanisms supplied by it, as well as mechanisms built in the USSR according to its drawings and instructions. In addition, the firm guarantees the speed of a ship built according to a theoretical drawing developed by it and equipped with the firm's mechanisms. The material expression of the guarantee is determined by fines that cannot exceed 13% of the value of the contract (according to the Italian-Soviet agreement of May 6, 1933)."
Apparently, the theoretical drawing of the Project 26 cruisers was nevertheless made on the basis of Eugenio di Savoia, but who made it, Soviet designers or Italian, is not clear.
Under an agreement with Ansaldo, the Italians sold us only the power plant and hull drawings, but it is well known that this did not exhaust Soviet-Italian cooperation in the creation of Project 26 cruisers: Italian specialists helped us with calculating the weight characteristics of the cruiser, in addition, the towers the main caliber was also designed with Italian assistance. It cannot be ruled out that we turned to Mussolini's shipbuilding companies on other technical issues. It can be assumed that a brief history of the design of Soviet cruisers looked like this: after the appearance of the first OTZ (6,000 tons, 4 * 180-mm guns), the USSR got the opportunity to get acquainted with the projects of the latest Italian cruisers, during which decisions were made to purchase the Montecuccoli power plant "And the installation of the third turret of the main caliber on the Soviet ship. Accordingly, domestic designers created a draft design for a cruiser with a displacement of 6,500 tons and carrying 6 * 180-mm guns, and in parallel with this, negotiations were underway to purchase running gear and technical assistance from Italians. In May 1934, an agreement was signed with the Ansaldo firm, and the Soviet side declares its desire to build a cruiser of 7,000 tons (here, apparently, they insured themselves against a further increase in displacement). The Italians considered that the theoretical drawing of "Eugenio di Savoia" would be best suited as the basis for the design for the new Soviet ship, and created the corresponding drawing - for a cruiser of 7,000 tons with three two-gun 180-mm turrets, and by the end of 1934 they It was “run in” in European experimental pools. While the Italians were engaged in a theoretical drawing, Soviet designers were creating a project (nevertheless, the internal structure of the compartments of Soviet cruisers, not counting the boiler rooms and engine rooms, is very different from the Italian ones, at least due to different booking systems). Of course, when designing, our design bureaus had the opportunity to consult with the Italians, but to what extent it is not clear. As a result, by the end of 1934, the Italian theoretical drawings and Soviet studies were supposed to "merge" into a high-quality cruiser project of 7,000 tons. An accident prevented it - just at the end of 1934, the "spontaneous" proposal of AA was adopted in the USSR. Florensky about replacing two-gun towers with three-gun ones, which required redesigning the towers, revising the hull design and, of course, reworking the theoretical drawing created by the Italians, but the Soviet design bureaus carried out this work almost independently. Why didn't the Italians ask? Most likely because they had already fulfilled their obligations and designed the cruiser at the request of the customer, and if the customer suddenly and at the very final stage decided to revise the conditions, then the Italians could not bear responsibility for this. At the same time, the level of Soviet design thought already made it possible to resolve such issues independently.
It should be noted that, having made such a decision, TsKBS-1 specialists took a pretty risk - the Italians vouched for reaching the contract speed only if the cruiser was built with an Italian chassis and according to the Italian theoretical drawing. Accordingly, having made changes to the latter, the specialists of TsKBS-1 took responsibility for themselves, now, if the contractual speed was not achieved, it was they, and not the Italians, who became responsible. But for such a failure it was possible to fall into the "enemies of the people."
Nevertheless, the Kirov-class cruisers should be considered predominantly Soviet development. Of course, the USSR took full advantage of the knowledge and shipbuilding experience of Italy, and this was absolutely correct. Under the conditions of the revolution, civil war and the extremely difficult economic situation of the country in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the domestic shipbuilding industry could not develop, in fact, it stagnated. And the leading naval powers at that time went into a technological breakthrough: the boilers and turbines of the 30s fundamentally surpassed everything that was created before the First World War, very advanced turret installations of medium-caliber artillery, more durable armor, etc. appeared. It would be extremely difficult to keep up with all this at the same time (although it is possible, for example, if we recall the power of the Leningrad leaders' power plant created in the USSR), so the use of someone else's experience was more than justified. At the same time, a very specific type of cruiser was created in the USSR, corresponding to the Soviet naval doctrine and completely different from the cruisers of other powers. One can argue for a long time about how correct the prerequisites laid down in the OTZ of the first Soviet cruiser were, but one cannot deny the specificity of the characteristics of the ships of the project 26 and 26-bis, which caused so much controversy about their "class" affiliation.
