Despite the fact that surface ships with guided missile weapons possess powerful air defense systems, aviation in naval warfare continues and will continue to retain its importance as a reconnaissance and strike weapon. The presence of deck (naval) aviation significantly increases the detection range of the enemy, and the search capabilities of a ship or group of ships, and the range at which a ship formation can attack a detected target, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
However, carrier-based aircraft, firstly, requires aircraft carrier ships, and, secondly, it costs a lot of money. And it is not known which is more expensive - planes fight, pilots die and retire, and keeping the carrier-based aircraft "in good shape" requires really large funds, even without connection with the cost of aircraft carrier ships.
Fleets that are limited in funding or limited by the capabilities of the shipbuilding industry and are unable to build a full-fledged aircraft carrier ship (or at least a universal amphibious assault ship with the possibility of basing aircraft), there is no opportunity to have their own carrier-based aircraft, or it is limited.
Alas, this applies fully to Russia. Our naval aviation is going through frankly bad times - the only aircraft carrier undergoing repairs, the completion date of which is very vague, the intensity of combat training leaves much to be desired, and the pace of fleet renewal is insufficient. As a class, there are no shipborne AWACS aircraft, ship transport and anti-submarine aircraft.
And, most importantly, there are almost no ships for this.
In general, such a heap of problems is simply physically impossible to solve quickly, even if there is the necessary money, which is not and in the foreseeable future will not be. And this means that it is necessary either to abandon naval aviation altogether, or to look for some way out that will allow to “close” this direction at a low cost, to look for some kind of “asymmetric” solution.
At present, there is a technical possibility to partially compensate for the lack of full-fledged naval aviation in Russia by the widespread use of special naval combat helicopters, which could perform their tasks based on surface ships that are part of the naval strike groups.
Can helicopters aboard URO ships and amphibious assault ships of the Russian Navy take on some of the tasks that, in theory, should be solved in a comprehensive manner by forces based on full-fledged aircraft carrier aircraft - both naval aircraft and helicopters?
The answer is yes, they can. And this is confirmed not only by various theoretical studies and exercises, but also by a relatively "fresh" by historical standards, combat experience. It makes sense to analyze this experience and, through its "prism", evaluate what capabilities the Russian Navy has, or rather may have, if a decision is made to widely use helicopters of various types in the course of naval operations (and not only on occasional flights of anti-submarine Ka-27 with BOD, corvettes and cruisers). First, some theory and technical details.
Rotary-winged fighters and their capabilities
The US Navy's combat instructions OPNAV (Operation Planning, Naval is the American analogue of our General Staff of the Navy) oblige the helicopter aviation of the Navy to be able to perform more than two hundred types of combat missions, which can be summarized in the following groups:
1. Air operations to combat sea mines (see article “Death from nowhere. About the mine war at sea. Part 2).
2. Strikes against surface targets
3. Anti-submarine warfare.
4. Transport tasks
5. Search and rescue operations.
6. Fulfillment of combat missions during special operations (Direct action - direct action. For example, the evacuation of a special forces group under fire).
7. Evacuation and transportation of the wounded and sick (including in the course of "Operations other than war", for example, during emergency natural actions).
8. Evacuation of personnel from dangerous areas (no search)
9. Reconnaissance above the sea surface
10. Strikes against ground targets.
As you can see, this does not include amphibious operations, which are carried out by helicopters of the Marine Corps in the US Navy.
In general, it is worth agreeing with the Americans that it is precisely such a "gentleman's set" that the naval helicopter aviation of the Navy should be able to carry out, if its development is brought to the maximum of its combat capabilities. Let's consider how this is done technically and immediately stipulate what limitations the Navy will face when trying to acquire the same capabilities.
Let's start with mine action.
In the US Navy, there are two helicopters focused on combating sea mines. The first is the MH-53E, which is mainly used as a towing vehicle for a helicopter mine sweep, and the second is the MH-60S, which is equipped with anti-mine means, which is part of the anti-mine "module" for LCS ships. The latter carries on board disposable NPA-destroyers of mines, dropped into the sea directly from the air and controlled from the helicopter itself. A laser system capable of “scanning” the water column in search of mines at the bottom should be used as a mine detection tool. Alas for the Americans, the system has not yet reached operational readiness. The MH-60S can be based on absolutely any warship, and the MN-53E can be based only on UDC, DVKD, or even on aircraft carriers, however, the latter is not entirely typical for an anti-mine helicopter. Someone may notice that we can get by with basic helicopters at all, but this is not the case.
