The Battle of the Kinoskephals occupies a special place in military history. Partly because it was the first large-scale field battle between the Roman legions and the Macedonian phalanx, partly because the fate of the Macedonian state was decided in it.
Traditionally, it is believed that the phalanx and the legions first clashed on the battlefield at the Kinoskephals. and it was this battle that showed the complete superiority of Roman tactics over Macedonian. This is not entirely true. Previously, the phalanx and the Romans had already clashed in battle, but these were local skirmishes or battles on rough terrain, the purpose of which was not to defeat the enemy. It was impossible to talk about the superiority of any one side. The battle of Kinoskephal itself also did not show the superiority of legion weapons and tactical concepts over the phalanx. Rather, we can talk about the unsuccessful management of the battle on the part of the Macedonian king and the competent actions of the Roman commander.
Romans
The commander of the Roman army, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, was an extremely ambitious and greedy man. In the Hannibal War, he served under the command of Marcellus and at a very young age was the governor of the captured Tarentum. A year ago, Titus, with difficulty, contrary to all customs and in violation of the order of holding office (he was not yet 30 years old with the age of 43), achieved election as consul and received a referral to Macedonia. The year of the war passed without decisive results. In January, the term of office expired, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus was ready to make peace rather than transfer command and glory of victory to a new consul. The Senate allowed the young aristocrat to continue the war, but sent two legates who had previously commanded the army to help. Therefore, the Roman general sought to impose a decisive battle on the Macedonian army.
Roman military art was on the rise at this time. After the victory over Hannibal, it was believed that the Roman army was stronger than any other, and the Roman military art was the best. The military leaders had extensive experience in the war against the regular army, there were many experienced fighters in the troops, and Flamininus, when he took office, was able to strengthen the army of 3000 veterans of Scipio. We know the forces of the Romans in the battle of Kinoskephal: it was a consular army reinforced by Greek contingents, which included 2 legions and the cohorts of allies assigned to them.
The legion, headed by successively 6 military tribunes elected in the national assembly, consisted of three lines: 10 maniples of gastats, 10 maniples of principles (each with 120 people) and 10 maniples of triarii (60 people), to which they were assigned 1200 velits and 10 turms of cavalry (300 horsemen). The legionnaire's armament was lightweight by Greek standards: instead of a linen cotfiba carapace or a bronze thorax, Roman soldiers wore a battle belt and a small Italian pectoral breastplate with shoulder straps. On the head they wore a helmet of the Montefortine type, lighter in comparison with the Greek samples. Since it was a very unreliable defense in close combat, a large (120 × 75 cm) oval scutum shield was used to cover the body. Offensive weapons included a heavy pilum dart and a sword. During the Hannibal War, the Mediterranean Hoplite thrusting sword was replaced by the Celto-Iberian "Spanish gladius" - a powerful 65-70 cm long cutting sword, the blows of which left wide bleeding wounds. Veleth wore a round leather parma shield, darts, and a sword. The Roman cavalry did not change from the Battle of Cannes - it was all the same riding infantry, ready to grapple with the enemy, to fight on foot, but incapable of equestrian combat.
The allies assigned to the legion (3000 heavy infantry, 1200 light infantry and 900 horsemen) had the same organization and armament as the Romans, and were reduced to the allied ala ("wing"), which in battle stood on the outer flank of the legion, forming a combat wing order. The allied ala was headed by three Roman prefects.
In total, the army wing consisted of 6,000 heavy infantry, 2,400 light infantry and 1,200 horsemen, and the army as a whole had 12,000 heavy infantry, about 5,000 light infantry, 2,400 horsemen. The consul's seat was either in the center of the attacking wing (between the legion and the scarlet), or between the inner flanks of the legions. The commander of the legion of the tribunes walked in the center of the legion next to the legion's badge, the rest of the tribunes controlled the lines of battle formation. Commands were sounded by trumpets.
In addition, Flamininus' army included the Aetolian allies - 6,000 infantry and 400 horsemen. The infantry of the Aetolians was ill-equipped for regular combat: the warrior's weapons were a light shield, sword and sling or javelins. The Aetolian cavalry also did not know how to fight in formation and was strong in loose combat. Finally, the Romans had at their disposal captured Carthaginian war elephants - a powerful fighting force that the Romans did not know how to use at all.
