On the eve of the 200th anniversary of the Bucharest Peace Treaty on May 16 (28), 1812, the REGNUM IA publishes an article by Vasily Kashirin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), which is an expanded version of his report at the international scientific conference "Accession Bessarabia to Russia in the light of centuries-old Moldovan-Russian-Ukrainian cooperation "(April 2-4, 2012, Vadul-lui-Voda, Moldova). In the "paper" version, this article will be published in the collection of conference materials, which will be published on these days in Chisinau under the editorship of S. M. Nazaria.
Any anniversary of a significant event in modern and recent history inevitably turns into the fact that politics and ideology are trying to tightly squeeze historical science in their arms. And no matter how hard real scientists strive to free themselves from this suffocating attention, in the depths of their souls they realize the impossibility of achieving this in full. Now, in the days of the 200th anniversary of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812, historians are breaking their spears in disputes about whether the annexation of Bessarabia was a boon or a crime on the part of Russia. In our opinion, the Russian empire, long gone in the past, equally needs neither accusations, nor excuses, nor praise. However, in order to at least partially overcome the mentioned influence of modern politics and ideology, we need to preserve and expand the positivist, factual knowledge of what and how exactly Russia brought the peoples of the Dniester-Prut region during the war with Turkey in 1806-1812. and after its completion. One of such acts of the Russian Empire was the elimination of the Tatar horde that inhabited the southern part of the Dniester-Prut interfluve, i.e. the region, which has long been known under the Turkish name Budzhak, or "Budzhak Tatarlerinum topragy" (that is, "the land of the Budzhak Tatars" or "Budzhak Tatar land") [1].
It seems that in terms of its consequences, the cleansing of the lands of Budjak from the Tatars became one of the most significant events for the region of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812. In historical retrospect, the destruction of the Budzhak horde - the last semi-independent fragment of the once great Ulus Jochi - was the final act of Russia's centuries-old struggle against the Golden Horde and its heirs. And the deep symbolism of this event also prompts us to turn our attention to it.
Many Soviet, Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian historians, such as I. G. Chirtoaga [2], A. D. Bachinsky and A. O. Dobrolyubsky [3], V. V. Trepavlov [4], S. V. Palamarchuk [5] and others. However, the detailed history of the Budjak horde has not yet been written, and therefore many blank spots remain in its past. As far as is known, the military-political circumstances of the death of the Budzhak horde have not yet become the subject of special historical research. With this article, we will try to partially fill this gap, and we will serve as a source base for this, in addition to the well-known published notes of I. P. Kotlyarevsky [6] and Count A. F. Lanzheron [7], - and a number of documents from the "General Staff of the Moldavian Army" fund (f. 14209) of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA) [8].
So, what was the Budjak horde in the last years of its existence? Its ethnic composition has not yet been fully elucidated by historians. In different periods, different tribal groups of Nogai Tatars moved to Budjak, with the permission of the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan; especially after the collapse of the Great Nogai Horde in the 17th century. As a result, the Budzhak horde was a complex conglomerate of representatives of various branches of the Nogai tribe and therefore was not so much an ethnic as a territorial-political union. In Russian sources of the early 19th century, it was said about the presence in Budjak of "districts" under the names Orumbet-Oglu, Orak-Oglu, Edisan-Nogai. All these are the names of different tribes of the Nogai / Mangyt ethnos well-known in historical science [9]. These "districts" were the territories of the possessions of the tribal groups of the Budzhak Tatars. It is known that the Tatars of the Edisan and Orak-Oglu clans lived on the lands of the later Russian Akkerman district, Orumbet-Oglu - the Kagul district, and the Tatars of the Izmail-Kanessi (Kalesi?) Union - near the Izmail fortress, on the Danube girls [10]. As modern researchers of the history of Budzhak I. F. The Greek and N. D. Russev, by the beginning of the 19th century, the "loose Tatar-Muslim community of Budjaks" had not yet managed to consolidate into the people [11]. And, since history does not have a subjunctive mood, we do not know whether the Bessarabian Nogays would ever have succeeded in creating a special "Budjak" ethnos.
The historical "border of Halil Pasha", separating the lands of the Budzhak horde from the Zaprut possessions of the principality of Moldova, ran along the Yalpug River, the Upper Troyanov Val and the Botna River to the Dniester. Thus, the possessions of the Budjak Tatars covered part of the territory of the present ATU Gagauzia, Taraclia, Causeni, Stefan-Vodsky districts of the Republic of Moldova, as well as most of southern Bessarabia, now part of the Odessa region of Ukraine. According to the calculations of the Soviet historian P. G. Dmitriev, in the middle of the 18th century from the total area of the Dniester-Prut interfluve of 45 800 sq. km under the rule of the Moldavian principality was only 20,300 square meters. km., and the greater half, 25,500 sq. km. occupied the lands of the Nogais and Turkish "raiyas" (fortress areas) [12].
Until the liquidation of the Crimean Khanate, the Budzhak horde was under double subordination - with the Crimean Khan and with the Turkish Ochakov Eyallet. The ruler of the horde was one of the representatives of the Crimean khan's house Gireiev; he had the title of sultan of the Budjak horde and the rank of seraskir. His residence and the capital of the horde was the city of Kaushany. The peak of the power of the Budzhak horde fell on the 17th century. According to many sources, at that time the Budzhak Tatars constituted one of the main striking forces in the army of the Crimean Khan in most of his military enterprises, near and far; and for this reason they played a significant role in the internal political struggle for power in Bakhchisarai. Also, the bujaks took an active part in the military campaigns of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, they and on their own initiative made predatory raids on adjacent Christian lands. The evidence of a significant number of sources (including the works of J. de Luc, G. de Beauplan, E. Chelebi, D. Cantemir and many others) confirm the validity of the assessment of the Soviet historians Bachinsky and Dobrolyubsky, who defined the Budzhak horde as "a typical military-predatory nomadic unification with the corresponding forms of life and economic structure "[13].
By the end of the 18th century, the Tatars of Budzhak gradually switched to a sedentary nomadic way of life. The basis of their economy was still cattle breeding. In the herbage season, the Tatars wandered from pasture to pasture, and in the winter they gathered in villages in which agriculture was also conducted [14]. A Russian eyewitness noted: "The Tatars, by nature their people are lazy and unaccustomed to agriculture, ate milk and a little meat; their income mainly consisted of trade in cattle and horses. They sow little wheat and barley, and only raise maize (Turkish rye) The magnificent pastures of Bessarabia are so large that they allowed each village not only to keep 20, 30 and up to 100 heads of cattle [15], but even the Hungarians and Transylvanians used them, bringing huge herds of sheep there for the winter and paying for each head a small amount of money, which constituted the country's income "[16].