In addition to war, the Navy must be ready to carry out humanitarian operations in any part of the planet, including demining. Thus, shipborne helicopters are definitely needed.
What limitations do we have?
Firstly, the Ka-27PS is the only serial platform on the basis of which a trawl towing vehicle with a ship-based capability can be quickly created. In the future, perhaps, its place will be taken by the Lamprey, but so far this is more of a project than a real helicopter.
Secondly, the only ships on which mine-action aircraft can be based without claims from other personnel in terms of habitability are the Project 11711 BDK, which has a hangar and sufficient internal volumes to accommodate crews and various equipment. There are two such ships in the Navy. Two more completely different ships, but with the same project number, were laid down on April 22, 2019. While they are enveloped in the "fog of obscurity." It is known that the project has not been completed, there is no clarity on which power plant will be used on the ships, and in general, this tab was a profanation. The joy was somewhat premature. Alas, these are the facts that have already become known today. Therefore, for now, these ships should not be taken into account. Let them first begin to build at least.
However, it is important for Russia to have an anti-mine force independent of any offshore operations. This means that in any case we need to make trawl towing helicopters, and make them much more than can be accommodated on ships.
Thus, the combat use of helicopters as part of anti-mine forces based on surface ships will simply need to be worked out on the existing BDK. They have already been built, and helicopters are to be built anyway.
With strikes against surface targets, everything is somewhat more complicated.
On the one hand, Russia has a very good specialized Ka-52K Katran attack helicopter. This is, without exaggeration, a unique machine, moreover, its potential is completely undeveloped. So in order for these helicopters to be used in a war at sea against a more or less serious enemy, they need to replace the radar. There is a project for the integration of a radar based on the N010 Zhuk-AE into this helicopter, it was generally conceived with it, and these developments will need to be implemented, otherwise the role of the Ka-52K as a strike vehicle will be seriously limited. If the helicopter is upgraded, it will become a truly deadly "player" in naval warfare. Especially considering the possible use of the X-35 missile from this helicopter. However, the use of combat attack helicopters in naval battles will be considered separately.
However, there is a problem along the way.
Since we have almost no aircraft carriers, the combat helicopters will have to be based on surface ships with guided missile weapons (URO). Moreover, taking into account the fact that it will not always be possible to use the BDK together with the URO ships (in the absence of the need for operations against the coast or demining, it is undesirable to include the BDK in the operational compound - it cannot break away from the enemy by moving along with URO ships due to the low speed and worse seaworthiness). And each place in the hangar occupied by a specialized attack helicopter will mean that there will be one less anti-submarine helicopter in the compound - and it is submarines that are today considered in most countries as the main means of fighting surface ships.
Is this acceptable?
It is not for nothing that the US Navy (if America has a variety of attack helicopters) is based on URO ships practically only SN / MH-60 of various modifications. When the Americans needed a means to attack from the air small-sized weakly protected targets, such as motorboats with terrorists, it was on these helicopters that the Hellfire ATGM "got up". When the US Navy needed the ability to launch air strikes against armed surface ships from these helicopters, it was on these helicopters that the AGM-114 "Penguin" anti-ship missile system was installed. Why is that?
Because there is no one to rely on at sea, and a universal helicopter is more useful than a specialized attack helicopter. So, the same anti-submarine Ka-27 can, if necessary, transport people, a lying wounded, a spare part from ship to ship. At the same time, there is no urgent need for armor, a cannon and ejection seats for a "pure" naval helicopter. The Ka-52K, with all its potential, will not be able to perform transport missions and will not be able to perform PLO missions. While armed with missiles and having the appropriate on-board radio-electronic equipment, the Ka-27 version can do everything. And this is not an exaggeration.
The Ka-27 was used to test the Kh-35 anti-ship missiles. This helicopter is systematically involved in solving transport and even amphibious missions during naval exercises. It's not even worth talking about anti-submarine missions - this is its direct purpose, although, frankly, its GAS in modern conditions is no good even for the modernized version. The helicopter needs to be altered, but the trick is that the domestic aviation industry is quite capable of doing this. There are all the technologies and developments, the problem is of an administrative nature, usual for the Navy.
