In 1781, on the site of the settlement of Anapa on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, the Turks, under the leadership of French engineers, began to build a powerful fortress. Anapa was supposed to ensure the influence of the Ottoman Empire on the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus and become a base for future operations against Russia in the Kuban, on the Don, as well as in the Crimea. During the next Russian-Turkish war that began in 1787, the importance of Anapa increased sharply. The Russian military command was well aware of the importance of Anapa and already in 1788 a detachment under the command of General-in-Chief P. A. Tekeli was assigned to take the fortress, but his campaign to Anapa ended unsuccessfully: after a fierce battle under the walls of the fortress, they had to abandon the assault. The second Anapa campaign in February-March 1790 of the detachment of Lieutenant General Yu. B. Bibikov generally ended in a heavy defeat - during an unsuccessful assault on the fortress and retreat under the blows of the mountaineers, his forces lost more than half of their strength. At the same time, the highlanders became more active, their attacks on Russian settlements began to occur much more often.
At this time, General-in-Chief Ivan Vasilyevich Gudovich (1741 - 1820) was appointed commander-in-chief of the Kuban and Caucasian corps, the Caucasian fortified line. He was an experienced military leader. Gudovich came from a clan of Polish gentry who entered the Russian service in the 17th century. Thanks to his wealthy father, a Little Russian landowner, he received a versatile education, studied at higher educational institutions in Koenigsberg, Halle, and Leipzig. He entered military service late - at the age of 19 he became an ensign in the engineering corps. An officer who had an excellent education, a year later, the most influential nobleman Count Pyotr Shuvalov took over as an adjutant wing. Then already Lieutenant Colonel Gudovich becomes an adjutant of Field Marshal Andrei Shuvalov. Such a rapid growth can be easily explained - his brother Andrei Gudovich was the adjutant general of Emperor Peter III. After the palace coup, when Catherine II seized power, Gudovich was arrested for three weeks, but then he was sent to command the Astrakhan infantry regiment. In 1763 he was promoted to colonel. The regiment was sent to Poland, where it kept order - there were elections for the king, in 1765 he returned to Russia. Gudovich successfully fought in the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, he distinguished himself in the battle of Khotin (1769-11-07), Larga (1770-07-07), Cahul battles (1770-21-07) and a number of other battles. Was promoted to foreman. After the end of the war, he became a division commander in Ukraine in the Ochakov area and on the Southern Bug River, then in Kherson. In 1785 he was appointed governor-general of Ryazan and Tambov and at the same time an inspector of cavalry and infantry (infantry), directly subordinate to the all-powerful favorite of the Empress G. Potemkin. When a new war with Turkey began - in 1887, he asked to go to the front and was appointed commander of the corps. Under his command, the Russian troops took Khadzhibey (1789-14-09) and the Kiliya fortress (1790-18-10).
Having been assigned to the North Caucasus, Gudovich had Potemkin's instructions to strengthen the Caucasian line. This fortified line was of great importance for the defense of the South of Russia. Porta tried to restore the North Caucasian peoples against Russia in order to maintain their positions in the region. For more than two centuries, this frontier has been the site of constant clashes and wars. In 1783, the Caucasian line was divided into two parts: Mozdokskaya - on the left bank of the Terek (3 fortresses and 9 Cossack villages), along the Kuban steppe (9 field fortresses), and Kuban - along the right bank of the Kuban river (8 fortresses and 19 fortifications). After the annexation of Crimea to Russia, it became obvious that it was necessary to strengthen the defense in the Kuban. Turkey could strike from the fortresses of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and raise the mountaineers for an auxiliary strike. Grigory Potemkin was instructed to build fortifications along the line between the village of Yekaterinodarskaya - the Malka River - the Laba River (it flowed into the Kuban). On the river Malka, opposite Big Kabarda, two outposts and three Cossack villages were built. Between Malka and Kuban, the Constantinogorsk fortress and 5 fortifications were erected. Three fortresses, 9 fortifications and one village were built on the right bank of the Kuban. These works were done in the period from 1783 to 1791.
