What the Ground Forces need in this century
An attack on infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) is used on the terrain accessible to them during an offensive against an enemy who hastily went over to the defensive, in the absence of organized resistance, and also when the enemy's defense is reliably suppressed and most of its anti-tank weapons are destroyed. We are publishing a discussion material dedicated to finding the best ways to protect motorized rifle units when attacking fortified positions.
You can't act like that
The tactics of the infantry offensive on the enemy's defenses was worked out during the Great Patriotic War. At first, the enemy's defense was subjected to shelling from cannons, mortars, multiple launch rocket systems, and a bomb attack was delivered on it. During the attack, the infantry moved behind the tanks on foot. A moving barrage was organized in front of the tanks (explosions of their shells and mines) at a distance of at least 200 meters. At the same time, the infantry suffered heavy losses from small arms bullets and shrapnel.
Almost 70 years have passed since then. How should modern motorized rifle subunits (platoon, company and others) attack the enemy's defenses? The attack tactics of a motorized rifle platoon (company) depends primarily on the armored vehicles that are in service with the Ground Forces (Land Forces). Currently, these are tanks (T-90 and others) and infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-3 and others). Theoretically, two options for a platoon attack are possible, if any.
The first is that a tank is involved in the attack, followed by three BMP-3s with 30 soldiers (nine people - the crew and 21 people - the landing party). In this case, the landing in the BMP begins to move from the line of attack and practically does not participate in the battle until it is disembarked from the vehicles.
In the second variant, a motorized rifle platoon (MSV) attacks as follows: a tank is in front, then motorized riflemen on foot, followed by three BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, which fire over the heads of the motorized riflemen. It is these two attack options that are prescribed by the modern Combat Regulations for the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat, put into effect by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of August 31, 2004 No. 130 (Part 2. Battalion, company. Part 3. Platoon, compartment, tank).
Figure 1 shows a diagram of an attack by an MSV on foot on a fortified enemy defense according to the current Combat Manual. A tank is moving ahead, followed by three motorized rifle squads (MSO) on foot, 21 people in total. Further - three BMP-3 (crew - three people). The commander of the attacking platoon is one of the commanders of the BMP-3.
What are the main disadvantages of this tactic?
If the first option is implemented (an attack by an infantry fighting vehicle with a landing party), then the probability of the death of three combat vehicles along with 30 soldiers is high, since the BMP-3 is vulnerable in front to armor-piercing sub-caliber feathered projectiles (BOPS) of 30-50 mm caliber used by modern foreign BMP "Puma" (Germany), CV-90 (Sweden) and others. The armor-piercing of these projectiles reaches 200 millimeters when interacting with the target vehicle along the normal at a distance of up to 100 meters. The aluminum side of the BMP-3, 40 mm thick, is pierced by armor-piercing 20-40 mm shells at almost any angle. The main disadvantage of this attack option is that the landing force (21 people) does not actually participate in the battle.
Let's consider the second variant of the attack. The speed of movement of the shooters is low (five to seven kilometers per hour), the soldiers have weak protection (body armor). Weapons (assault rifle, RPG) are practically unsuitable for dealing with enemy firing points (tanks dug into the ground, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, concrete pillboxes). Therefore, there is a high probability of the destruction of all three MCOs even before they approach the front line of the enemy's defense.
Thus, modern armored vehicles (BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3, BTR-80, BTR-90) are unsuitable for a successful attack against fortified enemy defenses and in its depths. Their use does not prevent the high probability of destruction of soldiers and officers of motorized rifle units, as well as equipment. Both options prescribed by the Combat Manual for attacking fortified enemy defenses are not suitable.
The problems are the same
Currently, the RF Ministry of Defense has stopped purchasing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but is carrying out R&D work on the creation of three types of armored vehicles: heavy - tracked (tanks and "heavy" infantry fighting vehicles), medium - on wheels (armored personnel carriers) and light (armored vehicles of the "Tiger"). With regard to the topic of this article, we are interested in a "heavy" infantry fighting vehicle (TBMP) on the Armata platform, which should be designed on the same base as the new tank by 2015. However, the future system of combat vehicles will also be unable to eliminate the costs of the considered options for attacking the enemy's fortified defenses.