At the beginning of the war with Turkey in 1806, the Russian side did not have accurate data on the size of the Budjak horde. So, the Russian officer I. P. Kotlyarevsky, who was directly involved in relations with the Tatars (see below for more details), wrote that at that time the Budzhak Tatars could have deployed 30 thousand armed soldiers [17]. However, this number seems to be grossly overestimated. In the official documents of the Russian command (including reports addressed to the emperor), the total number of the entire horde was determined by an approximate figure of 40 thousand people. The same number is repeated by Kotlyarevsky himself in another place in his "Journal" [18]. Obviously, he should be considered the closest to the truth.
In comparison with other Black Sea steppes, Budzhak was densely populated. The number of Tatar villages in Budzhaka by 1806 is known very accurately. By "counties" they were divided as follows:
• Orumbet-Oglu - 76 villages
• Orak-Oglu - 36 villages
• Et-isin (Edisan Nogai) - 61 villages
• Izmail district (Kyrgyz, Dzhenbulak, Kioybeyskaya, Koeleskaya districts) - 32 villages [19]
As a result of two victorious wars with Turkey during the reign of Catherine II, Russia extended its power to the entire northern Black Sea region from the Dniester to the Kuban. This space was the habitat of the Nogai hordes, formerly dependent on the Crimean Khanate. Having joined it, the Russian Empire faced the difficult task of subjugating the Nogai, which required a clear definition of the boundaries of their territory and, if possible, their resettlement deep into the Russian Empire, further from the theater of the next wars against Turkey. The Russian authorities tried to achieve the peaceful resettlement of the Nogai, but in the event of disobedience of the latter, they did not stop at tough forceful measures.
The most striking example of this was the actions of A. V. Suvorov against the Nogais in the Kuban. On June 28, 1783, the Edisan, Dzhemboyluk, Dzhetyshkul and Budzhak [20] hordes, as well as Sultan Adil-Girey with his people, took the oath of Russia on the field near Yeisk. The Russian authorities decided to relocate the Nogai hordes to the Ural steppes. The beginning of this operation, entrusted to the head of the Kuban corps, Lieutenant-General Suvorov, provoked protests from the Nogai. Under the influence of the agitation of the rebellious supporters of Shagin-Girey, Dzhemboyluks and a part of the Dzhetyshkuls revolted on July 30-31, 1783 and, in total 7-10 thousand people, rushed to the Kuban, attacking the posts of Russian troops along the way. On August 1, at the Urai-Ilgasy tract, the rebels were utterly defeated by the forces of the Butyrka Musketeer and Vladimir Dragoon regiments of the Kuban corps, and then in the fall of the same year, Suvorov himself inflicted a number of defeats on the rebellious Nogais during the campaign for the Kuban [21]. Russian military historian General P. O. Bobrovsky wrote: “In the battles on the tracts of Urai-Ilgasy, Kermenchik and Sarychiger, up to 7,000 Nogai fell, many thousands of them moved to Turkey or fled to the Circassians; no more than 1,000 people were taken prisoner, except for wives and children. Political identity of the Nogai horde, constantly barbarously devastated by its raids the land of the Donskoy army, has ceased "[22]. However, the Russian authorities realized the erroneousness of their plan to resettle the Nogai to the Urals and therefore decided to transfer some of them to the Caspian Sea, and to settle the Edisan and Dzhemboyluk hordes in the Azov region, on Milky waters [23]. There they were allotted 285 thousand dessiatines of comfortable and 68 thousand dessiatines of uncomfortable land, which formed a triangle from the mouth of the river. Berdy, which flows into the Sea of Azov, to the mouth of the Molochny estuary, and from there up the left bank of the Molochnye Vody river to the upper reaches of the river. Tokmok.
In 1801, the head of the Nogai hordes, Edisan Murza Bayazet-bey, put forward an ambitious project to transfer the Molochansk Nogai to the Cossack estate, which implied the obligation to perform military service in exchange for certain benefits. On October 5, 1802, the states of the Nogai Cossack army were approved, which was supposed to consist of 2 regiments, 500 people each. However, this army remained to exist only on paper, since the Nogai did not want to bear the burdens of the Cossack service at all. As a result, the Nogai army was abolished. April 10, 1804 was followed by a rescript of Alexander I to the Kherson military governor A. G. Rosenberg, according to which the Molochansk Nogays should have been turned "to agriculture and cattle breeding, as the two only branches of their economy." The Committee of Ministers worked out the "Regulations for the management of the Nogai", which was confirmed by the emperor on May 13, 1805. By this position, the Nogais were equal in rights and duties with the Crimean Tatars, and the administration of them was entrusted to the Tavrichesky civil governor. Direct supervision over the Nogai was carried out by a Russian official, whose position was called "bailiff of the Nogai hordes" [24]. Thus, having accumulated in previous years a rich experience of interaction with the Black Sea Nogais and streamlining their position in their possessions, now the Russian Empire intended to resolve the issue of the Budjak Horde in its favor, a favorable reason for which was the start of a new war with Turkey in 1806. In the initial period of this conflict, the actions of the Russian command in relation to the Budzhak Tatars were determined by the peculiarities of the general strategic situation in Europe and the Balkans, as well as by the rather specific military and political plan of the 1806 campaign.
The operation of the invasion of the Ottoman Empire was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the Dniester (later Moldavian) army of the cavalry general I. I. Michelson, which included five infantry divisions (9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th). The campaign plan was approved by Emperor Alexander I on October 15, 1806, which practically coincided in time with the receipt of the news of the defeat of the Prussian army near Jena and Auerstedt on October 2 (14). The defeat of the allied Prussia meant that now Russia had to bear the brunt of the hostilities against Napoleon in Central Europe. It was necessary to send additional forces of the Russian army to this theater of war. In particular, the 9th and 10th divisions of the former corps of General I. N. Essen 1st [25]. Thus, the operation to occupy Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia Mikhelson was forced to start with clearly insufficient forces - he had only three infantry divisions at his disposal, with a total force of about 30 thousand people [26]. The political situation was also very complex and contradictory. Formally, Turkey remained an ally of Russia, so Russian troops entered the Principalities without declaring war, under the pretext of preparing a movement to the Adriatic, as well as protecting the local population from the tyranny of the rebellious pashas and robbers-kirjali.
