How Mikhail Gorbachev was left without people loyal to him
9th KGB Directorate: 1985-1992
The study of the history of personal protection in the USSR reveals a clear tendency: if those attached to the guarded had good relations, then they remained faithful to him until the end, even after his death. And vice versa: arrogance, captiousness and ingratitude in dealing with personal security officers could at a difficult moment leave the leader of a huge country alone with his problems and enemies.
"I will come here in a year"
On November 15, 1982, a farewell ceremony for Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev took place in the Column Hall of the House of Unions of the USSR. On this day, a tradition that is significant for all those present in the main funeral hall of the country was established. The first to come out of the "special zone" to the coffin of the late General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was his successor. All those present, without exception, were waiting for this moment with the deepest trepidation. Including the leaders of the leading powers of the world, who considered it necessary to personally come to the funeral of the head of the Soviet state.
The funeral of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov took place on February 14, 1984. They were attended by George W. Bush (Sr.), then the US Vice President, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Both of them were present that day in the Hall of Columns. The current president of NAST Russia Dmitry Fonarev at that event was responsible for meeting distinguished guests at a special entrance of the House of Unions and for escorting them to the place of farewell in the Column Hall. According to him, Margaret Thatcher, seeing that Konstantin Chernenko appeared first from the open door in the opposite corner of the hall (he had Viktor Ladygin as the head of the security group), said to her escorts: "I will come here again in a year."
And so it happened: Thatcher fulfilled her promise on March 13, 1985 and this time saw that Chernenko was the first to leave the "sacred" room to the coffin of Konstantin Zemlyansky).
In order to give the reader an opportunity to better feel the scale of such mourning events, it is enough to tell how much work fell on the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR during these unhappy four days for the country.
Thus, leaders of 35 countries attended Brezhnev's funeral at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. The number of delegations, represented by other persons, was up to 170. Each head of a foreign state was obligatorily provided with security from officers of the 18th department and the main vehicle of the GON. Delegations of the highest level from the socialist countries were provided with accommodation in state mansions, the rest were accommodated in their embassies and missions.
In the same way, according to the plans of the guards, drawn up for the funeral of Joseph Stalin, the rest of the mourning events took place.
Personnel
By 1985, the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR was a superbly debugged system that fully met the requirements of the era. In general terms, its basic structure can be described as follows:
1st department - bodyguard:
18th (reserve) department
security departments of each protected person
2nd department - counterintelligence (internal security service)
4th department - engineering and construction
The 5th department united three departments:
1st department - protection of the Kremlin and Red Square
2nd department - protection of roadways
3rd department - protection of urban residences of protected persons
6th department - special kitchen
The 7th department united two departments:
1st department - protection of country cottages
2nd department - protection of state houses on Lengori
8th department - economic
The commandant's office of the Moscow Kremlin:
The commandant's office for the protection of the 14th building of the Kremlin
Kremlin regiment
Commandant's office for the protection of buildings of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Staraya Square
Commandant's Office for the Protection of Buildings of the Council of Ministers
Special purpose garage
Human Resources Department
Service and combat training department (command headquarters)
The personnel of the 9th Directorate consisted of just over 5,000 people, including officers, employees (warrant officers) and civilians. Candidates for the positions of employees of the department underwent a standard six-month personnel check by the KGB of the USSR and then a "course for a young soldier" in a special training center "Kupavna". According to the established procedure, officers were allowed to work in the 1st department, with a few exceptions, who had worked exemplarily in the department for at least three years. Attached - the chiefs of security groups, as a rule, were appointed from the officers of the 18th department, with at least ten years of work experience.
The first department was headed by a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Major General Nikolai Pavlovich Rogov, whom the officers lovingly and respectfully called the White General for his noble gray hair. Nikolai Rogov was replaced by the legendary Mikhail Vladimirovich Titkov, who went through his entire professional path from ensign to general in the "nine".
In fact, the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR by the mid-1980s was a powerful and rigidly centralized system, the head of which had direct access to the head of state. At the same time, he had at his "disposal" all the power of both the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. As for the army, the Minister of Defense was an ex-officio member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and therefore was also guarded by officers of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. At the same time, the officers - attached to the Minister of Defense of the USSR worked in the military uniform of majors - this corresponded to their ranks in the KGB, and one can imagine how many funny situations arose in their work when they indicated the proper place for multi-star army generals …
Security officer of the KGB of the USSR at the post. Photo: Nikolay Malyshev / TASS
14th department of the 1st department of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR
From the day of the death of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, literally emergency work began in the leadership of the "nine" to select personnel for the security group of the newly appointed General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. The traditional forge of personnel for the entire 1st department was its 18th department, which at that time was headed by Vladimir Timofeevich Medvedev.