Cruiser "Kirov" during the Second World War, the exact date of the photo is unknown
So what kind of cruisers did the USSR get? Light or Heavy? Let's try to understand the classifications existing in the 30s, determined by international maritime treaties.
In 1922, the five largest maritime powers of the world (England, USA, Japan, France, Italy) signed the Washington Naval Agreement, according to which the standard displacement of cruisers was limited to 10,000 "long" (or 10,160 metric) tons, and the caliber of guns should not exceed 203 mm:
Article 11 of the Agreement reads: "The Contracting Parties may not acquire or build, either themselves or within the framework of their jurisdiction, warships of other classes, except for large ships and aircraft carriers, with a standard displacement exceeding 10,000 tons."
Article 12 stipulated: "Ships of the Contracting Parties laid down in the future, except for large ships, must not carry guns of more than 8 inches (203 mm) caliber."
There were no other restrictions or definitions for cruisers in this document. In essence, the Washington Agreement tried to restrict the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers, and both of the above articles are aimed at preventing member countries from trying to build battleships under the guise of cruisers. But the Washington agreement did not regulate the cruiser classes in any way - would you like to consider the 203-mm 10-thousander a small or light cruiser? Your birthright. The agreement simply stated that a ship over 10 thousand tons or with artillery over 203 mm would be considered a battleship, that's all. It is interesting that the first Italian "Washington" cruisers "Trento" and "Trieste", when they were laid down in 1925, were listed as light cruisers (although they were later reclassified as heavy ones). So from the point of view of the Washington agreement, "Kirov-class" can be safely attributed to light cruisers.
The 1930 London Maritime Treaty is a different matter. In article 15 of section 3, two subclasses of cruisers were established, and the belonging was determined by the caliber of the guns: the first subclass included ships with artillery over 155 mm, and the second, respectively, with guns of 155 mm or lower. Taking into account that the London Treaty did not cancel the Washington Agreement (according to Article 23 it became invalid on December 31, 1936), both subclasses of cruisers could not be larger than 10 thousand tons of standard displacement.
Interestingly, France and Italy refused to sign the 3rd section of the London Treaty, which specified the cruiser. Of course, the point was not at all in the classification, but in the fact that France and Italy sought to avoid the restrictions on the tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, which were established by Article 16 of the third section. Be that as it may, the full text of the treaty was signed only by three maritime powers - the United States, Great Britain and Japan. However, later (Rome Pact of 1931) France and Italy nevertheless agreed to recognize the third section of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, but in 1934 Japan completely refused to fulfill it.
Despite these "throwing", it is probably still possible to consider that the London Naval Treaty of 1930 gave the world classification of cruisers, but it should be borne in mind that the 3rd section of this treaty (along with many others), as well as the Washington Agreement, acted only until December 31, 1936. So, starting from January 1, 1937, no document regulated the characteristics of cruisers, unless the countries again gather for an international conference and come up with something, but whether they will gather and what they will decide, no one could have foreseen.
As you know, the USSR did not sign either the Washington Agreement or the London Treaty of 1930 and was not obliged to fulfill their conditions, and the commissioning of the Soviet cruisers of Project 26 was to be carried out (and was actually carried out) only after these treaties had expired.
The last pre-war naval agreement governing the classes of surface ships (the London Naval Treaty of 1936) cannot be considered international, since only three of the five largest maritime powers signed it: the United States, Britain and France. But, although the USSR did not participate in the conference, it recognized its provisions, albeit later. This happened at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Maritime Agreement of 1937, in which the Soviet Union pledged to adhere to the classifications of the London Maritime Treaty of 1936. What were these classifications?