The Russian leadership built its campaign plan, proceeding from the expectation that the advantage of the Russian forces in military readiness, as well as the weakness of the central government in Constantinople and the political anarchy in Rumelia, should have helped the Russian troops quickly enough, without fighting, to occupy the Principality and achieve surrender. Turkish fortresses north of the Danube. This would allow Russian diplomacy to confidently demand political concessions from Turkey - first of all, refusal of cooperation with France and confirmation of guarantees of the rights and benefits of the autonomous Danube Principalities.
Guided by this plan, the Russian command tried to avoid hostilities with the Turks in the area north of the Danube as much as possible. For this reason, it attached particular importance to the methods of diplomacy, in particular with regard to the Tatars of Budjak. Of course, since the time of the steppe campaigns of B. K. Minikha and P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky in the 18th century, the Tatar cavalry in terms of combat did not pose any threat to the regular Russian troops. However, the behavior of the local Tatar population greatly depended on the security of Russian communications and the supply of troops with supplies on the spot, and, consequently, on the speed of the operation to occupy the Danube principalities and Bessarabia.
The Russian commander-in-chief, 67-year-old General Mikhelson, the winner of Yemelyan Pugachev, had not only experience of dealing with the Tatar population, but also quite definite plans for the Budzhak Tatars. In 1800-1803 he, being the Novorossiysk military governor, ex officio ruled the Crimean peninsula and the Nogai hordes in Milk Waters. It was then, at the beginning of 1801, that Bayazet Bey, the ambitious chief of the Molochansk Nogays, suggested that he, using family ties and acquaintances, persuade the Budzhak Tatars to move to Russia, which was an integral part of his plan to create the Nogai Cossack army. According to Bayazet Bey, the Tatars from Bessarabia themselves asked for permission to move to their relatives in Russia, away from violence and arbitrariness of the rebellious rulers Osman Pasvand oglu and Mehmet Girey Sultan. On February 25, 1801, Emperor Paul I ordered Mikhelson and Bayazet Bey to begin negotiations with the Turkish authorities on permission for the Tatars to leave Budjak. However, just two weeks later, Paul I was killed in a palace coup on March 12, and Alexander I, who ascended the throne, ordered to stop the process of resettlement of the Budzhak Tatars until this issue was agreed with the High Port [27]. As a result, the issue was postponed for several years.
In early October 1806, on the eve of the war with Turkey, Mikhelson remembered this project and decided to put it into practice. In his letters to the Governor-General of Novorossiya, Duke E. O. de Richelieu and Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ya. Budberga Michelson pointed out that the Budjak Nogai constituted a significant part of the light cavalry among the Turks in the Danube-Dniester theater of war and that with their raids they could create significant difficulties for the Russian troops. In this regard, he proposed to choose two or three people from the Nogai living in Russia and send them to convince their Budzhak relatives. Richelieu, approving Michelson's plan, selected 4 noble Nogais from Milk Waters for this mission and sent to Budjak. The documents give their names: Begali Aga, Ilyas Aga, Mussa Chelebi and Imras Chelebi [28].
According to the plan of the Russian command in 1806, the occupation of Bessarabia was entrusted to the 2nd corps of General Baron Casimir von Meyendorff (15 infantry battalions, 15 squadrons, 2 Cossack regiments, more than 10 thousand people in total) and a separate 13th division of the Duke de Richelieu (11 infantry battalions, 10 squadrons). On the night of November 21-22, the main forces of Meyendorff crossed the Dniester at Dubossary and began to move towards Bender, and at dusk on November 24, his troops entered the fortress without a fight, by prior agreement with the Pasha. On the same days, units of the 13th division of Richelieu crossed the Dniester at Mayakov (November 28) and without resistance occupied Palanca (November 29), Akkerman (December 1) and Kiliya (December 9) [29].
Under the pretext of a shortage of forage and food, Meyendorff stayed in Bender for more than two weeks, until December 11, and this delay is rightly regarded by many historians as the main strategic mistake of the entire 1806 campaign, which had far-reaching consequences. It is noteworthy that Meyendorff himself called the main reason for the delay also the uncertainty of the position taken by the Budjak Tatars. Brigadier I. F. Katarzhi and staff captain I. P. Kotlyarevsky, Meyendorff's adjutant, together with an interpreter. Ilya Filippovich Ka-tarzhi, the brigadier of the Russian service, was a representative of one of the noblest Moldovan families. He was the son-in-law of the ruler Gregory III Giki and at one time held the post of the great hetman of Moldova, and then, after the Yassy Peace, he moved to Russia. For the Dniester-Danube region, Katarzy was undoubtedly a "political heavyweight" and, in addition, possessed the talents of a diplomat-negotiator. Immediately before that, he successfully completed a responsible mission in Bendery, having secured the consent of the local ruler, Gassan Pasha, not to resist the Russian troops.
And now Katarzhi and Kotlyarevsky received a new task - "to persuade the Tatar elders to accept peace-loving proposals, promising them friendship and the very benefits of the Russian troops if they remain sympathetic to Russia and remain calm when troops pass through their lands" [30]. According to Kotlyarevsky, in Tatar villages they met everywhere "crowds of armed Tatars gathering for advice on the Russian army" [31]. However, diplomatic negotiations between Russian emissaries were successful everywhere, which was unexpected for them. The key role here was played by the news received by the Tatars that in the occupied Turkish fortresses Russian troops humanely deal with local Muslims, do not threaten their religion and pay with money for all supplies.
Indeed, units of the Moldavian army had the clearest orders not to hinder the Tatars in any way. For example, the commander of the 13th division, General Richelieu, on December 3 ordered the chief of his cavalry vanguard, General A. P. Zassu: "Moreover, for the necessary, I esteem to your Excellency to especially recommend that when passing with your detachment through the Tatar possessions, nothing should be demanded from them, neither carts, nor fodder, and even less insults or rudeness, but if you need to take [1 word nrzb.] Apartments or carts, then occupy and demand them in Moldovan villages, if the need happens in the Tatar villages to quarters, then the houses for apartments should be occupied by Christian ones, and by no means Tatar ones, but even more Murzin ones "[32]. As you can see, the political expediency forced the Russian command to impose the burden of providing troops on the friendly Christian population, freeing the Tatars of Budjak from them. As a result, the tribal "districts" of Orumbet-Oglu, Orak-Oglu, Edisan-Nogai and the Tatars of the Izmail district have consistently given a promise of loyalty to the Russian troops, backing up their commitment by sending amanats. On the way back, Katarzhi and Kotlyarevsky visited the capital of the Budzhak Tatars, Kaushany, and persuaded the local "voivode" [33] to submit to the Russian authorities and send their brother to the Amanats. Kotlyarevsky wrote: "Thus, this barbaric, cruel and distrustful people were happily bowed to the Russian side and calmed down when he could gather up to 30 thousand armed people; some Tatar villages belonging to the so-called Izmail rai, of which there are seven, remained adamant." [34].