The first option (for MSV): the enemy's defense is attacked by the Armata tank and three TBMPs with a landing party on board (most likely - 21 people), which are not participating in the battle during the attack. There is a high probability that these TBMPs will be destroyed along with the crews and the landing force (30 people in total). For this, ammunition can be used that is poorly countered by domestic active and dynamic protection: tank BOPS М829A3 (USA) with armor-piercing 800 mm; cumulative ammunition operating on the flight over the roofs of vehicles - ATGM Bill (Sweden), Tow 2B (USA); cluster self-aiming ammunition with a shock core - SMArt-155 (Germany), SADARM (USA).
In the second variant of the attack, a chain of motorized riflemen is moving behind the tank, as before, on foot, behind which there are three TBMPs. Poorly protected and poorly armed infantrymen are essentially range targets for defending soldiers. Therefore, there is a high probability of their complete destruction during an attack, and even more so in the depths of the enemy's defense.
Thus, the fundamental shortcomings of the attack options using modern armored vehicles (weak protection of dismounted motorized riflemen, a high probability of destroying TBMPs with a landing force, non-participation of the landing force in the vehicles in battle) are not eliminated.
Consequently, if the rearmament of the Ground Forces with TBMPs takes place, which will require multibillion-dollar costs, the combat effectiveness of motorized rifle units will remain in the same unsatisfactory state as it is today.
The main mistake in the formation of a system of armored combat vehicles for motorized rifle subunits (platoon, company) is that BMP (BMP-3 and projected TBMP - heavy tracked "Armata" and medium tracked "Kurganets-25") are endowed with two functions: 1) transportation of troops in the front line, participation in the defense of our forces; 2) participation in an attack on the enemy's defense and in a battle in the depths of the enemy's defense. For the second function, the BMP is unsuitable even if it has protection at the tank level.
BMS required
We propose to have two specialized vehicles: one for the transport of troops in the frontal zone (for example, BMP-3) and the second, which is maximally adapted for contact combat during an attack and breakthrough of defense. Such a vehicle must have the necessary weapons to combat buried tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, pillboxes, infantry in trenches, reliable protection against massive fire, mobility not less than that of tanks, and a minimum number of soldiers in an attacking vehicle.
In this case, another tactic of attacking a fortified defense is necessary. It involves both traditional combat vehicles (modernized T-72, T-80, T-90 or "Armata"), and ten soldier's combat vehicles (BMS). The crew of each BMS consists of three people - the commander, gunner and driver.
Figure 2 shows a diagram of a platoon attack with a BMS: a tank (three people), a BMS (30 people) and a command vehicle (four people). All 37 motorized riflemen are actively fighting during the attack. They are well protected and armed.
In a platoon with a BMS, it is also advisable to have an assault vehicle (SM). BMS uses a modular principle of armor protection. Without removable armor, the mass of the BMS is 12-14 tons, and with removable armor - 25. The machine in the version with a mass of 12-14 tons can be used by the Airborne Forces. The equivalent armor penetration thickness in the frontal projection of the BMS is at least 200 millimeters, and on the side of the sides - 100. The frontal part of the BMS is capable of withstanding the impact of a modern BOPS to 30-50 mm guns, and the side armor "holds" this projectile at an angle of 60 degrees from normals.
BMS should have the following types of protection: active type "Arena" and modern dynamic against cumulative anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and anti-tank hand grenades (RPG). BMS can be successfully used in military operations in cities and mountains. The ratio of engine power to mass and the amount of ground pressure in the BMS is not worse than that of the tank.
BMS can be quickly and relatively cheap (cheaper than the basic BMP) created on the basis of the BMP-3, since these vehicles are used as the same fighting compartment (combat module - BM) "Bakhcha-U" (100-mm rifled gun with an ammunition load of 40 high-explosive fragmentation shells, a 30-mm cannon with 500 rounds, a machine gun of 7, 62 mm with 2000 rounds, four ATGMs of 100 mm), and the same engine compartment with an UTD-32T engine with a capacity of 660 horsepower. The main difference between the BMS (it does not have an assault force) and the BMP-3M (with an assault force) is in the hull material. Modular armor - in the first case, aluminum - in the second. In addition, these vehicles have different sizes: the BMS is almost 1.5 times shorter than the BMP-3. The mass of the BMP-3M and BMS is practically the same.