The very concept of "cruiser" did not exist in it. There were 2 classes of large artillery warships - large surface ships (Capital ships are surface vessels of war) and light surface ships (Light surface vessels). The first are battleships, which in turn were divided into 2 categories:
1) a ship was considered a battleship of the 1st category if it had a standard displacement of more than 10 thousand "long" tons, regardless of what caliber the artillery was installed on it. Also, the 1st category included ships with a displacement of 8 to 10 thousand "long" tons, if the caliber of their artillery exceeded 203 mm;
2) battleships of the 2nd category included ships that had a standard displacement of less than 8 thousand "long" tons, but had more than 203-mm artillery.
What kind of battleship is less than 8 thousand tons? Probably, in this way they tried to separate the coastal defense battleships into a separate subclass.
Light surface ships had a standard displacement of no more than 10 thousand tons."Long" tons and were divided into 3 categories:
1) ships whose guns were larger than 155 mm;
2) ships whose guns were equal to or less than 155 mm, and whose standard displacement exceeded 3 thousand "long" tons;
3) ships whose guns were equal to or less than 155 mm and whose standard displacement did not exceed 3 thousand "long" tons.
A number of sources indicate that the second London one gave a different definition of light cruisers and that those were considered as those whose artillery caliber did not exceed 155 mm, and the standard displacement was 8 thousand "long" tons. But judging by the text of the agreement, this is a mistake. The fact is that the London Treaty of 1936 forbade the construction of "Light surface ships" of the first category (that is, with guns over 155 mm) and allowed the construction of the 2nd category, but only on the condition that the standard displacement of such ships would not be exceed 8 thousand "long" tons. Those. if some power had cruisers with a displacement of 8 to 10 thousand tons with 155-mm artillery at the time of signing the contract, it was recognized as light (second category), but until the expiration of the treaty it was forbidden to build light cruisers over 8 thousand tons of displacement.
And what about our Kirovs? Obviously, from the point of view of the letter of the treaty, the cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis are heavy cruisers (the first category of "Light surface ships"). Nevertheless, the small standard displacement (for the cruisers of the project 26 - 7880 metric tons), was within the limits allowed for construction. Therefore, in the process of negotiating the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement, the USSR notified England that the new Soviet cruisers are light and have a displacement of less than 8 thousand "long" tons, but they carry 180-mm cannons.
In essence, the "moment of truth" had come for our cruisers: they really differed from everything that the leading naval powers built, and their position in the cruising "table of ranks" remained unclear. Now it was necessary to decide whether they were light or heavy (more precisely, whether they belong to the first or second category of "light warships" of the London Treaty of 1936), and the question was extremely important … The fact is that if the cruisers of Project 26 were recognized as heavy, their construction, in accordance with the London Treaty of 1936, should have been prohibited. It is clear that the USSR would not disassemble the four cruisers under construction, but it was possible to prohibit the laying of such ships in the future, or to demand the replacement of 180-mm guns with 152-mm ones. References to the fact that the USSR did not have 152-mm artillery at that time cannot be taken into account, since the same England could well provide at least drawings, at least ready-made guns and tower installations at the most reasonable price.
In order to fully understand what happened in the future, you need to consider the following. During this period, the UK economy was far from booming, and the new naval arms race was ruinous for it. That is why the British were so eager to conclude international treaties limiting the number and quality of warships of all classes. This was the only way England could remain the leading maritime power (agreeing to parity only with the United States).
However, the efforts of England were in vain: Italy and Japan did not want to sign a new treaty, and thus the British, French and Americans were in a position where the restrictions they had invented applied only to them, but not to their potential opponents. This put England, the United States and France at a disadvantage, but nevertheless they went for it, besides there was still hope that Japan and Italy would change their minds and join the second London Treaty.
At the same time, the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1937 was concluded only between Britain and the USSR. And if it turned out that this treaty would in some way contradict the London Naval Treaty of 1936, then both the United States and France would have every right to immediately break the agreement that was unfavorable for them. Moreover, Italy and Japan could effectively use such a violation, announcing that England persuades the leading maritime countries on the same terms, but right there, behind their backs, concludes treaties on completely different ones and that from now on, England, as the initiator of international agreements, is not and will not be maybe. Worse, the same could have been done by Germany, which quite recently (in 1935) concluded a naval agreement with England, which the latter's leadership tried to present to its people as a great political victory.