This does not mean that the Ka-52K is inapplicable in operations in the far sea zone, it means that more often than not there will be no place for it. But, firstly, sometimes there will still be, and secondly, there are also joint operations with the near sea zone, and in the coastal zone, where the rotation of helicopters on ships, on the same corvettes, can generally be carried out. There is a threat of a submarine - on board the Ka-27, there is no threat of a submarine, we are changing it to the Ka-52K, which is used for strikes against enemy ships and along the coast. Then we change again.
One way or another, but in order to gain full-fledged capabilities for the destruction of surface targets, it is necessary to modernize the Ka-52K, and create a new modification of the Ka-27 capable of carrying both anti-submarine weapons, GAS, buoys for searching for submarines, and guided missiles of various types, especially anti-ship ones, and possibly anti-radar, airborne machine guns in the doors, and even better - in the doors overlooking both sides.
For transport and rescue tasks, you need a winch for lifting loads and the ability to place a stretcher, you need a thermal imager that can detect a person on the surface of the water and a television viewing system that works at low light levels. Modern electronics allows you to "pack" all this into a 12-ton helicopter. It might be worth installing a spotlight.
Interestingly, the same thermal imager, a winch, pylons for rocket weapons and machine guns are needed to use a helicopter in the interests of special forces. Of course, infrared interference systems will also be needed to protect against heat-guided missiles and radio jamming systems, but this is a priori needed on any military helicopter, moreover, this is all already used in the videoconferencing system, mastered by industry, is produced and does not weigh much. The Vitebsk defense system, for example, has shown itself very well in Syria. During the battles for Palmyra, Anna-News reported footage of the militants firing missiles from MANPADS at our helicopters, but they just flew past, without capturing a helicopter equipped with a defense complex. There is no problem equipping a Ka-27 helicopter with the same.
Of the other tasks, only reconnaissance and strikes on the ground are worth mentioning separately.
Reconnaissance tasks over the sea cannot be solved without an airborne radar. Moreover, for a naval strike group as a reconnaissance tool, it is much more "interesting" not to the Ka-27, even if equipped with a modern radar (presumably the same as the hypothetical modernized Ka-52K), but the Ka-31 AWACS helicopter or some its further development.
It is the AWACS helicopter that may not be enough for the ship's strike group in order, for example, to detect in advance the work of enemy air reconnaissance or an enemy helicopter at low altitude, preparing to launch anti-ship missiles at the ships from a safe distance, and most importantly, it is much easier to repulse an air attack with it. Although it unmasks the connection, it is often impossible to do without such a tool.
There is nothing new on board our surface ships with AWACS helicopters. In 1971, the Ka-25Ts helicopter entered service with the USSR Navy aviation, which, due to a combination of flight altitude and a powerful radar, can detect a large surface ship at a distance of up to 250 kilometers from the helicopter. And these helicopters were based on both Soviet cruisers and BODs, providing naval strike or search and strike groups of the Navy with the opportunity to "look beyond the horizon", and very far, even by today's standards. Ka-25Ts provided not only reconnaissance, but also aimed launches of heavy anti-ship missiles of the Soviet fleet over long distances.
Currently, the Ka-35 helicopter tested in Syria is ready for serial production in Russia. Its combat capabilities are incomparably higher than that of the old Ka-25Ts or even the Ka-31, used from the board of the Admiral Kuznetsov. Such a helicopter is essential for any naval strike group that leaves to "work" in a distant sea or ocean zone. And not in a single quantity.
With strikes against ground targets, everything is not easy either. For them, the Ka-52K is much better suited to the unarmored and flimsy Ka-27, or any modification of it, for example, the old Ka-29, which is still kept in the Navy.
But, as already mentioned, this helicopter is too specialized and it will not always be possible to sacrifice space in the hangar, which could be occupied by the modernized Ka-27, capable of performing ASW missions and striking surface targets, carrying people and cargo, rescuing those in distress and to land special forces in secluded corners of enemy territory. In principle, it is possible to use the Ka-27 for strikes on the shore. But for this, it will also have to equip it with a long-range anti-tank missile system "Hermes" and ensure interaction with UAVs, for example, of the "Orlan" type, the combat use of which the Navy has already practiced.