Anapa. Preparing for the hike
The headquarters of the Russian troops in the Caucasus at that time was located in a small fortress in the middle of the Caucasian line - Georgievsk. Gudovich immediately inspected the forces and fortifications entrusted to him. And I realized that the main danger comes from Anapa. It was a powerful fortress with a large garrison, which had the ability to receive reinforcements and weapons by sea, moreover, it was located dangerously close to the Kerch Strait. Through Anapa, the Turks could incite the mountain peoples against Russia. Gudovich decided to root out this "splinter" at the Russian border, since the war was going on and there were appropriate instructions from Potemkin.
The Turkish fortress was founded on the site of an ancient Sindh settlement - Sindh harbor (Sindiki), which appeared before our era. After joining the Bosporus kingdom, Gorgippia was called, from the 13th century AD - the Genoese colony Mapa. It belonged to the Turks since 1475, and powerful fortifications were built there in 1781-1782. In Istanbul, they understood the importance of the position of Anapa and did not spare significant money for the construction of strong fortifications under the leadership of French engineers. Under the Turks, Anapa became one of the largest centers of the slave trade in the Black Sea basin. It should be noted that the slave trade was one of the most important and profitable sectors of the economy of the Ottoman Empire. Highlanders were also focused on this activity, especially the Adyg feudal lords. After two Russian expeditions to Anapa failed in 1787 and 1790, the Turks became convinced of the inaccessibility of the stronghold. Anapa, together with Izmail, was considered a strategic fortress.
Gudovich devoted two months to preparing the campaign against Anapa. Field artillery was brought from various fortresses and fortifications, carts (carts) were prepared, and pack animals were collected. For the gathering of troops, two assembly points were identified - units of the Caucasian corps were pulled together to the Kuban border post Temizhbek; the troops of the Kuban corps under the command of Major General Zagryazhsky (from Voronezh) went to the Yeisk fortification on the Azov coast. At the same time, enough forces were left on the Caucasian line to stop a possible raid of the highlanders.
On May 4, Temizhbek had 11 infantry battalions, 24 cavalry squadrons and 20 cannons. The expedition's infantry consisted of incomplete (there were about 1 thousand people) of the Tiflis, Kazan, Voronezh and Vladimir regiments. Three battalions of well-trained and battle-hardened riflemen were allocated from the Caucasian Jaeger Corps. The cavalry consisted of four squadrons of Rostov, three - Narva, one - Kargopol carabinieri regiments; eight squadrons were each in the Astrakhan and Taganrog dragoon regiments. The cavalry units were also incomplete. The Khopersky, Volga, Don Koshkina and Lukovkin regiments also took part in the campaign. Plus two hundred Greben and one and a half hundred Terek Cossacks.
On May 10, the forces of the Kuban corps were concentrated in the Yeisk fortification - the Nizhny Novgorod and Ladoga musketeers, the Vladimir and Nizhny Novgorod dragoons, and two Don Cossack regiments, with 16 guns. In total, up to 15 thousand people took part in the campaign, taking into account the protection of rear communications, which remained in small fortifications along the route of the detachment.
Painting "Turkish fortress Anapa". Artist Yuri Kovalchuk.
Hike and siege the fortress
The morale of the expedition was high, the soldiers and officers were not embarrassed by the fact that the two previous campaigns had failed. Everyone had heard of the Russian victories on the Danube, including the brilliant victory in Izmail. Soldiers and officers wanted to glorify Russian weapons on the Caucasian front as well. On May 22, units of the Caucasian corps approached the Talyzin crossing, two days later they were joined by the troops of the Kuban corps. They immediately began to erect a pontoon crossing and a field bridgehead in case of an enemy attack. On the way to the Talyzin crossing, Gudovich left small garrisons in fortified posts and redoubts in order to secure the rear and communications. So, on the way to the Yeisk fortification, six earthen redoubts were built.