Macedonians
The king of Macedonia Philip V was, unlike Flamininus, an experienced and wise politician who fought for half his life with his freedom-loving neighbors - the Greeks and Illyrians, not so much even for the sake of multiplying the kingdom, but for maintaining political balance in the Balkans. Victory in the battle meant for him an increase in his authority in the Balkans and winning the campaign, and defeat meant a threat to independence and humiliating peace to the delight [8] of the Greek cities. For him, this was already the second war with Rome, and the tsar, using the example of Carthage, knew what the conditions of peace with Rome were: the extradition of the fleet, a sharp reduction in troops, the rejection of an independent foreign policy.
The backbone of the Macedonian army was the phalanx. The phalangite warrior was armed with a 6-meter sarissa lance with a heavy inflow and a narrow dagger tip designed to pierce linen armor. An additional weapon was a Greek xyphos sword with a narrow laurel blade up to 60-65 cm long and a massive handle. It was a weapon for fighting in the cramped phalanxes, it was convenient for them to deliver short stabbing and ripping strikes into the enemy's unprotected face and thighs. In battle, an aspis shield with a diameter of about 70 cm was hung on the forearm and neck strap, and in his hands the warrior held a sarissa at the ready. The armor included a Thracian-type helmet with an elongated egg-shaped headband, a visor and developed cheek pads that well protected from chopping and stabbing blows to the face. The first rows of the phalanx wore a Greek bronze thorax with a scalloped pterugon skirt and leggings; in the depths of the phalanx, the warriors limited themselves to a linen cotfib, a wide combat belt and "ifficrat boots" - high laced shoes with open toes.
The minimum tactically independent part of the phalanx was the speyra - a detachment of 256 soldiers, consisting of 16 rows of 16 phalanxes who stood side by side "in a column of 16". The commanders of the speyra (speyrarch. Tetrarchs, lohagi) stood in the first row. The last line was formed by the closing hurrages. Behind the formation were the hurricane who provided control (in fact, it was he who transmitted the received orders to the phalanx), the adjutant-hyperreth, the herald-stratokerik, the signaling officer-semiphore with a signal flag on the pole, the trumpeter-salpinktes. The formation of phalanxes (16,000 shields) formed a line of spares.brought together on a permanent basis in the chiliarchy (about 1000 people) and strategies, each of which was given its own hurray, signalmen, semeiophores, etc. The maximum structural unit of the phalanx was a wing that had its own control.
2000 Peltasts were an elite formation and took the place of the Alexander Hypaspists in the Macedonian army. They were warriors in lightweight armor, similar to the armor of the warriors in the depths of the phalanx. Instead of sarissa, they were armed with long spears, the xyphos was usually replaced by a powerful mahaira, convenient in loose formation. Peltasts were capable of fighting both in phalanx and in loose formation. In the battle formation of the army, the peltasts stood on the right flank of the phalanx. On the left, the phalanx was covered by up to 1,500 Greek mercenaries who entered the army, armed similarly to the Macedonian peltasts.
The elite formation of light infantry consisted of 2,000 Thracian mercenaries, armed with mahairs (this was their national weapon), bows or javelins. Protective equipment for them was a crescent-shaped pelta shield. Another light infantry unit was the 2,000 Illyrians of the Thrall tribe with javelins and swords.
The Macedonian cavalry (1000 horsemen) was considered the best in Europe: they were heavily armed aristocratic warriors operating in close formation. Their armor, generally similar to that of the hoplite, also included legguards and a brace that (instead of a shield) completely covered the left arm that held the reins. The right hand also had additional protection. A Boeotian-type helmet (a bronze headband with crumpled brims) made it possible to look down, acting with a spear or mahaira. The less heavily equipped Thessalian horsemen (1000 people) also acted in a dense formation.
The tsar's place on the battlefield was determined by tradition and the need for command and control. As a rule, the king led into battle the cavalry standing on the right wing at the head of the royal mud, or went on the attack in the formation of the Peltasts, who stood to the right of the phalanx and, in turn, covered themselves from the right by the Macedonian cavalry and Thracians. Traditionally, the entire course of the battle was determined by the blow of the right wing, while the left, which usually included the left wing of the phalanx and attached to it on the left, mercenaries-Peltasts (not Macedonian), hired light infantry (Cretans, Illyrians, etc.) and Thessalian cavalry, remained without the attention of the king and demanded a separate command.