Otherwise, you should abandon helicopter strikes against coastal targets, and use naval artillery and cruise missiles for this, if possible. Although, if landing ships capable of carrying helicopters are involved in the operation, it will be quite possible to use them as well. Then the search and rescue missions will be assigned to the Ka-27, which are based on other surface ships, and the shock missions will be assigned to the Ka-52K from the landing ships. Currently, without taking into account the possible participation in the operations of "Admiral Kuznetsov", the Navy can provide combat use of four such helicopters from the landing ships of the "Ivan Gren" type, of which two can take off simultaneously. Everyone else will have to fly from warships or patrol ships.
It is of interest to add Project 22160 patrol ships to the combat group from the BDK. Not being useful in anything, these ships, nevertheless, can provide the basing of helicopters and UAVs "Horizon". True, there are no conditions for storing aircraft weapons in significant quantities on board, so to carry weapons they will have to fly to some other ship, which, of course, is terribly inconvenient, and to some extent shameful, but we have other ships in the amount you need is not there, so …
It is quite another matter when you need to attack targets on the coast not far from your territory. Then, the naval warships operating near the coast, in fact, will be for Ka-52K helicopters a kind of analogue of reserve airfields or jump airfields. Everything is already there for practicing this kind of action.
Let's summarize.
In order for shipborne helicopters to take on part of the tasks of naval aviation based on an aircraft carrier, when this very aircraft carrier is not, the Navy needs:
1. Upgrade the Ka-52K, bringing its performance characteristics to the originally desired (full-fledged radar).
2. To create a new version of the Ka-27 helicopter, similar in its capabilities to the American Sea Hawks - PLO, strikes against surface and coastal targets using anti-tank systems, strikes against surface targets using anti-ship missiles, transport and search and rescue missions, delivery of special forces groups to the shore and back. Such helicopters should be equipped with modern defense systems and sighting and search systems.
3. Create a modification of the trawl towing helicopter based on the Ka-27, and a trawl for it.
4. To produce a sufficient number of AWACS helicopters.
5. To work out the main possible scenarios for the combat use of naval helicopters in a naval war and to consolidate this development in the regulations.
All these tasks do not seem to be unsolvable.
The carriers of helicopters for various purposes in operations at the DMZ will be URO ships, amphibious assault ships and patrol ships (since they already exist).
In general, the Black Sea Fleet today is capable of deploying 4 helicopters on full-fledged URO ships (one on the cruiser Moskva and one each on three frigates of Project 11356) in the distant sea and ocean zones. A couple more helicopters can carry defective and non-combat patrol ships of Project 22160, and in a few years there will be six of them. Unfortunately, due to problems with speed, the "patrolmen" cannot operate in conjunction with full-fledged combat ships, but, nevertheless, we will fix an early opportunity for the Black Sea Fleet to deploy ten helicopters to the DMZ.
There are also five helicopter carriers in the Baltic Fleet - SKR Yaroslav the Wise and Project 20380 corvettes. temporary shelter. After the TFR "Fearless" is out of repair, one more carrier will be added, and approximately by the end of 2022, two more corvettes, in total there will be eight warships capable of carrying helicopters and ensuring their combat use, and one ship of limited suitability for this. Provided, of course, that one of the listed ships will not be undergoing another long-term repair.
In the Northern Fleet, the nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" (2 helicopters), the RRC "Marshal Ustinov" (1 helicopter), two BODs (4 helicopters in total), the frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" (1 helicopter) are in service. Soon, the Admiral Kasatonov will be added to them, with one more helicopter. There are two more BODs under repair, one of which, however, was stuck in repair for a very long time, and the nuclear cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" with a couple of seats.
After one BOD and Nakhimov are out of repair, it is possible to increase the total number of seats for helicopters to 13 units, with the BDK of project 11711, which can already be considered a fait accompli, 17, if by some miracle the Chabanenko is repaired, then 2 more, in total 19. This, of course, without Kuznetsov, which in theory, when bringing naval air regiments to the required level of combat capability, will solve the aviation problem much more efficiently.
