US Army soldiers in Korea. 1950g
The second half of the twentieth century began anxiously. The Cold War was raging in the world. Former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition stood on opposite sides of the barricades, and the confrontation between them was growing. The arms race that unfolded between the NATO led by the United States, on the one hand, and the USSR with its allies, on the other, was gaining momentum. Conflicts of varying degrees of tension flared up and extinguished, hot spots arose where the interests of the parties collided. One of these points in the early 1950s was the Korean Peninsula.
Korea, annexed by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, was promised independence by the allies at the Cairo Conference (December 1, 1943). The decision was enshrined in the Postdam Statement (June 26, 1945). When Japan surrendered in World War II, the allies reached an agreement (August 15, 1945) to establish a dividing line along the 38th parallel, to the north of which Japanese troops would surrender to the USSR, to the south - to the United States. Following the terms of surrender, the USSR considered the 38th parallel to be a political border: the “Iron Curtain” was falling along it.
In accordance with the decisions of the Moscow meeting of foreign ministers, the tasks of the joint Soviet-American commission were to assist in the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and to develop appropriate measures. To this end, the Commission, when preparing its proposals, had to consult with the Korean democratic parties and public organizations. The Soviet side in the Commission relied primarily on left-wing democratic parties and organizations that expressed the will of the people. The United States relied mainly on the right-wing forces and social parties and organizations that were oriented towards capitalist America and collaborated with it in South Korea. The position taken by the United States on the issue of consultations again showed their unwillingness to listen to the voice of the Korean people, direct opposition to the creation of an independent democratic Korea. The American government deliberately tried to exclude the participation of representatives of democratic parties, trade union, peasant, women's, youth and other organizations of the South in consultations. It insisted on involving in consultations those parties and groups that opposed the Moscow decisions in December 1945.
The Soviet Union, on the contrary, pursued a line in the Commission on the broad involvement of as many Korean democratic parties and public organizations as possible, that is, those who expressed the true interests of the people, in consultations. As a result of the activities of the United States, the Commission until May 1946 was unable to come to any decisions, and its work was interrupted.
Meanwhile, the main line of political and democratic development of Korea shifted more and more to the North. Under the leadership of the Labor Party, on the basis of the reforms carried out with the active participation of the working people and the constant assistance of the Soviet Union, the process of consolidation of progressive forces was developed, the struggle for national unity and democracy, for the creation of an independent, truly people's state, intensified and expanded on a common Korean scale. North Korea became the center, uniting the efforts of the entire nation, aimed at the formation of a provisional democratic government of a united Korea. The people's power in the North pursued an initiative policy in matters of uniting the country and its political structure, coordinating the most important actions with the Soviet Union.
At the founding congress of the North Korean Workers' Party on August 29, 1946, the central task of the Korean people was defined as follows: “To overcome the anti-popular line of reaction of South Korea as soon as possible, to carry out there, as in North Korea, consistent democratic transformations and thereby build a new, democratic Korea, united and independent”. The most important condition for solving this problem was the all-round strengthening of the United Democratic National Front - the unification of all the patriotic, democratic forces of Korea.
The united front tactic, adopted by the North Korean communists as the central link in the struggle for the country's unity, has been a proven means of uniting social forces in the struggle for freedom and democracy. Put forward by the 7th Congress of the Comintern, it has already been used by the Korean communists in the course of the struggle for the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule. Now, in the conditions of the division of the country, the United Democratic National Front has become an especially relevant and effective form of struggle for a democratic solution to the problem of unification of the homeland. This line of popular power in North Korea was also relevant for another reason. In South Korea, the struggle of the masses against the policy of the American military administration, which in the Joint Commission impeded the establishment of the Provisional Government of Korea, was growing at that time. The Labor Party and the United Democratic National Front of South Korea joined this struggle. The largest action was the railroad strike, which grew into a general political action by the workers, peasants and other strata of the population, demanding, in particular, the immediate resumption of the activities of the Joint Commission. In December 1946, the Right-wing faction dispatched Syngman Rhee to Washington to persuade the United States to take responsibility for establishing a separate South Korean government. He told American ruling officials that allegedly "the Russians would not agree with the creation of a free government for all of Korea." Rhee Seung Man proposed: organize elections for the South Korean government, which should function while Korea is divided, and general elections immediately after its unification; accept this government in the UN and allow it to negotiate directly with the governments of the USSR and the USA regarding the problems of the occupation of the North and South of Korea; keep US troops in South Korea until both foreign armies are withdrawn at the same time.