On May 29, the troops crossed without any problems to the other side of the Kuban. True, the highlanders tried to destroy the crossing by lowering the logs of large trees along the river, but the sabotage failed. In one passage from Anapa, a detachment from the Taurida Corps (located in the Crimea) under the command of Major General Shits joined the main forces - 3 battalions, 10 squadrons, 3 hundred Cossacks with 14 guns. They brought with them 90 assault ladders.
The success of the expedition could be largely due to the attitude of the mountaineers to the Russian corps. The highlanders could dramatically complicate the combat operation. Therefore, Gudovich showed the talent of a diplomat, informing the local feudal lords that the Russians were planning to fight the Turks, not the mountaineers. He ordered the release of the captured Circassians, who attacked the carts, foragers, not to offend the local residents, not to poison the crops.
Turkish intelligence monitored the movement of the Russian corps, but the Anapsky Pasha did not dare to give battle to the fortress. Just at the fortress itself, a detachment of several thousand Turks and mountaineers occupied the dominant heights near the Narpsukho River and tried to stop the Russian vanguard. But the Russian forward units under the command of Brigadier Polikarpov crossed the river on the move and resolutely went on the attack, Gudovich supported the vanguard with several squadrons of dragoons. The Turks and Circassians did not accept the battle and almost immediately fled. On June 10, the Russian units approached Anapa, the siege and preparations for the assault began.
The Turks significantly strengthened the fortress for the arrival of Russian troops. The moat was renewed and deepened, the powerful rampart, which rested against the sea, was reinforced with a palisade. The garrison numbered up to 25 thousand people (10 thousand Turkish infantry and 15 thousand mountaineers and Crimean Tatars), with 95 guns and mortars. There were several ships in the roadstead, from which additional weapons could be removed. In addition, the garrison could be strengthened by transferring reinforcements by sea. There was no hope of forcing the Turks to surrender - ammunition and food were easily delivered by sea. Russia did not yet have a powerful fleet that could block Anapa from the sea. The fortress was commanded by the experienced Mustafa Pasha, his assistant was Batal Bey (at one time he tried to break through the Caucasian line and raise the North Caucasian peoples against Russia). The military, religious and political leader of the Caucasian highlanders, Chechen Sheikh Mansur, was also in Anapa. He was a "prophet", a predecessor of the ideas of muridism - he opposed the slave trade, feudal lords, blood feud, believing that mountain customs should be replaced with Muslim Sharia law. He raised the mountaineers to a "holy war" against Russia, his ideas were popular not only among the Chechens, but also among the Circassians and Dagestanis. He had a number of private successes, but was eventually defeated and with the remnants of his forces took refuge in Anapa.
Gudovich cut off the fortress from the mountains so that they would not come to her aid - during the siege, the enemy tried several times to break through to Anapa, but was repelled. The left flank cut the road to the Sudzhuk-Kale fortress (on the site of modern Novorossiysk). The main forces stood on the left bank of the Bugru River, the Shits detachment on the right bank. On the night of June 13, the first siege battery was set up. In the morning the Turks opened heavy fire and sent out 1,500 detachments to destroy the battery. The two hundred rangers who were guarding the battery under the command of Zagryazhsky met the enemy with a friendly salvo, and then hit them with bayonets. The Turkish detachment was overturned and fled in panic, the Russian huntsmen pursued the enemy to the gates of the fortress.
By June 18, several more siege batteries were erected. On this day, they began to bombard the fortress. The Turks initially responded actively, they had an advantage in the number and power of guns. An artillery duel ensued, in which the Russian artillerymen won. Soon the fire of the Turkish artillery began to subside, at night Anapa was lit up with a huge fire - the Pasha's palace, the garrison's food store and other buildings were on fire. The next day, the Turkish batteries almost did not respond, suppressed by the fire of the Russian artillerymen. The Turkish command made a big mistake, having significant forces in its hands, it refused sorties. The garrison lost heart. Gudovich offered an honorable surrender, with the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Anapa. Mustafa Pasha was ready to surrender, but Sheikh Mansur opposed it. He turned out to be a more influential figure, and the Turks refused to surrender the fortress.