In the Pacific Ocean there is the Varyag RRC, three BODs and two corvettes, which in total gives 9 helicopters, the Thundering helicopter, which is being handed over this year, will give one more helicopter, 10 in total. only 13, and by the end of 2022, three more corvettes will be added, this is another 3 helicopters and a total of 16 cars. Plus "conditional carrier" - EM "Fast".
We do not count the auxiliary fleet, although there are also ships with hangars there.
Is it a lot or a little?
The KUG, which has 16 helicopters, can provide continuous combat duty of one or two helicopters in readiness number 1 or in the air around the clock. As you can see, from the composition of the Navy it is quite possible to form a compound with so many helicopters and deploy it to any possible theater of operations.
How many ship-based helicopters can fight in modern warfare? The American experience of using helicopters from the decks of large ships, for example, UDC or aircraft carriers, is not applicable to us - we do not have such ships as theirs, and will not be in the foreseeable future. But there is also another experience. Deck helicopters based on URO ships fought quite successfully. And even if this experience is also American, but here it is, it is quite applicable to us. Let's analyze it.
Persian Gulf - 91
Preparing to repel an allied air offensive, the Iraqis decided to move their air defense systems forward into the sea, thus creating a defensive line outside Iraqi territory. The bulk of the air defense missile systems that were used for this task was concentrated on eleven offshore oil platforms of the Ad-Daura oil field southeast of Bubiyan Island, which, as it were, “closes” the sea approaches to the Iraqi city of Umm Qasr. Part of the air defense missile system was also located on two small islands south of Bubiyan - Karu and Umm al-Maradim.
These islands were captured by the Iraqis at the very beginning of their invasion of Kuwait. In addition to the fact that Iraqi reconnaissance posts and air defense positions were located on the islands and oil platforms, the channels between the Arabian Peninsula and Bubiyan Island were used by the Iraqi fleet for the relatively safe and covert movement of their ships. The Iraqi command planned that at the end of January 1991, tactical amphibious assault forces from the channels to the rear of the coalition forces defending Ras Khavji would contribute to a successful ground attack on this city. Several medium landing ships and speed boats were ready to carry out landing operations. Their cover, in addition to air defense systems on platforms and islands, was carried out by Soviet-built missile and torpedo boats, minesweepers and German high-speed patrol boats, which the Iraqis armed with Exocet missiles.
For additional protection of their fleet, the Iraqis deployed launchers of the Chinese anti-ship missiles "SilkWorm" on the coast, with well-prepared calculations. According to the Iraqi military, the coalition ships could not have done much damage to coastal defenses without entering the zone of destruction of these missiles.
In order for the plans of the allies to land in Iraq be realized, and the plans of the Iraqis to land at Ras Khavji and keep the coalition forces away from the Iraqi coast remained only plans, it was necessary to destroy all these forces.
Further actions in a sense are "model" for us. Should the Navy happen to fight somewhere far from its native shores, such solutions will be the only ones that are available to us due to our technical equipment. Of course, only if the type of helicopters and their performance characteristics are brought to the required level, and the pilots, technicians, ship crews and headquarters are properly trained.
On January 18, 1991, the aircraft of the coalition forces began to inflict massive bombing strikes on Iraq. The air defense systems installed by the Iraqis on two oil platforms and islands immediately "started talking". They did not manage to shoot down anyone, but they succeeded in getting in the way, and the problem had to be solved as quickly as possible.
On the same day, the US Army reconnaissance and forward guidance helicopter OH-58D Kiowa Warrier flew to the Oliver Perry-class frigate Nicholas (USS FFG-47 "Nicholas"), where it was ready for a combat mission against the coastal target SH -60B. At night, "Nicholas" approached the oil platforms at a distance that allows for artillery fire. Both helicopters were taken into the air. The Kiowa provided guidance and deployed two ATGMs, and the deck Sea Hawk delivered several precision strikes against the platforms with guided missiles. Several hits resulted in explosions of ammunition on platforms and the escape of Iraqi soldiers in a rubber boat.