March
Both sides in the winter of 197 B. C. preparing for battle on the Thessalian Plain. The Romans sought to drive the king north into Macedonia and isolate his garrisons in Greece. Philip, in turn, wanted to keep Thessaly and cover the Tempe passage to Macedonia. At 50 stadia from Fera on the Phthiotian plain there was a clash of the vanguards, which ended in the victory of the Aetolian cavalry. Philip decided to leave the "glorious wives of beauty", overgrown with gardens and partitioned off by stone fences Fthiotida and go out to the more convenient for the phalanx Scotusa. Flamininus understood his plan and moved in a parallel march along the southern side of the ridge of rocky hills. On the first day, Philip reached Onchesta, and Flamininus reached Eretria, on the second, Philip settled at Melambia, and Flamininus at Thetidius (Farsal). In the evening there was a heavy downpour with a thunderstorm, and in the morning a heavy fog arose.
The plot of the battle
Philip set out on a campaign in the morning, but because of the fog he decided to return to the camp. For cover from the side of the Kinoskephal, behind which the enemy could be, he sent Ephedria - a guard detachment of no more than 1000-2000 people. The main part of the army, setting up guard posts, remained in the camp. A significant part of the soldiers was sent to collect fodder for the cavalry.
Titus Quinctius Flamininus, who also did not know about the enemy's movement, decided to reconnoiter the situation on the ridge of hills separating him from the Macedonians. For this, extraordinaries were allocated - selected 10 rounds of allied cavalry (300 horsemen) and 1000 light infantry.
At the pass, the Romans suddenly saw a Macedonian outpost. The battle between them began with separate skirmishes, in which the velites were overturned and with losses retreated along the northern slope. Flamininus immediately sent to [9] the pass under the command of 2 Roman tribunes, 500 Aetolian horsemen Eupolemus and Archedamos and 1000 Aetolian infantrymen. The crushed Macedonians withdrew from the ridge to the tops of the hills and turned to the king for help.
Philip, who intended to stay all day in the camp, decided to help his soldiers and sent the most mobile and maneuverable part of the army to the pass. The Macedonian cavalry of Leontes (1,000 horsemen), the Thessalian cavalry of Heraclides (100 horsemen) and mercenaries under the command of Athenagoras - 1,500 Greek peltasts and lightly armed and possibly 2,000 thralls - entered the battle. With these forces, the Macedonians overturned the Roman and Aetolian infantry and drove them down the slope, and the Aetolian cavalry, strong in a loose battle, clashed with the Macedonians and Thessalians. Lightly armed infantry fled to the foot of the mountain.
The messengers who arrived told Philip that the enemy was fleeing, unable to resist, and the opportunity simply should not be missed - this is his day and his happiness. Philip, dissatisfied with the uncertainty of the situation and the untimeliness of the battle and the accident of its place, gathered the troops that remained with him. He himself led the right wing of the army to the ridge: the right wing of the phalanx (8000 phalangits), 2000 peltasts and 2000 Thracians. On the crest of the hills, the tsar rebuilt the troops from the marching order, deploying to the left of the pass and occupying the height dominating the pass.
Also dissatisfied with the inevitability and suddenness of the battle, Titus lined up an army: on the flanks, cavalry units and allied als, in the center of the Roman legions. Ahead, for cover, 3800 velits were lined up in loose formation. Flamininus turned to the army and explained that the enemies were already beaten Macedonians, all of whose greatness rests not on power, but on glory alone. He led the left wing of the army - on the right the 2nd legion, to the left of the 2nd allied ala, in front of all the light infantry, the Aetolians, probably on the flank of the legion (a total of 6,000 heavily armed, about 3,800 velites and up to 4,000 Aetolians), stood in the center and led to the aid of the defeated Aetolians. The right wing, in front of which a line of elephants stood instead of velites, remained in place.
Flamininus brought the troops to the site of the battle, saw the retreating Aetolians and immediately, without withdrawing the lightly armed for the line of maniples. attacked the enemy. The Romans approached the Macedonians who were beating up the light infantry and the Aetolian cavalry, the velites threw pilums and began to cut themselves with swords. The numerical superiority was again with the Romans. Now, about 8000 infantry and 700 horsemen fought against 3500-5500 infantry and 2000 horsemen. Mixed in pursuit, the ranks of the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry and lightly armed did not withstand the blow and fell back up to the protection of Philip.
Collision
The Tsar led the retreating crowd to the right flank, not wasting time separating the cavalry from the infantry. Then he doubled the depth of the phalanx and peltasts and closed their ranks to the right, making room for the deployment of the left flank ascending to the ridge. The right wing of the phalanx was lined up in 32 ranks of 128 people each. Philip stood at the head of the Peltasts, the Thracians stood on the right flank, the retreating lightly armed infantrymen and cavalry were deployed even further to the right. On the left, the right wing of the phalanx was not covered by either the left wing of the phalanx (it rose next in the marching formation), or by peltasts. The Macedonian army was ready for battle - 10,000 in formation, up to 7,000 in loose formation, 2,000 horsemen.