It was necessary to find a person who, in accordance with his professional experience, would be able to lead the main security group and at the same time, both in age and in human qualities, would be suitable for the Gorbachev couple. It is the couple, not the spouse. Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov, the head of the Nine, understood this perfectly well. The candidacy of Vladimir Timofeevich was the best fit. It remained to decide on the number and quality of officers for the visiting security of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This work was entrusted to the leadership of the 1st department and the personnel department of the "nine".
Since the new Soviet leader, in contrast to the previous ones, was a man of active age, dynamic, the requirements for the personnel of the field guard department, which had already received its own separate - 14th - number, also changed. These demands were not formed by the guarded himself, as is commonly thought in wide circles, but namely by the head of the 9th Directorate, Yuri Plekhanov, and the head of the security group itself, Vladimir Medvedev.
The backbone of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev's outgoing security consisted of officers who already had experience working with top officials of the state. They were joined by young officers of the 18th department with sports qualifications (primarily in hand-to-hand combat), who passed not only strict personnel checks, but also possessed the necessary intellectual and external data.
The full composition of the security group of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the period from 1985 to 1992:
Medvedev Vladimir Timofeevich, head of department, senior officer-attached;
Boris I. Golentsov, attached officer;
Goryachikh Evgeniy, officer-attached;
Zemlyansky Nikolay, officer-attached;
Klimov Oleg, officer-attached;
Lifanichev Yuri Nikolaevich, officer-attached;
Osipov Alexander, officer-attached;
Pestov Valery Borisovich, officer-attached;
Vyacheslav Semkin, commandant of the security group;
Belikov Andrey;
Voronin Vladimir;
Golev Alexander;
Golubkov-Yagodkin Evgeniy;
Goman Sergey;
Grigoriev Evgeniy;
Grigoriev Mikhail;
Zubkov Mikhail;
Ivanov Vladimir;
Klepikov Alexander;
Makarov Yuri;
Malin Nikolay;
Reshetov Evgeniy;
Samoilov Valery;
Nikolay Tektov;
Feduleev Vyacheslav.
The head of the guard and the guarded person already knew each other. In the summer of 1984, Medvedev was instructed to accompany Gorbachev's wife Raisa Maksimovna on a trip to Bulgaria. At the same time, it was quite transparently hinted to him that the assignment could greatly affect his future fate. The KGB already knew that the young and promising Mikhail Gorbachev would replace the aged Konstantin Chernenko. The only question was time. Vladimir Medvedev passed his "exam" in Bulgaria successfully.
At first, Vladimir Timofeevich was very pleased with the new service. Working with the energetic and young Gorbachev seemed much more interesting than working with the ailing Brezhnev. And Raisa Maksimovna initially made a good impression on him. But the joy was short-lived.
The first Soviet lady
In his book "The Man Behind the Back", Vladimir Medvedev noted that, while working for Brezhnev and sometimes performing functions that were not characteristic of the chief of security, he still never "felt like a servant" and was convinced that "a bodyguard is a profession in many ways and a family one." … Under the Gorbachevs, he had to face "arrogant alienation, secrecy and sudden outbursts of His sharpness" and "Her lordly whims and whims."
As the oldest employee of the state security, retired colonel Viktor Kuzovlev, said, it was not easy for Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov: “For any questions, even trivial ones, Raisa Maksimovna made it a rule to call the head of the 9th Directorate, Plekhanov. She constantly demanded his increased attention, regardless of his position. All this hurt him painfully. He repeatedly asked to be transferred to another area of work, but Gorbachev refused, stating that he fully trusts him and wants him to be in charge of the security service of his family and the families of all other leaders."
Throughout the history of the Soviet state, it was not customary for the wives of leaders to interfere in state affairs. This tradition did not continue in the Gorbachev family.
According to Vladimir Medvedev, one of the unusual and unpleasant responsibilities that were assigned to him under Gorbachev was the recruitment of service personnel. Unpleasant - because the head of the security was constantly involved in conflicts between the first lady of the USSR with cooks, maids, government officials and other service personnel.
As Vladimir Timofeevich noted, Raisa Maksimovna believed that good workers have no right to get sick. To the attempts of the head of security to object that they are real people and different things can happen, she replied: "Don't, Vladimir Timofeevich, I am not interested in your opinion." Once, on a summer vacation in Crimea, he let two workers go to get school notebooks for their children: they were supposed to return to Moscow by September 1, and they simply had no other opportunity to prepare the children for school. Upon learning of this, Raisa Maksimovna gave a riot to all the service personnel, and complained to her husband, who reprimanded his chief of security.