The sources known to us do not allow us to find out unambiguously whether the missions of four noble Nogais from Milk Waters and Katarzhi-Kotlyarevsky were somehow coordinated with each other. It can only be assumed that the trip of the Molochansk Nogays to the Tatar villages of Budzhak took place a little earlier, on the eve or at the very beginning of the Russian entry into Bessarabia, and therefore the envoys of General Meyendorff were already acting on a partially prepared ground. In any case, the formal result of these missions was a brilliant diplomatic success - the overwhelming majority of the Budzhak Tatars promised to keep the peace and cooperate with the Russian authorities. The command reported on a bloodless victory and petitioned for awards for those who distinguished themselves - on the production of Nogai emissaries from Milk Waters to the next Cossack officer ranks - Begali-Agu to the Esauly, Ilyas-Agu to the centurions, Mussu-Chelebi and Imras-Chelebi - to the cornet permission for all of them to wear lanyards on sabers [35]. Note that the idea of producing these Nogays for officer ranks looks curious, since the Nogai Cossack army had already been completely abolished by that time. Whether they received the desired ranks in the end remains unknown.
In addition, on December 7, General Meyendorff turned to the commander-in-chief with a proposal for material reward for the noble Nogai of Budjak for their loyalty. He wrote: "To further strengthen the loyalty of the Tatar officials, it is necessary to make gifts to the Kaushan governor agassa and the chief murzam, according to the custom of the eastern peoples." Meyendorff compiled a whole list of noble Tatars, with the designation of the gifts due to them [36]. This list looked like this:
Kaushan voivode Agasy Fox fur coat 400 rubles
Officials who have money with him
Orumbet oglu county
1st Oglan Temir bey Fox fur coat, covered with thin cloth, RUB 300
2nd Kotlu Ali aga Fox fur coat with cloth RUB 200
Edisan Nagai County
1st Olan Aslan Murza Fox fur coat, covered with cloth, 250 rubles
2 Agli Girey Fur coat, covered with cloth, rubles per 200
3 Khalil Chelebi Fox fur coat, covered with cloth, RUB 150
Orak County Uglu
1st Batyrsha Murza Fur coat, covered with cloth, RUB 250
2nd Biginh Murza Silver Watch
3rd Chora Murza Silver Watch
Etishna Oglu county
1st Ak Murza Fur coat, covered with cloth, rubles per 200
2nd Izmail Murza Silver watch
Kyrgyz Mambet Naza Agli Shuba, covered with cloth, RUB 200
Bey Murza Confident Money
By the way, attention is drawn to the presence in this list of "Bey-Murza Confident", i.e. a secret agent who reported information to the Russian command for a monetary reward.
Mikhelson approved the list, and in January 1807, from his headquarters to Meyendorff for distribution to Budjak notables, fox furs for 9 fur coats were sent as gifts and 45 yards of cloth of different colors, as well as 3 pairs of silver watches [37]. The cost of these gifts was negligible compared to the cost of the bloodless diplomatic success achieved. However, as subsequent events showed, it was too early to celebrate the victory.
Having received the assurances of the Tatars of obedience, General Meyendorff with the main forces of his corps on December 11 finally set out from Bender on a campaign to Ishmael. Russian troops approached the walls of this fortress on December 16, 1806. The Russian command had all the data to believe that the locals, remembering the terrible storming of Ishmael in 1790, would easily agree to a peaceful surrender. But military happiness turned away from Meyendorff, as if in punishment for his delay in Bender. Only one day ahead of him, the Turkish commander Ibrahim Pehlivan oglu arrived in Izmail with 4 thousand janissaries, who was destined to become famous as the most talented and energetic commander of the Ottoman Empire in that war [38].
Having pacified (and partially interrupted) the supporters of surrender with an iron hand, Pehlivan breathed energy into the garrison of the fortress and immediately began to strengthen its defense. On Meyendorff's offer to surrender Ishmael the commandant refused; then from the Russian side several cannon shots were fired at the fortress. This was the beginning of hostilities in southern Bessarabia during that war. In response, on December 17, the Turks of Pehlivan made a sortie, during which a rather hot cavalry case took place and both sides suffered losses. Russian troops near Izmail did not have a siege park, and also experienced an acute shortage of food and especially forage. Considering all this, Meyendorf decided to retreat from Ishmael in a northwest direction, to Falche on the river. Prut, where he located his main apartment [39]. With this movement, he actually lost direct communication with the Russian garrisons in Bendery, Kiliya and Akkerman from the 13th division, and also opened the way for the enemy to the central part of Bessarabia [40].
Meyendorff's retreat from Ishmael was perceived by the locals as a clear and undoubted failure of the Russian troops. It has been noted many times that such incidents at the beginning of hostilities always had a great psychological effect on the peoples of the East, drawing in their minds a picture of the imminent death of the infidels and inspiring them for further struggle. That is why, in all wars with Turkey, Russian military leaders tried at all costs to avoid even minor failures in the initial period of the struggle. In addition, a few days after the retreat of the Russian troops from Ishmael, the news came to Budjak that on December 18 the Sultan had finally declared war on Russia. Lanzheron wrote about it this way: "The Tatars, surprised by Meindorf's defeat, frightened by Peglivan's threats, tempted by his promises and the unity of religion associated with him, having received the firmans of the Sultan who called them to defend the faith, first agreed to listen to the proposals of our enemies and ended up accepting them. "[41].
Russian troops occupied a cordon position in Budzhak, which made it easier for the enemy in Izmail to carry out raids and raids on the positions of Russian units. Pehlivan Pasha remained the leader and soul of the active operations of the Turkish garrison of Ishmael. He managed to make a number of long-distance sorties, of which the raid near Kiliya on December 22 was especially successful, where in the village of Chamashur [42] on the shore of Lake China a detachment of Russian cavalry under the command of Colonel Count V. O. Kinson. From the documents it follows that then the Tatars also participated in the attack [43]. A number of neighboring villages, in which Christians lived, were ravaged by the people of Pehlivan [44]. He continued to successfully use the tactics of terror, and the Russian troops were unable to stop him. By the way, the Tatars could not count on Pehlivan's soft treatment. So, according to Lanzheron, he destroyed all the villages near Ishmael, resettled their inhabitants to the fortress and took away all food supplies from them [45].