Preliminary calculations showed that if the cost of the TBMP is comparable to the cost of the tank, and the cost of the BMP is not higher than the cost of the BMP-3, which is half the cost of the T-90 tank, then the cost of arming the platoon in the first scenario will be 4C, where C is the cost of the T- 90. Platoon weapons cost in the second scenario is 6C.
However, the increased security and fire capabilities of a platoon with a BMS (second scenario) make it possible to use in an offensive not a motorized rifle company (MSR, 12 combat vehicles and 99 soldiers) against a defending platoon, as prescribed by the Combat Regulations, but only one platoon with a BMS. In this case, the “cost of the offensive” in the second scenario will be two times less (6C versus 12C). By the way, the determination of the optimal front size in the second scenario requires research.
Improvement paths
The effectiveness of a platoon with a BMS can be significantly increased if an assault vehicle (SHM) is added to the tank-10 BMS system, which can be created by upgrading T-72, T-80, T-90 tanks or based on the Armata platform. In this case, the 125-millimeter cannon is replaced by a 152-millimeter howitzer that fires the same rounds (OFS, adjustable Centimeter or controlled Krasnopol) as the Msta self-propelled howitzer. CMM allows you to increase the maximum firing range for a platoon from seven to 13 kilometers. At the same time, in many cases, there is no need to turn to the help of long-range artillery or aviation, which gives a gain in time and accuracy of hitting the target. This makes it possible to implement the principle of “saw and fire”.
The most important problem for a platoon with a BMS is firing at invisible targets of the OFS and guided projectiles such as "Arkan" and "Krasnopol". To ensure effective firing, UAVs with a flight range of 20-25 kilometers of the Eleron-3 type developed by ENIKS are required.
To control 12 combat vehicles in a platoon with BMS, a command vehicle (CM) is needed, which, when attacking, moves together with the CMM behind the BMS and the tank (Fig. 2). The platoon commander is directly subordinate to four people: the commanders of the tank and the CMM, as well as two commanders of the MSO, each of which has five BMS (recall, in the old type of platoon there are three MSOs). All BMS must have communication with each other, they are controlled by the CM, which is equipped with a combat information and control system (CIUS), and also receives timely information about the tactical situation in its zone of responsibility from a higher echelon. Thus, all BMS should be informationally integrated into the automated command and control system (ACCS) of the tactical level and be one of the strike and fire elements of the network-centric combat system, uniting various types of weapons into a single reconnaissance and information field (ERIP).
ACCS should begin to be created precisely at the tactical level (platoon, company), and in our army it is stubbornly built from above. Such an automated control system, which is now being created (ESU TZ), will practically not function both with the existing system of combat vehicles (based on the T-90 tank and BMP-3) and with the promising one (the Armata tank and TBMP). The ACCS operation ends as soon as poorly protected and weakly armed motorized riflemen leave the BMP and begin an attack on foot under intense fire.
A platoon and a company with a BMS should provide individual vehicles and, above all, a tank with collective protection from air attack and tank-dangerous forces. The platoon must conduct electronic warfare (EW), prevent the guidance of precision guided munitions and be protected from helicopters and aircraft. The technical characteristics of the BM "Bakhcha-U" ensure the defeat of modern helicopters and attack aircraft, but in addition to these goals, it is necessary to deal with reconnaissance and strike UAVs, self-aiming combat elements with a shock core of the SADARM type, ATGMs that strike a tank from above and are inaccessible for destruction using the complex "Arena". To combat these targets, it is necessary to attach the Tor-M2 type air defense system to the company during the offensive.
Wars of the future
Today, industrial and military robots are being intensively developed in many countries. So, in the United States, since 2003, a program for creating a system of armored combat vehicles has been carried out, within the framework of which lightly armored vehicles with crews (combat vehicles for reconnaissance and determination of the tactical situation, medical, repair), as well as combat and support robots (for mine clearance and transportation), have been designed. four types of UAVs. The main idea of the program is that the developed system of machines should have a unified control system, the latest communications, reconnaissance and target designation. This allows the lightly armored protection of vehicles to compensate for the ability to outstrip the enemy in determining the tactical situation, the speed of decision-making and inflicting fire damage.
Undoubtedly, such advantages of troops sharply raise their combat effectiveness. It will increase significantly if combat vehicles have reliable armor, dynamic and active protection. The widespread use of combat vehicle-robots (BMR) for the ground forces will allow the transition from the principle of "shooting soldier" (XX century) to the principle of "soldier in command" (XXI century), which will significantly reduce losses in manpower.