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Semkin, commandant of the security group, who traditionally worked with the wife of the protected person and practically performed the functions of the attached Raisa Gorbacheva, recalled the following episode:
“In 1988, Gorbachev went on a visit to Austria. The guards were instructed to check the house in which Mikhail Sergeevich and his wife would live. I went out onto the balcony and saw that literally all the windows of the neighboring house were lined with cameras. What to do - call somewhere? No, we decide everything ourselves, and on the spot. I ordered the windows to be closed to prevent them from being photographed in the house. The windows were laid, the exit to the balcony was covered with drapes. Raisa Maksimovna arrived, I began to show the house, and she wanted to go out onto the balcony. And then I said: there, they say, is impossible. Well, in response, of course, I heard: “Who can't ?! I can go everywhere."
Vyacheslav Semkin, this conversation almost cost the post …
However, it cannot be said that the relationship between the Gorbachev couple and their guards was unambiguously bad. The same Vladimir Medvedev recalled that in some issues both Raisa Maksimovna and Mikhail Sergeevich were very attentive: for example, they never forgot to congratulate him and his wife on their birthdays. And with those security officers who "learned" to work with them, the Gorbachevs kept their distance, kept even.
Of course, Vladimir Timofeevich and Yuri Sergeevich got the most. But this is a natural situation, since any issues of ensuring safety, comfort, rest, treatment and other areas of personal life were the responsibility of the leadership of the security group and, of course, the 9th Directorate.
According to the officers of the Nine, the main problem was that the main protected country did not consider it necessary to take into account the real circumstances of everything that was happening around, and even more so to carry out reasonable and sometimes extremely necessary recommendations of the security group. This was especially true of foreign trips, in the number of which Mikhail Sergeevich became the absolute record holder among Soviet leaders.
He was in power for only six years - at first only as a party leader, and in March 1990 he also took up the new post of the president of the USSR, both for himself and for the country, to which he was elected by the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies. During this short time, Mikhail Gorbachev managed to make several dozen visits to 26 countries of the world. In total, he spent almost six months on business trips abroad.
Raisa Gorbacheva surrounded by guards while walking around New York. Photo: Yuri Abramochkin / RIA Novosti
Frivolous games
According to the recollections of Vladimir Medvedev, a huge preparatory work preceded Gorbachev's trips abroad. First, a group from the protocol departments of the presidential administration and the Foreign Ministry was sent to the site of the planned visit. Then, two or three weeks before departure, another group flew out, which included the guards who were preparing the stay. An hour and a half before the main departure, another plane was sent - with food, accompanying persons, another guard. A separate plane was used to deliver Gorbachev's main vehicle and cover vehicles.
Just like Nikita Khrushchev in his time, Mikhail Sergeevich loved to communicate with the people. This is not surprising: he needed to show the whole world his democratic aspirations. There was nothing out of the ordinary in this: the leaders of Western countries did the same.
However, the same Americans had it: if the first person is going to "go to the people", he must warn the security officers in advance that during the trip there will be events with the participation of a large number of people. Thanks to this, the guards were able to work out a well-thought-out route, clearly plan all meetings "with the people" - where, what time, for what time, etc.
“In our country, the president got out of the car wherever his wife wanted,” Vladimir Medvedev recalled. - It didn't work to convince him that it was nothing like anything: “Is this what the security will teach the secretary general? This will not happen, will not happen! " As a result, the situation turned out to be ugly, there was a crush, emergency situations, people got bruises and bruises."
According to Medvedev, Mikhail Sergeevich said: “I do my own thing, and you do yours. This is a good school for you."
Because of this attitude of Gorbachev to security issues, difficult situations constantly arose, and some of his impromptu "outings to the people" could have ended very badly. If in the USSR this feature was calculated and in the event of such "surprises" the reserve outfit was always strengthened both in the number of officers and in the time of taking up posts, then abroad such decisions of Mikhail Sergeevich were not met by his foreign colleagues. First of all, they were unpleasantly surprised by the agents of the American Secret Service.
“During a visit to the United States,” writes Vladimir Medvedev, “an American guard was covering Gorbachev on one of the streets. He just hung over him, covering him with his body. People reached out to the Soviet leader from all sides and received sharp blows in the hands in response. The security guard literally turned our president around and began to push him towards the car. When we returned to the residence, he showed me that he was all wet, and through an interpreter said: "These are very frivolous games."
Back in 1985, during a visit to France, unexpectedly for the security service, the Gorbachevs decided to get out of the car on the Place de la Bastille. The audience that met them there was not at all like the elite. On the contrary, it was the “top of the Parisian bottom”: clochards, homeless people, unemployed people, drug addicts … Seeing a richly dressed man and woman emerging from a luxurious limousine, all these brothers rushed forward in the hope of making a profit. A stampede began, Gorbachev's personal bodyguards had no opportunity in the crowd for any quick action. As luck would have it, at that moment TV men appeared on the square and immediately began filming this whole mess. Somehow the security officers managed to drive the limousine and take Gorbachev away from the square. But this did not help either: literally after some hundred meters, he … again ordered to stop with the words: "I made a move, deceived the correspondents." The crowd rushed to him again, and the guards again had a hard time …
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev (in the car on the right) getting acquainted with the products of the Peugeot automobile plant during an official visit to France. Photo: RIA Novosti
The incident that took place during Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 also tickled the nerves of the guards. Since one of the topics of the negotiations was the Kuril Islands, public opinion was extremely agitated. In such an environment, protective measures needed to be strengthened.