Hellenistic type of helmet, III century. BC. Bronze. Louvre Museum No. 1365. Paris, France
Titus Quinctius Flamininus let the lightly armed infantry pass between the rows of maniples, reorganized the heavy infantry into a checkerboard formation and led them on the attack - 6000 in formation, up to 8000 in loose formation, up to 700 horsemen. Philip commanded to lower the sarissa, and the phalanx bristled with the dagger tips of the sarissa. The battle came to a climax.
Greek types of swords: 1. Ksifos, 2. Kopis. 1 - IV century BC. Veria, Greece; 2 - IV century BC. National Archaeological Museum. Athens, Greece
The Romans, accustomed to overturning the barbarian phalanx with a hail of pilums, stumbled upon an impenetrable wall. 10 sarissas were sent to the chest of each legionnaire, which inflicted deep bleeding wounds, and the Romans fell on the stony ground wet from the rain, unable to even harm the Macedonians. And the phalanx walked forward with an even step, the Macedonians stabbed forward with the sarissa taken over the edge, and only a sudden resistance to the spear sent forward meant for the warrior of the fifth or sixth rank that he fell into the enemy. Faced with resistance, the 2nd Legion and the allies with the Aetolians began to roll back. The Aetolians still tried to fight with the phalanx, but the demoralized Romans simply ran away.
The battle was essentially lost by the Romans. King Philip was advancing quickly. On the right flank of the rushing forward right wing of the Macedonians, there were tidied up peltasts, lightly armed and mercenaries under the command of Athenagoras. Heraclides and Leontes, the best cavalry in the Balkans, were also put in order there. Nikanor Elephas led out to the crest of the hills, lowered down and sequentially deployed the left wing of the phalanx into the battle line.
If at this moment Philip could bring the cavalry into battle, the retreat of the left wing of the Romans would turn into a beating, and it would be very difficult for them to avoid defeat. The Romans were supposed to have about 1800 more horsemen who did not participate in the battle, but the quality of the Italic horsemen could not be compared with the Macedonian or Thessalian: they were all the same riding infantry as at Cannes. To preserve the battle formations of the right wing, the Romans would have to let the remnants of the 2nd Legion, pursued by the Macedonian cavalry, pass by themselves and meet the blow of the rebuilt front of the Phalangites. which, under the leadership of the king, had just defeated the enemy and to which a fresh left wing of the phalanx was being attached.
There was still some hope that the war elephants would strike, but the Romans were well aware that this branch of the army was powerless against disciplined and well-armed heavy infantry. Moreover, the only known way of using elephants to the Romans was to attack them in front of the front of their own infantry, and a closed phalanx with sarissa strikes (as happened in the Battle of Hydaspe) would force the animals to turn back to the Roman system, turning it into a crowd of people in panic. However, Philip continued the pursuit, ignoring the unprotected left flank of his wing and the deployment of the second part of the phalanx.
Fracture
Flamininus did not wait for the defeat, but turned [10] his horse and rode to the right wing, which alone could save the situation. And at that moment the consular drew attention to the formation of the Macedonian army: the left wing, in marching order, in separate speyrs crossed the ridge of the hills and began to descend from the pass in order to turn into battle formation to the left of the pursuing fleeing king. There was no cavalry or peltast cover - they all went on the right flank of Philip's successfully advancing right wing.
Then Titus Quinctius Flamininus launched an attack that changed the course of the battle. He brought out the right wing that was standing aside from the battle and moved it (60 maniples - about 6,000 heavily armed) to the left wing of the Macedonians that had risen to the ridge. Elephants marched ahead of the battle formation.
This was a turning point in the course of the battle. The phalangits, built in marching order, were not able to consistently turn the front towards the enemy on the narrow road and began to retreat in a disorderly manner, without waiting for the impact of elephants and a hail of pilums. Nicanor Elephas either hoped to regain control of the ridge of the hills when the phalanx broke away from the Romans, or succumbed to general panic.