In the light of such incidents, in the last days of 1806, anxious moods began to prevail among the Russian command; considered probable and feared a deep raid by Pehlivan in Bessarabia and a general uprising of the Budjak Tatars and Muslims in the occupied Turkish fortresses. So, on December 24, the commandant of Bender, Major General M. E. Khitrovo reported to Mikhelson: "On top of this, I receive information from various residents and from the officers I send that the Tatars, due to the retreat of our troops from Ishmael, are completely hesitant and secretly prepare weapons, releasing sabers and making spears" [46]. And in a report from Kilia, which Khitrovo also forwarded to the commander-in-chief, it was said: "Moreover, one Moldovan from among the residents reported that he personally saw the Tatar khan in Izmail, who, taking advantage of the retreat of the corps of Baron Meyendorf, set out with a thousand people to the Tatar villages, so that having gathered all the inhabitants to cut off traces of our relations with Baron Meyendorff, as well as with Ackermann. Troops are constantly crossing the Danube to Ishmael, so that Mr. Lieutenant General Zass all these days awaits an attack on Kiliya. the ruin of Moldavian and Volosh villages "[47].
And in the report of the commandant Ackerman, General N. A. Loveiko said: "The Akkerman Tair-Pasha, through an interpreter who was with me, showed the appearance of his goodwill towards us, let me know that the Tatar Sultan, or a certain rebel called Batyr-Girey, with a crowd of 4000 intruders, is 10 hours away from Ackerman The Turks who live here, secretly moving to him in several people, trustfully have relations with him; that they all breathe treason towards us and adhere to the party of the famous Pekhlivan; and that he considers an attack on Ackerman inevitable. Following this, from the Tatar villages of Murza, they came to me with a request to take them into patronage and with an announcement about the revived certain rebel Batyr-Girey. They confirmed the same in their reasoning, with the cancellation only that he was 25 hours from Ackerman and had his camp in the village of Katlabuga, but returned to Izmail, and that there really was an attempt on his life to attack Ackerman and the Tatar villages, not wanting to join him. And the cordon containing the cordon from Akkerman to Bender with a Cossack regiment named after his Don Army, the military sergeant major Vlasov, in his 2nd report informed me that the Moldavan living in the village of Kaplanakh, Vasily Busar, came to him, announced that in the villages of Bulakche, Shakhay and Totabe, where he lives Temir-Murza, by his collusion and about the information he received from Izmail, since there are few Russian troops near Ishmael, in order to go to the rear of this together with the Izmail congregation to defeat them, armed Tatars are going and intend to make this intention into action "[48] …
In this report from General Loveiko, several things stand out. As you can see, local Christians regularly informed the Russian side about unfriendly sentiments and subversive propaganda among the Tatars. Undoubtedly, their long-term enmity with the Tatars, and the fear of physical violence on the part of Pekhlivan and his supporters, also affected here. Moreover, if you believe Loveiko's words (and we have no reason not to believe), it follows that a number of Tatar Murzas asked the Russian command for protection from "peglivan robbers" (as we called the military forces of the head of defense of Izmail).
Also noteworthy is the mention in Loveiko's report of the role that a certain Sultan-Batyr-Girey played in the indignation of the Budzhak Tatars. The sources and historiography known to us do not give an answer who exactly this Tatar leader was. Most likely, he was a representative of that branch of the Crimean khan's house of the Gireys, which traditionally ruled the Budzhak horde. But what were his rights to power in Kaushany and his status in the Ottoman military-administrative hierarchy at that moment - this remains to be seen. There is no doubt only that in Russian documents he is called "seraskir". In the draft of Michelson's report to the Highest name dated January 18, 1807, it was said: "From the Sultan Ferman about the war, it is clear that this determination was influenced by the new Seraskirs, on the one hand, Sultan Batyr Girey, who gave the hope to raise the Tatars against us, on the other hand Mustafa bayraktar, whom Porta considered able to prevent us from entering Wallachia "[49]. In another document, Mikhelson once again repeated that the change in the mood of the Budzhak Tatars began precisely under the influence of the seraskir of Izmail Batyr-Girey. The phrase "new seraskirs" suggests that Sultan-Batyr-Girey was recently promoted to this high rank by the Porta, possibly in recognition of his merits in the Tatars' indignation against Russia. Or maybe, by doing so, the Ottoman authorities approved him just in the rank of the ruler of the Budjak horde (who traditionally had the rank of seraskir).
So, the Russian command began to realize that the peaceful conquest of the Tatars of Budjak turned out to be an illusion, moreover, it was unsafe, and that the situation required urgent countermeasures. Lanzheron wrote: "The Bessarabian Tatars, still very peacefully remaining at their hearths, could easily side with Peglivan, and it was very important for us to prevent this intention; we had to force them to join Russia by force of fear or persuasion" [50]. Commander-in-Chief Mikhelson ordered to guard the Tatar amanats more strictly [51]. However, this would not have produced any results anyway. Having borrowed the practice of amanathism from the peoples of the East, Russia still could not use it effectively, since Christian morality and ethics did not allow the cold-blooded killing of hostages, without which their taking and keeping would be meaningless. On this occasion, Lanzheron wrote: “The fate of these hostages was of very little interest to the Tatars, especially since they knew Russian customs too well to think that they would kill them” [52].
It is impossible to ignore another possible reason for the transition of the majority of Budjaks to the Turkish side - violence and robberies committed by parts of the Russian army, with the connivance or powerlessness of the command. In the latest monograph by I. F. Grek and N. D. Roussev, these phenomena are named as the main and, in fact, the only reason for the treason of the Tatars and their flight to Ishmael and beyond the Danube [53]. However, the source on which this version is entirely based is Langeron's Notes. Brightly and colorfully written, they are unique in terms of completeness of presentation of a memoir about the war of 1806-1812. and therefore invaluable to the historian. However, the exceptional arrogance, sarcasm and bias of their author's judgments and assessments in relation to people and phenomena of Russian life have already been repeatedly and quite rightly noted. Langeron portrayed the vast majority of Russian military leaders, with whom he had to serve and fight, as limited, immoral, cowardly and corrupt people. A striking example of Langeron's tendentiousness is his grossly offensive in style and absurd in content statements about the commander-in-chief of the Danube army M. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, about his military and administrative activities.