Before the trip, the Japanese ambassador to the USSR sent two members of the Japanese security service to Medvedev. They demanded that Gorbachev's guards persuade him not to get out of the car where it was not provided for by the program. Hearing that the security personnel of the Soviet leader could not influence him, the Japanese were terribly surprised: how can a boss be capricious when it comes to his own safety ?! They insisted that the Soviet colleagues go and report on the demand of the Japanese side to Gorbachev.
“Of course, we didn’t go anywhere,” recalls Vladimir Medvedev, “and even then this conversation was not passed on to Gorbachev: it was useless. The Japanese got very nervous … Then everything went in a routine disorder. Driving through the streets of the Japanese capital, Raisa Maksimovna offered to get out of the car."
Passers-by immediately rushed to the presidential couple and surrounded her. Japanese youth chanted hostile slogans and demanded the return of the Kuril Islands. The atmosphere was very tense. With great difficulty, the guards of the Soviet leader managed to create a corridor so that Mikhail Sergeyevich and his wife could move along the street.
The head of the USSR and his wife did not suffer, but the Japanese ambassador accompanying the Soviet delegation was extremely irritated. Indeed, as Vladimir Medvedev noted, the situation turned out to be ugly, and "from the point of view of security, it was simply ugly." It is not surprising that they tried not to write about this case in the newspapers - neither in Soviet, nor in Japanese.
In fact, the situation was further complicated by the fact that the officers of the visiting security of the leader of our country were … without weapons - according to Japanese law, it was subject to deposit at border crossing. Attached, however, had weapons. This was the merit of the leadership of the Nine, which, when preparing the visit and negotiations with Japanese colleagues, argued its position by the fact that the Japanese were allowed to be in their country with weapons to the agents of the US Secret Service. A compromise was found on this issue. Only the last argument of the Chekists remained secret. What will happen if the Japanese do not agree to an agreement? Will the visit take place or not? This is not a Foreign Ministry protocol, these are security issues. And this is just a small touch to the theme of the professionalism of the system that was called the "nine".
How the KGB guarded Reagan
Continuing the theme of the professionalism of the Nine, it is necessary to return to 1987, since one cannot ignore the real case of precisely the prevention of a terrorist act against US President Ronald Reagan. This work was coordinated by Valery Nikolaevich Velichko, assistant to the head of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. Valery Nikolayevich came to the post in February 1986 at the invitation of Yuri Plekhanov. According to the profile of his official duties, he headed numerous control headquarters, created for each status event. And since there were more than enough such events, the headquarters of the "nine" worked almost constantly. Such a headquarters was also headed by Valery Nikolaevich during the visit of the American president in May 1998.
“… Literally the day before Reagan's arrival, intelligence gave us information about the impending assassination attempt,” Valery Velichko said. - Moreover, the information was very scarce. Only the height of the alleged terrorist was known - 190 centimeters and the fact that he arrived as part of the White House press group 40 minutes before the start of all events. So we didn't have any time. It was then that a special group was allocated under my leadership, which was supposed to prevent this terrorist attack. We had every conceivable and inconceivable authority."
Dmitry Fonarev recalls one episode of work to ensure the safety of this visit.
“… On May 25, 1987, during a return visit to Moscow, Ronald Reagan was supposed to walk along the Arbat. It was agreed in advance on which section of the famous street he should go, and on this section everything was checked, right down to every attic. The outfit closed the route with enormous forces. And then suddenly Reagan decided to walk along the same street, but … in the other direction. Apparently, he remembered a similar decision by Gorbachev, which he made six months ago in Washington, stopping the motorcade halfway to the White House and starting a conversation with the "people." A crowd of people rushed to Reagan just to see him. My American colleagues and I tried to form something like a circle around him, focusing on the expressive views of the officer - the attached Reagan from the Soviet side, Valentin Ivanovich Mamakin. The Americans looked at their own. The crowd began not just to put pressure on us, it was shrinking towards the center, under the pressure, in my impression, of everything especially crowded on this beautiful sunny day in the Arbat. A little more, and the situation would have gotten out of control … Valentin Ivanovich simply showed Reagan where to go, and literally along the wall we escorted him to the same alley, from where he turned "the wrong way" …
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan walking along Red Square. 1987 year. Photo by Yuri Lizunov and Alexander Chumichev / TASS photo chronicle
In June 1999, Margaret Thatcher also got into a similar situation in Spitak, which was destroyed to the ground, when a crowd of 2 thousand people formed the same more than "close" circle around her. The Prime Minister was practically saved by the chief of her security, attached to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mikhail Vladimirovich Titkov. Here you need to understand that Mikhail Vladimirovich at that time was the head of the 1st department. Realizing the importance of the visit and following the professional traditions of the Nine, he practically took over the post himself, although it was in his power to appoint any officer of the 18th squad to this post. Realizing what was happening and imagining what could happen, he almost forced her into the car and, using a cunning maneuver, promising that they were going to look at the legendary Armenian crosses - "khachkars", took her … to the airport. Already on the plane, the "iron lady" literally promised to fire Mikhail Vladimirovich, though she did not say where and how …"
Valery Nikolayevich himself tells how the operative support of the visit went:
“We started by shuffling all 6,000 accredited correspondents at random before each event with Reagan's participation, determining which of them would sit where. That is, the New York Times was no longer guaranteed that its journalists would sit in the forefront, as they were accustomed to, if the lot accidentally fell not on them. Thus, the repeated stay of the same persons next to Reagan was excluded.