Storm
Gudovich made a very risky decision - to take Anapa by storm. He decided to storm a powerful fortress with 25 thousand garrisons with only 12 thousand people. But there was no other way out - strong reinforcements could arrive from the sea, this could change the situation in favor of the Turks; in the immediate rear there were up to 8 thousand Circassians and Turks, who constantly harassed the Russian posts, interfered with the search for food and feed for horses. The Russian command could not organize a correct siege, since there was not enough large-caliber artillery and engineers. A letter came about the appearance of a powerful Turkish fleet near the Dniester, which meant that at any moment enemy ships with reinforcements and weapons for the fortress could appear.
Gudovich decided to deliver the main blow to the southeastern part of the fortress wall. 5 shock columns were formed: four main columns of 500 people each were to strike in the southern part of the fortress, the general command was carried out by major generals Bulgakov and Depreradovich. Behind them were reserves, which were supposed to strengthen the columns in the event of the failure of the first assault or be used to develop success. There was also a general reserve under the command of Brigadier Polikarpov, he had to react to a change in the situation in any direction. The fifth assault column of 1,300 men under the command of Colonel Apraksin was to make a diversion with the task of breaking into the city along the coast of the sea. In addition, taking into account the danger of a strike from the rear, a 4,000 detachment was allocated under the command of Zagryazhsky, which was supposed to block a possible enemy strike from the outside. A marching wagenburg (mobile field fortification), guarded by three hundred riflemen with 7 cannons. As a result, no more than 6, 4 thousand people took part in the assault, out of 12 thousand Russian troops.
On the night of June 21-22, the assault columns and all units took up their positions. They moved stealthily, trying not to frighten the enemy. Exactly at midnight, the batteries began bombarding the fortress. Under the rumble of guns and explosions, the attack aircraft approached even closer to the fortifications. An hour or two later, the Russian batteries died down. The Turks gradually calmed down, leaving only sentries and gun crews on the walls. The Turkish command apparently did not expect that the Russians would go on an assault so soon, there were not even patrols outside the walls. Just in front of the main gate, they set up an ambush of 200 people. But the Turks behaved carelessly, went to bed, the Russian huntsmen crept up to them and in an instant they punctured everyone, without a single shot being fired.
Half an hour before dawn, the Russian batteries delivered another fire strike, and the assault columns silently went on the attack. Russian troops were able to reach the ditch without opposition and began an attack. The Turks responded with fierce gunfire. First, the left-flank column under the command of Colonel Chemodanov broke into the rampart, and then into the fortress walls, Turkish batteries were captured. Colonel Chemodanov himself received three wounds and handed over command to Lieutenant Colonel Lebedev, who brought reinforcements.
The second assault column under the command of Colonel Mukhanov, it was one of the dismounted dragoons, also breaking the fierce resistance of the enemy, made its way onto the rampart. The dragoons captured the enemy battery, with the arrival of reinforcements, captured another section of the rampart, step by step retaking the fortification. Then they went down to the city and started a fight in Anapa itself.
A more difficult situation developed in the sector of the third assault column of Colonel Keller - she attacked the strongest enemy fortification - the bastion at the middle city gates. The attackers could not immediately break into the shaft, suffering heavy losses. Keller was seriously wounded, he was replaced by Major Verevkin, who brought reinforcements. I must say that such losses among commanders were common at that time - since the time of Peter I it was established that commanders were in the forefront of military units. Soon the third column was able to break through to the rampart, besides it was supported by the fourth column of Colonel Samarin.
The fifth column of Apraksin, which operated off the coast, was the least successful. The Turks managed to get ready and upset the column with rifle and cannon volleys. Apraksin took the soldiers away and began to prepare the detachment for a new attack.