Cruiser Missouri firing at North Korean positions
US Secretary of State Marshall and the head of the US military administration in South Korea, General Hodge, then rejected the plan of Rhee Seung Man and continued to insist on the trusteeship plan, arguing that it was the only correct way to unify Korea. After that, the situation inside Korea sharply deteriorated: Hodge, in a report to Washington in February 1947, wrote that a civil war was inevitable if the governments of the United States and the USSR did not take immediate measures to unite Korea. On the American side, such a "measure" was the recommendations of General D. MacArthur on the Korean question. They provided for: transferring the Korean problem to the UN General Assembly for consideration; the formation of a commission on Korea, which would consist of representatives of disinterested states, in order to monitor the Korean problem and develop recommendations on the merits of the case; further meetings between the governments of the USA, USSR, China and Great Britain in order to work out an acceptable solution for the implementation of Art.3 of the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers with regard to Korea; high-level meetings of representatives of the United States and the USSR to discuss and solve problems that impede the successful development of Korea as a political and economic association seeking to create an independent state. Thus, already in the process of the Joint Commission's work, the United States tried to lay the foundation for a future solution to the Korean problem on the American model, that is, the nucleus of a reactionary separate South Korean government was created.
After a new powerful wave of strikes and demonstrations of the working masses of South Korea, which received the unanimous support of the population of North Korea, in favor of the resumption of the activities of the Joint Commission and the active initiative of the Soviet Union in this regard, the Joint Commission resumed work on May 21, 1947.
It should be emphasized that the international situation during this period deteriorated significantly - it was the height of the Cold War, the time of the proclamation of the doctrine of "containment of communism", the tough political course of President H. Truman, the implementation of the "Marshall Plan". Nevertheless, even in such unfavorable conditions, thanks to the persistent efforts of the USSR, despite the resistance and tactics of delays on the American side, the Joint Commission nevertheless achieved some results by the end of 1947. Democratic parties and public organizations of North and South Korea submitted applications to the Joint Commission on their intention to participate in oral consultations with her, allocated their representatives for this, set out their views on the structure and principles of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local authorities and on the political platform of the Provisional Government. It is noteworthy that representatives from 39 political parties and 386 public organizations were allocated from the South Zone. They claimed to represent 52 million people, which exceeded the population of all of Korea by 20 million and testified to clear falsification and fraud. 3 parties and 35 public organizations were represented from the North. The Soviet side proposed to reduce the number of parties and groups from the South to 118, but the American side refused to do so, stating that such a step would actually lead to communist domination in the future government of Korea. Nevertheless, the first results achieved clearly and unequivocally indicated that the Korean people saw the future of the nation in independent democratic development. However, this is precisely what caused serious fears of internal and external reaction.
On September 17, 1947, another effort was made to reach an agreement with the American side: it was proposed to proceed with the implementation of those issues on which the points of view of both delegations became closer. However, in this case, too, the Commission did not receive a clear answer from the US representatives. Finally, on September 26, at a meeting of the Joint Commission on behalf of the Soviet government, a new constructive proposal was made: to withdraw both Soviet and American troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948 and to provide the Koreans themselves with the opportunity to form a national government. Thus, the Korean people opened up the prospect of restoring their independence and statehood in the shortest possible time without any outside interference. This proposal presupposed a radical solution to the Korean problem, immediately eliminating the difficulties that had arisen on the path of the allied powers fulfilling their earlier obligations. Only the United States and its South Korean protégés reacted negatively to this proposal. The refusal of the United States to accept it led in October 1947 to the termination of the activities of the Soviet-American Joint Commission.