Then there was the usual method of checking equipment and people using service dogs, gas analyzers, and so on. There was a large-scale counterintelligence work in the places of residence of the correspondents, each of them was seriously monitored. But the sandwich is known to fall butter down. Our terrorist, as it turned out later, on the last day at Vnukovo-2 was standing one and a half meters from President Reagan. But next to him were KGB officers who were focused on neutralizing anyone whose slightest action could arouse their suspicion.
Until now, it is not clear how exactly this man was going to commit the assassination attempt. Soon we received operational information that he abandoned his intentions, but was going to detonate a pyrotechnic cartridge during an official event. Imagine what would happen? Both the one and the other guards on a platoon. Someone with fright could react and shoot. Provoke shooting with victims. But we didn’t allow that.”
In 2013, Valery Velichko presented to the general public his book "From Lubyanka to the Kremlin", which vividly and in detail tells about the events of this period on behalf of the original source. Valery Nikolayevich adds very interesting details to the picture of everything that happened in the "nine" during the GKChP period and after it until its abolition.
Flowers and bullets for the president
Just two months after the unpleasant events in Japan, there was another rather serious incident from the point of view of operational security. This time in Sweden, during the one-day visit of Gorbachev (already the President of the USSR and still the General Secretary of the CPSU) on the occasion of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to him. At the end of Mikhail Sergeevich's performance, a woman came up to the stage with a bouquet of flowers. The President's security politely stopped her. Realizing that she would not be allowed to see the speaker, the woman began to shower him with curses, a man's voice supported her from the audience. The man and the woman were detained by the Swedish special services.
This is all information that has become public domain. A completely different "performance" was played out behind the scenes of what was happening, and it began more than a year before the visit with the efforts of Western special services. With the help of special technologies, a double of one of the employees of the Scandinavian direction of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was selected and properly "processed".
Only ten years later the essence of what had happened was clarified by Georgy Georgievich Rogozin (from 1988 to 1992 he worked at the Institute for Security Problems, then became the head of the Security Service of the President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin). Directly from Moscow, through the deputy of Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov, Major General Veniamin Vladimirovich Maksenkov, Georgy Rogozin warned the attached Gorbachev Boris Golentsov by special communications about the really impending assassination attempt on the Soviet leader. This was the first time that the "nine" dealt with new psychophysical technologies. Detailed information about this story is in the archives of NAST Russia.
In the USSR, Gorbachev's communication with the people also did not go without incidents. By the early 1990s, many people had already become disillusioned with his policies; against the background of shortages and bloody clashes in a number of union republics, discontent was growing. In Kiev, Gorbachev, as usual, unexpectedly for the guard, stopped the car, got out of it and began to make a traditional speech. Suddenly, from somewhere in the crowd, a briefcase flew in his direction. Field security officer Andrei Belikov intercepted the object and closed the case with his body. Fortunately, it was not explosives: there was another complaint in the case. The leadership of the KGB of the USSR awarded Belikov with a valuable gift.
There were plenty of various incidents during Mikhail Gorbachev's time in power, but a carefully planned real attempt on his life happened on November 7, 1990, during a demonstration on Red Square.
The security plan for special events on Red Square is a particularly interesting and, perhaps, the oldest complete document since the time of Joseph Stalin. It was a hefty folder and by 1990, taking into account all the additions and clarifications, especially in the action on alarms, totaled more than 150 pages. And on this day it worked like a clock on the Spasskaya Tower.