Gudovich threw into battle a part of the general reserve under the command of Polikarpov - six hundred infantrymen and three squadrons of dragoons. The dragoons galloped to the gate, dismounted and burst into the fortress (the arrows lowered the drawbridge). The dragoons were able to break through to the central quarters, Mustafa Pasha threw against them all the people who were at hand - a bloody hand-to-hand fight ensued in the center of Anapa. The dragoons fought almost in encirclement, too far removed from the main forces. Gudovich again took a risk and threw the remaining cavalry into battle - the horse attack turned out to be simply brilliant. Squadrons rushed into the city on the move: one group captured an enemy battery and opened fire on dense enemy lines, the other cut its way to the sea. At the same time, Gudovich sent a fifth column to the city, part of it continued to clear the fortifications, others began to capture the city streets. All other columns intensified the onslaught, the Turks began to flee to the sea. To finally break the resistance of the enemy. Gudovich brought the last reserve into battle - four hundred huntsmen. This was the last straw, the enemy began to drop weapons in droves and beg for mercy. The last defenders were driven into the sea, where they began to surrender. A total of a hundred or two hundred people escaped (on ships). The crews of ships and vessels did not pick up people and fled in panic.
It should be noted that not only Gudovich's decisiveness, but also his caution. It was not in vain that he left behind a powerful group under the command of Zagryazhsky, which did not take part in the assault. The Turks and the highlanders, who were waiting in the wings in the mountains and forests, decided to strike, and if not for the rear guard, the battle could have ended very sadly. Even at night, the enemy tried to capture Wagenburg, but the guards repulsed the attack. In the morning, seeing that a battle was going on in the fortress, the 8 thousand enemy detachment went on the attack. The Terek and Grebensk Cossacks were the first to take the blow, they withstood the onslaught and were cut down practically surrounded. The Russian command quickly reacted - the infantry and cavalry came to the rescue of the Cossacks. Through joint efforts, the enemy was thrown into the forest. The enemy bravely went on the attack several more times, but everywhere he was repulsed and suffered heavy losses - the superiority of the Russian troops in weapons and training affected.
"Russian Gate" (the locals call them "Turkish") - the remains of a fortress, a monument of Ottoman architecture of the 18th century, as they looked in 1956.
After reconstruction in 1996.
Outcomes
- The Turks and mountaineers lost only in killed up to 8 thousand people, a significant number drowned in the sea, 13, 5 thousand were taken prisoner. Including the Turkish command and Sheikh Mansur. 130 banners were captured, all the guns (some died in the battle), thousands of firearms and knives. The whole Russian army got - a large powder store and garrison ammunition. The Russian army lost 3, 7 thousand killed and wounded (according to other sources - 2, 9 thousand).
- Sheikh Mansur was brought before the eyes of the Empress to Petersburg, and then to an honorable exile to the White Sea, where he died.
- Russian troops once again confirmed their highest level of combat training and morale by capturing a strong fortress - "Caucasian Ishmael", although there were 4 times less storming people than defenders. Gudovich proved himself in this campaign as a brilliant commander. This blow will be for Porta the most powerful shock after the fall of Ishmael.
- The fact that Gudovich made the right decision, did not wait, confirmed the arrival of the Turkish fleet two days later. Gudovich set up an ambush, and the Russians were able to capture one ship, which was the first to come ashore. The Turks soon learned about the fall of the fortress from hundreds of corpses, these were people who drowned while fleeing or were thrown into the sea dead (such a huge number of those killed simply could not be buried), panicked. The airborne crews and soldiers refused to go into battle - the commander wanted to bombard Anapa and, possibly, land the landing. The Turkish commanders were forced to take the ships out to sea.
- Gudovich developed his success - a separate detachment was sent from Anapa to the nearby Turkish fortress Sudzhuk-Kale (on the site of modern Novorossiysk). At his approach, the enemy burned down the fortifications and fled to the mountains or on ships at sea, throwing 25 guns.
- Anapa was returned to the Turks according to the Yassk peace in 1791, but all the fortifications were destroyed, the population (up to 14 thousand people) was taken to a settlement in Tavria (Crimean region). Finally, Anapa became part of Russia under the Adrianople Peace Treaty of 1829.
Monument to General Ivan Gudovich in Anapa.