Russia has fundamental scientific and technical groundwork in the field of robotics, both military and civil. This makes it possible to carry out development work on the creation of BMRs, suitable for offensive and battles in the depth of defense. In particular, the previously considered BMS is potentially prepared for conversion into a BIS, since the Bakhcha-U BM is largely automated. The BMR can be controlled by soldiers from the BMS from a distance of 500-1000 meters. In this case, a platoon with a BMR will be armed with 10 BMRs, 10 BMSs, a robot tank, ShM, KM. The staff is 40 people.
Figure 3 shows a diagram of an attack by a platoon with a BMR: a total of 37 people and 23 vehicles. At the same time, the principle of waging war in the 21st century is implemented, when robots conduct a contact battle with the enemy, and soldiers from the BMS control these robots, which guarantees minimal losses in manpower. According to our estimates, a platoon with a BMP has a firepower eight times higher than that of an MCV with an BMP-3, and also has significantly more reliable protection.
Consider the possible options for the structure and composition of motorized rifle subunits (platoon, company, battalion and brigade) of the ground forces when equipping them with BMS and BMR. The main stages of offensive operations should be taken into account (concentration of troops near the line of attack, attack, battle in the depth of defense, consolidation of captured positions), while each stage requires its own system of combat vehicles.
Platoon with BMS. To attack and fight in the depths of the defense, four combat vehicles are needed: a tank, BMS, SHM and KM (a total of 13 vehicles and 40 people). A platoon with a BMS advances when a platoon of the enemy breaks through to the defense. After the capture of a strong point, it is necessary to secure this territory by a platoon of motorized riflemen, that is, each platoon with an BMC must be supported by a platoon of "ordinary" motorized riflemen (three infantry fighting vehicles and 30 people). The BMP-2 and BMP-3, as well as the projected TBMP on the Armata and Kurganets-25 platforms, are suitable as such BMPs. For the first time, preference should be given to the BMP-3, since the production of these machines has been established. In addition, BMS, BMP-3M, BMD-4M have a high level of unification for BM "Bakhcha-U" and the engine compartment with the UTD-32T engine. This allows you to reduce production and operating costs. In addition, the BMP-3 is a well-armed amphibious vehicle necessary for the ground forces to quickly overcome water obstacles and organize defense on the opposite shore.
A company with a BMS. Each company must have two platoons with BMP (80 people and 26 vehicles) and two platoons with BMP-3M (60 people, 6 BMP-3M). Such a structure will make it possible to have a combat-ready unit capable of independently conducting the main stages of an offensive under the command of the company commander: an attack on two platoons in defense, a battle in the depths of defense, and anchoring captured enemy platoon support points. Thus, a company with an BMS will consist of four platoons and will be armed with 20 BMS, two tanks, two CMM, two KMs and six BMP-3Ms (a total of 32 vehicles and 140 people).
Battalion with BMS. If the battalion has three companies (420 people, 60 BMS, six tanks, six CMM, six KM and 18 BMP-3), and a motorized rifle brigade has three battalions, then a brigade with a BMS will have 1260 motorized riflemen, 180 BMS, 18 tanks, 18 ShM, 18 KM and 54 BMP-3. In total, a full-scale modern brigade has 4,500 people, and of them no more than one third of motorized riflemen. In a new type brigade, this proportion of motorized rifle and other units (missile, artillery, engineering) will remain.
It makes no sense to compare the combat effectiveness of a brigade with a BMS and a "regular" brigade with an BMP-3 (or TBMP after 2015). In the first case, all 1260 soldiers are prepared to participate in a successful attack and battle in the depth of defense, since they are well protected and have the necessary weapons, while in the second case, two-thirds of motorized riflemen essentially do not participate in the battle when attacking the BMP-3 (or TBMP) with a landing party on board.
Again, the probability of the destruction of motorized riflemen during an attack on foot is extremely high, therefore, modern motorized rifle brigades are practically unsuitable for attacking fortified defenses and fighting in its depths.
It would be a big mistake to equip motorized rifle brigades with "heavy" infantry fighting vehicles instead of BMPs, since hundreds of billions of rubles spent will not give a noticeable increase in combat effectiveness when solving the tasks considered.