Dmitry Yazov (left), Mikhail Gorbachev (center), Nikolai Ryzhkov (right) at the parade, 1990. Photo: Yuri Abramochkin / RIA Novosti
Unlike the May one, the November demonstration of workers began immediately after the military parade. If you look closely at the enthusiastic mass of people passing through Red Square, you can see that they are moving in organized columns. So, these columns were organized by employees of the "nine" together with the forces attached to it. At the same time, the officers and guards were nominated in a predetermined order together with the demonstrators from the Historical Passage, thus setting the direction of their movement. When the head line of workers was finishing their journey on Vasilyevsky Spusk, the officers of the "nine" (strictly in civilian clothes) walking with them stopped at the stands of the Mausoleum. So the very corridors that can be seen in the television chronicle of those years were formed.
The security plan provided that when the corridors were formed, the central places in them - opposite the Lenin Mausoleum - were occupied by officers - employees of the "nine". There were six corridors in total, and it was professional security officers who had their posts in the nearest three of them. The added forces formed the continuation of the corridors.
Militia senior sergeant Mylnikov, who was standing in the fourth corridor opposite the Mausoleum, suddenly saw a passing protester take a double-barreled sawn-off shotgun from under his coat and point it towards the Mausoleum rostrum. The policeman reacted instantly: he blocked the attacker's hand, grabbed the barrels and jerked them up, and then pulled out the weapon. Shots rang out. Officers of the Nine ran up to help Mylnikov from the nearby corridors. A moment later, the gunman literally "swam" in the arms of the guards towards the central entrance to GUM. It was there, according to the security plan, that such "characters" were to be evacuated.
The lone terrorist turned out to be a junior researcher at the Research Institute of Cybernetics, Alexander Shmonov. During a search, they found a note in which, in case of his death, he said that he was going to kill the President of the USSR. The results of the attack could have been serious, since the shooter was standing right in front of the Mausoleum rostrum, only 46 meters away, and the gun was well aimed. From this it was possible to lay a moose on the spot from 150 meters. During interrogation, the terrorist said that he accused Gorbachev of seizing power without the consent of the people, as well as the deaths of people in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 and in Baku on January 20, 1990.
This story is somewhat similar to Ilyin's attempt on the life of Brezhnev in 1969. Their motives were about the same. Shmonov, like Ilyin, was mentally ill. In both cases, lone terrorists acted, and both were neutralized thanks to the professionalism of the Nine employees. This was achieved due to the strict implementation by all subdivisions of the fundamental provisions of the planned training of personnel for command and control of the forces of the service and combat training department. For this department, after the attempt on Brezhnev's life on August 22, 1969, Leonid Andreevich Stepin was responsible. On November 6, 1942, Leonid Stepin, then a sergeant, repelling an attack on Anastas Mikoyan's car when leaving the Kremlin's Spassky Gate, was seriously wounded in the leg. For this episode, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
There was, however, during the reign of Gorbachev and another incident with a sawn-off shotgun, but this time, rather, from a series of curiosities. As the head of the 1st department of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, Viktor Vasilyevich Aleinikov, recalled, in Krasnoyarsk, during the traditional communication of the leader with the people, Mikhail Vladimirovich Titkov saw in the crowd a man with a sawn-off under his clothes. He was detained, but it turned out that he was not a terrorist at all, but an ordinary hunter, who, returning from the forest, saw the crowd and decided to see what was happening. After the trial, the man was released, promising not to walk around the city with a gun anymore.
"Three minutes to get ready!"
As has happened most often in Russian history, the greatest danger for the first person comes not from some lone malefactors, but from their own entourage. In August 1991, during the coup, the head of the 9th Directorate, Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov, and his first deputy, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Generalov, would be among the "conspirators". Why are the "conspirators" in quotation marks? Time has put everything in its place. Both generals have been rehabilitated.
In the “GKChP case”, three years later, Yuri Sergeevich was amnestied, and rehabilitated on the day of his death on July 10, 2002 by Russian President Vladimir Putin. All awards and titles were returned to him. But he did not recognize this …
Someone, and the leadership of the "nine" was much better informed about the real state of affairs in the country than the president. As Dmitry Fonarev notes, Gorbachev simply did not want to hear about "negative signals from the field." In the operative information of three or four printed pages for the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who were prepared in the "nine", "alarming" news was on the last pages. To read them, some of the guarded sometimes simply did not have enough time or patience. And the desire to analyze reality was also lacking.
Note that even with his closeness to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the head of the 9th Directorate remained subordinate to the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov. Formally, it was Vladimir Kryuchkov who was directly subordinate to Mikhail Gorbachev and had direct access to all members of the Politburo of the Central Committee and members of the government. It was he, as the head of state security, who was aware of everything that was happening and, fulfilling his duties, promptly informed the country's leadership. According to Dmitry Fonarev, Gorbachev's departure on vacation at a time when the country was literally seething in a cauldron of contradictions is not just carelessness, but already an official position.