"Nicholas", meanwhile, approached the platforms even closer, maintaining complete radio silence and opened artillery fire on the Iraqis, already "softened" by the attack from helicopters. While the frigate was firing, helicopters carrying Navy SEALs took off from several other ships and soon landed on the platforms. After a firefight that lasted for several hours, accompanied by shelling from a frigate, the Iraqis surrendered.
Next came the turn of the smallest island captured by Iraq - Karoo.
During the sortie of A-6 Intruder deck attack aircraft, the latter managed to sink an Iraqi minelayer, a minesweeper and a patrol boat near the island. Another minesweeper in the course of this attack was able to evade the attack aircraft, but "flew" into the Iraqi minefield and was blown up.
Soon, helicopters were lifted into the air to lift the survivors from the USS "Curts" from the water, but they were fired upon from the island and they could not get anyone out of the water. "Kurz" then began shelling the coast from its 76-millimeter paper, at the same time maneuvering so that it was as difficult as possible to reach it with return fire from the island. While this continued, another ship, the Spruance-class destroyer Leftwich, lifted a helicopter with another group of Navy SEALs, which, as in the case of the platforms, was landed under cover of artillery fire from a frigate. Soon the Iraqis surrendered on this island as well.
The third island - Umm al-Maradim, was captured by the marines who were on the ships of the amphibious formation going to Iraq.
Realizing that tactically the Iraqi forces could not resist the combined attacks of special forces and naval artillery, the Iraqis made an attempt to save their ships. The Iraqi navy infiltrated Umm Qasr. In the future, the Iraqis planned to flee to Iran, while the KFOR had to lay new minefields to protect the fleeing and then leave behind them.
On the night of January 28-29, the A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft and the E-2C Hawkeye AWACS aircraft detected the passage of many small targets to the northwest from Bubiyan Island along the southern edge of the swamps in the Shatt al-Arab delta. The targets were moving towards Iran. Later, the aviation identified them as Iraqi patrol boats. In reality, these boats were really there, but not only them - the entire Iraqi fleet fled to Iran.
The Coalition Surface Combat Commander deployed a detachment of forces against the Iraqis, which consisted mainly of Westland Lynx helicopters.
With some external fragility, this is a very serious combat vehicle. It was "Lynx", albeit retrofitted, that was the world's first serial helicopter, the speed of which exceeded 400 km / h. He was one of the first to perform the "loop".
It was "Lynx" that became the first combat helicopter in the world to use anti-ship missiles against a surface ship during the hostilities - on May 3, 1982, such a helicopter damaged the Argentine patrol ship "Alferez Sobral", hit by the "Sea Skewa" missile, with a missile strike.
To hunt the Iraqi fleet, the helicopters armed themselves with the same anti-ship missiles. Thus began one of the most famous naval events of the Gulf War - the Battle of Bubiyan, also sometimes called the "Hunt for Turkeys of Bubiyan". For 13 hours, British helicopters took off from ships, carrying anti-ship missiles on pylons.
Using guidance from aircraft and American R-3C Orion aircraft and SH-60V helicopters, the British reached the required launch line and used their anti-ship missiles against Iraqi ships. During the 13-hour operation, they struck 21 attacks on the Iraqi fleet. These helicopter strikes damaged 14 Iraqi ships of different types to the point of impossibility to recover: 3 minesweepers, 2 minesags, 3 high-speed boats armed with Exocet missiles, 2 Soviet-built patrol boats, 2 SDKs, 2 rescue ships. Canadian fighter-bombers CF-18 also contributed, and they also damaged (and in fact destroyed) several missile boats.
At the end of the battle, only a couple of Iraqi ships reached Iran - one KFOR and one missile boat. The Iraqi Navy has ceased to exist. And the main role in their destruction was played by helicopters.
In general, helicopters turned out to be the main force in the war at sea in the Persian Gulf. The commander of "surface combat operations" usually could count 2-5 British Lynx helicopters during the day, the main task of which was missile strikes against surface targets, from 10 to 23 American SH-60Bs, which were mainly used for reconnaissance, and as a secondary missions had guided missile strikes against surface targets and sea platforms, as well as army ON-58Ds in the amount of 4 units, which were used for night attacks on coastal objects (mainly on the islands) and platforms.
Despite the fact that these helicopters belonged to the US Army, thanks to the folding blades of the main rotor (like all US army helicopters), they were based on URO ships, like other helicopters. URO ships, in addition to being carried by helicopters, were themselves used in hostilities.