In May 1948, separate elections were held on the territory of South Korea under the control of a UN commission created at the initiative of the United States. Former professor of Washington University Lee Seung Man was elected to the post of head of state. The government of South Korea declared itself the government of the entire country, with which, of course, the communist forces of the North did not agree. In the summer of 1948, they organized elections for the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea, which proclaimed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9. Thus, the legalization of the split of Korea into two states took place, and the government of each declared itself the only legal one.
For Kim Il Sung, the support of the USSR was especially important, which, having restored its national economy after the Second World War, was one of the most powerful powers in the world. Kim Il Sung remembered that on October 13, 1948, in a welcoming telegram to the North Korean government on the occasion of the proclamation of the DPRK, I. V. Stalin confined himself to wishing success to the new government "in its activities on the path of national revival and democratic development," without delving into the problems of further relations between the two states. Therefore, the head of the DPRK government persistently sought Moscow's consent to a visit by the DPRK government delegation to the Soviet Union. The leader of the North Korean communists needed to find out Stalin's position on the DPRK.
Since the end of 1949, relations between the two Korean states have become increasingly aggravated. Both governments claimed to unite Korea, each under their own auspices. In October 1949, South Korean President Rhee Seung Man told American sailors in Incheon that "if we have to solve this problem on the battlefield, we will do whatever is required of us." On December 30, at a press conference, he toughened up his position, saying that "we should unite North and South Korea on our own." On March 1, 1950, speaking at a rally in Seoul, Rhee Seung Man proclaimed that "the hour of Korea's unification is approaching." His defense minister was also not shy in terms. On February 9, 1950, he declared: "We are in full readiness to fight for the restoration of the lost territory and are just waiting for the order."
Another batch of ammunition for the Korean War
The United States also did a lot to, as the then American ambassador to Seoul, J. Muccio said, "to bring the time of the general offensive into the territory north of the 38th parallel." The chief military adviser of the United States in South Korea, General W. Roberts, in January 1950, five months before the start of the war, at a meeting with South Korean ministers, indicated that "we will start the attack," although he stipulated that a pretext for an attack should be created to it had a valid reason."
To the north of the 38th parallel, very militant plans were also hatched, but this was done under the cover of secrecy without broadcasting statements. Intensive supplies of weapons, military equipment, and ammunition from the USSR to North Korea continued throughout 1949. 1950 introduced nuances. On January 19, 1950, the Kremlin received an important message from Pyongyang. Soviet ambassador Shtykov reported: “In the evening, a reception was held at the Chinese embassy in connection with the departure of the ambassador. During it, Kim Il Sung told me the following: now that the liberation of China is being completed, the next question is the liberation of Korea. The guerrillas will not settle matters. I stay awake at night thinking about reunion. Mao said there was no need to advance to the South. But if Rhee Seung Man attacks, then it is necessary to launch a counteroffensive. But Lee Seung Man does not come … He, Kim Il Sung, needs to visit Stalin and ask permission to attack to liberate South Korea. Mao promised help, and he, Kim Il Sung, will meet with him. Kim Il Sung insisted on a personal report to Stalin for permission to advance to the South from the North. Kim Il Sung was in a state of some intoxication and talked in an agitated state."