The GKChP did not appear out of nowhere. In June 1991, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, who, like Yuri Plekhanov, was a pupil and protege to the post of chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov, made a speech about "agents of influence" and joined the demand of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov to provide the Cabinet ministers of the USSR "emergency powers". Kryuchkov had operational developments for two members of the Politburo, but when he put these documents on Gorbachev's desk, he ordered that such work be stopped. He could not believe in the objectivity of the professional work of the Chekists. Already in the early 1990s, Vladimir Aleksandrovich himself told about this episode in a TV interview to the program “600 seconds”. Therefore, Valentin Pavlov asked for extraordinary powers for the Council of Ministers, since the USSR Minister of Defense was formally subordinate to the Council of Ministers.
Yuri Plekhanov answers questions in the hall of the Supreme Court. Photo: Yuri Abramochkin / RIA Novosti
Most likely, Vladimir Kryuchkov had information about the essence of the negotiations between the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the still union republics on the "decentralization" of the country. Boris Yeltsin's ambitions were obvious, and his influence on the situation was growing. It was necessary to counteract this decisively and very quickly.
On August 20, 1991, Gorbachev planned to sign the Union Treaty. He probably did not think that the heads of the republics would only be happy to subscribe to an idea that would lead to the collapse of the country, and not to its consolidation. After all, for them the sweet word "independence" meant personal unlimited power. Local kings became kings by a simple stroke of the pen. In just a few months, these aspirations will be finally confirmed by the agreement in Belovezhskaya Pushcha….
But even before that, the goals of the local elites were well understood by sane people in the leadership of the USSR. The process of gaining independence by the Baltic republics served as a quite illustrative example. Thus, on March 11, 1990, Lithuania proclaimed its independence, on May 4, Latvia adopted a declaration on the restoration of independence, and on May 8, the Estonian SSR was renamed the Republic of Estonia. On January 12, 1991, Yeltsin signed an agreement in Tallinn "On the Foundations of Interstate Relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of Estonia." At the time of the putsch, the USSR had not yet recognized the independence of the Baltic republics, this will happen a little later, but the collapse of the state has already begun.
To counteract the "decentralization", those very sane people from the highest echelons of power created the form of the State Emergency Committee, equipping a delegation to the head of state, who was enjoying his rest. Both the chairman of the KGB and the leadership of the 9th Directorate joined the people who did not want the collapse of the Union. Being not just patriots, but professional state security officers who swore allegiance to their homeland, they could not afford to derail the country. Well, Gorbachev, according to our expert Dmitry Fonarev, when he realized what was happening, he simply “went into himself” and waited “where everything would turn out”.
However, how many people, so many opinions. Everyone who took part in the "Foros sitting" and in the "Foros voyage" has his own point of view regarding the events of that time. At the same time, there are details that are not archived, but transmitted only in words and only to those who are trusted by the eyewitness narrator. The complete picture can be restored only with a detailed study of all versions. At his direction, Gorbachev's mobile security guards voiced their version of the events at the Zarya facility of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR to television journalists.
So, on August 19, the president was going to fly to Moscow, since the signing of the Union Treaty was scheduled for the 20th. According to Medvedev, under Gorbachev it was established that when he returned from somewhere to the capital, one of the leaders of the Moscow "nine" would surely fly to pick him up.
Mikhail Gorbachev's security during a meeting at the airport in Moscow after returning from Foros. Photo: Yuri Lizunov / TASS photo chronicle
And on August 18, Yuri Sergeevich Plekhanov and his deputy Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Generalov arrived in Foros. Only this time not alone: a whole delegation flew to Gorbachev. These were people from the president's inner circle: head of the department of organizational work Oleg Shenin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Oleg Baklanov, chief of the presidential administration Valery Boldin, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Lieutenant General Valentin Varennikov. They consulted with Gorbachev, then Yuri Plekhanov told Vladimir Medvedev that the president would continue his vacation in Foros, and ordered Medvedev himself to fly to Moscow. This is how the episode is described in The Man Behind the Back:
“Now, from my side, it was about elementary military discipline.
- That's an order? I asked.
- Yes! - answered Plekhanov.
- Are you removing me? For what?
- Everything is done by agreement.
- Give a written order, otherwise I won't fly. This is a serious matter, you will refuse tomorrow, but what will I look like?
Plekhanov took a sheet of paper, a pen, sat down to write."
Medvedev was given "three minutes to get ready."
He further writes: “My bosses understood very well that it was impossible to leave me at the dacha, I would never have gone to an agreement with them, I would have continued to serve the president with faith and truth, as it always was.”
This is how the head of the "nine" spoke out practically against the person protected by the state, and the chief of security attached to Gorbachev, who could take the situation under control and organize the sending of the president to Moscow, was immediately dismissed from affairs.
Security "triangle"
To an outsider, such a development of events may seem out of the ordinary. But for those who are related to personal protection, the situation is quite understandable, if not standard.