The Romans rushed to chase. One of the tribunes held 20 maniples and turned them to the rear of Philip, who was continuing to pursue the defeated enemy. Since these maniples did not participate in the pursuit of the fleeing (Roman discipline could not have recalled them), it should be assumed that they were in the 3rd line, and these were 10 maniples of triarii and 10 maniples of principles or triarii of the allies - about 1200 in total. 1800 people
Montefortine type of helmet. Bronze, approx. 200 BC Found in Canisium (Canosa di Puglia, Italy). Baden State Museum. Karlsruhe, Germany
There was no cover on Philip's left flank - the left wing did not have time to get in, and the light infantry remained on the right flank. 20 maniples hit the flank of Philip's advancing right wing and stopped his advance. Even in this situation, Philip had a chance to stop the enemy's attack and maintain control. The fact is that before the attack, the spacers doubled their formation, and the doubling was done by withdrawing even rows to the second line. In the first rank of the second line were the protostats - the commanders of the ranks who knew how to keep the alignment and carry out marching evolutions. The Gemilohits, the commanders of the half-ranks, who were in the 8th (in this case, in the 24th) rank, were also able to do this. There was an opportunity to withdraw from the battle several "half-spars" of the left flank under the command of the Uraghs, turn them to face the enemy, stretching the front, rebuild them in 8 ranks (for this, the hemilochits took out the rear half-rows in the intervals between the front half-rows) and meet the attack with the sariss line. But for this it was necessary that the king was in control of the battle, and not chasing the fleeing legionnaires.
But there was no cover on the left flank, and the Macedonians found themselves in a difficult position. The commanders were either far ahead or in the middle of the formation, and could not get out. Uragi died in the first moments of the battle. It was very difficult to turn around in a deep formation: the aspis and huge sarissas worn on the elbow were useless in close combat and clung to the equipment. The linen cotfib, worn by the warriors of the back rows, did not protect well against the chopping blows of the wide gladius that was recently adopted by the legions. But even now the phalanx held on due to the density of the formation and heavy weapons, and the halted phalanxes, throwing the sarissas that had become useless, fought off the pressing cold and flank of the Roman swordsmen with short xyphos. The left flank of the wing still retained the ability to spontaneously, disorganized rebuilding facing the enemy. However, the forward movement of the phalanx stopped, and the Macedonian cavalry was never withdrawn to pursue from the crowd on the right flank. When the tribunes put the 1st Legion in order and the battle resumed from the front, the Phalangites wavered and fled.
Retreat
Only now the king got out of order with a small group of horsemen and peltasts, looked around and realized that the battle was lost. The left wing was randomly rolling back to the crest of the hills, while the right was swept from the front and rear and rapidly turned into a crowd of fugitives. Then the king gathered around him loyal Thracian mercenaries and Peltast-Macedonians and began to quickly retreat to the pass in order to regain control of at least the left wing there. And here there was still a hope of avoiding defeat - if only to have time to rebuild on the hill and repeat the attack by the sarissa. In case of failure, one could at least orderly retreat to the camp. But when the king reached the top, the Romans finally caught up with the retreating left wing, and the demoralized phalangites, seeing the elephants and the line of legionaries in front of them, began to raise the sarissa as a sign of surrender. Flamininus tried to avoid the beating and accept the surrender, but the soldiers had already caught up with the upset ranks of the Macedonians, and the carnage began. The crowd rushed to the pass, ran along the hillside and swept away the royal detachment. Now the defeat has become inevitable.
Outcome
The Romans pursued the enemy for a short time, while they were chasing the Macedonians, their Aetolian allies plundered the captured camp. In the evening and at night, the king broke away from the pursuit, withdrew to the Tempe Valley, gathered the fugitives and with the remaining troops blocked the passage to Macedonia. Peace talks began.
Flamininus announced 8,000 killed and 5,000 captured Macedonians - mostly from the phalanx. It was announced that the loss of the Romans amounted to 700; whether the purely Aetolians were included is unclear. 1200 Romans were ransomed in the Greek cities from among those captured and sold into slavery by Hannibal. In triumph, they carried 3730 libres of gold, 43,270 libres of silver, 14,500 Macedonian staters. The estimated contribution was to be 1,000 talents - 3,200 kg of gold and silver.
The Aetolians, provoking the well-deserved indignation of Flamininus, reviled Philip in every possible way and boasted of their victory over the Macedonians. In response to yet another insulting poem, the tsar wrote a couplet:
Here, without bark, without foliage, a pointed stake rises.
Traveler, look at him! He is waiting for Alkey to come to him.
Philip V handed over a fleet to the Romans, removed garrisons from Greek cities, and undertook to consult with Rome on foreign policy. The army was greatly reduced. Every year, the tsar recruited recruits from the peasants, conducted training in combat formation and dismissed them to their homes, preserving the appearance of a small army. After 30 years, his son Perseus had 32,000 phalanxes in the ranks and money for 10 years of war.
Publication:
Warrior No. 5, 2001, pp. 8-11