According to Lanzheron, Russian troops very soon after entering Budzhak in the winter of 1806-1807. began to oppress local residents, plundering their main asset - livestock. He wrote: "The commanders of the regiments and various speculators from Odessa and Kherson first bought cattle at a very low price, sending it down the Dniester and selling it there at a high price, but then, they got tired of buying cattle from the Tatars and they began to acquire it, according to a cheaper price from the Cossacks, who stole it from the Tatars, which did not present any difficulties, since the herds grazed without any patronage and protection. Unhappy Tatars, plundered and ruined, tried to complain, but it was useless, since no one even listened to them. to the last extreme, they decided to join Peglivan "[54].
Undoubtedly, this testimony of Langeron deserves attention and further research. However, any historian familiar with the professional basics of his craft must understand that a single source of a memoir nature cannot serve as a basis for putting forward a concept of the causes of an important historical event and then defending it as an indisputable truth. If there are documents in the archives that reflect the facts of major abuses and violence by Russian commanders and troops against the Tatars of Budzhak in late 1806 - early 1807, then until now these materials have not yet been introduced into scientific circulation. Undoubtedly, there were certain problems with the discipline and behavior of the Russian troops in Bessarabia and Budzhak; first of all - not with regular units, but with Cossacks and volunteer formations.
The command knew about these harmful phenomena and tried to fight them. So, the same Lanzheron wrote to General Zass on January 13, 1807: "Do not leave your Excellency to the Cossacks who are being dispatched in the villages to maintain the chain to maintain a chain, so that they behave in good faith, no offense to the Tatars would be attempted. the severity of the law should be punished "[55]. Note that in this order it was about the Tatar villages of Budzhaka and about the Cossacks who carried out an outpost service there.
This observation completely coincides with the data of Lanzheron's Notes on the events in the south of Bessarabia. If you read them carefully, it becomes clear that, speaking about the abductions of Tatar cattle, he meant, first of all, the actions of the Cossack regiments of the 13th division (which he himself was appointed to command at the very beginning of 1807 due to the serious illness of the general Richelieu) - the 2nd Bug Cossack Major of the Baleyev Regiment and the Donskoy Vlasov of the 2nd Regiment (under the command of the military captain Redechkin). These regiments, which were part of the Russian avant-garde of General Zass, were stationed in the villages from Kiliya to Izmail, in the most densely populated part of Budjak. According to Lanzheron, all the other "tricks of the subordinates seemed child's play in comparison with what happened in Kiliya" [56]. It was the Cossacks of the two named regiments of the 13th division, due to their geographical location, who had the opportunity to seize cattle from the Tatars and sell them to dealers across the Dniester.
The Bug Cossack army, which arose during the Catherine Wars with Turkey, was abolished by Paul I and restored by Alexander I on May 8, 1803. This army, consisting of three five hundred regiments, had the right to accept foreign immigrants into its ranks, and therefore it became a refuge for a motley rabble - adventurers, vagabonds and criminals from Moldova, Wallachia and from across the Danube. The fighting qualities of the Bug Cossacks at the beginning of the war of 1806-1812. were exceptionally low. But in the matter of robbery, they knew no equal; only volunteer formations from the inhabitants of the Danube principalities and Balkan immigrants, which were widely created by the Russian command in that war and were sources of severe headache for it, could compete with them in this field.
Lanzheron wrote about the Bug Cossacks and their chiefs: "The commanders of these regiments: Yelchaninov and Balaev (correctly Baleev. - Auth.) Were terrible robbers; they devastated Bessarabia as much as Pehlivan himself could do it" [57]. Subsequently, Major Ivan Baleyev was put on trial and expelled from service for his abuses. The fact that the robberies in Budzhak were carried out by irregular formations in no way relieves the responsibility of the Russian command, which unsuccessfully tried to control the Cossack volunteer freemen. However, we note that the 2nd Bug Cossack Major Baleyev's regiment had five hundred, which at the beginning of the war consisted of only 13 officers and 566 Cossacks [58]. The strength of the Donskoy Vlasov of the 2nd regiment was comparable to this. So, if you believe the "Notes" Langeron, it turns out that about a thousand Cossacks from the Richelieu division for about one and a half months at the beginning of winter 1806-1807. the 40-thousand-strong Budzhak horde, which had more than 200 villages, was completely ruined, and thereby persuaded it to go over to the side of the Turks. So far, we have no choice but to leave this grotesque statement on the conscience of Count Langeron himself. However, in reality, it seems that the transition of most of the Tatars of Budjak to the Turkish side at the beginning of 1807 was due to a much more complex set of reasons than some historians see it. In our opinion, these reasons included:
• The moral impact of the unsuccessful actions of the Russian troops in the Izmail region in the winter of 1806-1807; hopes of the Muslim population for the defeat of Russia in the war.
• Propaganda, incl. religious, by the Turkish authorities. Influence of the Sultan's firman on the holy war against the Russians.
• Active raiding operations of Pehlivan Pasha and Sultan-Batyr-Girey in the southern part of Budjak; repression and intimidation on their part.
• Cases of abuse and violence by irregular units of the Russian army, primarily the Cossack regiments of the 13th Richelieu division (the scale of which needs to be clarified).
At the beginning of the new 1807, in his reports to St. Petersburg, the commander-in-chief, General Mikhelson, continued to paint a rather blissful picture of relations with the Tatars of Budzhak. For example, on January 18, he wrote: "At least not all of the Budzhak Tatars, that is, excluding the Izmail districts, gave again a written commitment, which I attach in a copy, of loyalty to us and loyalty, and even a chain with our Cossacks between the Tatars. Bunar and Musait (where our main posts) contain, considering this action not against the Port, but against the rebel Pehlivan, against whom they have hatred "[59]. However, in reality, Pehlivan, who received the full forgiveness of the Ottoman padishah after the declaration of war on Russia, was no longer a "rebel", and not all Tatars hated him.
The headquarters of the Moldavian army quickly realized the seriousness of the real state of affairs. For negotiations with the foremen of the Tatars, Budzhak Mikhelson decided to send the court adviser K. I. Fazardi (aka Fazardiy), an official of the diplomatic department, who was at his headquarters "to manage Asian affairs" [60]. Cayetan Ivanovich Fatsardi in 1804-1806 served as the Russian consul in Vidin, had a good command of the Turkish language and was an expert in the region. He visited Budjak more than once on business and was well acquainted with the local Tatar elite. In particular, it was he who was sent to Budzhak on a diplomatic mission in 1801, when the then failed resettlement of the Tatars to Russia was being prepared. Now, at the beginning of 1807, Fatsardi received an order from Michelson to convince the Tatar Murzas of the death threatening them, in case of disobedience, and also to persuade them to move to Russia, to Milk Waters. Fazardi embarked on his mission energetically. On January 29, he reported to Michelson from Falchi that, "being sent several times to Budzhak, he managed to get to know these Tatars; to see the old ones and get to know the new ones" [61]. The overall content of his report was reassuring. Fatsardi noted "the disagreement, envy and natural distrust of each other always held between the Murzas" [62]. In addition, according to a Russian official, there was fierce hatred between the Tatars and the Bulgarians and Moldovans living among them "due to religions and complete fanaticism" [63]. Therefore, the Christians of Budjak were the most serviceable informers about the intentions and actions of the Tatars, due to which the latter had to seriously beware of rash steps. All this, according to Fazardi, gave hope for a successful development of events in Budjak and for the success of the negotiations.