Any leader of the country is taken under protection by the decision of the state and at the expense of the state. By the decision of the leadership of the state security, persons responsible for ensuring personal safety are appointed to positions. The heads of the divisions appoint the executors of the security plans - attached and so on along the structural hierarchy. At the same time, the guiding principle of direct subordination is preserved.
But historically, all the chiefs of security (senior officers-attached) of the leaders of our country, no matter how it was called, always performed the work entrusted to them by the state in the interests of the protected person. This is the psychology of professionals who are responsible every minute for everything that happens to a person who has entrusted their safety to them. And it will always be so, it is simply impossible to work in the position of an attached person in another way. The only questionable situation is when the actions of the protected person will clearly and unequivocally threaten the security of the country.
But the heads of the state security system, if they are professional, will always work exclusively for the state, which has given them Trust (just like that, with a capital letter), having appointed them to such an important position.
This is the eternal contradiction between the relations in the triangle of the protected person - the head of the system - attached.
Mikhail Sergeevich and Raisa Maksimovna did not delve into these psychological subtleties. Probably, they perceived their security group as an armed universal subservient at state expense. Understanding why they need this protection, they did not bother to differentiate between the spheres of private interests and those of the state.
Therefore, it is quite natural that, not finding Vladimir Medvedev, the head of his own bodyguards, in his usual place in the Zarya's main house, Gorbachev immediately considered him a "traitor" and did not even let him into his car upon arrival in Moscow. The head of Gorbachev's security was deputy major general Medvedev, major Valery Pestov, and his first deputy was Oleg Klimov.
“The head of state, who was torn away from the real world, did not even think about the fact that his attached one was not and never was his property,” notes Dmitry Fonarev. - The impeccably professional bodyguard officer Vladimir Medvedev, in fact, is much better than the Gorbachev couple, taken together, versed in the Kremlin (and not only) life. And he acted as befits an officer of the KGB of the USSR, and not a servant of a noble ruler."
No security system - no state
The security service of the KGB of the USSR, organized on the basis of the abolished 9th department, accompanies the president in 1991. Photo: Nikolai Malysheva / TASS newsreel
We can say that by the end of August 1991, the fate of the "nine", and indeed of the entire KGB, was practically decided. Moreover, the "GKChP case" was not the main reason here, but rather, only the last link in a whole chain of processes that took place in those years in the highest echelons of Soviet politics.
On May 29, 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and took up an office in the White House on the banks of the Moskva River. Its activities were aimed at separating the powers of the RSFSR within the USSR, which is clearly confirmed by the "Declaration on State Sovereignty of the RSFSR" adopted by the Congress and signed by Yeltsin on June 12, 1990. This document sharply increased the influence of Boris Nikolaevich on the political Olympus of the USSR. Well, the events of the August putsch further strengthened its role.
Therefore, immediately upon returning from Foros to the Kremlin, Mikhail Gorbachev thought about reforming the personal protection system. According to his plan, the new structure was to be part of the apparatus of the President of the USSR. And inside it there should have been two departments responsible for the security of the key statesmen at that time - the President of the USSR Gorbachev and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Yeltsin.
And now, on August 31, 1991, the 9th Directorate was renamed into the Security Directorate under the USSR President's Office and, according to the name, was personally subordinate to Gorbachev. From August 31 to December 14, 1991, the head of this department was 54-year-old Colonel Vladimir Stepanovich Rarebeard, previously mentioned in the publications of this series, and his first deputies were the head of the personal security of the President of the USSR Valery Pestov and the head of the security of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Alexander Korzhakov.
Then the infamous "reforming" of the KGB began. After the arrest of the GKChP members, events unfolded rapidly. Feeling his strength, Boris Yeltsin imposed his man on Gorbachev as chairman of the KGB for the still USSR, and on August 23, Vadim Bakatin became the head of state security. In his memoirs, Boris Yeltsin did not hide the fact that "… this man had to destroy this terrible system of suppression, which has been preserved since Stalin's times." What Vadim Viktorovich successfully implemented.
Subsequently, he wrote about seven principles of "reforming" the KGB, the main of which were "disintegration" and "decentralization". And as the last "principle" was listed "not causing damage to the security of the country." It is obvious that all the "Yeltsin-Bakatinsky" principles in relation to the state security system were mutually exclusive. Professional security officers know that when any systemic operational unit is reformed during the re-establishment period, its effectiveness is reduced by a third. Well, when there is no security system, there is no state. That was convincingly shown by subsequent events …
December 3, 1991 Gorbachev abolishes the KGB of the USSR. The powers of the state security are retained by the republican security committees. On December 8, after the 11 heads of the union republics signed the Belovezhsky agreement, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and on December 25, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from his presidency.
We will talk about how the protection of the country's top officials during the Yeltsin era was organized in the next publication of this series.