After the defeat at Bubiyan, helicopter operations from URO ships continued. Throughout February, the Kiowa and SiHoki carried out sorties from ships to reconnaissance and attack identified coastal anti-ship missile launchers. Once SH-60B was able to issue target designation for the use of anti-ship missiles to a Kuwaiti boat, which successfully destroyed an Iraqi ship. British Lynx helicopters also continued their sorties. On February 8, 1991 alone, they attacked and damaged or destroyed five Iraqi boats.
By the end of February, the Iraqi Navy was completely destroyed. The total number of ships, vessels, boats and watercraft that were hit by the coalition naval forces reached 143 units. A significant share in these losses was inflicted on the Iraqis by helicopters launched to the URO ships, and they also inflicted the highest one-time losses.
Comparing the forces and means that the allies used in the war at sea in the Persian Gulf in 1991, we can say that the tasks of the same scale for the destruction of surface forces and stationary facilities of the Russian Navy, even in its current state, could easily be fulfilled. Subject to the availability of competent command, and helicopters, modernized as indicated above.
Helicopters against the shore. Libya
The 2011 Libyan War, in which NATO crushed and plunged into chaos and savagery this once-thriving state, also became a landmark for helicopter gunships. NATO combat helicopters deployed at sea on landing ships made a certain contribution to the defeat of the Libyan government forces. France deployed 4 Tiger helicopters on the Tonner DVDKD (Mistral class), from which they made regular combat missions.
Similarly, Great Britain deployed five Apaches on the Ocean landing helicopter carrier. All sources note the modest contribution of helicopters to this war, if we assess them by the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy.
The sources, however, are disingenuous.
The fact is that one of the tasks of attack helicopters in Libya was to support "their" special forces. While the whole world was watching the staged popular uprising in Tripoli filmed by Al-Jazeera, in and around Tripoli fleeting, but fierce battles were going on between the defenders of Libyan statehood and NATO special forces. And the support of the attack helicopters was of great importance for the NATO "specialists". In addition, the statistics do not take into account strikes against dispersed infantry, against enemy units leading the battle, taking into account only the number of sorties against such targets, but not particularly mentioning the damage inflicted.
Proof that the helicopter operations in Libya were successful is that after the war, interest in strikes along the coast from ship-based attack helicopters increased dramatically.
Moreover, in contrast to the battles in the Persian Gulf in 1991, in Libya, NATO used specialized helicopters with army pilots against the "coast" in an organized manner. They were based on special landing ships, but on the scale in which they were used there, they could also fly from URO ships, which means that we also have the right to consider such operations as a model for study.
A little future
Britain intends to integrate Link16, an American interchange information system, into its army helicopters, and to increase the frequency of army Apache exercises from aircraft carrier ships. Even before the invasion of Libya, the British tried to conduct exercises to destroy speedboats going into a massive attack against a British surface ship. It turned out that the Apache is extremely successful in performing such a task, now Britain is intensifying the interaction between the fleet and army helicopters.
France is also not lagging behind, which also quite successfully used its "Tigers" in Libya.
Australia is closely watching the participants in the operation. The Australians have already begun practicing the flights of army attack helicopters from the UDC supplied by Spain. It is expected that the range of their application will be wider and wider.
At present, in the field of the combat use of army helicopters from ships, there are tendencies to increasingly increase the share of combat helicopters in the performance of the entire volume of strike missions along the coast. Also, the trend is the use of more and more advanced missile weapons, as well as the integration of UAVs and helicopters into a single strike complex.
And don't underestimate its capabilities.
As for the use of helicopters against surface warships, with the exception of Russia, this has become standard practice even for not very large and strong navies, not to mention developed fleets.
The Royal Navy of Great Britain, for example, received a significantly improved version of the Lynx helicopter - Wildcat, a very dangerous attack naval helicopter, which has both a perfect search and sighting radar, and an optoelectronic sighting system with a thermal imaging channel, capable of carrying and using as a small-sized multipurpose missiles with LMM "Martlet" with combined laser and infrared guidance, and anti-ship missiles "Sea Venom", which replaced the "Sea Skew".