However, in reality, there was no reason for such optimism. In mid-January 1807, a real mass exodus of the Budjak Tatars to the Turkish side began. As Lanzheron recalled, "most of them were transferred to Ishmael and entire villages moved there every day. Since they moved with all their property and livestock, several cavalry raids inland could have stopped many of them."
Russian commanders tried to stop the flight of the Tatars by force, but they were unable to achieve their goal. The troops of the Moldavian army in southern Bessarabia continued to be cordoned off, in fact, in winter quarters, and were still experiencing a shortage of food and fodder. Their commanders tended to tread carefully. For example, on February 8, Lanzheron ordered General Zass to send a hundred Don Cossacks as soon as possible to the Edisan Horde, the Tatar villages of Chavna, Nanbash, Onezhki, Id Zhin Mangut [64] with the following instructions: look to get out to join with Ishmael, and if they have already left these villages, then is it possible to turn them back; but observe extreme caution, whether they have a cover sent from Ishmael, with which they try as much as possible not to get involved; and if they really intend were to leave for Izmail or turn back from the road, in that case, take away their weapons, escort everyone to Tatar-Bunar, and let me know immediately "[65].
Under these conditions, Pehlivan Pasha, the Turkish hero of the defense of Izmail, still held the initiative. Although for active operations at a distance from the fortress he could have a detachment of no more than 5 thousand people, Pehlivan was not afraid to make long-range sorties, more precisely, whole raids to cover the Tatars' movement to the Turkish side.
The decisive events of the 1807 winter campaign in Budzhak unfolded near the village of Kui-bey (Kubiy along Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Kinbey along Lanzheron; otherwise Kioy-bey), on the road from Izmail to Bender. Learning about the movement of a large mass of Tatars to Ishmael, Pehlivan came forward to meet her with a 5-thousand-strong detachment, arrived on February 10 in Kui-Bey and began to strengthen there. A Russian detachment of Major General A. L. was sent to intercept him. Voinov with a force of 6 battalions, 5 squadrons, 2 Cossack regiments and 6 horse guns.
Voinov decided to attack the enemy on the morning of 13 February. However, preparing for battle, the Russian commander made several blunders at once. Having separated the infantry and cavalry of his detachment into two separate columns, he himself, at the head of the infantry, tried to cut off the enemy's escape route. However, due to the mistake of the Cossack guide during the night march, Voinov could not get out exactly to Kui-bey, having missed a few miles. Pekhlivan, reinforced by Tatar horsemen from the surrounding villages, attacked the Russian cavalry and put it to flight. When Voinov with infantry and artillery finally approached the place of the battle, Pehlivan hurried to take refuge in his retrenchments in Kui Bey. Voinov tried to attack the enemy's positions, but the Turks put up fierce resistance, and the Russians were forced to retreat with losses. In total, on that ill-fated day, Voinov's detachment lost about 400 people killed and wounded, as well as 3 guns. After that, Pekhlivan was able to freely retreat to Izmail along with the entire Tatar convoy, "triumphant in victory", which Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the author of the official history of the war of 1806-1812, was forced to admit. [66]
The failure at Kui Bey was a turning point in the struggle for the Tatars of Budjak. Some private successes, like the one about which Langeron wrote: “On the day of Voinov's defeat, I was happier at Lake Kotlibukh, could not change the course of events unfavorable for Russia. the main gathering place was the valley of the Kondukty river, in which dozens of villages were then located. I moved there with four battalions, five squadrons, the Don Cossack regiment, Shemiot volunteers and 12 guns. Lake Kotlibukh, an innumerable crowd of Tatars. The small convoy accompanying them was defeated by our Cossacks and dragoons, and we captured many carts, horses and cattle, but since when we ran into the Tatars, it was already quite late and soon darkness fell, it was almost we lost half of the booty, but the other part was enough to enrich the entire detachment "[67].
And yet, most of the Tatars of Budjak, with their herds and other movable property, safely sided with the Turks. About 4 thousand Tatar soldiers joined the garrison of Ishmael, and the rest crossed to the southern bank of the Danube. Let us again give the floor to Count Lanzheron: “After the Kinbei affair, the Tatars somehow completely disappeared, and with them their villages also disappeared, which they themselves, for the most part, destroyed, and the houses they left, built of clay, did not last even a month, there was no trace of these once magnificent villages of Bessarabia; traces of their existence could only be found by the thick and dark grass that stood out in the meadows "[68].
According to Lanzheron, about three quarters of all Tatars in Budjak passed to Ishmael [69]. Only a smaller part of them remained in the reach of the Russian command, namely the so-called. "Beshley" Tatars [70] from the vicinity of Bendery, as well as Tatars of the Edisan-Nogai clan who lived near the Dniester [71]. The Russian command wanted to avoid repeating mistakes and therefore began to act more decisively. The patrolling of the region by military teams was organized with the aim of disarming the remaining Tatar population and suppressing rebellious sentiments in its midst. On February 16, Lanzheron ordered Zass:
"According to rumors that the Tatars are making weapons to do evil against us, as a result of the order of Mr. General Baron Meyendorff, please your Excellency to order that military teams in significant numbers be sent incessantly to pass through the Tatar villages. residents. If in any village someone will be found who will have a weapon, order them to immediately take it away and keep it from you, and take the murz under guard and keep it until the resolution, however, on this occasion, do not cause any offense and not start quarrels; Since harsh treatment and insults are not required for any need, the military command should only carry out what is ordered. Assure as many Tatars as possible that this is being done in their own favor "[72].
During February, the Tatars remaining in Budjak were forcibly disarmed. The same court councilor Fazardi was in charge of ensuring this procedure. If earlier promises of loyalty were first and foremost obtained from the Tatars, now the course was taken to resettle them to Russia. There was a formal reason for this - after the declaration of war by Turkey, all the Turks and Tatars of Bessarabia, as enemy subjects, could be forcibly removed from the theater of military operations.