Stalin was in no hurry to answer. I exchanged messages with Mao Zedong, who believed that the issue should be discussed. Only after that, on January 30, 1950, an encrypted message was sent from Stalin to Pyongyang from Moscow: “I received a message of January 19, 1950. Such a big deal needs preparation. The case must be organized so that there is no big risk. Ready to accept …"
In Pyongyang, the telegram was regarded as consent to the operation with the condition of achieving guaranteed success. After another consultation with Beijing, Stalin on February 9 agreed to prepare a large-scale operation on the Korean Peninsula, approving Pyongyang's intention to unite his homeland by military means. This was followed by a sharp increase in supplies from the USSR of tanks, artillery, small arms, ammunition, medicines, oil. At the headquarters of the Korean army, with the participation of Soviet advisers, a plan for a large-scale operation was being developed in deep secrecy, and several new Korean formations were being rapidly formed. But Stalin, having agreed to the campaign of Kim Il Sung, still hesitated. He feared US armed intervention in the conflict between North and South Korea, which could lead to unpredictable consequences, and maybe even to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers, which threatened a nuclear war. Therefore, as he believed, Moscow should, on the one hand, secure Beijing's consent to support the DPRK's actions to unify Korea by force, and on the other, distance itself as far as possible from the USSR's possible participation in the imminent conflict in order to avoid the risk of being drawn into a war with the United States., in the event of their interference in Korean affairs. The Kremlin was increasingly inclined to think that Kim Il Sung's approach to the south could be crowned with success if he acted vigorously and quickly. In this case, the North Korean army would have time to capture the southern part of Korea before the Americans could intervene in the course of events.
The position of the Americans, as it seemed to Moscow, made it possible to hope that South Korea did not occupy the first places among the American strategic priorities in the Far East. For example, US Secretary of State D. Acheson announced on January 12, 1950 that South Korea was not included in the US “revolving perimeter” in the Pacific region. "My speech," he later recalled, "opened the green light for an attack on South Korea." Of course, this statement by Acheson was heeded by the leaders of North Korea. However, the calculation was not taken - and most likely they did not know about it - another important document of the US government. In March 1950, the US National Security Council issued a directive - SNB-68, in which the government was recommended to toughly contain communism around the world. The directive stated that the USSR was more inclined to engage in "patchwork aggression" than in total war, and any failure of the United States to repulse this kind of aggression could lead to "a vicious circle of taking too hesitant and belated measures" and a gradual "loss of positions under force. by pushing ". The United States, the directive said, must be ready to confront the USSR anywhere in the world, without making a distinction between "vital and peripheral interests." On September 30, 1950, US President Harry Truman approved this directive, which fundamentally changed the US approach to defending South Korea.
Meanwhile, the DPRK was finishing preparations for the first large-scale offensive operation against the troops of Syngman Rhee. Encouraged by the support of his great neighbors - the USSR and the PRC - Kim Il Sung ordered the invasion. At dawn on June 25, 1950, the troops of the Korean People's Army (KPA) launched an offensive into the interior of the Republic of Korea. When the North Koreans were developing an offensive to the South, Kim Il Sung asked to send Soviet advisers directly to the units fighting on the front lines. Moscow was refused. However, with the outbreak of the war, despite the major successes of the North Korean troops, foreign policy events did not develop as expected in Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing. From the very first days of the war, the conflict was internationalized as a result of active US intervention in it. In order to prevent American participation in the war from being interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of Korea, the US political leadership took care to make the actions of its troops legitimate from the point of view of international law. The United States has put to a vote in the UN Security Council the question of turning the American expeditionary forces in Korea into "UN troops." This action could have been prevented by using the veto, but the Soviet representative to the UN, Ya. A. Malik, at the direction of Moscow, left the UN Security Council meeting, which was a major blunder of Stalin's diplomacy. In addition to the United States, 15 more states were involved in the "campaign against communism", although American troops, of course, formed the basis of the interventionist corps.
Although the war was between the two Koreas, it is clearly visible that these two states were just puppets for the USSR and the United States. After all, the Korean War was the first and largest conflict since the end of the Second World War. Based on this, one can judge that Korea became the starting point for the beginning of the Cold War. One cannot but take into account the fact that the UN General Assembly at that time was under the noticeable influence of America, which, in turn, also greatly influenced the course of the history of the Korean War. The United States became an aggressor in relation to not only North Korea, but also South Korea, as it strongly put pressure on the ruling circles headed by Rhee Seung Man. Many sources of that time say that it was only under pressure from the United States that South Korea launched an offensive against the DPRK.