In other words, if England, when signing a naval treaty with the USSR, in some way would violate the London Treaty of 1936, then all political efforts in the field of limiting naval arms would go to waste.
England agreed to consider the Kirov-class cruisers approved for construction. Thus, the British de jure admitted that, despite the 180-mm caliber, the Soviet ships of the 26 and 26-bis project should still be considered light cruisers. At the same time, the British introduced only one, quite reasonable, condition: they insisted on limiting the number of such ships by quotas of heavy cruisers. The USSR received the right to build seven 180-mm ships - i.e. as many as there were 203-mm cruisers in France, which was equated with the fleet of the USSR under the Anglo-Soviet agreement. This was logical, since if the number of Kirov-class cruisers allowed for construction were not limited, it turned out that the USSR received the right to build more powerful light cruisers than Britain, France and the United States.
Interestingly, neither the United States, nor France and no one in the world tried to appeal against such a decision and did not consider the cruisers of Project 26 and 26 bis a violation of existing treaties. Thus, the international community agreed with the British interpretation and de facto recognized the Kirov-class cruisers as light.
The question arises. If Soviet naval science and the international community recognized the cruisers of projects 26 and 26-bis are light, then what reason do modern historians have to translate them into a subclass of heavy ones? Is it the same letter of the London 155-mm treaty? And exceeding this parameter per inch automatically makes the Kirovs heavy cruisers? Okay, then let's look at the issue of classifying Soviet cruisers from a different perspective.
It is well known that the Washington cruisers' limitations - 10 thousand tons and 203-mm caliber - did not arise as a result of the evolution of this class of ships, but, in general, by accident - at the time of the signing of the Washington Agreements, England had the latest Hawkins cruisers with a displacement of 9.8 thousand tons with seven 190-mm guns in deck installations, and it was clear that Britain would not send newly built ships for scrap.
At that time, these were the largest modern cruisers and Washington restrictions were focused on these ships. But the Hawkins, for all their novelty, represented the yesterday of shipbuilding. On the way were completely new types of ships, with turret artillery of the main caliber, which weighed much more deck installations. At the same time, the Hawkins were built as a fighter for light cruisers, and as such carried extremely moderate protection, capable of covering the ship only from 152-mm shells from light cruisers. But everyone rushed to build "Washington" ten-thousanders, and accordingly the question arose about meeting the same cruisers in battle, which required adequate protection from 203-mm shells.
Very quickly, shipbuilders around the world became convinced that the creation of a harmonious ship with 203-mm guns in a displacement of 10 160 metric tons was impossible - they turned out to be fast, but almost unprotected ships. Then practically all the fleets of the world went to cheat - they strengthened the performance characteristics of their ships, violating the Washington and London agreements on a displacement of one to two thousand tons, or even more. Italian Zara? The standard displacement is 11,870 tons. Bolzano? 11,065 tons. American Wichita? 10 589 tons. Japanese "Nachi"? 11 156 tons. Takao? 11 350 tons. Hipper? Generally 14 250 tons!
None of the above (and many others not mentioned in this list) ships, according to the current international classification, is not a cruiser. All of them, with a standard displacement of over 10,000 "long" (10,160 metric) tons, are … battleships. Therefore, focusing on the letter of the treaty, of course, we can recognize the Soviet cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis heavy. But in this case, it is completely meaningless to compare ships of completely different classes, which, from the point of view of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, are the heavy cruiser Kirov and, for example, the battleship Zara or Admiral Hipper.
The question is not chicanery, but the fact that situations with violation of international treaties are absolutely identical. In the Soviet Union, a light cruiser was designed, but they considered that the 180-mm caliber better suited its tasks and thus exceeded the limits for light cruisers according to the international classification. In Italy, the heavy cruiser Zara was designed and, in order to make it more balanced, the displacement was increased, which exceeded the limits for heavy cruisers according to the same international classification. Why should we transfer the cruiser Kirov to the next subclass of cruisers, but at the same time keep the Zara in its class?