Further events developed as follows. At the beginning of 1807, 120 families of Tatars from near Kiliya migrated to the right bank of the Dniester and joined the Budzhak Edisans there. Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Zh. B. de Traversay ordered Ackermann's commandant, General Loveiko, to ensure the transfer of these Tatars to Russia. However, there was a slight hitch here, since these Tatars from near Kiliya gave the Edisan Horde a promise not to separate from it without its consent. The Russian command, for many reasons, did not want to use brute force. And then General Loveiko, with the assistance of a number of interneed officers of the Turkish garrison of Akkerman, began negotiations with a group of Yedisan elders led by Khalil-Chelebi and achieved unexpectedly great success. The Edisanians gave a written commitment to move their entire horde to Milk Waters, with the transition to eternal citizenship of the Russian Empire [73]. This document was signed by Otemali Effendi, Kuchuk Murtaza Effendi, Khalil Chelebi and Inesmedin Chelebi [74].
An important condition on which the Tatars insisted was that one of their fellow tribesmen should be left as their boss. However, this did not correspond to the general line of Russian policy, since after the abolition of the Nogai Cossack army and the transfer of the Nogai to a "settlement state", it was decided in principle that the "bailiff of the Nogai hordes" should be a Russian official (at that time Colonel Trevogin was such). However, the Tatars received assurances that representatives of their own nobility would govern them in their internal affairs. For the final conviction of the Budjak Edisants, Admiral Traversse again summoned to Budjak those four Molochansk Nogays, who at the end of 1806 had already been involved by the Duke of Richelieu in agitation among his fellow tribesmen. As a result, it was agreed that the Edisans would perform in March. At the request of the Tatars, the Russian command promised until that time to protect them from Pekhlivan's troops; for this purpose, a military command was sent from one infantry company and several Cossacks [75]. The fact that the Yedisans specifically asked for this serves as further evidence that the terror of Pehlivan and the fear of the Tatars before him were one of the factors that determined the behavior of the inhabitants of Budjak at that time.
On April 3, 1807, Admiral Traversay reported to Michelson: “On March 16, the entire Horde, suddenly moving away from its place, followed by starting to cross the Dniester in the Mayak on the 19th, 1st of this April passed with all the property to our side. with my sheets open with two officials of the Nagai hordes through Voznesensk, Berislav to Moloshny waters. Tatars of the Edisans, as the military sergeant major Vlasov 2nd informs me, passed all without withdrawal to the Lighthouses Men 2342 and women 2568, total 4 910 souls "[76]. And in the same place, Traversay wrote: "Twenty villages of Bendery cinuta beshleev for the misdemeanor declared prisoners [77], I ordered to be sent to custody under supervision in Yekaterinoslav, but by the will of Your Excellency now they will go to their compatriots to settle in the Melitopol district" [78].
According to available statistics, the total number of the Budzhak horde, which migrated to Russia in 1807, amounted to 6,404 people. Of these, 3,945 people remained on Molochny Vody, and the rest were settled in the Kherson and Yekaterinoslav provinces. Here, the Russian authorities tried to create favorable conditions for the transition of the Tatars from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle, but this process did not go very well. Many Tatars were unhappy with the new situation and chose not to associate their future with Russia. Article 7 of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812 specifically stipulated the right of the Yedisan Tatars from Budjak to freely move to Turkey [79]. On October 23, 1812, in the midst of the epic struggle of Russia with the invasion of Napoleon, the Budzhak horde unexpectedly took off, on November 7, 1812, it crossed the Dnieper near Berislavl and proceeded further beyond the Danube, into Turkish possessions. According to official Russian data, a total of 3,199 souls of both sexes left, with 1,829 wagons and 30,000 head of cattle [80]. As we can see, exactly half of the Tatars who were resettled there in 1807 from Budzhak decided to stay on Milky Waters. Here they and their descendants remained until the Eastern War of 1853-1856, after which, during the mass migration of Tatars and Circassians from Russia, all the Nogais left the Azov region and moved to Turkey.
So, even before the outbreak of the war with Turkey in 1806-1812. The Russian authorities proceeded from the fact that Russia's strategic interests in the region require a solution to the issue of the Budjak Horde, and considered possible options for achieving this goal. The main goal of the Russian Empire was to cleanse Budzhak of the Tatars, which was supposed to finally secure Odessa and its environs, as well as contribute to the creation and development of a strategic rear area on the lower Danube for all further wars with Turkey. The most preferable option seemed to persuade the Budzhak Tatars to voluntarily relocate deep into Russia, to Molochnye Vody, further from the border with Turkey. The stake was placed precisely on diplomatic methods of persuasion. And here certain successes were achieved, due, first of all, to the involvement of energetic and experienced people in the negotiations, as well as the Nogai elders from Milk Waters. However, due to military and administrative mistakes, it was not possible to fully implement the plan. The indecisive actions of General Meyendorff near Ishmael in December 1806 led to the fact that the initiative was intercepted by two energetic Turkish commanders - Pehlivan Pasha and Sultan Batyr Girey. With their agitation and bold raids on Budjak, they managed in the winter of 1806-1807. to win over to their side a significant part of the Tatars. And the Russian troops were unable to prevent the Tatars with their families, cattle and part of their property from moving to Ishmael and from there across the Danube.
However, this partial military and political-administrative failure of Russia in a global perspective still had beneficial consequences for the region. As a result of the cleansing of the Tatars, for the first time since the 15th century, Budzhak was again administratively annexed to the Moldavian principality, and after the Bucharest Peace of 1812 - to that part of it that became part of Russia, i.e. to Bessarabia. For colonization, economic and cultural development, vast areas of Budjak, which remained practically deserted, were opened - 16455 square meters. versts, or 1714697 dessiatines and 362 ½ sq. fathoms [81]. According to the data of the Treasury-Economic Expedition of the Bessarabian Regional Government, in 1827, 112722 souls of both sexes lived within the Budzhak proper [82]. Of these, there were only 5 Turks, and not a single Tatars! Thus, the population of the Budzhak steppes, which was almost "zeroed out" after the Tatars left in 1807, during the first 20 years of the region's stay under Russian rule exceeded almost three times (!) Its previous, pre-war value.
The elimination of the Budzhak horde directly contributed to the expansion to the south, up to the Danube Girls, of the settlement area of the Moldovan people and its more active interaction with representatives of other creative nations - Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Jews, as well as German and Swiss colonists who began the development after 1812 steppes of southern Bessarabia.