The British, therefore, do not forget about their combat experience and continue to develop specialized anti-ship helicopters.
They are not alone. Many countries are developing the capabilities of their naval and anti-submarine helicopters to attack surface targets with missiles. We cannot be left behind.
Helicopters vs. Airplanes
Separately, it is worth dwelling on the issue of the air defense of the ship formation and the role of helicopters in it. It has already been said about AWACS helicopters, but the matter is not reduced to them, and here's why.
Until now, detection and classification of a helicopter hovering over the ground remains a huge problem for any radar station. Above water, this effect is even more pronounced, and makes it impossible to detect such a target in advance.
The reason is simple - the fluctuating surface of the sea gives such a chaotic signal "in response" that the radar of a fighter plane cannot pick out any stationary radio-reflecting object in the chaos of interference. A helicopter hovering over the water at low altitude is naturally invisible for a while, until the fighter plane gets too close to it. And then, the fighter will be able to detect the helicopter by the reflected signal from its rotating blades. The speed of movement of the helicopter blade at each moment of time is high enough for a "Doppler shift" to occur and the radar radio signal reflected from the blades returned back with a different frequency than the one that is reflected from the waves.
The trouble with the fighter is that a helicopter equipped with a modern radar will detect it much earlier. And this cannot be overcome.
Currently, there is no airborne radar in the world that would be located on a small fighter aircraft and would be able to detect a helicopter hovering above the water at low altitude from at least 45-50 kilometers
And it is not clear how it can be created, in any case, none of the radar manufacturers in the world has come close to solving the issue. At the same time, aircraft detection at the same and long ranges is not a problem for most radars, even outdated ones, and many of them can be used on helicopters as well. For example, the one that was originally planned for the Ka-52K.
In fact, under these conditions, it becomes possible to create an anti-aircraft barrier located far from the ship's group on the basis of helicopters. The combination of a full-fledged AWACS helicopter and combat helicopters carrying air-to-air missiles will allow relatively safe attack on enemy aircraft going to the KUG guidance, it will be able to evade the launched rocket. And if the combat helicopters themselves are equipped with full-fledged radars (which must be done), then they will do without the data of the AWACS helicopter, it will be enough just to warn that the enemy is "on the way", and they are guaranteed to catch him in a "missile ambush" - They will put you in a situation when a rocket swarm will suddenly fall on the drummer loaded with rockets and outboard tanks.
Naturally, this requires the armament of helicopters and air-to-air missiles. I must say that the West is actively engaged in this. So, Eurocopter AS 565 carries, among other things, Air-to-Air missiles, the Americans have been equipping the Cobras of the Marine Corps with Sidewinder missiles for a long time.
In comparison with advanced countries, we behave as always: we have good helicopters, we have good missiles, we have experience in using R-60 air-to-air missiles from helicopters, we have experience in integrating Mi-24 helicopters into the country's air defense system, and even according to a number of rumors, the only victory of the helicopter over a jet fighter in aerial combat was achieved on the Mi-24. And we cannot connect everything together. A full-fledged radar station separately, Ka-52K separately, air-to-air missiles separately. And so everywhere and in everything. It's just some kind of tragedy …
Of course, it may turn out that launching missiles from hover upward will be difficult. But this problem can be solved - we are not the first and we are not the last, the creation of a two-stage rocket with an accelerator on the basis of an "air-to-air" rocket - not Newton's binomial, and this has already been done in the world. There is no reason why Russia could not repeat this. At least there are no technical ones.
It is also unambiguous that multipurpose helicopters for the Navy must "be able" to use air-to-air missiles. After all, as it was said earlier, it will not always be possible to take Katrana with you on a military campaign.
We can only hope that common sense will prevail. In the context of the actual absence of its own aircraft carrier fleet and the absence of at least large landing ships such as the Mistral, the rate on helicopters has no alternative, just as there is no alternative and their basing on URO ships - there are no others, patrol and landing ships can be used only in conditions when you will not have to tear yourself away from anyone, and it is guaranteed. Nobody has promised us such a naval war and is not promising.
This means that you will first have to learn to act at the same level at which the West acted in its naval wars, and then surpass it.
Technically, we have everything for this, and the question is solely in desire.
However, we always have everything, not just helicopters, rests against just this.
