Sukhoi Superjet 100. Wings clipped

Sukhoi Superjet 100. Wings clipped
Sukhoi Superjet 100. Wings clipped

Video: Sukhoi Superjet 100. Wings clipped

Video: Sukhoi Superjet 100. Wings clipped
Video: This is Why You Never Mess With a Royal Guard... 2024, April
Anonim

Created from scratch, the XXI aircraft turned out to be one of the most advertised technical projects in modern Russia. He had to show that our country is still in the game and is capable of taking serious positions in the global aviation industry. However, more than 10 years have passed since the first flight, and the small regional airliner SSJ-100 remains on the margins of not only world, but even Russian passenger traffic. What is the reason for such an attitude towards an aircraft that is quite advanced from a technical point of view?

In full compliance with international integration, 80% of the aircraft structure consists of foreign components. At least this share was included in the original project. And here lies the main problem: Russia lacks the competence and experience in creating a competitive technical filling for civil aircraft. That is, we can do it, but it will turn out either very expensive, or there will be problems with international certification. Therefore, the motors were created together with France (Snecma) and the USA (Boeing), the interior was given to the Italians, the control system to the Germans, and the list of this borrowing goes on for a long time. Such cooperation, of course, brought a lot of new things to our developers from the Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Design Bureau, but in the end, Russia only had to design the center section, wings, fuselage and assemble the car on the stocks. Agree, this is not much different from the screwdriver assembly of Western cars at factories in Kaluga, Vsevolozhsk and Kaliningrad. All this makes our aircraft industry dependent on Western technologies. And the recent example with the "black wing" MC-21 is a clear confirmation of this. Particularly painful is the presence of components in the SSJ-100 from the United States.

Image
Image
Image
Image

In 2018, Russia and Iran intended to sign agreements on the supply of 40 airliners, but the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal and renewed anti-Iranian sanctions. At the moment, the whole story is in limbo and is about to break down: the United States may not give the go-ahead for the "resale" of its components to a hostile country. Moreover, in connection with the anti-Russian hysteria, the SSJ-100 generally becomes "toxic" for many foreign carriers. Thus, the Latvian AirBaltic in 2015 intended to buy several of our short-haul liners, but after appropriate consultations with the country's political leadership, it abandoned the idea.

Of course, the developers of the aircraft in the early 2000s could not lay such risks. SSJ-100 became hostage to the political situation. The first problem logically leads to great difficulties with the sale of the liner. By selling the aircraft only on the domestic market, the manufacturer will never recoup all development and production costs. Here it is necessary at least to close the Russian market from new and used Airbus and Boeing products. In the initial plans, Sukhoi had to collect more than 800 aircraft by 2031, later this level was lowered to 595, which is about 35-40 aircraft per year. In 2017, 33 SSJs were assembled, and in 2018 - only 24 aircraft. And 2019 is unlikely to be a breakthrough in this direction. In total, at the beginning of 2019, 162 airliners were produced, and 136 winged aircraft are in active operation. The schedule lag is very serious.

Image
Image
Image
Image

Initially, Russia spent more than $ 2 billion on the development of the aircraft, hoping that the civilian direction of the Sukhoi would become self-sufficient. It didn't work out … By 2014, the total amount of the company's debts exceeded 2.6 billion.dollars, and the state had to save the situation with injections of 100 billion rubles. Auditors were sent to the office, and it turned out that Sukhoi Civil Aircraft was extremely ineffective in spending funds. Thus, the first buyers of the cars were offered unique discounts: Aeroflot bought an SSJ-100 at a price of $ 18.6 million overboard, while the catalog lists $ 35.4 million. Following the scandal of the President of the United Aircraft Corporation and the ideological mastermind of the SSJ-100, Mikhail Poghosyan, was transferred to the honorary position of rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute.

In the hope of increasing the competitive advantages of the Superjet, the state has developed a program for the modernization of the machine and the creation of new versions. It costs 6 billion rubles and involves the development of a shortened version for 75 seats, which will have an increase in the share of Russian components, avionics, wing, motors and fuselage are being deeply modernized. All this will result in a reduction in weight, an improvement in aerodynamic quality and a reduction in specific fuel consumption. A car with an expanded up to 110 seats, as well as a cargo version are currently under development. It will not be long to wait for new modifications, until 2023. The plans include a light version of the modernization, named SSJ-100R, in which the percentage of domestic components should be increased. Life support systems, hydraulic pipes and parts of the on-board cable network will be replaced with Russian counterparts.

In fairness, it should be noted that the SSJ-100 appeared on the market in an era when new civilian airliners were not supposed to be born at all: the whole initiative is now in the hands of the Boeing and Airbus duopoly. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of buyers, especially abroad, are reluctant to pay attention to new market players. It is much easier and safer to work with trusted manufacturers, who, moreover, have long established a high-quality service. Try convincing a company like Lufthanza to buy the Superjet instead of the mega-popular Airbus A320. In Russia, all operators are somehow connected either with the state or with leasing companies controlled by the state. These are Aeroflot with its 50 Superjets, Gazpromavia with 10 airliners, and Yakutia with Yamal. The only exceptions are the private Azimut, which has bought 17 cars, and S7, which has expressed a desire to purchase one hundred SSJs for 75 seats at once. The special squad "Russia" also has plans for 10 "shortened" aircraft. The "Profile" edition mentions the possible replacement of the Tu-134 fleet by "Superjets" by the Ministry of Defense, but the share of foreign components in the design casts doubt on this information. Overseas, SSJs now fly in the interests of the Mexican Interjet, the Irish CitiJet, the Royal Thai Air Force, the governments of Kazakhstan and Malta. This is a drop in the ocean of the global aviation business. But preliminary agreements have been signed with the Peruvians, Thais and Slovaks, which, however, do not bind anyone to anything.

Image
Image
Image
Image

On average, the reliability of the Sukhoi civil aircraft is at a fairly high level, but the service is seriously letting down. If Boeing and Airbus are ready to deliver the necessary element literally in a matter of hours to anywhere in the world, then the Russian manufacturer has natural problems with this. The lack of service centers due to the scanty presence in the market entails a low quality of service for aircraft malfunctions. And nobody will develop the service to the detriment of profitability. It turns out to be a classic vicious circle. As a result, the SSJ-100 flies on average 3.1 hours a day, and only in Russia for foreign cars this figure is almost three times higher.

But Sukhoi Civil Aircraft are not standing still and are actively building up stocks of repair kits, opening a round-the-clock technical support service and expanding the network of service stations. However, competitors-mega-monsters Boeing and Airbus are not asleep - they have taken small players such as Bombardier and Embraer under their wing, thereby increasing their market share.

In general, the situation is not very good for the Superjet. However, the lack of competition in the market, and the duopoly is close to this, often leads to technological stagnation. We have not seen anything new in civil aviation for several decades. Only minor improvements are visible, which are often controversial. And two crashes of Boeing-737 MAX 8 are clear confirmation of this. It is quite possible that a redistribution of the market is coming, in which there will be a place for the SSj-100 and its older brother MS-21.

The material used the information resources of the "Profile" edition.

Recommended: